Iron Cross

Hewitt knew that it was inappropriate for him to interrupt, because this was an Army matter. It was very unserious for him, a naval general, to express his opinions. If serious battle damage occurred in the future, he would not be able to bear the responsibility. As for himself, he would never take the responsibility. If a destroyer fights a cruiser, wouldn't that be a collision of eggs and stones? However, apparently there are also U.S. Army officers who don’t see it that way.

He heard a voice with a strong English accent speak: "It is necessary for the Sherman to install new tank guns, but it is unnecessary to delay the departure for this reason. When Hitler attacked Russia, he had no tanks. The T-34 is also comparable to the Russians. Has he stopped attacking? We can’t be frightened by the Germans.”

The voice was familiar to him—it was the voice of Army Major General George Patton.

"George, what nonsense are you talking about? If you can't find a way to change the cannon without wasting time, you should shut up that stinky mouth of yours." U.S. Secretary of War Henry Lewis on the side*** *Said unhappily.

Even though the ****** student scolded him harshly, Hewitt knew that Patton had a good relationship with the minister. He was the minister's external liaison officer 30 years ago. He seemed so affectionate after being scolded by his old boss. It would be better to replace him with General Marshall. I still dare not say that about Barton.

Sure enough, Patton shrugged indifferently: "I can't do this. What I mean is that we can just take the old Sherman and set off, and keep the new one at home and modify it slowly. Besides, the only place we are going to is France." Man, they couldn't handle the old Sherman, could they?"

Everyone was dumbfounded by this statement: the French really couldn't deal with Sherman, but now the Germans are in Tobruk, and the tanks in their hands are man-eating tigers. Once Britain and the United States land in Morocco and Algeria, the Germans who react will inevitably rush over from the front and attack them in large numbers. Without reliable armored forces, they may not be able to consolidate the landing sites. But the British didn't care about this. They finally found an American general who was willing to support their views. They suddenly became energetic and repeated the views they had just repeated several times. Hewitt frowned, and so did everyone else. Yawning profusely, looking impatient.

Patton fired the cannon and then retreated. Then he saw Hewitt and offered his hand to shake. Even after shaking Patton's hand and exchanging smiles, Hewitt still had a poor impression of his Operation Torch collaborator. He felt that he still couldn't understand this weirdo. He was obviously a talented, charming soldier who fought for honor, but that charm lasted too short, and he soon showed his arrogance and unruliness. The untamed side. Hewitt had never had any dealings with Patton. At first, he admired this armored major general who seemed passionate and ruthless. However, in order to prepare plans related to the Torch Project, his impression of Patton plummeted.

The staff of Task Force 34 proposed that a large-scale amphibious landing campaign would require at least 6 months of preparation from the time the order was received to the departure of the fleet. However, due to the endless quarrels between Britain and the United States, Task Force 34 was only given 7 weeks in the end. Preparation time - this is the most complex military operation in American history. The lack of time originally drove Hewitt crazy, but Patton's casual attitude made the army-navy collaboration even more painful. Although Patton kept scolding the damn idiots in Washington for their delay in making up their mind to fight, instead of moving his headquarters to Hampton Roads, Patton continued to stay in a spacious and bright office on the top floor of the Munitions Building on the National Mall in Washington, doing nothing.

Hewitt angrily criticized Patton more than once in front of his subordinates: I have called and written many times to tell him that he must come as soon as possible to cooperate with us, but he proposed a landing site in Morocco without consulting the navy at all. There was no beach on one side and a shallow shoal full of booby traps on the other - God knows what he was thinking.

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Chapter 12 Hewitt’s Troubles (1)

It was approaching the end of September, and the weather in Washington had already begun to turn cooler, but U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Kent Hewitt's heart was filled with heat, or more precisely, uneasiness caused by anxiety.

A few months ago, he received the task of landing in Northwest Africa. This was the policy determined by the Allies at the Arcadia Conference on Christmas Day in 1941. Prime Minister Churchill specifically proposed the "Northwest Africa Plan" - codenamed "Sportsman", which planned to land in Algeria, Africa in order to gradually tighten the encirclement of Germany, and said that if France agreed, the US military would also land on the coast of Morocco. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not interested in this plan, President Roosevelt himself agreed with it and repeatedly promoted it.

At first, the plan was designed perfectly: wait for the British 8th Army to achieve a decisive victory in Cyrenaica, and then cooperate with the British and American Allied forces to land in Northwest Africa to completely kill the North African Axis forces. But in June this year, not only did the expected victory not come, but the African Army, led by Rommel, even took the lead in attacking the Jazzala Line and caused the collapse of the British Army in North Africa. However, Churchill's enthusiasm for this plan has not diminished. Not only did he change its name to "Super Sportsman", he even advocated that the Allied forces land in Northwest Africa as soon as possible and advance to the border of the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw the plight of the British Army in North Africa and decided to help these "poor and pathetic Anglo-Saxons" - this was what Hewitt heard from General Marshall, and what Hopkins, the President's special envoy and close friend, said in private. It is not known whether President Roosevelt meant it. The promised siege of the Axis forces ended up being a relief for the British Army, and he felt very irritated anyway. The US side suggested November 7, and finally President Roosevelt compromised and required the landing date to be no later than October 30.

In July, the US-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee held two more meetings in London. Finally, at Churchill's initiative, the battle plan was renamed "Torch" in the hope of inspiring people, and it was determined that American Lieutenant General Eisenhower would be the commander. However, in addition to the agreement on the commander, the differences in time and place were even greater. In a hurry to relieve the North African troops, the British side suggested October 7 as the target date, while the American side suggested November 7. Finally, President Roosevelt compromised and asked for the landing date to be no later than October 30.

Finally, Eisenhower, the commander-in-chief of the operation, proposed a compromise plan: it was suggested to land simultaneously inside and outside the Mediterranean, but not to cross the east of Algiers, because the German army might send planes from Sicily and Sardinia to carry out air strikes, and only a small-scale landing in Bonico to seize the airport. Unfortunately, the British side was not satisfied and insisted on a large-scale landing in Bonico or further east. After more than half a month of quarrels, in the countless telegrams between Roosevelt and Churchill, it was not until September 15 that the two sides finally reached an agreement: November 8 was the designated landing date, and the Algiers landing was agreed to be included in the plan, but the US military only landed in Casablanca, Morocco and Oran, Algeria, and the British army landed in Algiers and further east. Hewitt criticized Patton in front of his subordinates more than once: I have called and written to him many times to tell him to come as soon as possible to cooperate with us, but he proposed a landing site in Morocco without consulting the navy at all. There was no beach in one place and a shallow shoal full of booby traps in the other place - God knows what he was thinking.

Hewitt's order was to lead the 34th US Task Force, with 102 US warships (including 29 transport ships) and more than 30,000 US troops from Hampton Roads, Virginia to Casablanca, Morocco, to carry out an expedition spanning 4,500 nautical miles. The task of capturing Oran was given to the Central Task Force, which had nearly 20,000 US troops, commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall and escorted by British naval forces commanded by Commodore Thomas Trubridge - because these troops were transported to Scotland and Northern Ireland in early August, and they had spent two months doing nothing in countless quarrels between the top leaders of both sides.

I thought the plan was finalized, but only 10 days later, Hewitt was called to a meeting again. He heard a fierce argument before he even entered the room.

"The enemy situation has changed dramatically. We can't simply follow the original plan." An American staff officer said something with red ears, while the British liaison officer stationed at the Joint Chiefs of Staff had an indignant look on his face.