The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 21 "Police Operations" (1)
Out of political and diplomatic expediency considerations, President Truman's decision to use the U.S. navy and air force to defend North Korea was delayed for 12 hours before being announced to the American public.When the president made his decision, it was after 11 a.m. on Monday night, when it was difficult to arrange an in-depth briefing for Congress.Truman knew that to go to war, he had to win political support.He doesn't want key allies in Congress to lose their support by getting news of developments in the Washington Post early Tuesday morning.Secretary of State Acheson also objected to allowing Chiang Kai-shek to obtain news of the blockade of Taiwan from news channels.As a result, there was no press communiqué until Tuesday morning when the president briefed congressional leaders.

MacArthur sent a telegram from Tokyo complaining about the slowness of action.The Koreans are at stake, and it is imperative to tell them that American aid is not coming, before they collapse completely.In a teletype meeting with Deputy Secretary of State James Webb and Army Secretary Frank Pace after midnight, MacArthur argued.He said the war would be over in a matter of hours unless South Korean troops were given a shot of stimulant to hold them back.Webb came up with what his State Department colleague George Kennan called a "quite ingenious but desperate idea": Allow MacArthur to broadcast the president's decisions on radio stations in South Korea, but only in Korean, and without Alarmed Western reporters in Tokyo; at the same time, sent a messenger to Taiwan to inform Chiang Kai-shek of the situation.

That way, North Koreans — at least those within earshot of the few radio stations that still operate — can get news of the U.S. intervention at a time when the American people are sleeping in the sweet dream of not knowing.

At a White House briefing Tuesday morning, congressional leaders asked Truman a surprisingly few questions.The President asked Acheson to review the events of the past few days.Truman "hoped that the Soviets had not been involved in the invasion, but is currently studying what the Soviets might do next."In any case, the United States "cannot allow the situation to develop unchecked."Finally, Truman emphasized that he was acting under a mandate from the United Nations to ask member states to provide assistance to the Republic of Korea "to help it repel armed invasion and restore international peace and security to the region."

Even Republican critics left the room applauding Truman.Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire declared, "Nice job." Word reached Congress, and one observer compared the excitement to that of the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. Joseph Harsh of the Christian Science Monitor summed up the mood of the day as follows:

In the 20 years I have lived and worked in and out of this city, I have never felt the sense of relief and unity that prevails throughout the city.

The most incomprehensible thing in the matter was Monday's pessimism, which came from the belief that the government was going to miss the boat and do something futile or specious.The decision to act has been made, yet almost everyone still thinks no action will be taken.When action comes, people are first surprised, then relieved.

What Mr. Truman did was clearly more than expected, and almost exactly what most people hoped to do.I have never seen so many people in Washington feel so satisfied with a decision of the administration.

But the next day, Wednesday, Senator Robert Taft, the Republican speaker of the Senate, declared that the Truman administration, and Acheson in particular, were solely responsible for the war that had been caused by "a misbehavior and an inconsistent foreign policy."He accused Truman of jumping into a war without the prior approval of Congress, and without consulting congressional leaders at Tuesday's White House briefing, at best, by presenting them with a fait accompli.He ended with a line that liberal senators used in the 60s to accuse the United States of being involved in another undeclared war, Vietnam:
If this is what I see as an outright usurpation of the President's authority to use the nation's armed forces, then I have no desire for such an action to be approved by the Senate.

If this event is allowed to exist without opposition, at least in this Court, then we will forever lose the power to declare war that the US Constitution gives only to Congress.

Taft made an effort to emphasize that he had no objection to the decisions themselves, and would have voted for them had they been brought to the Senate.Nor did he pursue the matter by introducing a resolution against Truman's administrative procedures.Taft knew that the president controlled a strong majority in the Senate, and that the Truman administration could win an arbitrary pretext vote and call it an endorsement of Truman's actions.Taft, who was scheming and dreamed of being a president, could only state his views and record them, and let the situation develop on its own.

