Film and Television: Starting from the Journey to Guandong

Chapter 154

Logistics determines how far you can go in the war, and strategy determines your destiny.

Looking at the major powers in the second station, France is the first and only major country in the alliance camp to suffer the fate of annihilation.

This unfortunate encounter was the third catastrophic event that France in the post-Napoleonic era suffered after the disastrous defeat and the disastrous victory in the Franco-Prussian War.

As a result, the Third French Republic collapsed, and its painstakingly managed Maginot Line became a laughing stock in the world.

It is precisely because France suffered such a disastrous defeat in the 1940 battle that few future generations have tried to stand in France's position and explore the deep planning behind the Maginot Line.

Although "The Collapse of the Third Republic" written by William Shirer has the grandeur of an epic poem, the author has no real knowledge of military matters and can only speak in general terms. There are small details, but there are big principles, the place of life and death, and the way of survival. Then it is not seen.

In addition, because of the influence of Liddell Hart (who was regarded as the Clausewitz of the 20th century and the "Pope of Military Theory"), strategy theorists often attributed the French defeat to the German army's clever bypass of Maginot. line of defense;

Weaponists are content to use the difference between concentrated and decentralized use of tanks to explain the defeat of the French army and the victory of the German army;

Spiritualists were keen to denounce the low morale of the French army and the constant political disputes at the top. In fact, these are just clouds that obscure the view, and the secret is not seen.

After the world has ridiculed the Maginot Line for 70 years, no one has raised such a question:

At one stop, the German troops operating according to the Schlieffen Plan did not place their main attack direction on the French-German border, but on the Belgian corridor in the north.

One stop later, the German General Staff's concept of operations against France was still based on the realization of the Schlieffen Plan.

The judgment of the British and French coalition forces also believed that the direction of Belgium was most likely to become the main war zone.

Throughout the 30s, Belgium repeatedly called on the French army to strengthen fortification projects in this direction.

In this case, in line with the principle of "attacking the enemy rather than defending it, defending the enemy must attack", if the French army is superstitious about the power of defense and believes that it must rely on not breaking the defense line to defeat a new round of German invasion, and knowing that its resources are limited, it should build the defense line at The Franco-Belgian border in the northeast should never be built on the Franco-German border in the southeast, a secondary direction where it was known that no main enemy force would attack.

Could it be that the top brass of the French military are more stupid than we previously thought? Of course not, on the contrary, there is a French-style painstaking effort hidden here.

To understand this, we need to extend the scope of history and stand at the level of grand strategy rather than technology and tactics, so that we can get to the point.

When it comes to the history of the European powers' struggle for hegemony over the past 1500 years, what I have to say is naturally the struggle for hegemony between Britain and France.

Some even say that after removing the content about how the British dealt with the French and the French dealt with the British, there will not be much content left in the history of European international relations.

Obviously, the struggle between Britain and France for hegemony is a bright line in the history of European international relations.

There is a hidden thread behind it - the competition between France and Germany, but it is often forgotten by the world.

Due to their geographical location, France and Germany are natural geographical competitors.

As a peninsular country, France has two strategic fronts: sea and land, so it often faces the crisis of fighting on two fronts.

Fortunately, Germany was only a geographical concept for a long time, which allowed France to compete with Britain with all its strength.

Precisely because they have seen this fact, French strategists since Richelieu have all regarded maintaining the division of Germany as their number one strategic task.

Having also seen this fact, Britain has long used Prussia as its European iron fist to contain France and Russia.

However, since the Napoleonic Wars, France has been far behind the German states led by Prussia in terms of population, industrial growth, and the pace of military transformation.

The Franco-Prussian War is a clear example of this long-term historical gap: in a war fought alone, France had no chance of winning.

It is worth noting that the main battlefield of this war was near the French-German border, and the battle of Sedan, which ultimately determined the outcome, took place against the Belgian border.

It was this national border that caused the French army to lose room for maneuver, allowing Moltke to adjust his deployment and conduct an outstanding external encirclement.

