Film and Television: Starting from the Journey to Guandong

Chapter 143

In 1924, the previously described 9000-ton aircraft carrier project seemed to be progressing smoothly.

The landing system was successfully tested against fighters and torpedo bombers on a wooden simulation deck set up at an airport near Rome.

The Italian Navy also publicized the summer's exercises in newspapers, hoping to draw public attention to the aircraft carrier issue and the importance of the fleet's need for naval aviation support.

The exercise simulated escorting a convoy from Italy to Tobruk, and for the first time included Britain rather than France as the imaginary enemy.

But before the end of that year, there were new cuts in the Navy's budget, forcing the cancellation of the 9000-ton aircraft carrier project.

Undeterred by Mussolini's strong dissatisfaction, the Italian Navy proposed the same plan in 1925.

In addition (with the half-hearted support of the Italian Navy's top brass) Giuseppe Rota from the Naval Engineering Directorate proposed a design for a hybrid cruiser with a dock at the stern capable of accommodating four MAS boats.

However, at the meeting held on August 1925, 8, Mr. Mo personally vetoed these projects, allowing the Navy to order only two 11-ton treaty cruisers to counter the two ships of the same type that France had just ordered (a few weeks later, even These have been cancelled).

In 1926, Guidoni proposed an initial plan for a catamaran aircraft carrier (displacement 3500 tons, speed 33 knots).

这艘船反映了他在双体船和三体船方面的世界权威地位，但动力系统显然不切实际，由4台用于14节巡航的柴油机和96台用于高速航行的800马力菲亚特A.25航空发动机组成。

In the autumn of 1926, God closed another door, and the ongoing financial crisis (the worst since 1920) led Navigazione Generale Italiana to abandon the hull of the Caracciolo, which was still mothballed in the Bay of Baya. It was abandoned the following year.

The decision crushes any chance the Italian Navy had of realizing its aircraft carrier dream, at least in the short term.

After the first stop, the industrial restructuring of Italian shipyards resulted in a reduction in the number of slipways, with only three capable of building hulls over 200 meters in length: two at the Ansaldo Company in Genoa and one in Trieste.

In addition, Ansaldo Company actually only had one slipway with this capability, as evidenced by the delays in the construction of the two 1924-ton cruise ships Roma and Augustus from 1926 to 30000.

Occupation of the large slipway at the Italian shipyard between 1924 and 1932. The asterisk was the slipway reserved for the planned construction of the Argentine cruiser.

On December 1927, 12, the debate about aircraft carriers entered the government agenda again, appearing at a meeting between Balbo and the Naval Staff, and was adjudicated by Uncle Mo.

The Italian naval side was led by the young Rear Admiral Romeo Bonotti, up to that time Italy's most prominent supporter of aircraft carriers, having published articles in the "Rivista Marittima" magazine and newspapers.

He was also a brilliant theorist and had been appointed Vice Chief of Naval Staff six days earlier.

In this debate, Benotti fiercely defended his view that Italy needs a small aircraft carrier, similar to the 8000-ton aircraft carrier Dragonhead that Neon has just announced, to gain experience in the use of such warships.

Colonel Francisco Priccolo made a less convincing case for the Air Force.

In his speech, he claimed that the Mediterranean is a puddle for us, which made Balbo increasingly annoyed and scolded him with a sharp "Shut up, idiot!".

Regardless of whether Pricolo's choice of words was inappropriate, the outcome of the debate was already decided:

The Chief of the Naval Staff, over Benotti's protests, announced that the Italian Navy accepted the status quo.

In exchange for the postponement of the Brazilian aircraft carrier project to the next naval plan (this was the Italian Navy's first four-year plan, which lasted from 1927 to 1931), the Navy would immediately receive an order for two Zara-class heavy cruisers to ensure Before the last year of this plan, it will compete with the French Navy's future construction of 10000-ton cruisers.