Nor did Taft have the support of many of his more venerable Republican colleagues, notably William Nolan of California, who also had lofty aspirations for the presidency.Asked whether Nolan agreed with Taft, he replied that there was no reason for Congress to issue a formal declaration of war.His only criticism was that the president had limited military action south of the [-]th parallel.Nolan didn't care that Truman let the Air Force cross the [-]th parallel, like a cop leaving a crime scene to chase a thief.

"The action taken by this administration is a police operation against thugs who violate the laws of this country and the Charter of the United Nations," Nolan said from the pulpit.

Near the weekend, Truman held his first press conference since the North Korean invasion.He was asked several times about the nature of the U.S. response.

Q Mr. President, every American is asking, are we or are we not at war?
Answer: We are not at war... The members of the United Nations are going to save South Korea from bandit attacks on the Republic of Korea.

Q Mr. President, according to your explanation, this is a police operation by the United Nations, correct?

A: Yes, exactly.

Thus America's most unpopular war acquired the moniker "police action," a euphemism not invented by Truman but merely characterized by his characteristic (and indifferent Reasonable) A word that stubbornly clings to it.For the more than 10 U.S. soldiers who were dying or wounding in North Korea, what was happening there was much more than a "police operation."Over the next 18 months, Truman's careful avoidance of the proper title "Korean War" cost him dearly in winning public support and moral sympathy.

back to the united nations

On Tuesday, Truman made a public statement on American intervention, mentioning briefly the role of the United Nations.Contrary to Truman's statement, the Security Council had yet to call on its members to "provide necessary assistance" to counter North Korean aggression.At noon that same day, UN Secretary-General Trygev Lie made an unintentional mistake that narrowly escaped a situation in which the Soviets returned to the Security Council (which they had resisted for six months) and used their veto.

That's what happened.Early on Tuesday (June 6), U.S. diplomats stationed at the United Nations sounded out the members of the Security Council and found that the resolution was generally supported, but the Indian representative said that it would take time to get formal instructions from his government.Accordingly, the meeting of the Council was postponed until the afternoon.But Truman's congressional briefing and public statement were scheduled for later in the morning.Therefore, government officials decided to take a chance. Anyway, the Security Council will vote according to the expected procedure.As a result, Truman announced in advance that he had the support of the United Nations.

Konstantin Chinkinko, a Soviet diplomat to the United Nations, had arranged a private lunch at the Stockholm Restaurant on Long Island a few days earlier, one of the regular Russian social events during the boycott to meet other members of the Security Council maintain political ties.U.N. Secretary-General Lie sat between Ernest Gross, the U.S. representative, and Yakov Malik, the Soviet representative.During the meeting, the North Korean issue was the main topic.Malik insisted that the North Korean action was in response to a "border offensive" by South Korean forces, while Lie and Gross pointed out that the "fundamental nature" of the war was a North Korean invasion.Malik then complained about the U.S. bombing, which Gross and Lie countered, stating that the bombing had been caused by the invasion and had been authorized by the United Nations.

After coffee and dessert, Lie told Malik that he and other diplomats were going to the Security Council for a meeting.He asked: "Aren't you going with us? I think your country's interests require your presence."

Gross flinched back, pale.If Malik is present, there is no doubt that he will veto the resolution, and the carefully planned plans of the United States will be destroyed in one go.He wanted to touch Rye with his foot under the table and signal to get out of the subject.

But Malik shook his head and said, "No, I'm not going."

Gross tried his best to conceal his undecided shock, and left the restaurant with Lie. "What do you think," he said to Lie rather angrily, "what will happen if he accepts your invitation?" Then Lie realized his mistake.He tried to downplay the issue, saying the issue might need to be brought to the UN General Assembly, where it would be approved by a majority vote.Gross said bluntly that he hoped that the Secretary-General would stop playing diplomacy.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the Security Council held a meeting.The debate lasted for several hours and was then adjourned for several hours as Indian and Egyptian representatives awaited instructions from their respective governments.Near midnight, the resolution was finally passed—a resolution that Truman had declared 12 hours earlier that he had in hand.