The source of all this is that this is a war that only occurs between France and Germany, rather than a multinational and multilateral alliance war.

With the glorious victory in 1870, Germany achieved historic unification, and France's Eastern Policy collapsed.

But at the same time, Germany's rise was so rapid that it began to have a profound impact on the traditional power structure of Europe. In particular, William II's immature foreign policy intensified the fear of Germany by the great powers such as Britain and Russia.

Realizing that it could no longer defeat Germany independently, France took advantage of the situation and finally weaved a huge encirclement against Germany step by step.

While achieving a great diplomatic victory, the French army made serious technical and tactical mistakes.

The French army forgot Clausewitz's teachings that defense is always a stronger way of fighting. It also ignored the development of automatic firearms and failed to see that the tactical defense system during World War I was particularly overwhelming compared to the tactical attack system. Advantage.

The French army, which was too superstitious about offensiveism, shed a lot of blood and paid a large number of meaningless casualties. It was not until the moment when it was exhausted and the demographic structure was imbalanced that it suddenly woke up to this fact.

At the same time, World War I was another general war with huge destruction.

Northeastern France, the main battlefield, is the heartland of French industry.

Unfortunately, at the beginning of the war, the German army took the lead here.

Since then, the two sides have launched a series of offensive and defensive battles, leaving France's heart scarred.

For France, World War I was a tragic victory with profound lessons.

France could no longer afford a similar "victory," let alone a defeat.

Therefore, French senior leaders came to the following conclusion based on a deep reflection on history:

1. In future wars, efforts should be made to avoid a one-man showdown with Germany, but to form an alliance war situation in which multiple powers attack Germany together, with special emphasis on the alliance with Britain.

2. Future wars will be more destructive. We must try our best to conduct battlefields outside national borders, and we must especially try our best to avoid fighting near the Northeast Industrial Zone.

3. The future war will still be a war dominated by defense, so we must try our best to give full play to our defensive advantages.

Regardless of whether the French army's judgment is right or wrong, it is obvious that there is some contradiction between the second and third items.

Because under normal circumstances, only offensive operations can expand the battlefield beyond national borders.

Therefore, what France needs to consider is how to combine the tactical advantages of defense with the strategic advantages of attack, and carefully choose the direction and timing of advancement.

The first one is difficult to do.

Because it was not just France that reaped the bitter fruits of the tragic victory that year, the British Empire was also one of them.

Therefore, many British strategists, including Liddell Hart, clamored to abandon continental responsibilities, opposed the establishment of a large-scale army, and no longer participated in wars on the European continent. The British people continued to set off an anti-war wave.

In the realist camp, there are many voices who believe that the German threat has gone far away, and now we should be wary of the new Napoleonic Empire.

At this time, the British government will inevitably look forward and backward and have many concerns when formulating its European policy.

However, the Third French Republic actually took into account the above three aspects at the same time, forming a new strategic situation. The key to its success lay in the construction of the Maginot Line.

The Maginot Line was first of all a return to the principle of defensive dominance. More importantly, the reason why it was built on the French-German border was to force the German army to restart the Schlieffen Plan in the future.

If the war starts on the border between France and Germany, it is likely to become a purely Franco-German war.

France has little chance of winning such a war, whether it is protracted or quick.

However, if the German army is forced to restart the Schlieffen Plan, it will trample on the sovereignty of the Low Countries and threaten the security bottom line of the British Empire. Only in this way can it hope to turn the Franco-German war into an anti-German alliance war.

On the contrary, if France builds its defense line on the Franco-Belgian border, it will not only cross the industrial elite area, but also force the German army to attack from the south.

This is not conducive to France's diplomatic goals. What's more, the soil in this area is soft and it is not convenient to build heavy concrete fortifications.

By the spring of 1938, the Committee for the Defense of the British Empire had realized that the weakened state of the Franco-Belgian border was a "deliberate inducement" to "force us to defend an area which for centuries we had regarded as crucial." Intervention on land”.

