The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 51 "Operation Yoyo" (2)
But there was a complicating factor: when the 7th Division arrived in Iwon, were there still North Korean People's Army units there?For a full ten days, the soldiers of the 7th Division sat on the transport ship in Busan Port, suffering from the wind and waves, looking at the ocean and sighing every day.At the same time, the staff in Tokyo racked their brains to make a decision, and then issued an order: all people disembarked and must be reloaded, and this time the ship was "loaded in a state of battle", that is, a beachhead attack The personnel and their equipment and supplies must be loaded on the same ship.As General Collins pointed out, loading a ship in readiness for battle takes a considerable amount of time because there is no room for deviation.Once troops landed on a North Korean-held beachhead, they had to have enough supplies to fight independently until a defensive perimeter was firmly established.Thus, until 10 October, the ships carrying the 27th Division finally left Pusan.Fortunately, the communists did not lay mines in the waters near Liwon, and the South Korean capital division had already driven the city's defenders out of the city. Therefore, the 7th Division encountered no resistance when it landed, and it went smoothly from beginning to end.

However, the 7th Division did not unload its personnel and equipment until 11 November.

Mishandled "Brilliant Strike"

MacArthur's decision to withdraw half of his troops from the battle when the North Korean army was retreating is, by any measure, one of the most notable blunders in American military history.This mistake was enough to overshadow his commanding achievements.Perhaps for reasons of professional politeness, the generals who worked with MacArthur largely balked at this miscalculation in their writings about the war.General Lawton Collins wrote: "It is easy to do 'in hindsight' after a military operation has been completed." Although the actions of X Corps proved unnecessary Koudi made a detour according to MacArthur's idea, that is, detoured to the east of the 10th Army.Wonsan and Xingnan are important ports, and the mines blocking the ports must be cleared no matter what.That's what Collins wrote, but he also acknowledged that the retreat of the Tenth Army from the port of Incheon just as the Eighth Army was pursuing the North Koreans caused logistical confusion.After all, Collins is the veteran of the Army, and he criticized MacArthur in a gentle and no-nonsense way:
It is impossible to estimate with any certainty the consequences of stopping the pursuit of North Koreans on the Western Front.It is common sense in the military to pursue and defeat retreating troops, but it failed to do so after the capture of Seoul.Only the 10th Army's position is conducive to pursuit, and it can fight with the South Korean troops who are bravely assaulting the Eastern Front.

The implication of Collins's euphemism is that simple military common sense requires MacArthur to allow Tenth Army to pursue and destroy the North Korean People's Army, but MacArthur was so enthralled by his "strategically brilliant shot" that he would have In Tokyo, he uses his own fantasies to control the reality on the Korean battlefield.He missed his chance to win the war in October, and now he added to that mistake by deciding that the Tenth and Eighth Armies would continue to operate as separate units, both reporting to the Far Eastern Theater Command in Tokyo.

Long after the Korean War ended, some of MacArthur's senior staff officers told Army historians that they believed that after the Incheon landings were over, Tenth Army should be absorbed into Eighth Army.These included Major General Doyle Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, Brigadier General Edward Wright, Chief of Planning, and Major General George Eberly, Chief of Logistics.But MacArthur said nothing about these differences in his memoirs.So did General Almond, who wrote: "It should be noted, however, that General MacArthur was fully capable of making his own decisions throughout, without the need for guidance from others."

MacArthur's usurpation of power
After the United Nations occupied Pyongyang, MacArthur was eager to end the war immediately. On October 10, he set a new target line that was 17 to 9 miles ahead of the target line he proposed on September 28 and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 9.This new front probably ran from Xuanchuan on the west coast to the plain northwest of the Chotsu Reservoir, and then eastward through Fengshan to Chengjin on the Sea of ​​Japan coast.The new front in a northeasterly arc runs almost parallel to the North Korean border, 27 miles apart.All UN forces were free to advance to this new line of objective, but non-Korean forces could not move across it "except under the direct order" of MacArthur.Tenth Army and Eighth Army continued to operate as separate units.In Washington, jittery staffs noted that the two forces would be separated by the rugged, steep 50-foot peaks of the Taebaek Mountains, with communication between them only between their respective headquarters, not Between field commanders.

