The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 32
Dean and Tabor rushed out of the door and hid in a rice field.Dean lay down in the mud of the paddy field, crawled on his elbows into a ditch, then climbed over the ditch and into another paddy field.Taber did not follow. (Taber was apparently captured in later days. He was sent to a POW camp, where he died of malnutrition a few weeks later.)
In the next 35 days, Dean wandered in the mountains and fields of South Korea, sometimes begging for food from the common people, but more often he was refused and reported to the North Koreans.On several occasions, he was able to escape by climbing the cliffs.

On August 8, Dean finally faced his doom.Two men volunteered to take him across the line, but they handed him over to the North Koreans for a reward of $25 each.

Dean was a prisoner for three years.For his bravery before and after his capture, he was awarded the Medal of Honor after his release in September 1953.But the loss of a major field commander was just one of many troubles for General Walton Walker's Eighth Army as the war entered its second month.

China issue
In the first week of the war, President Truman had to deal with two major issues related to the war in addition to dealing with the losing battle situation: one was the controversy over Taiwan policy provoked by General MacArthur, and the other was the removal of Lewis. • A serious feud ended in Johnson's defense secretary job.The first question was the most crucial, because it was the first confrontation in the months-long feud between the general and his Washington boss.

Here is some background.After Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan from mainland China, the Truman administration managed to maintain a cordial but distanced relationship with the Nationalist government.The United States gave Chiang Kai-shek billions of dollars in military and economic aid in the 40s, but got nothing. In December 1949, Dean Acheson revealed informally to Time magazine: "Now we must alienate the Chinese Nationalists. If we stand on the side of Taiwan (referring to continuing to support Chiang Kai-shek), then it will be difficult to make This necessary rupture." At the National Security Council meeting on December 12, 1949, Truman decided not to provide material assistance to Taiwan and to take a "hands-off" approach should the Communists attempt to seize the island.

This decision angered MacArthur for several reasons: he saw Taiwan as a necessary element in the defense of Japan, a lesson he had learned from the Pacific War; he admired Chiang Kai-shek; Asia encroached on more territory.MacArthur expressed his point of view through the conversation with the interviewer. He regarded Taiwan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier", and the United States would have endless troubles if it lost it.

When the Korean War broke out, Truman revised his policy toward Taiwan, adopting a cautious two-track approach.In his June 6 directive authorizing MacArthur to use troops in North Korea, he also ordered the 28th Fleet to protect Taiwan from attack, but the same directive also ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from attacking the mainland.This order has little military significance, because in the summer of 7, the 1950th Fleet had only 7 aircraft carrier, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, and 1 destroyers-such a "fleet" was responsible for defending the entire East Asia.As Acheson acknowledged in Senate hearings the following May, since the fleet was tasked with fighting in Korea, it would be powerless to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking Taiwan.

But deploying an illusory force is symbolic.Diplomatic historian Foster Rhea Dulles argues that Truman's line of defense around Taiwan was a necessary comfort to Republicans, who had long advocated the need for such a barrier.Dulles called the decision "a decisive factor" in winning the necessary bipartisan support to intervene in North Korea.However, according to India's ambassador to Beijing, Panikha, the Chinese communists believe that US actions on Taiwan pose a ... "immediate threat" to their security.

But MacArthur believed that Truman's order "too cheap" for the Chinese Communists, so that they do not need to muster a large army across Taiwan to prevent Chiang Kai-shek's invasion.MacArthur asked not to make this U.S. policy public, leaving the Chinese Communist Party at a loss.

But MacArthur supported another Truman decision regarding Chiang Kai-shek.In the first few days of the war, Chiang Kai-shek offered to send three divisions to fight in Korea, but Truman politely declined.Truman wished not to associate Taiwan with the Korean War, knowing that accepting Nationalist troops would cause trouble for the British, who were only able to retain the colony of Hong Kong because of Communist tolerance.In the end, he considered Chiang Kai-shek's troops to be of little military value.MacArthur agreed with the latter view: equipping Nationalist troops and transporting them thousands of miles would be costly and time-consuming, and there was no reason to think they would have fought better in Korea than in mainland China.Moreover, withdrawing the 3.3 people provided by Chiang Kai-shek would make Taiwan vulnerable to attack.What Truman wanted to say was very clear: any expedient action concerning Taiwan must not affect long-term policy.In a statement issued on July 7, the President said:
Taiwan's current military neutrality will not harm political issues related to the island.We hope that Taiwan will not be involved in hostile actions that endanger the security of the Pacific, and that all issues related to Taiwan should be resolved peacefully as expected in the Charter of the United Nations.