Therefore, while France spent huge sums of money to build the Maginot Line on the Franco-German border, it also formed elite field corps (the 1st Army and the 7th Army) for fighting in the Franco-Belgian border area.

Once the German army crosses the Derby border, the field group will quickly move forward together with the British Expeditionary Force, enter Belgium, and seize favorable terrain along the Dale River to form a solid defense line.

In this way, Belgium will be divided into two and become the main battlefield of the next war.

The British and French forces will form a solid defensive front from Belgium to the French-German border, locking the German army's maneuver space.

Then, the war will enter a protracted state, and Britain will take advantage of its sea power to let Germany gradually bleed to death.

The victory at one stop would be repeated, but the price paid by the British and French forces would be greatly reduced.

If the Mao Xiong takes the opportunity to launch operations in Eastern Europe, the Third Reich will be defeated even more quickly.

Of course, there is no perfect defense line since ancient times, and this time is no exception. The Maginot Line has two major flaws, but France has found ways to deal with them.

The first flaw exists at the national strategic level. After World War I, in order to contain Germany, France not only blocked the merger of Germany and Austria, but also fostered a large number of new countries between Germany and Russia.

Among them, Poland is a hardcore anti-Soviet and anti-German country. France attaches great importance to alliance with Poland to form a flanking attack on Germany.

However, the construction of the Maginot Line meant that once the German army attacked Poland, the French army would be unable to provide effective assistance.

On the contrary, if the German army attacks France, relatively weak Poland will be required to launch a diversionary attack.

It can also be said that the alliance between France and Poland is an alliance without responsibility for France and a high-risk alliance for Poland.

Fortunately, most of Poland's top leaders are foolhardy people who have long pursued offensive defense and are willing to take alliance risks.

Uncle Xi saw through this, so he wanted to defeat Poland before the war started on the Western Front.

"Otherwise, Poland will definitely take advantage of our fighting on the western front to launch a surprise attack on our rear."

Actual combat proved that the French army was really unwilling to cross the Maginot Line to attack Germany, so Poland was wiped out without any suspense.

For France, this result is regrettable, but it is still an affordable loss.

France was confident that as long as Britain entered the war, it could still defeat Germany.

The second flaw exists at the operational level.

At the junction of the French army's northern and southern defense lines - the Ardennes-Meuse-Sedan area, there is a relatively fragile defensive gap, and the combat effectiveness of the French army here (the 2nd and 9th Group Armies) is also relatively weak.

However, in the eyes of the French army's top brass, this area was more like a carefully dug trap than a flaw.

First of all, from the perspective of large corps movements, internal combustion engine mobility at that time could only play a role at the operational and tactical levels, and strategic mobility still relied on the railway system.

The Ardennes area is far away from the railway hub and is rugged and difficult to navigate, making it extremely inconvenient for large corps to enter and exit.

Secondly, even if the German army makes a surprise attack and suddenly concentrates its armored spearheads to cross the Ardennes area in the early stages of the war, it will then hit the natural barrier of the Meuse River. The French army has deep ditches and high forts here to wait for it, and the German heavy artillery and baggage , infantry units found it difficult to keep up in time.

The result was that the German army would be at a standstill for five to six days before the Meuse River.

This time was enough for the British and French forces to mobilize reinforcements from the west, north and south to launch a devastating counterattack against the German army.

As a counterattack fist, the French army deployed a powerful 21st Army south of Sedan, including the 3rd Reserve Armored Division, 3rd Light Mechanized Division, and 5th Light Cavalry Division, with strong counterattack capabilities.

Among them, the 3rd Reserve Armored Division has 4 tank battalions (two of which are heavy tank battalions), 1 towed artillery regiment, and also equipped with truck-mobile mechanized infantry. It is a force that cannot be ignored.

When necessary, the coalition forces can also deploy fresh troops from the north and west for reinforcements.