MacArthur's new operational order may also meet the letter of the directive limiting the movement of non-South Korean troops along the northernmost border, but it undermines the spirit of the October 10 U.N. resolution.According to the resolution, pacification tasks north of North Korea's narrow "waist" should be carried out by South Korean troops.General Collins later wrote: "This was the first time, but not the last, that MacArthur gave orders beyond the directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff took note of this - and I don't recall that we ever did - — and we have not objected.”

Three days later, MacArthur usurped his power even more recklessly. On October 10, he ordered "the relevant ministries" to "make every effort" to quickly seize the new objective line and "make preparations for the continued rapid advance to the North Korean border."MacArthur skillfully used ambiguous terms here: did "the relevant ministries" refer to his entire army, including Americans and South Koreans, or just the South Korean troops authorized to approach the border?The implication is that the U.S. military now has unfettered access to the Yalu River.Still, the chiefs of staff of the Joint Conference were silent on it.

MacArthur's new offensive progressed rapidly.By October 10, the 23th Army and South Korean troops had reached the Qingchuan River, which ran parallel to it, 8 miles south of the Yalu River.To the north of the Qingchuan River basin, there is a narrow mountain range that winds its way to the Yalu River.The range's closest point to the Yalu River overlooks the huge Xihu hydropower dam and reservoir, which forks between steep peaks along the river's banks, forming numerous fjord-like valleys.If the United Nations forces want to control the Yalu River crossing, they must first control this watershed.To this end, the UN forces had to occupy three villages—Taechuan, Unsan, and Onjing—at the southern entrances to the three great river valleys.

The progress of the United Nations forces was so rapid and the defeat of the North Korean People's Army so complete that MacArthur issued another order on October 10, effectively making the Yalu itself his new - and he hoped final - goal Wire.He lifted the final restrictions on the American advance, and the Eighth and Tenth Armies were "authorized to employ any and all ground forces ... as necessary to control the whole of North Korea."

At this point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff hesitated.In a telegram they sent on the same day, they reminded MacArthur of their September 9 instruction that only South Korean troops could fight "in the northeast region bordering the Soviet Union or along the 'Manchuria' frontier."Although they believed MacArthur had "just cause" to issue the new orders, they demanded to know the status of those orders because his actions were "a matter of concern here."

MacArthur was not prepared to allow Washington to intervene in his offensive.He replied that his order was based on "military necessity" because South Korean forces alone were not strong enough to take North Korea; moreover, South Korean military commanders tended to be emotional and unreliable.MacArthur then used bewildering and illogical language to support his argument: he had not violated the September 9th order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which stated that non-South Korean troops were not allowed to approach the Yalu River. policy issues".MacArthur went on to say that the order itself made clear that its directives "may require revision and thus cannot be considered final." (The Joint Chiefs of Staff may be surprised to find that the recipient of the order, not the issuer, would have amended it in the first place.) MacArthur further defended himself by citing a September 27 letter sent to him by Secretary of Defense Marshall. Telegram that he "could advance north of the 9th parallel with a tactical and strategic sense of freedom."Of course, Marshall actually intended to use this telegram, which was only for MacArthur's personal knowledge, to induce MacArthur to cross the 29th parallel as quietly as possible, so as to avoid the timid supporters of the United States in the United Nations; The directive that non-South Korean troops should not enter the far north is clearly worded.

MacArthur then adopted a "believe me or fail me" attitude.He was well aware of the purpose and intent of the September 9th order.But any other alternative approach could lead to "tactical dangers".MacArthur added, almost as an afterthought: "The whole subject was discussed at my meeting on Wake Island."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not question MacArthur. However, MacArthur's explanation, at least in General Collins's view, was clearly dishonest and labor-intensive, which aroused the vigilance of MacArthur's superiors in the military.In Collins' view, this incident was MacArthur's first open disobedience to military orders.Six months later, Collins testified before the Senate:

I think it's one of many signs that unequivocally suggests that General MacArthur is not following... basic policy. ...which makes us increasingly concerned that, just as he violated a policy this time by not consulting us, he may repeat the same mistakes on other issues of a more serious nature.