During the negotiations, Balbo, over the objections of his air-rights advocates, agreed that the Navy would develop the long-desired torpedo bombers and eventually build an aircraft carrier (the carrier-based aircraft would be flown by Air Force pilots - a move that was inconsistent with the interwar period). British naval aviation was no different).

Finally arrived in 1932, after a four-year break.

The Navy proposed a new aircraft carrier project - this time a 16000-ton aircraft carrier plan designed by Giuseppe Vian of the Naval Engineering Bureau. Like Rota's earlier design, it retained the dock to accommodate the MAS boat.

Everything seemed to be ready for the final order to be placed on the ship. But fate once again played tricks on the Italian Navy.

圭多尼在1926年提出的33节，3500吨双体航母方案，动力系统由4台柴油机和96台菲亚特800马力航空发动机组成。

After years of economic growth (Italian GDP increased by 1920% between 1931 and 95), the global financial crisis of 1929 inevitably affected Italy.

They immediately cut the army budget, and the high-level needs of the Italian Navy were forced to give way to the traditionally more important Army.

The Army needs to spend twice the Navy's budget to maintain 30 divisions armed with weapons left over from World War I.

The Navy's need for aircraft carriers has also been hampered by the battle for supremacy among Italy's major shipyards.

Costanzo Ciano, then the second-in-command in the Italian regime, the MAS boat hero of World War I and the father of the future more famous and unfortunate Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, was the only person who had A senior naval officer who joined the fascist movement.

In the 1920s, he developed a close relationship with the Ansaldo Company.

With the advent of the budget crisis in 1931, Ciano secured an order for the Ansaldo Company for a 10000-ton cruiser, the Bolzano.

The latter design was modified from the Trento-class rather than the newer, more balanced Zara-class to ensure that no royalties were paid to Ansaldo's rival Otero Terni Orlando.

From 1929 to 1933, former army general Hugo Caballero served as the president of Ansaldo Company. He served as Minister of War and Mo's deputy in the War Department, which made the company's position almost impregnable.

Ansaldo Company received a small number of orders from the state at the right time to obtain funds, but at this time its competitor Trieste Technology Company had nothing to do. Only cranes and dredgers were working in the shipyard of Novo!

In this case, ordering an aircraft carrier from the Trieste shipyard (if this had been in the first months of 1932, it seemed possible to obtain sufficient funds) would be enough to satisfy Mr. Mo's constant claims of employment. balanced.

But Ansaldo's lobby group killed the aircraft carrier project that year, hoping to gain a near-monopoly in Italy's shipbuilding industry with its ally Fiat Group by annexing Trieste Technologies and its important machinery plant.

The Navy then urged the Air Force to reintroduce torpedo bombers.

Although Balbo agreed, the Italian Air Force generally believed that the torpedo bombers were a Trojan horse that would allow the Italian Navy to regain control of the bombing squadrons and perhaps, in the future, its original land-based aviation.

The Navy and Air Force subsequently conducted experiments in 1933-34 (which was interrupted in 1927-31), using several S.M.55 seaplanes and some old Austro-Hungarian torpedoes, but the results were not satisfactory and the performance of the torpedo bombers was The exploration was again fruitless.

In 1934, the Navy wanted to circumvent the Air Force's aircraft monopoly by purchasing some Cierva C.30 rotorcraft.

Tests in January 1935 on a wooden platform built on the cruiser Fiume achieved good results, even though the gyroplane's range and reliability prevented it from having any real military value.

The Navy subsequently purchased two other rotorcraft from the United Kingdom for further testing, and at the same time considered installing improved models on new 35000-ton battleships.

However, the staff of the Italian Air Force quickly ran to the Palazzo Venezia and declared to Uncle Mo that they had the monopoly on any kind of aircraft. Uncle Mo favored them as always.

The C.30 was delivered to the Italian Air Force as scheduled in September 1935, and crashed within two weeks due to a series of unfortunate accidents.