This gap can be regarded as a meat grinder. Once the German army gets in, it will face the river with its back to the dead ground. If it advances, it will be defeated by the Allied forces, and if it retreats, it will collapse.

Therefore, no one from the French army veteran Marshal Pétain to the commanders of the forward group armies believed that there was a fatal threat in the direction of the Meuse River.

Ang Qijie, the commander of the 2nd Army, even hoped that the stupid German army would launch the main attack here.

What’s more interesting is that “experts all agree.” Before the second station, this was not only the conclusion of the French army, but also the consensus of the elites of the German General Staff.

This is why the top brass of the German army have always opposed offensive operations on the Western Front. Until the eve of the war, the famous German general Bock still insisted on opposing the main attack direction in the Ardennes area, because it was too obvious a trap.

When Mr. Xi insisted on attacking on the Western Front, the General Staff had no choice but to bite the bullet and go back to the old path of the Schlieffen Plan, hoping to take advantage of the operational and tactical mobility advantages of the German armored forces to form a solid defense line in Belgium before the British and French coalition forces. Having previously achieved a breakthrough into the industrial regions of northeastern France, it then switched from offense to defense, awaiting a political solution. Because there is really no other way to go.

Uncle Xi, who has always pursued complete victory, was very dissatisfied with this plan.

In early November 1939, he pointed to the Ardennes area on the map and asked: "Can we attack from here?"

Neither the General Staff Headquarters nor the Army Headquarters dared to neglect this proposal, which was full of head-of-state intuition. They quickly consulted relevant experts.

After learning that armored forces could pass through this area, they prepared to revise the original plan to a limited extent and add an assist operation mainly relying on armored forces in the Ardennes area to coordinate with the main offensive in the north and strive to break through the Dale River defense line as soon as possible.

But what are the chances of this plan succeeding? There is widespread pessimism within Germany.

Although the French army did not know the specific plans of the German army, they were convinced that the strategic situation they had painstakingly managed was indestructible.

It was with such a high degree of confidence that the French army ushered in the Battle of the Western Front in 1940.

When the battle began on May 1940, 5, there was an atmosphere of calm among the coalition forces.

The commander-in-chief of the coalition forces, Gan Molin, walked back and forth in the headquarters in a high-spirited manner and even hummed a military song. He was confident that "I will catch them."

One witness said he had never seen Gamelin so happy and uplifted.

The French Minister of War expressed deep trust in Gamelin: "Everything is under Gamelin's control, and he is putting the plan into action."

A certain French general said happily: "This is the moment we have been looking forward to for a long time."

Even the sudden appearance of the German armored corps in the Ardennes did not make the French military leaders at a loss, because everything was expected. Some senior French generals even expressed the thought that "I didn't expect the Germans to be so stupid." idea.

When the third day of fighting ended, the German forwards in the Ardennes direction had swept through the French outposts east of the Meuse River and on the edge of the Ardennes region, and successfully reached the banks of the Meuse River.

This is exactly the same as the German army's pre-war predictions, and the same as the French army's pre-war predictions.

Although the French army encountered a surprise attack in the outpost battle, the remaining troops successfully withdrew to Hexi and blew up all the bridges.

On the evening of that day (May 5), George, the commander-in-chief of the French Northeast Theater, came to the following conclusion: The defense of the entire Meuse River defense line seemed to have been completely consolidated.

The fierce fighting in the north gave the coalition forces a sense of reassurance.

5月12日、13日，在开阔的比利时平原上，法军的两个轻机械化师（轻机2师、轻机3师）和德军的两个精锐装甲师（装3师、装4师）展开激战。

Although later historians overwhelmingly admitted that the German army was ahead of the French army in the pace of military transformation, and the German armored divisions were far superior to the French light mechanized divisions. Unfortunately, the battlefield space was limited, and the French army was extremely proficient in delayed dogfights.

As a result of the battle, the advance of the German armored divisions slowed down significantly.

The six main divisions of the French 1st Army successfully arrived at the line of Dell River and began to build a defensive line.