With peace restored, even the thorniest political problems can be resolved.However, in the face of barbaric and unprovoked aggression, some issues must be shelved for the time being in view of the fundamental security interests of the whole.

Still, Truman feared that the Chinese communists could attack Taiwan at any moment (the CIA and General Willoughby's G-2 in Tokyo had been predicting an invasion for months). In late July, intelligence reports said that a Communist force of some 7 men had been assembled across Taiwan, a force sufficient for a successful offensive despite the US protective barrier on Taiwan. On July 20, Secretary of Defense Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated allowing Chiang Kai-shek to mine the waters between Taiwan and mainland China and to bomb Communist staging areas.Acheson successfully dismissed both claims as "impossible".Truman's final decision was to send a survey team to Taiwan to draw up a concrete plan for increased military aid.

On July 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought MacArthur's opinion on possible "defense measures" for Taiwan. At the same time, he mentioned in an oblique way that the two actions of mine-laying and bombing had been rejected at the National Security Council meeting two days earlier.The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed MacArthur about sending an investigative team to Taiwan.In his reply MacArthur strongly favored bombing and minelaying, saying that this would appease the "very discontent" of many Nationalist officers against the United States and would end the enemy's "clear military advantage" that had come from the United States' restraint on Chiang Kai-shek Caused.He also announced his intention to go to Taiwan on July 29 to inspect the defense in person, and to personally explain to Chiang Kai-shek the reasons for not using his troops.The Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that MacArthur consider sending another senior officer there, but the end of the telegram was: "Please go ahead, this is your authority." (General Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's subordinate, said that MacArthur thought there were two meanings in this sentence-the State Department, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had reservations about the trip, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff vaguely told him : "Relax and go!")
Therefore, MacArthur went as scheduled.Strikingly, William Sebold, the top U.S. diplomat in Tokyo, was not included in the entourage.MacArthur told Siebold that this trip was only about military affairs, so he didn't need to go with him, and that his appearance would have "political implications." (The skeptical Acheson thought this was clearly a ploy to keep the State Department from knowing about the meeting.)
The Kuomintang gave MacArthur a grand welcome at the airport.MacArthur walked in the car with Madame Chiang, and called her husband "my old comrade in the last war."Whitney was "surprised" that despite fighting a common enemy, the two hadn't seen each other for years, yet they talked as if they were old friends.

Unfortunately, the talks between the two men were fruitless.They looked at the map together, walked along the beach, and Chiang Kai-shek pointed to mainland China with a gesture.MacArthur did have to emphasize one unpleasant piece of news: If Chiang Kai-shek attacked the mainland, the 7th Fleet would be ordered by the president to stop it.The main outcome of the talks, Whitney later wrote, was that MacArthur had a "basic understanding" not only of the local military situation but also of the intelligence the Nationalists had gathered about the mainland.The visit ended with a sumptuous banquet and mutual overly flattering toasts.

The next day, MacArthur issued a statement from his Tokyo office, playing on Truman's earlier statement (concise but thoughtful) that the United States intended to defend Taiwan against Communist attack.MacArthur said cleverly at the beginning: "Under the current situation, the island, including the nearby Penghu Islands, will not be subject to military invasion." However, the two agreed that sending troops "could seriously weaken the defenses of Taiwan itself. Arrangements have been made for effective coordination between the American forces under my command and the Nationalist forces, which is an important It is the best strategy for the power to attempt to launch an attack".MacArthur finally praised Chiang Kai-shek: "I am in awe of his indomitable determination to resist the rule of the Communist Party. His determination goes hand in hand with the common interests and goals of the Americans, that is, the people of the Pacific region should be free, not enslaved .”

Truman and Acheson perceived MacArthur's Taiwan trip as potentially troublesome, especially when "background sources" in Tokyo began to leak details. "Time" magazine interviewed a "reliable source" there, he said with authority that MacArthur "believed" that the Korean War would be useless unless the United States was willing to pay "communism anywhere in Asia." Crackdown, even if it meant supporting Chiang Kai-shek, the British in Hong Kong, and the anti-communists in Indochina, Siam (Thailand), and Burma, "failure to act so resolutely will inevitably invite communism to sweep across Asia."As early as April, the National Security Council had already determined this series of courses of action (excluding support for the collapsed Chiang Kai-shek regime), but careful readers can draw the conclusion from these remarks that Asia is the Truman administration's " Another example of being soft on communism".

