New Shun 1730

This idea is naive. It is also a continuation of thinking under the influence of the Dashun orthodoxy.

But at least, it is an idea.

It seems to be more reliable than the mysterious cultivation of virtue and the kingly way.

At least in Niu Er's opinion, he thinks it is more reliable.

Because there is such an idea.

So in his heart, he has his own judgment on what to do, what is right, and what is wrong.

Then in his judgment, it is completely wrong to follow the local customs and retain the original taxation system in India.

Although it seems that it is easy to preserve this system, Dashun can easily collect taxes here-since Timur's descendants can collect taxes here, Afghans can collect taxes here, and British can collect taxes here, it is not difficult for Dashun to collect taxes according to its tradition.

However, in Niu Er's opinion, Dashun's vassal policy, foreign policy, or the purpose of managing vassal states should all revolve around the development of industry and commerce and his thousand-ship immigration plan.

Including the pressure that Dashun has put on Japan and Korea in recent years, the conquest of Nanyang, etc., in his opinion, the ideas are all consistent.

He thinks that Liu Yu's ideas are like this, and he believes that what he thinks of Liu Yu's ideas is correct.

Since the Songsu reform has already caused many problems, these problems can be predicted and solved in the next reform.

For example, the people who lost their land in Songsu, the court had no money before, so in Niu Er's view, the Duke of Xingguo worked hard to let capital play its role and move the people to Guandong and Nanyang.

Then, immigration to the South Ocean and North America is not profitable. As long as the court has money, can't the court do this? The court can do it.

As long as these problems are solved, the coastal areas can follow the path of the Songsu reform.

Therefore, Dashun's vassal policy should be based on the idea of ​​​​favoring the development of industry and commerce and being able to collect enough taxes to immigrate.

Obviously, continuing India's original taxation policy is not conducive to this long-term goal.

On this point, Niu Er believes that the rule of Dashun and Britain over Bengal is necessarily different.

Britain can drive the development of Bengal's industry and commerce in a short period of time because the British come to buy. Calcutta has gathered tens of thousands of people in just a few years, all of which are mainly engaged in the textile industry.

Dashun will cause the collapse of Bengal's old industry and commerce in a short period of time. Even if it cannot be sold, it will never buy something.

Then, the most favorable state for Dashun in Bengal should be to grow rice, jute, cotton, twist yarn, sell raw silk, and reel silk.

Other industries such as iron smelting, weaving, pottery, etc. should all be destroyed.

And if you want to promote the development of rice, cotton, and mulberry trees, you must not adopt the original taxation system.

Otherwise, the Great Chamindar contracted 11 million silver taxes, subcontracted to the next level to collect 20 million, and then subcontracted to the next level to collect 30 million... What kind of cotton, mulberry trees, and rice are they planting?

How many times has Dashun suffered losses in such things? Reality has proven that if this is done, people will only hoard land and collect rent, rather than engage in planting and reclamation of agriculture.

Niu Er's idea of ​​how to solve this problem is also very simple.

Break up all the big ones.

Make the small ones hereditary, that is, let them be real landlords and fully privatize.

Some small chaimingdars, in theory, still have land owned by the government, and they are only responsible for contracting the taxes of several villages. Of course, they also have their own land, manors, etc.

Niu Er's idea is to make the contract hereditary, which is a disguised radical landlord ownership reform.

For example, this chaimingdar has four villages. So, just draw a circle, measure the scope of these four villages, and directly give this chaimingdar a permanent contract.

From a legal point of view, the land originally belonging to these four villages belongs to the government. The chaimingdar just helps the government collect taxes.

Now, the four villages are directly packaged together. Taxes are still collected as before, but the permanent right to use the land belongs to the Zamindar. The government collects land taxes from the Zamindar. Legally, the Zamindar collects rent from farmers, not tax farmers to help the court collect taxes.

Farmers are still farmers, not serfs, and the Zamindar has no legal power to control these farmers.

It doesn't matter whether they migrate, run away, or change their homes.

In short, the colonial government recognizes acres, not people.

It is a radical means to break the village community tradition and the unclear issue of land ownership, and quickly turn a group of roles between landlords and tax collectors into landlords.

In the future, whether you run a plantation, rent the land to industrialists and businessmen, and drive the people to flee; or force the people to grow rice and cotton; or you have no ambition and want to live by collecting rent, it will be convenient.

Because the ruling level of Dashun can never reach every farmer directly, and it is also troublesome for Dashun to deal with things like the village community system and the caste system.

Therefore, in Niu Er's opinion, this method of clarifying ownership and mass-producing landlords is the most suitable method for Dashun.

Farmers originally had to pay taxes, and because of the existence of the tax farming system and the layered subcontracting system, their taxes were not low.

Now it is nothing more than a change of skin, and the taxes that farmers have to pay have been replaced by landlords' rent in name. For farmers, there is not much difference, and it may even be lighter than before.

Because the middle link is reduced, although there is still a middleman. But compared with the legendary 8-layer middleman system under the original Zamindar system, it certainly reduces the burden on the people.