In January 1931, the Cierva C.1 rotorcraft flew on a wooden platform built on the cruiser Fiume.

The Air Force took control of these aircraft in September 1935, and both aircraft crashed within weeks, ensuring that they would never be carried on future 9-ton battleships.

Diplomatic incidents during the period of internal strife in the navy and air force made the development of aircraft carriers a top priority.

Britain and Italy were clashing over their policies on economic and colonial affairs, the first threat of confrontation between the two countries since 1925.

At that time, Britain could deploy six aircraft carriers, three of which were fast, and at least one was permanently stationed in the Mediterranean.

Due to the need for effective countermeasures, the Italian Navy's top brass planned to convert the large cruise ships Count of Savoy and Königs into fleet-type aircraft ejection ships that could carry 1931 water reconnaissance aircraft and fighter jets between 1934 and 30, and another 5 The smaller 14-knot postal cargo ships Aegean, Egypt, Ciudad Bari, Filippo Grimani and Piero Foscari were converted into escort aircraft catapult ships.

This approach was far from ideal, as merchant ships were unprotected, and by 1935 seaplanes were virtually useless against carrier-laden wheeled fighters, but it was the only option in the face of the perceived threats of the time.

In February 1934, under the leadership of the new Chief of Staff, Admiral Domenico Cavagnari, the growing East African crisis between Rome and London revived the Navy's interest in the aircraft carrier project.

He immediately rejected a project supported by the Italian Air Force to build a Chitose-class high-speed seaplane carrier similar to Neon's recently announced Chitose-class, equipped with two triple 55-caliber 152mm cannons at the front, because it was nothing more than a meter A 30-knot replacement for the Lalia.

Despite repeated objections from the Air Force, Cavagnari and much of his staff strongly advocated the construction of a true aircraft carrier.

The first thing to study was to convert the old dreadnoughts Doria and Durio into aircraft carriers.

However, because a similar previous Leonardo da Vinci modification project was canceled due to speed and hull structure problems, the admiral gave up this option within a week.

The Naval Staff then commissioned two aircraft carrier designs from Umberto Pugliese, who by now had firmly established his reputation in the military.

The initial plan had a displacement of 22000 tons and gave up the dock to accommodate the MAS boat.

However, Cavagnari correctly realized that Mohamed, who had been Secretary of the Navy since 1933, would veto the project because of the price.

Cavagnari felt that a similar 14000 ton project in Pugliese was the ideal solution.

This design was completed in July 1936 and was based on the USS Raider aircraft carrier.

After the battleship Littorio was launched in 1937, it could be built on the main slipway of the Ansaldo Shipyard.

In the late summer of 1935, as Italy's antagonism with Britain on the Ethiopian issue became increasingly serious, Cavagnari proposed that the cruise ship Roma be quickly converted into an emergency aircraft carrier.

Although she can only reach a speed of 21 knots with her original power, she can accumulate experience for the Navy's future construction of 14000-ton aircraft carriers, and assist the two older Doria-class battleships in defending the Gulf of Taranto against the British Mediterranean fleet.

At that time, the reconstruction of the two Cavour-class battleships was still in its early stages, and the new 35000-ton battleship would still take several years to enter service.

In 1936, the Navy studied a similar project to convert the cruise ship Augustus into another slow-speed aircraft carrier.

However, Cavagnari believes both designs are too vulnerable to underwater threats.

In the summer of 1936, Captain Luigi Cartonio, who had presided over the development of the Italian Navy's ejection system, completed a more ambitious design, modifying the Roma after the British aircraft carrier HMS Fury.

He designed a modernization plan for the Roma and Augustus based on the expected use of the new 1915-horsepower diesel engine proposed by Fiat's Turin factory in 18000 - which could increase the speed to 26 knots.

This improvement gave the Italian Navy a true fleet carrier rather than an auxiliary escort carrier.