The United States now has a broad mandate to take further action in North Korea: "to provide ... assistance necessary to help repel armed invasion and restore international peace and security to the region."

chaos in seoul

Meanwhile, in South Korea, U.S. air strikes delayed North Korean advances but failed to stop them.South Korean forces continued to retreat on a broad front.After Ambassador Mucho left Seoul, he took a jeep all the way south to find Syngman Rhee and the remnants of his government who had escaped.He found the South Korean president at a house in the western city of Daejeon, about 90 miles south of Seoul.Syngman Rhee was sullen and once again complained that the United States had "abandoned" him. He once again vowed to take up a gun and fight against the Communist Party himself.He bluntly stated that he does not believe in the various promises of the United States.If America is determined to save his country, where is its military?

Mucho didn't argue with him.All he asked was Rhee's commitment to keep the South Korean government alive, while tacitly handing over the war to the United States.The United States urgently needs to preserve the Syngman Rhee government as a tool to fight this war.If the Rhee government disappears, the legitimacy of the US presence in North Korea will cease to exist.According to Harold Noble, a diplomat traveling with Mr. Mucho, Mr. Mucho's biggest challenge that afternoon was "to wage a fight to free South Korea from its leader's panic".

Mucho told Syngman Rhee that, in his view, the cabinet and the National Assembly could temporarily cease to exist, and that the war should be led by professional soldiers from the United States and South Korea. intervene.An advance team of American officers will soon be here from Tokyo to investigate how American military equipment can be put to good use in South Korean hands.

"I don't have to hide difficulties from you," Mucho said, "but I and the government I represent firmly believe that the North Korean people have the determination and confidence to get through this. If I lost confidence, I wouldn't be here, U.S. troops And not in North Korea."

Although Syngman Rhee was reluctant, he still agreed.He promised to give the Americans the time and power that Mucho asked for.But Mu Qiao knew that the capricious Syngman Lee would change his attitude in an instant.He was, and remains, a volatile ally.

What is remarkable is that the military advisory group in South Korea managed to evacuate Seoul in the chaos of the night, and only three people were slightly injured.The Han River Bridge was bombed prematurely by the Koreans. Colonel Sterling Wright and his party competed with the terrified Koreans for the few seats on the ferry carrying refugees.Polite discussions are not enough. The Americans saw what the South Koreans did and followed suit.An officer shot a boatman next to him, got his attention, and then made a gesture with his gun: Send us across the river or get shot.The North Korean boatmen immediately surrendered.

The Military Advisory Group in Korea was finally on its way to Suwon Airport, about 20 miles south of Seoul, where they encountered an advance investigation team from Japan led by Brigadier General John Church.Church's delegation came to learn about the logistical needs of the ROK Army.The investigative team consisted of only 13 officers and 2 soldiers, but they bore the extremely prominent title of "General Command's Advance Command and Liaison Group in North Korea".

Church spent all day Wednesday trying to figure out who in the South Korean Army had authority or knowledge.South Korean military officers at all levels are as frightened as a bird.Church spent a lot of time cheering them on and assuring them that the gear had shipped.Late Wednesday, Church received a puzzling telegram from Tokyo that a "senior military officer" was coming to inspect the site the next morning.Is Suwon Airport available?
Church replied yes.He privately guessed the identity of the visitor, and he guessed correctly.

MacArthur's usurpation
Douglas MacArthur fidgeted.A lot of news sent to the First Building has no sense of presence, and there is no roar and roar of battle that can only be felt by a commander visiting the front line for inspection.Apart from attending President Rhee's inauguration a few months earlier, MacArthur had no first-hand knowledge of the land where war was erupting.He had reviewed prewar South Korean Army efficiency reports, but he had never seen the army in action.Can this army be saved?Can you remake the defeated division into a brave fighter?
At noon on Wednesday, MacArthur called his pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Storey, and informed him that he would fly to North Korea the next day to inspect the battlefield in person.Storey hesitated to leave. According to the weather forecast, the next day was rainy and rainy, with low clouds and dense clouds.But no one can dissuade MacArthur, he intends to personally inspect.That night, MacArthur invited four reporters to his office, told them his plan, and said he would take them with him.MacArthur described the flight as a suicide trip.

(End of this chapter)