The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 3 The Origin of This Book
By Memorial Day 20, I had been struggling for a new book about 50s America, and it wasn't a very happy year.I had intended this book as a sequel to my book The Best Years (1977-1945). Belle Époque is about America from the day Japan surrendered in August 1950 to the beginning of the Korean War in June 1945.Many of the problems encountered are troubling, because America in the immediate aftermath of the war is not particularly different from what it was in the early 8s.So, on Memorial Day, I complained about these problems to a longtime journalist, Robert Sherrill, who I knew well.

"Damn it," suggested Sherrill, "forget about comprehensive history and write about the Korean War." The Complete Book of War.Some memoirs of generals and politicians did come out, as well as analytical articles and revised histories, which varied in quality and degree of credibility.But what about the full picture of the Korean War? "No one has written a book like this," Cheryl said.

Cheryl's suggestion came at just the right time.When I started poking around for Korean War material, it was astonishing in both its quantity and quality: either it was in the public domain for the first time on the government's normal declassification schedule, or it was available through the Freedom of Information Act.As a result, this book is largely based on previously unpublished material, in a way, the "Pentagon War Papers."Through the Freedom of Information Act, I was able to read hundreds of (previously top secret) cables between Washington and its field commanders in the Far East, first General Douglas MacArthur, then his successors Matthew Ridgway and Mark Clark.In the telegram from the State Department, I read the U.S. government’s true views on South Korean President Syngman Rhee. Officially, he was “brave and fearless,” but in private, he was “an irrational and illogical fanatic” (such as President Special Envoy Walter Robertson said so of him in July 1953).In briefing documents provided by the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff task force, I saw the policy take shape.I was able to observe the progress of the war through the periodic assessment reports of a relatively lean new agency in Washington called the CIA.On a trip to a federal archive in Suitland, Maryland, I found dusty crates containing Far East Command's Daily Intelligence Roundups before and during the Korean War .As an outsider, I have had a rare glimpse into the raw intelligence data on which important national decisions are based.I traveled to various military libraries, presidential libraries, and other libraries, archives, and interviews.Wherever it went, it looked like the itinerary of a national political campaign, or like a bank robber on the loose, scurrying around in a car with a bad map.

In any book-writing process that involves research, serendipitous luck often and inevitably plays a vital role.After being introduced by acquaintances on both sides, I was able to conduct several long interviews with Hans Toft.He is a charismatic Danish-American, a master spy.He conducted covert CIA operations in North Korea during the early stages of the Korean War.Toft's place is just a few blocks from my home in Georgetown, within walking distance.He has an amazing memory, which is complemented by copies of past action reports and even photographs.When I asked him why the material hadn't been used before, Toft replied, "No one ever asked about it."

There are also some interesting information obtained in a chain-like manner.When Dean Acheson was preparing to write his memoir, "The Birth of a President," he called rotating State Department departments to Princeton University for free-lance discussions—thousands of pages of transcripts—to confirm Memories of my time as Secretary of State.One of the participants in the discussion was Paul Nietzsche, who once mentioned in passing that Major General Charles Willoughby, the head of MacArthur's intelligence department, once admitted that he arbitrarily falsified the intelligence assessment report to cater to the appetite of his superiors.I wrote to Nietzsche and asked him if he remembered where he had heard Willoughby say such things.Nietzsche wrote a two-page, single-spaced letter answering my question.The letter provided further information on Willoughby and finally suggested "by the way" that I speak to Charles Burton Marshall.Marshall had been Nietzsche's colleague in the State Department's Policy Planning Division during the Korean War.

A few days later, in an office shared by Marshall and Nietzsche at a think tank outside Virginia, I interviewed Marshall, mainly about the Truman administration's attempt to initiate peace negotiations in the spring of 1951.After hours of productive interviews, I was packing up my notebooks and pencils when Marshall broke in and said, "By the way, do you know Thomas Jefferson Davis? When MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the Army He's the lieutenant."

I admit, I don't know, the name is completely unfamiliar.

Marshall gestured for me to sit back in my chair and told me a story.Shortly after the end of World War II, he and Davis both worked at a refugee relief agency in Washington, where they often had lunch together.Davis, then a brigadier general, had maintained a friendly but matter-of-fact relationship with MacArthur for a decade.The relationship ended bitterly when MacArthur kicked Davis off his staff for being so disloyal to MacArthur that he bet that Roosevelt, whom MacArthur had in mind, would win re-election in 1940 enemy.Davis told Marshall a lot of gossip about MacArthur... oh, anecdotes, especially about how he dealt with women.Marshall always used these stories as interesting conversation materials after dinner until August 1950. MacArthur's behavior caused unease in Washington official circles, so Marshall persuaded Davis to write a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff describing his work at the time. MacArthur's personal adjutant, what he observed when he was with MacArthur day and night.

The materials provided by Davis (recorded in the Introduction to this book) show that MacArthur was too volatile to be entrusted with such a delicate military and political command.In 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not act upon Davis' memo.The following spring, they did not use these materials against MacArthur during the tumultuous hearings after MacArthur's resignation.Now, for the first time, Davis's observations of MacArthur's eccentric personal behavior have been made public by a chain of relationships that began with Dean Acheson asking Paul Nietzsche to help him write a book.

My special thanks go to my wife, Leslie Cantrell Smith, who took part in the middle of this four-year voyage and served her admirably during this period aboard and in other positions.

Joseph Gulden
in Washington, D.C., and Rileyville, Virginia, Round Hill, Arlington
April 1981

(End of this chapter)