The end result was that, although impressive on paper (it was planned to complete the conversion in just 12 months), the staff did not like the fact that the ships had no underwater protection.

This improved emergency aircraft carrier plan was shelved in the same year because Fiat declared that it could not complete the large diesel engine prototype promised that year - as a result, it failed to be delivered in 1937, 1938 and 1939.

Meanwhile, the Air Force's traditional opposition to naval aviation received a serious blow in August 1935, when Italian Air Force Chief of Staff Giuseppe Valle admitted at a cabinet meeting that his force was powerless against the British battle fleet unless volunteers were recruited. who rammed a British warship;

Even in the latter case, his short-range bombers that could only carry small bombs could not cause any damage to British warships.

The air force's incompetence gave Cavagnari the opportunity to state his demands to a stunned Mussolini: first, long-range land-based wheeled torpedo bombers - actually S.M.81 three-engine bombers, which Balbo approved on a large scale. The revolutionary bomber produced.

In November 1933, Balbo was dismissed and sent to Libya, where he became the new governor of the colony.

The second is the necessary fighter jets and single-engine torpedo bombers for the aircraft carrier.

In August 1936, the Italian-Egyptian War ended, and Italy resumed beneficial cooperative relations with Britain.

In April 1936, Mr. Mo held secret negotiations with the United Kingdom. In July, economic sanctions officially ended, the local fleet withdrew from the Mediterranean, and the United Kingdom suspended tariffs on Italian exports for one year.

This removes external incentives for effective naval and air force cooperation.

Although the Navy has already ordered fighter jets (Caproni Ca.165 biplane fighter) and torpedo bombers (replacing the Z.1012 business jet with a more powerful Isotta Frascini aircraft engine), at least in theory, Its performance is similar to that of Neon's Type 14000 carrier-based attack aircraft), but the hope of building a -ton aircraft carrier was dashed.

A plan proposed in 1936 to convert the Roma cruise ship into a high-speed "emergency" aircraft carrier.

However, Fiat failed to produce the required large-scale diesel engines before 1943, and the plan could only fail.

At this time, the needs of the recently conquered East African empire prompted Mussolini to make sweeping cuts to the military budget.

War Minister Ettore Baistrocchi immediately warned that if the plan to improve the three services was not prepared:

“Leader, you will lose the empire you won”;

Then he was fired for being outspoken.

The more diplomatic Cavagniari proposed in 1937 that the integration of the combat fleet and the future ocean-going light cruiser detachment deployed in East Africa would require two modern aircraft carriers.

But he was only allowed to continue research on the aircraft carrier (which raised the final displacement of the 1936 design to 15 tons).

In 1936, the development of land-based torpedo bombers also came to a standstill.

The Navy was pleased with the performance of the aerial torpedo prototype: it could be launched at an altitude of 100 meters and a speed of 300 kilometers per hour - both world records at the time.

Even the similar weapons used by the United Kingdom could not do it, but the Italian Air Force raised the requirements to 300 meters and 500 kilometers respectively. This rebuke kept the torpedo bomber trials going for another two years, and for pure publicity, one of the two S.M.81 prototypes was displayed at the Milan Air Show in December 1936.

Later, on August 1936, 8, a dozen SM.5 bombers piloted by Italian "Volunteers" repelled a group of Spanish Republican destroyers in the Strait of Gibraltar, damaged the Lepanto, and successfully covered a group of destroyers. An important national army fleet arrived safely in Spain from Morocco.

This operation was significant for strategic and propaganda reasons, since on September 1936, 9, the newly commissioned (only partially outfitted) heavy cruiser Canaria and light cruiser Severa were taken from the National Army. Before setting off from Vigo in the Atlantic Ocean and seizing control of the Strait of Gibraltar by sinking the Spanish Republican destroyer Admiral Fernandez, this was the only time that heavy weapons were provided to support the National Army on the other side of the strait.