MacArthur pretended to be "surprised" by the confusion caused. He blamed some "habitual critics" of him in the United Nations and elsewhere, saying that they "applied to the Soviet Union and Red China." certain groups within the United States".He made a "conciliatory" statement after listening to criticism for days, in effect a vicious attack on those who took issue with him.He said that the trip to Taiwan——

Viciously misrepresented to the public by those who have been preaching defeatism and appeasement in the Pacific.It is my hope that the American people will not be led astray by the sly insinuations, rash speculations, and consistently false statements from anonymous sources that are insidiously fed to them nationally and internationally by those who are miles and miles away from actual events of.

MacArthur's statement was alarmist and insinuating, and it was a masterpiece of demagoguery—the government couldn't deal with it without dismissing MacArthur.

On August 8, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified MacArthur that the President had rejected their suggestion of a defensive attack on mainland China, which made MacArthur feel more and more alienated from Truman.If the Kuomintang attempted to launch such an attack, MacArthur should stop it."No one other than the President ... has the right" to authorize such an attack, the cable said. "The paramount national interest requires us that our actions avoid triggering a full-scale war or giving others an excuse to start a war."

Whitney noted that MacArthur "could have been insulted, if not taken aback," when he read the cable.The initial strike recommendations were drawn up by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and MacArthur endorsed them when he was consulted, and he gave no hint of implementing them without the president's consent.As expressed by Whitney, MacArthur's camp believed that "from now on, the general must be careful not to express candid opinions when asked by his superiors in Washington, even on military matters," because if he suggested Take another course of action and he would be "accused of carrying out his proposals in a threatening manner".MacArthur's call back showed his outrage: He said he fully understood the president's determination "to protect the Communist Continent."

Averell Harriman's Mission
As Truman confessed in his diary, this period of time disturbed him so much that he considered replacing MacArthur for a while.But because the war was at a critical moment, he decided to temporarily retain MacArthur's official position.On the other hand, he dispatched his experienced and trusted diplomat and adviser, Avril Harriman, to Tokyo to interview the general.Harriman recounted: "I asked the President what he wanted me to talk to MacArthur. The President said, 'Tell him two things. First, I will do everything he can to support South Korea. Second, I want you to tell He, I hope he won't make us fight the CCP.'" Truman also asked Harriman to know exactly what MacArthur wished to Chiang Kai-shek.

On August 8, Harriman flew to Tokyo. He talked with MacArthur alone for about eight hours, and also had a talk during the meal.Harriman was perhaps the first visitor in more than a decade who was entertained by MacArthur without being intimidated by him.Harriman was wealthy, had a long diplomatic career and was fearless even in his wartime dealings with Joseph Stalin.His controlled demeanor allowed him to talk to MacArthur on an equal footing—polite, of course, but relentless in asking probing questions.MacArthur was able to judge and realize that he was not dealing with an ordinary president's messenger. Harriman's arrival showed the president's dissatisfaction, which must not be taken lightly.

On the surface, everything went well.MacArthur praised Truman's decision to intervene, gushing about his strategy: "North Korean forces must be wiped out as soon as possible to prevent the Russians and China from deciding to "reinforce massively." It's not a disaster, it's going to be difficult."He believed that although the Chinese and Russians had egged and equipped the North Koreans on their adventures, they did not wish to engage in an all-out war.

Then Harriman got down to business.He told the general that Truman "wanted me to tell you that Chiang Kai-shek must never be allowed to be the cause of war with the Chinese Communists on the mainland, and the result of doing so may drag us into a world war."MacArthur replied that "as a soldier" he would "obey any order given by the President."He discussed only military issues with Chiang Kai-shek.When Chiang Kai-shek wanted to turn to political issues, he resigned.Chiang Kai-shek offered him command of the Nationalist troops, which he said was "inappropriate," but would be willing to give military advice if asked to do so.

Harriman found MacArthur's words unconvincing:
I don't think we have reached a complete agreement on how to deal with the Taiwan issue and how to deal with the Generalissimo (referring to Chiang Kai-shek).He accepted the president's view and would implement it, but he was not convinced.He had a strange notion that we should support anyone who was against communism, though he couldn't explain why an anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek could contribute effectively to dealing with the Chinese communists.

(End of this chapter)