government theory

Chapter 55 On the Dissolution of Government (4)
“Quidergo，nullinecasusinciderepossuntquibuspopulosese erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere et invadere juresuosu queauthoritateliceat？Nullicertequamdiurex manet. Semper enim ex divinis id obstat，Regem honorificato，et qui potestati resistit，Dei ordinationi resistit：non ali s igitur in eum populo polestas estquamsiidcommittatpropterquodipsojurerexessedesinat. Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber；hoc modopopulusetsuperiorefficitur，reversoadeumscilicetjure illoquodanteregeminauguratumininterregnohabuit.Atsunt paucorumgenerumcommissaejusmodiqu hunceffectumpariunt. Ategocumplurimaanimoperlustrem，duotantuminvenio，duos，inquam，casus quibus rex ipso acto ex rege non regem se facit et omni honore et dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit; quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horumunusest, siregnumdisperdat, quemadmodumde Neronefertur, quodisnempesenatumpopulumque Romanum atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare, ac novas sibisedes q u rere decrevisset. Et de Caligula，quod palam denunciarit senequecivemnequeprincipemsenatuiampliusfore，inqueanimo habuerit，interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo，quoque Alexandriam commigrare，acutpopulumunoictuinterimeret，unameicervicem optavit.Taliacumrexaliquis meditaturet moliturserio，omnem regnandicurametanimumilicoabjicit，acproindeimperiumin subditos amittit，ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium.236 . Altercasusest，sirexinalicujusclientelamsecontulit，acregnumquodliberum majoribusetpopulotraditumaccepit，alien ditioni mancipavit. Namtuncquamvisfortenonementeid agit populo plane ut incommodet；tamen quia quod prcipuum est regidignitatisamisit，utsummusscilicetinregnosecundum Deumsit，et solo Deo inferior，atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum，cujuslibertatemsartamettectamconservaredebuit，inalterius gentis ditionemetpotestatemdedidit，h cvelutquadamregniabalienatione effecit, utnecquodipseinregnoimperiumhabuitretineat, necin eumcuicollatum voluit, juris quicquamtransferat ; atqueitaeofacto liberumjametsu potestatispopulum relinquit, cujusreiexemplum unumannales Scoticis suppeditant.—Barclay, Contra Monarchomachos, I.iii, c.16.
The translation of the above is:

237．Then, is it not possible that if the king oppresses the people violently, does the people have the right to arm themselves according to their authority and attack the king?If the king was still a king, such a thing must not have happened.The people cannot do this because of the revelation of God, "Honor the King" and "Whoever rebels against power is rebelling against the command of God".The people, therefore, cannot have power over the king, unless the prince has done something to prevent him from being king; To a private state, the people enjoyed all the powers during the vacancy of the throne before he was made king.But this kind of thing happens only when there are very few failures of government.After researching all aspects, I could only find two occasions.I say that there are only two things in which a king ceases to be a king in his name, and loses power over his people, and this Venzelus also noticed.

The first case is if he attempts to overthrow the government—that is, if he deliberately conspires to bring about the ruin of the whole country.For example, King Nero is recorded in history. He was determined to eradicate the Senate and people of Rome, so he burned the whole city to rubble with fire and sword, and then moved to another place.Another example is the historically recorded Galigula, who publicly declared that he was no longer the head of the people or the Senate. All the people have only one neck, so he can kill the people with one blow.If any king has such a design in his heart, and is serious about its realization, he forsakes all care and care of the state, and consequently loses his power over his people, as if a slave-owner deserts him. slaves, he also lost the right to rule over slaves.

238. In the second case, when a king submits to another king, the kingdom handed down from his fathers and generously handed over to him by the people is also governed by another country.For, even though he did not mean to harm the people, he thereby forfeited the main part of his throne, which was second only to God in the country and was supreme, and he betrayed the people by leaving them in under the domination of other nations, and the liberty of the people is what he should be careful to preserve.As he seemed to have sold his kingdom in this way, he lost the power he had formerly had over it, and those to whom he intended to transfer it did not receive it; freed to make arrangements for themselves.An example of this exists in Scotland's history.

239．Even though Barclay supported absolute monarchy, he had to admit in those cases that the people could rebel against the monarch, and the monarch could cease to be a monarch.We need not give many examples, but, in short, wherever the prince loses his authority, the people can rebel against him, and he is no longer prince; for where there is no authority, there is no prince, and The monarch is just like any other ordinary person.The two occasions which he points out are not very different from the above-mentioned cases of destruction of government, except that he does not indicate the principles upon which his doctrine is based.And this principle is that the prince has failed the trust of the people, and has failed to maintain the form of government agreed to by all, and has not managed to achieve the ends of the government itself for the public welfare and protection of its property.If a king ceases to be a king, and puts himself and his people in a state of war, he has lost his kingship, and what can be done to prevent the people from suing him?The people treated him like anyone else with whom they were at war.Barclay and others of like mind would do well to clarify this.