In the same week, MacArthur again ignored the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a more indirect way.The incident was sparked by a warning from the CIA.The CIA believed that the Chinese might send troops across the Yalu River to protect the Xihu Hydropower Station, which supplies much of the electricity to Manchuria.The State Department, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked MacArthur to reassure the UN Security Council that he did not intend to harass Xihu.The Joint Chiefs of Staff "authorized" MacArthur on October 10 to act at the request of the State Department—a euphemism in military language for asking him to act as such.MacArthur refused.He didn't intend to bomb Xihu, but he didn't want to be at the disposal of the United Nations until he had convinced himself that the hydropower station was not being used by the Communists to make arms.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not continue to press MacArthur on the matter.In this way, MacArthur once again deftly ignored the orders of his superiors, and got away with it.

"Teacher Returning Home"

U.S. troops resumed combat activity over the summer and early fall.Now that victory was in sight, what Army historian Roy Appleman called "disarmament fever" was everywhere.The War Department spoke with MacArthur about sending some of the Eighth Army's troops back to the United States or to Europe. On October 8, the Pentagon told MacArthur that it had canceled shipments of troops to the Far East scheduled for October and November, saving 10 NCOs.MacArthur did not object.In the Far Eastern Forces, General Walker was eager to ask for additional ammunition just a few weeks ago, and now he told MacArthur that his ammunition was more than enough, and the ammunition ship from the United States should be diverted to Japan in the future.Maj. Gen. Walter Wyble, in charge of Logistics Command in Japan, told his colleagues in San Francisco to cancel any unpaid orders for ground weapons and ammunition and to unload all munitions ships still in port.The 25th Army is circulating a proposed document, which proposes that only the US 10rd Infantry Division should stay in North Korea, and the rest of the troops should return home.

Units of the 1st Cavalry Division were the most optimistic, even talking about a Thanksgiving parade in Tokyo wearing their favorite yellow scarves.Some of these troops actually began to store weapons and guns, ready to return home.When administrators handed out price lists for Christmas presents at North Korean army consumer cooperatives, many troops threw them away, planning to buy New Year's goods in Tokyo.

However, instability in some areas continued to exist, and the 1st Marine Division encountered it once.After an unopposed landing at Wonsan, the division advanced inland to a distance of 35 miles from Goju when it bewilderedly encountered North Korean People's Army units reorganized as guerrillas.Although the division's overwhelming strength and firepower eventually brought the stragglers into submission, the Marines suffered losses nearly equal to their casualties in and around Incheon.

Despite sporadic resistance—mainly in eastern Korea, that is, south of "Manchuria" near the Soviet Union—progress was going well.With MacArthur's approval, the two armies raced northward with almost no actual contact.The object of each force is to advance as quickly and as far as possible without regard to the situation of the other forces or the danger posed by gaps in the battle lines. "Everything is going very well," General Walton Walker told reporters at his headquarters on October 10.

South Korea's 6th division is progressing the fastest.It moved rapidly northward along the main trunk of the Qingchuan River valley, without encountering significant resistance, sweeping town after town. On the morning of October 10, the reconnaissance platoon of the 26th Battalion entered Chushan Town, which is facing the Yalu River.Major Harry Fleming, U.S. military adviser, was platooned with the reconnaissance.

From a cliff on the river bank, Fleming and the South Korean troops could see North Korean People's Army soldiers fleeing to Manchuria across a small bridge.They set up a machine gun, set it so that it would not land in China, and shot down a number of North Koreans.After several hours of reconnaissance, the reconnaissance platoon returned to the main force.

In this way, this reconnaissance platoon became the first—and only time—of the Eighth Army to reach the Yalu River during the entire war.

The situation in mid-October was as follows: the Eighth Army was aggressively attacking the western part of North Korea, and the South Korean division swept across the east coast; the international community was unanimous in hoping for a quick victory and peace;Would the Soviets accept the destruction of a satellite state?Will the Chinese do nothing when a hostile country's troops are on the border?The landing of the 10th Division at Liyuan brought the UN forces into a sudden leap near the Chinese border.In the eyes of the Chinese, this action undoubtedly heralds the preparations for the breakthrough of the Yalu River.

MacArthur's stupid way of dispatching the 10th Army has already caused him to lose the chance of a quick victory.Now autumn was turning to winter, but his troops were trapped in the mountains of Asia, which would soon be covered with severe cold and snow.President Truman and his key advisers thought it would be an opportune time to meet with General MacArthur and make plans to achieve the peace they felt was already at hand.

(End of this chapter)