The remnants of the Belgian army, which had suffered a complete defeat in the border battle, were able to break away from the German army and go to the Dale River to join the main force of the coalition forces.

When the setting sun disappeared between heaven and earth on May 5, it seemed that everything was developing according to the French army's expectations, and the German army was about to suffer the most disastrous defeat since Jena.

However, in fact, on the afternoon of the 13th, the situation had already taken a turn for the worse.

The top brass of the French army were calm because they did not learn in time about the drastic changes taking place on the front line.

What happened that afternoon and over the next few days was like an irresistible spell cast upon a mortal being.

The German troops in the Ardennes area did not pause, and on the afternoon of the 13th, they forcibly crossed the Meuse River while marching.

After crossing the river, there was no pause again, but straight into the heart of France at an alarming speed.

The speed of its advance was so alarming that the French army who were ordered to block it discovered time and time again that the blocking line had long been broken through by the Germans!

Because he did not receive the battle report from the Meuse River line in time, George still maintained blind optimism until the evening of the 13th. However, by the next morning, with the arrival of the battle report, this optimism disappeared.

General Beaufort, who would become a famous strategist in the future, was just an ordinary staff officer at that time.

On May 5, he accompanied Gamelin's chief of staff, General Du Mengke, to the Northeast Theater Command, and was fortunate enough to witness a historic scene: "The room was dark, and the atmosphere was like a family of a dead person keeping vigil. Only a certain The sound of someone talking on the phone broke the silence.

The chief of staff (General George) fell into his chair dejectedly. George faced Dumanque with a pale face and shouted sadly: 'Our Sedan defense line has been breached! The army has collapsed! ’ He sat down, choked with sobs. "

Panic quickly spread. Paris, which had been peaceful and peaceful, suddenly had an atmosphere of war.

In just one hour, taxis and buses were all gone, commandeered to evacuate refugees and transport troops, while private car owners desperately tried to escape from what seemed like an imminent fall.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the lead in burning documents. "Documents and files poured down from every window. Sailors from the Maritime Ministry abandoned the documents of the Ministry into the sea, and panicked staff hurriedly threw the papers into the firewood pile. The fire pile burned all day long, and the charred fragments Floating among the astonished passers-by.”

Gan Molin tried his best to stay calm, but couldn't find a way to make a comeback.

How did the German army turn the Ardennes' dead end into a way to break the deadlock? Why did all the precautions taken by the French army fail? What happened on the Meuse River on May 5th and 13th?

Regarding this series of questions, the people who were involved in the situation back then were certainly in a fog.

More than 70 years later, in fact, few people still know the truth about the drastic changes on the Western Front.

Gamelin despondently concluded to British Prime Minister Churchill who rushed over: "Quantity is not as good as the enemy's, quality is not as good as the enemy's, and skill is not as good as the enemy's."

However, in addition to a slightly smaller number of aircraft, the coalition's total strength, number of tanks, artillery and other key indicators are all higher than those of the German army.

In terms of the quality of the weapon platform itself, the coalition forces are not inferior to the German army.

Gamelin's summary shows that the coalition generals completely failed to understand the key to the German victory.

Until the end of the war, Gamelin still refused to believe that the German breakthrough on the Meuse River and the subsequent deep advance were planned actions:

"It was an outstanding action, but was it fully foreseen in advance? I don't believe it was so - at most, it was no more than Napoleon could have foreseen for the Battle of Jena, or Moltke Sr. in 1870. The Battle of Sedan. It was a perfect use of the environment.”

However, at least later generations have sufficient evidence to prove that this time, the German victory was indeed a planned victory.

However, this plan did not come from the Supreme Commander, nor from the General Staff Headquarters, but from the grassroots, from two famous military wizards who have always been looked down upon by the Chinese people - Manstein and Guderian.

If Guderian inherited the tradition of Seydlitz, Manstein inherited the mantle of the old Moltke.