From what Barclay said, I also noticed this layer, that the people can prevent danger before they are themselves.According to him, a planned tyranny could turn the people against him.These attempts, (he says) if the king carries them out seriously and surely, he renounces all care of the state; Such an attempt can at least be regarded as a sufficient reason for people to resist.And he summed up the whole reason in this way: The king should be careful to guard the liberty of the people, but he betrayed the people or forced them.He also added that "the people are subject to the power and jurisdiction of another country", which does not make much sense, because it is the people's fault and loss of power if they lose the protection of the king, not the people who rule them. different.Whether people become slaves of their own country or of any foreign country, their rights are alike violated and their liberty alike deprived.This is what they have been violated, and they have the right to resist it.To prove this, instances are to be found in all countries where it is a change of government that inflicts insults upon the people, and not a change of the nation of those who govern.

If I remember correctly, a bishop of our church and a staunch advocate of the power and privileges of monarchs, Bilson, in his treatise The Obedience of Christians, admitted that monarchs could forfeit their powers and The status to which subjects obey.If the facts are obvious but authority is needed, I can refer the reader to Brackton, Fortescue, the authors of The Mirror, and others who either understand our government or are not related to it. For the enemy.But I think it is sufficient to refer to Hooker's theory for the satisfaction of the advocates of ecclesiastical government, who are governed by a strange fate in which they deny Hooker's Those principles on which to build his argument.They had better wonder if, here, they have become the tools of cunning workmen to tear down their own buildings.Of this I am sure, their social policies are so novel, so dangerous, and so harmful to the interests of both the rulers and the people, that the people have not advocated them in the past. the legacy of the slave overseer, then one will think with contempt of those servile sycophants who, though useful as they may seem, have reduced all government to absolute tyranny, and want all men to be born in a state of servitude befitting their own base souls.

240．Presumably here again the often-asked question arises: who is to judge even if the sovereign or the legislature behaves not in accordance with their mandate?Perhaps, if the power exercised by the prince is only the privilege he should exercise, there will be malicious and malicious people spreading rumors among the people.To this, my answer is: the people should be the judges, and it is the people's entrustment to the monarch, so who can be a more suitable judge except the entruster?The trustee gave the monarch a mandate, and when the monarch failed the mandate, the people had the right to withdraw it.If this is justified in individual cases, why not in cases of the utmost importance, when the welfare of thousands is at stake, and where the evil would be more difficult, more laborious and dangerous to remedy if left unguarded how about this?
241．But there is another layer, the question of who should be the judge does not imply that there should be no judge; because if there is no judiciary in the world to resolve people's disputes, then the judge can only be God in heaven.Of course, he alone is the arbiter of justice; but on such occasions, as on all others, whether the other man has put himself in a state of war with him, or whether he should be like Jephthah Appeal to the highest referee, and each one to judge for himself.

If some matter is not regulated by law and when there is doubt and the stake is high, a dispute arises between the sovereign and a part of the people, in such cases I think the best arbiter is the collective of the people.Because the monarch is entrusted by the people, he is not bound by ordinary laws on ordinary occasions. If someone feels that he has been harmed and thinks that the behavior of the monarch has failed the entrustment of the people or exceeded the scope of entrustment, then except for the people's collective ( Except that the people collectively entrusted the monarch), who can be the arbitrator and accurately judge the scope of the people's original entrustment?But if the sovereign, or anyone in power, refuses to settle disputes in this way, there is only heaven for help.Forcing is a state of war if the parties to whom it is used lack a recognized superior, or if the circumstances do not permit the referee to be called for help.In this case, the only option is to seek help from heaven, and the injured party has to judge for himself when it is appropriate to seek help from heaven.

242．My conclusion is that, in participating in society, each person confers on society certain powers which, as long as society does not disappear, cannot return to the individual, but remain in society; for otherwise, there would be no Where there is society, there will be no state, and this is contrary to the original agreement.In the same way, therefore, if the society has committed the legislative powers to an assembly—and this assembly is composed of several persons—it is for them and their successors to continue to exercise these powers, and to give the assembly the sphere and power, then, so long as the government does not disappear, the legislative power cannot be returned to the people; for they have given power to the legislature, and let the legislature exist forever, so the political power given up by the people cannot be taken back, but only can be given to the legislature.But if they fix a period for the existence of the legislature, so that this power is only temporarily enjoyed by any individual or assembly, or if those who hold it lose it by abusing it, then when the power is lost, or when the fixed period comes, the society may By regaining these powers, the people have the right to exercise supreme power, and the legislative power will continue to be exercised by them.Or a new form of government may be instituted, or under the old form of government the legislative power may be given to new persons as they see fit.

(End of this chapter)