This coup from Spain allowed the Air Force to re-establish its privileged position in the eyes of Mr. Mo, and this success was reinforced by Valais's dramatic demonstration of the prototype S.M.1936 dive bomber in December 12.

Uncle Mo believed that this was his key to dismantling the Mediterranean fleet in one day, young Galeazzo Ciano (himself a pilot, but not often on friendly terms with the navy, even though that was his father's profession ) recorded the incident in his famous diary.

There were no significant developments in 1937 and 1938.

During this period, Cavagnari gave a speech in the Senate, hinting to Uncle Mo that although the Italian Navy does not need aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, they are still indispensable outside the Red Sea and Gibraltar, and according to Uncle Mo’s imperial policy, the Italian Navy is expected to The Indian and Atlantic Oceans project military power.

Even so, the Navy's request for two 15000-ton aircraft carriers was rejected, and the torpedo bombers remained experimental curiosity; the only progress was the upgrade of the Roma cruise ship's emergency refit plan.

与此同时，意大利空军声称已于1937年5月21日在阿尔梅里亚港炸毁了西班牙共和军的无畏舰海美一世号（事实上，5架S.M.79轰炸机仅命中了几颗50千克炸弹，造成微不足道的损伤。

Haimi I sank on June 1937, 6, due to an accidental internal explosion).

However, despite launching hundreds of sorties between April and July 1938, the vaunted Italian bomber force failed to hit even a single Spanish Republic cargo ship at sea.

This defeat was coupled with the final success of Italian bombers in the Balearics in 1939 against merchant shipping and warships in the Spanish Republic's last port in the Mediterranean.

The Italian Air Force formulated new operational regulations for horizontal bombing of ships: using a large number of 50kg and 100kg bombs to cover anchor targets, because using larger and smaller quantities of 250kg, 500kg and 800kg bombs, in The hit rate at sea is almost zero.

Uncle Mo hoped that the new dive bomber introduced by the Air Force after March 1939 could be used as an effective anti-ship weapon; however, in actual use, the S.M.3 exposed a serious lack of power (during the war, this aircraft No attacks were carried out, forcing the Italian Air Force to purchase and operate Ju.85 dive bombers from Germany in September 1940).

Although this once again demonstrated the incompetence of the Air Force, Uncle Mo's confidence in the Air Force (which was his military policy until the autumn of 1940) did not change. '

During the Sudden Crisis, the Italian Navy considered converting the cruiser Bolzano (which the Navy called a "gorgeous mistake") into an aviation cruiser; she would retain the A and Y turrets, but the center hull would be The hangar and flight deck, along with an island, also have four catapults.

Used to catapult a dozen seaplanes, the carrier-based fighter was probably the Ro.51 (a modern fighter with a top speed of 480 kilometers per hour, the prototype of which crashed during a test flight in 1938 and was therefore never put into production).

After the crisis was resolved, the entire study was quickly dismissed.

In March 1939, the Navy once again proposed to order two 3-ton aircraft carriers as usual.

This time, the Air Force seemed inclined to accede to the Navy's demands due to their poor performance in the long-running dispute over aerial torpedoes.

In fact, the two latest 35000-ton battleships, Roma and Empire, were scheduled to be launched at the end of 1939 and in the spring of 1940. The slipways vacated after their launch could be used to build aircraft carriers.

The hard currency crisis of 1939 resulted in the Italian Navy operating only two Costanzo Ciano-class cruisers.

However, the general consensus remained that the carriers would be ordered the following year and commissioned in 1943 and 1944 respectively.

The Danzig crisis and the subsequent outbreak of war prompted Cavagnari to initiate a plan to convert the cruise ship Roma into an emergency aircraft carrier.

根据1936年卡托尼奥的设计，海军于1939年9月11日从纽约召回了她，并打算在12个月内完成改装工座。

However, the long-awaited Fiat large diesel engines were still not available (they were not ready until the spring of 1943); therefore, in October 1939, the Roma project was placed on a lower priority list, later due to the Italian " "Non-belligerent" neutrality is suspended.