The former was a master of maneuver warfare and the main architect of the German armored force after World War I. The latter are elites trained by the German General Staff Headquarters and are proficient in military strategy and combat coordination.

As early as 1935, Manstein was already the director of the Operations Division of the German Army General Staff, and was promoted to deputy chief of staff the following year. It was only when he was affected by personnel disputes at the top of the German army that he entered the grassroots staff group like a star descending from the earth.

Manstein had no illusions about the General Staff's Western Front plan.

He knew very well that the German army's advantage lay in its mobility at the combat level, as well as its ability to plan and execute large-scale battles. From a tactical perspective alone, the coalition's mobility and firepower even surpassed the German army.

The space in the Belgian corridor was too small, which reduced the German army's advantage and magnified the advantage of the Allied forces.

Under such circumstances, it would be difficult for the German army to quickly penetrate France's northeastern industrial zone.

Even if a breakthrough is achieved, I'm afraid it will be a heavy loss and no stamina.

The more important point is that the main point of the "Schlieffen Plan" was never a surprise attack, but to use the enemy's wrong maneuvers to carry out counterattack strikes. During World War I, the French army was superstitious about offensive doctrine and was eager to regain the lost territory in Alsace and Lorraine, so it launched the famous "Operation No. 17" on the French-German border.

The German army took advantage of this erroneous momentum and passed through the Belgian Corridor. Based on the principle of "attacking the enemy rather than defending it", they marched straight in.

A hammer hit the French army on the back. The deeper the French army penetrated into Germany, the more severe the losses were.

A big mistake made by the German army at that time was to modify the essence of the "Schlieffen Plan" and turn the rotating strike into a large and unnecessary pincer offensive.

The fiercer the German offensive on the Franco-German border, the more the French army was driven out of the encirclement, allowing them to use their internal advantages to defeat the German offensive one by one.

In the same way, if the German army wants to win this war at a low cost, it must make full use of the coalition's advance into Belgium.

If the German army sticks to the form of the "Schlieffen Plan" and still sets the main direction of attack in Belgium, it will be equivalent to repeating the mistake of attacking the French-German border and facing the French Army's Plan 17 head-on.

The German army now wants to take advantage of the immovable characteristics of the Maginot Line and the momentum of the coalition forces penetrating into Belgium to intensify the north-south tension. On the one hand, it only uses a small number of troops to suppress the defenders in front of the Maginot Line (in actual combat, the German army was on the French-German border. Only 17 divisions were deployed, and they were able to contain the French army on the opposite side, which was three times their size). At the same time, they launched a feint attack in Belgium, attracting the main force of the coalition forces like an anvil.

Then, the main force of the German army broke in from the center and tore apart the Allied defense line.

Therefore, there is only one path to success, which is to take the Ardennes region, break through the Meuse River, quickly enter the open area, sweep across the rear of the coalition forces, and cut France in half.

With constant maneuvering, the coalition forces would be unable to reestablish a fixed front.

At this time, the deeper the coalition forces penetrated into Belgium, the deeper they fell into the German trap.

Once the coalition forces in the north are eliminated, an east-west defense line will emerge from the English Channel to the Meuse River.

This line of defense is connected to the north-south Maginot Line of Defense, and the coalition forces no longer have sufficient troops to defend both lines of defense at the same time.

The remaining task for the German army was to march straight in, sweep across the remaining enemy forces, and use the coastline and the Maginot Line as anvils to suppress, encircle and annihilate the remaining French forces.

The key lies in how to solve the problem of the German army's pause period in front of the Meuse River, so as to beat the enemy with a time lag.

If the key to the "Schlieffen Plan" lies in the surprise of space, the key to the "Manstein Plan" lies in the surprise of time.

For modern large-scale corps operations, this is a highly professional technical issue, and cannot simply rely on morale, will and desperate measures.

Guderian was the professional Manstein wanted to consult.

Both men fought in this area during World War I and had first-hand experience of the terrain.

After understanding the essentials of the "Manstein Plan", Guderian immediately started working on the map.