With 8 layers of middlemen, the government can still receive the same amount of money, and how much tax is borne by the lower level, only God knows.

It is better to directly create a layer of contractors, and Dashun directly creates thousands of landlords with tens of thousands of acres of land in Bengal.

They, as the grassroots pillar of Dashun's rule in Bengal, disintegrate the influence of the original old forces and old aristocrats.

Form a vertical structure of colonial government-county government-landlord-permanent tenants to reduce the middle link.

In terms of taxation, Dashun only deals with these created landlords, not with the farmers and villages below.

There are obvious benefits to doing this.

Politically, the old upper-class forces can be wiped out.

Dashun does not need to hesitate on this point, because Dashun is not Britain, and can use troops in Bengal without any form of compromise with the old upper class.

At the same time, Dashun was not short of grassroots officials, because Dashun had a large number of students who graduated from practical schools, and they could not participate in the imperial examinations. There was no shortage of people for the selection of colonial officials in the form of imperial examinations.

It was nothing more than the content of the examination, which was different from the imperial examinations.

If Dashun had the current strength in the late Ming Dynasty, it would naturally not compromise too much. Now that it is outside and has strong strength, it can choose not to compromise.

And those who were originally lower-level vassals have become permanent landlords. Their power and interests are derived from the colonial government. Of course, they will stand firmly on the side of Dashun.

At the same time, reducing middlemen is also a benevolent policy for farmers, and they will also recognize Dashun's rule.

In terms of taxation, this form will not affect the original tax amount at all.

In theory, Dashun can increase the degree of exploitation, but Niu Er believes that such things should be done slowly and not too harshly.

In terms of economy, this form is conducive to the long-term development of Niu Er's beautiful future.

The per capita land area of ​​Bangladesh is higher than that of Dashun. After the burden is reduced, these farmers who have changed from state farmers to permanent tenants will have greater consumption capacity.

It is wrong to kill the chicken to get the eggs.

We must sustainably exhaust the pond to catch fish.

The main body of Dashun's attack on India is the court, not the company's shareholders, and it is not entirely for the purpose of profit and dividends.

At the same time, the permanent landlord contract system that has been determined is conducive to future agricultural transformation and the promotion of improved varieties and agricultural technology.

On the premise that the tax amount remains unchanged, landlords have a variety of choices. As long as the price of cotton is stronger than rice, some of them will choose to grow cotton.

Even after confirming their permanent possession of the land, they can also rent some land to Dashun capitalists through commercial cooperation, and let them open up cotton plantations and the like.

This can also greatly accelerate the polarization of rich and poor in rural areas.

The small landlords produced in batches and the permanent land use rights also mean the legalization of land sublease transactions. The problem that the Confucian scholars in Korea are now worried about is the emergence of land transactions and the legalization trend of land transactions. This is exactly the direction that Dashun should actively guide and radically reform in India.

The problem of Dashun is the problem of private ownership of land. It is too serious and too deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, which has become an obstacle to the further development of Dashun.

The problem here is that the concept of private ownership of land is too unclear, which has become a major obstacle for Dashun to make this place a raw material production area and consumer market.

Because the concept of private ownership of land is not very clear and somewhat vague, these small landlords produced in batches can only sign a contract similar to the perpetual tenancy right with the farmers in the village community to continue the tradition.

As long as Dashun recognizes this perpetual tenancy right contract and this tenancy right can be legally resold, it means the promotion of private ownership of land and the huge gap between the rich and the poor in rural areas will soon appear.

This is just another way to quietly promote private ownership of land in Dashun in accordance with Indian traditions.

Of course, this method is only for the legacy of the original dozen or so large Chaidaminer oligarchs.

The rest, of course, will not adopt this method.

For example, some self-cultivating rural communities that have already been divided, they originally paid taxes to the Mujiadan class, and then the Mujiadan class directly paid it to the government.

For this kind of situation, let Dashun take over directly, and Dashun will send people to replace the Mujiadan class, measure the land, and issue land deeds to self-cultivating farmers. Allow buying and selling, and fixed taxes.

For another example, there are still a lot of uncultivated land in Bengal, all of which are owned by the colonial government. Dashun can have people willing to immigrate, or willing to contract plantations, or willing to recruit people to cultivate, that's all.

In the short term, this kind of ruling conception of the land system should not make as much money as the tax farming and auction tax farming methods.

In Niu Er's view, this is exactly the advantage of Dashun. If it is in the form of a British company, shareholders only care about dividends, so it must be how to make more money.

The initiator of the Dashun conquest was the imperial court, so in theory, there could be a long-term, clear goal that was beneficial to the country.

In addition, Niu Er believes that the governance of Dashun's vassal states or colonies in the future should be a discipline centered on "how to promote the development of domestic industry and commerce, how to collect taxes to ensure a large number of domestic immigrants to South Oceania and North America."

The ritual government is outdated.

You must know what the purpose is before you know how to proceed. This is a common phrase used by Confucianism in the ideological confrontation in the late Ming Dynasty. Now Niu Er also wants to use this phrase, but he doesn't know whether the court agrees with his opinion.