In September 1939, Valais once again showed his nervousness, publicly admitting that the air force was unable to take effective action against the British and French battle fleets. Afterwards, the torpedo bomber problem seemed magically solved and they ordered two wings (totaling about one hundred S.M.9 torpedo bombers) of torpedo bombers for the Italian Air Force;

At the same time, the Air Force placed an order for the first Caccia Marittima (a naval fighter aircraft, the last of which had been stationed in the Dodecanese Islands since September 1931, equipped with slow Ro.9 seaplanes and finally disbanded in June 44). 1941 Caproni Vizzola F.6 carrier-based fighter aircraft were batched, and the radio systems required for the Navy's future slow aircraft carriers were specified and procured to facilitate their control.

Valle was criticized for some inappropriate remarks (most importantly, his later support for General Alberto Pariani, Undersecretary of War and Chief of Staff of the Army, who had advocated taking advantage of the situation before the concentration of British troops in the Middle East began in February 1939). launched a surprise attack on Egypt), leading to his removal from the cabinet by the powerful centrist wing of Foreign Minister Ciano.

His successor, Francesco Priccolo, was a protégé of Ciano, a fervent enemy of naval aviation since the 1920s and the man who made the infamous "Mediterranean watering hole" argument in the crucial aircraft carrier debate of 1927. The proposer, with shrewd operations, was able to quietly reverse the development momentum of the entire naval aviation.

First, he assigned the F.5 fighters (delivered in August 1940) to the "Defense of Rome" mission, as they were the only Italian Air Force fighters equipped with radios.

Then, on November 1939, 11, he appointed Francesco Marini to fill the vacant post of commander of the Aviazione della marina (the air force's seaplane unit) (after an eight-year vacancy!).

In late March 1940, as the threat of war increased day by day, the Italian Navy began to mobilize, which prompted Cavagnari to once again request that Roma be refitted.

不过，此时这艘邮轮正搭乘着数千名犹太乘客逃离欧洲，由于1940年3月1日后英法实施了更加严格的封锁，她直到1940年6月5日才返回意大利。

However, the refit work expected to be carried out at the Ansaldo shipyard in Genoa never started because Fiat's diesel engines were far from ready.

They abandoned the entire project within weeks, believing the war would be over in three months (not to mention the Air Force's ongoing lack of enthusiasm for the matter).

It was the Battle of Calabria on July 1940, 7. On the one hand, it was the obvious failure of the Italian Air Force bombers, and on the other hand, the threat posed by the Swordfish torpedo bombers taking off from the Eagle aircraft carrier and land-based airports, which allowed the navy to break through. Pricolo's psychological defense and gets:
-

A small squadron of S.M. 79 torpedo bombers enters service;-

Increase the number of reconnaissance flights. There were too many false alarms and undetected enemy warships by reconnaissance aircraft in June and July;-

Re-open the aircraft carrier's files;-

It is proposed to develop a new helicopter for anti-submarine warfare under the supervision of the Navy, which can also be used to support mountain troops.

In order to meet the needs of the Navy immediately, Cavagnari proposed the emergency conversion of the 50 gross ton cruise ships Königs and Count of Savoy.

These giant ships can reach speeds of up to 27 knots. They only need to build a flight deck and a small ship island to fight with the combat fleet. Even though they lack underwater protection, they still need to solve the many logistical needs that these ships inevitably bring. .

However, the "enormous economic value" of the ships triggered strong protests from the fascist Merchant Marine Minister Horst Ventura and the shipping lobby, who vetoed the proposal that same month.

The Navy subsequently studied the conversion of the battleship Empire into an aircraft carrier, and a model of one proposed conversion can be seen in the Venice Naval Shipyard Museum.