After repeated deductions, Guderian concluded that if this plan is to succeed, the following four conditions must be met:

1. Concentrate a sufficient number of armored divisions in the direction of the Ardennes area.

2. Air power must closely support ground operations to make up for the lack of heavy artillery units.

3. Make good use of professional combat engineers. Infantry and armored units should repeatedly train in forcible crossing operations before the war.

4. After breaking through the Meuse River, you must not stop and wait for the follow-up infantry and baggage units. Instead, let the armored spearhead give full play to the mobility advantages of the internal combustion engine and drive straight in to completely defeat the opponent's defense system and disrupt the opponent's war schedule.

In the end, Uncle Xi dramatically adopted the "Manstein Plan", while the French army still lived in another time and space.

What is particularly beneficial to the German army is that on the eve of the war, Allied Commander-in-Chief Gamelin further revised the combat plan.

Foreseeing that the German army would attack not only Belgium but also the Netherlands this time, he decided to extend the northern front further into the southern Netherlands.

This move further tightened the coalition's front line and kept four division-level mechanized units and three elite infantry divisions away from the Ardennes area, which made it easier for the German army to drive straight in after breaking through the Meuse River.

Thus, there was the tragic summer of 1940.

Actual combat proved that May 1940, 5 was a fruitful day for German staff operations, as well as a glorious day for German infantry, engineers and "Stuka" dive bombers.

With close coordination, the German forces broke through the French defense lines at multiple locations.

As the famous British war historian Len Deighton pointed out:

"In Sedan, the French army's defense was relatively tight, but the German army's attack was equally thorough. The three river crossing locations were selected in advance by the German army based on the terrain. The German attack force had also practiced in similar terrain, and was conducted by relevant units. Provides aerial reconnaissance photos and a very detailed map of the French defense line, down to the location of each bunker.

But these photos and maps did not make the infantry and engineers of the 10th Armored Division feel any better. They had to wade through knee-deep grassland before they could put down their rubber boats after reaching the river, because the French army was entrenched in the woods. The lush Mafi Highlands can easily wipe out most of the attacking forces. "

“Although the infantry of the 10th Armored Division suffered heavy casualties on the left bank, they were finally able to successfully attack and capture the French positions, and then continued to attack the French strongholds on the Mafi Heights.

However, in addition to their own bravery, the Luftwaffe's contribution was not small. "

It was these air artillery teams that made up for the shortcomings of ground heavy artillery and provided strong support for the river crossing operation.

Also noteworthy are the German engineers:

"On the afternoon of May 5, after the first wave of attacks was launched, German engineers set up a pontoon bridge on the northeastern bank of the Meuse River... It was against this pontoon bridge that almost all the tanks and tanks of the 13th Armored Corps The motorized infantry divisions following them all crossed the river."

"The performance of the German engineers was outstanding - the first ferry was assembled in less than thirty-eight minutes. By midnight, a pontoon bridge capable of carrying a load of sixteen tons had been spanned across the Meuse River flowing through Gleier."

Thus, there was a scene in which General Georges (Commander-in-Chief of the French Northeast Theater) burst into tears on the morning of May 1940, 5.

Dumontque (then Gamelin's chief of staff) tried to calm General Georges down.

At his suggestion, a group of French generals walked to the map and began to reflect on strategies to defeat the enemy.

Under Dumanque's planning, George immediately decided to order the 21st Army to immediately launch a counterattack from south to north.

At the same time, two reserve armored divisions will be mobilized from other battlefields for reinforcements - the 1st Reserve Armored Division, which has entered Belgium, is now ordered to attack from north to south;

The Second Reserve Armored Division, which was on its way to the Dale River, was also ordered to change its march route and attack from west to east.

This formed a situation in which three armored iron fists and more than 3 tanks attacked the German bridgehead separately.

These were also all three division-level armored units available to France at that time.

The national destiny of France and the fate of the French army will be determined by this armored battle.

However, the French armored division and the German armored division are two completely different products.

The three reserve armored divisions of the French army were not established until the beginning of 3. They had not yet formed a reasonable service structure and had no mature military doctrine to support them.

At that time, the French army's division-level armored units were divided into two types, one was the light mechanized division and the other was the reserve armored division.

The missions of the former are reconnaissance, vigilance, and delay, while the missions of the latter are to act as an iron fist for attacking and counterattacking.

The former has combat-level long-range mobility capabilities, but its attack power is relatively weak. The latter has strong attack power, but does not have long-range maneuverability at the combat level.

According to the French army's pre-war assumptions, the task of the reserve armored division was to conduct limited maneuvers in a small area, or to be deployed behind a fixed defense line to counterattack the enemy's breakthrough, or to attack the enemy's fixed defense line.

Therefore, from the design of weapons to the combination of arms, the French armored divisions are not suitable for mobile warfare with German armored divisions in large spaces.

The next few days were both a dark day for the French armored forces and a legendary day for the German armored forces.

Due to the disjointed logistics support and repeated misjudgments of the German advance speed, the three French armored divisions fell down one after another on their way out.

Not only did these three divisions fail to form a big fist, but each division itself never achieved a centralized counterattack. All its forces were used piecemeal to deal with new situations and crises.

They are like a torrent running across the wasteland, gradually dividing, disintegrating, and drying up.

Most of the French armored units either self-destructed due to logistical disorganization, disintegrated in German air strikes, or were defeated one by one in melees with German armored units.

By May 5, the German army had fully broken through the Meuse River defense line.

The French army had no time to reinforce or form a new line of defense.

All counterattacks were ineffective. Now, the backside of the Maginot Line, the retreat route of the northern coalition forces, the smooth road to Paris, and the direct road to the English Channel were all exposed to the German armored cavalry at the same time.

The overwhelmed French army no longer knew in which direction to prioritize forming a new line of defense.

Ang Qijie repeatedly pressed Shangfeng, but the final answer he got was: judge for yourself.

Organized resistance gradually collapsed.

The arrows of the German armored forwards on the Meuse River began to turn into a huge death sickle, cutting France in two! Although the main force of the British army luckily escaped back to the mainland at Dunkirk, France's defeat was already doomed.

In the face of defeat, France was not only divided spatially by the German army, but also internally divided in terms of the choice of its future path.

A group of French people believe that the war is over, and even believe that Britain's defeat has entered a countdown state. France should make peace with Uncle Greek as soon as possible while it still has some chips in its hands.

They chose Petain, the old hero of the last war, hoping that he could minimize losses.

Another group of French people believed that the war had just begun and that the Third Reich was not an enemy country in the general sense, but the public enemy of all mankind.

To deal with them, the only option is to win or die.

They followed Pétain's disciple, Charles de Gaulle, who had just been appointed deputy minister of defense on June 6.

General de Gaulle persisted in resisting and was willing to fight alongside the British until the Third Reich was wiped out.

So, he went to London to fight the war to the end.

On June 6, Pétain delivered an important radio speech:

“French people, the President of the Republic beseeches you, today I envisage the direction of the French government... I dedicate myself to France to relieve its suffering... It is with a heavy heart that I declare that we must stop fighting. Last night, I Consult our adversary and ask him if he is prepared to join me, as warrior to warrior, after a battle, to find an honorable way to cease confrontation."

The next day, de Gaulle also delivered an important radio speech on the other side of the strait:

"The victory or defeat of this war does not depend on the situation on the French battlefield. This war is a world event... No matter what happens, the flame of French resistance should never be extinguished and will never be extinguished."

Although the choices of the two masters and apprentices were different and there was no prior consultation - at least there is currently no relevant historical evidence to support it - objectively speaking, it did play the role of "Cheng Yingchujiu, Yue Zhao Xixiang, I and I will take charge of each other." As a result, no matter which camp wins in the end, France will have a plan to deal with the aftermath.

(End of this chapter)