In October 1940, just before the Rome cruise ship was refitted according to the "slow" plan of 10, the Air Force announced a news that surprised the Navy. The best they could do was to provide a newly designed sea fighter, which is still in use today. Prototype stage for wind tunnel testing;

No fighter or attack aircraft were provided for carrier use because they lacked the experience and research necessary for a monoplane equipped with folding wings.

In November 1940, the Italian Navy suffered a heavy blow from carrier-based torpedo bombers at Taranto, and the subsequent Battle of Cape Spadivento (although the attack by the Swordfish torpedo bombers on the Ark Royal did not achieve results, but Still impressive), forcing Cavagnari to petition Uncle Mo again.

However, on December 1940, 12, Cavagnari's briefcase contained an urgent memorandum recommending the rapid refit of the Count of Savoia, but the leader dismissed him because he was "too annoying in the navy." ".

Afterwards, the leader appointed Cavagnari's old enemy Arturo Riccardi to succeed him, who firmly believed that the protection of merchant shipping routes was the key to victory.

Riccardi was shrewder than his predecessor, abandoning the Count of Savoy aircraft carrier project and focusing on the Roma cruise ship.

The real issue was speed, and his idea was to use the power systems of two Roman Archon-class light cruisers (from Cornelius Sulla and Paulus Aemilius), the latter of which was being built It was suspended in June 1940 when Italy entered the war.

The proposal was made in January 1941 by Giuseppe Bozzoni and Carlo Sigismondi from the Naval Engineering Directorate.

However, the Air Force said that month that they would not be able to deliver a monoplane fighter or attack aircraft with folding wings within two years.

This, combined with their refusal to think in terms of a protracted war, brought the project to a standstill.

At the end of March 1941, the Italian fleet headed by the Vittorio Veneto unwisely entered Cretan waters.

Then suffered air attacks, culminating in a catastrophic defeat near Cape Matapan at night.

The impact of this naval battle caused another turning point in the Italian Navy's aircraft carrier plan.

Uncle Mo publicly supports the modification of the Roma cruise ship.

In June 1941, after hopes for a quick solution to the war in the Mediterranean were dashed, the project was proposed again with the support of the new Italian Chief of Staff, Ugo Cavaleiro, who had also been the president of Ansaldo ten years earlier.

Although the aircraft carrier plan was supported by the war situation and influential people at this time, Pricolo continued to protest that the modification would take too much time and that Italy's current technical level could not allow aircraft to land on the aircraft carrier.

The only thing that could be done was to eject the aircraft using the catapults that the Italian Navy had been using since 1925 for sea reconnaissance aircraft.

Despite repeated delays by the Air Force, under Caballero's guidance, they finally approved the Navy's aircraft ejection ship project on July 7 and received Caballero's blessing.

The delivery time specified in the contract is after 12 months.

Then the Navy discovered that it had no aircraft elevator design suitable for an aircraft carrier, only an elevator designed more than a decade ago for the Zara-class cruiser.

Since there were so few aircraft that could be parked on the flight deck (10 Re.2000 fighters, an improved version of the Wilsky P-35 fighter), the only option was to respectfully go to the Germans.

It is understood that the elevators on the unfinished aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin have undergone a large number of simulation tests.

After Italy's visit to Germany in September 1941, the German navy provided more than expected assistance; the Germans not only shared all the (more sparse) information on the aircraft carrier that they had obtained from Britain in 9 and later from Neon; All materials had been built (flight deck, catapults, landing arresters and two elevators), which was scrapped in 1936.

This once-in-a-lifetime opportunity prompted Riccardi to request the construction of a real aircraft carrier rather than a simple aircraft ejection ship, although the completion date would inevitably be delayed until 1943.

Cavaleiro agreed, and in November 1941 persuaded Mussolinipp to sack Riccolo.

This final outcome had more to do with the personal rivalry between the two generals as they both yearned for their leader's favor than with the final outcome of a bitter struggle between the Air Force and the Navy.

However, to the delight of the Navy, the new Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force, Rino Corso Forgier, advocated for the first time since 1926 the establishment of an effective partnership between the two services, despite repeated resistance from his own staff.

The question now is whether there will be enough time to seize the opportunity when it comes again.

In November 1941, the refitting of the liner Roma began in Genoa and progressed rapidly, incorporating practical ideas such as the use of concrete as an underwater defense system (a more effective remedy than originally anticipated);

The flight deck is clad in teak and mahogany, all of which were taken from the original cruise ship.

Genoa had not been bombed since February 1941, but in November 2, British Air Force bombers raided the shipyard in the middle of the night. Fortunately, the Skyhawk only suffered some minor damage to the deck.

The Italian Navy learned its lesson and converted the hull of the unfinished light cruiser Cornelius Sulla into a camouflaged aircraft carrier.

However, the huge difference in length between the two ships made this ruse less effective, but it gave rise to rumors of the Sulla carrier conversion project, first seen in the 1945 edition of Jane's Ship Yearbook and followed by many historians Also mentioned.

In 1942, Italy's first true aircraft carrier project continued and was renamed Aquila in February 1942, which led the Italian Naval Staff to decide to requisition Rome's sister ship Augustus.

The original idea was to convert it into a similar ship called Falcon, but at this time the Germans were reconsidering their aircraft carrier project and refused to provide additional materials. The Italian Navy instead chose to convert it into a simple large escort. aircraft carrier.

In 1943, the latter was renamed Harrier to avoid confusion with the original design.

It was based on an old project from 1935, but used an island and a traditional flight deck instead of the original layout of a long, narrow catapult at the bow.

Since modern fighter jets cannot take off and land on such an aircraft carrier, the carrier-based aircraft planned to be equipped with the Harrier is the Ro.63 short take-off and landing reconnaissance aircraft.

It is similar to Germany's famous Fi 156 "Stork" and will be used to perform anti-submarine missions.

At the same time, the Ugly case has caused the Italian Navy to start a craze for escort aircraft carriers, and is considering using the modern naval oil tanker Strooper (19.641 gross tons, speed 14 knots), as well as two similarly faster civilian ships of the Italian Petroleum Corporation. The oil tankers Giulio Giordani and Sergio Raggi (both ships 10.500 gross tons, speed 16 knots) were converted into escort carriers.

However, this plan was only a preliminary study, because at the end of 1942, North Africa's transportation lines urgently needed high-speed oil tankers, and it was difficult for Italy to afford such a luxury.

Enthusiasm for the pursuit of aircraft carriers began to spread, and the staff even began to convert the damaged cruiser Bolzano into another aircraft ejection ship.

On August 1942, 8, the cruiser was damaged by a British submarine off Panarea Island.

This idea was based on the fact that the Bolzano's hull and rear propulsion were still intact.

She was repaired in Naples in the autumn of 1942, and then went to La Spezia to continue repairs.

However, this proposal was quickly abandoned as the Navy's first choice was to convert the cruiser into a flat-deck light aircraft carrier.

In December 1942, the Navy considered carrying out the same modification on the French cruiser Foch.

After the French fleet scuttled on November 1942, 11, the cruiser sank in the port of Toulon.

In January 1943, although Operation Torch had begun, the Italian Navy still maintained an optimistic attitude.

The successful holding of the Tunisian beachhead, the successful withdrawal of German and Italian mobile forces from Egypt, and the botched performance of British and American forces in Tunisia's attempt to capture Pesetha.

Germany successfully convinced Mussolini and the Italian army that it was possible to counterattack Morocco the following summer.

According to this forecast, the Italian Navy would escort convoys sailing along the Algerian coast, while the combat fleet would block the Strait of Gibraltar in 1944 and 1945, thus requiring the support of aircraft carrier forces.

However, these wishful thinking ended in early March 1943, and the failure of the offensive in Algeria showed that all the Axis forces in North Africa could do was hold on as long as possible.

(End of this chapter)