The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 10 Whale Fighting Shrimp (4)
Hodge replied that there was no problem.He said he considered "the Koreans and the Japanese to be of the same species" and intended to treat them both as conquered enemies; moreover, the number of Koreans who had fought with the Japanese was so great that he needed time to figure out their true colors.Hodge's speech was reported by the U.S. press, surprising his bosses in Washington.General George Marshall ordered him to disband the Japanese police force and refrain from making further insults to the Koreans, but the damage was done.Hodge later spent another four years in North Korea under the false title of U.S. vice-consul.During those years, his mutual opinion with the North Koreans has not changed.

Hodge had his reasons, and in his first few months in North Korea he received no direction from Washington, forcing him to start from scratch.He had not been trained to serve as a local military commander, his unit lacked Korean-speaking personnel, and the rapid postwar discharge deprived his division of some of its most experienced officers and men.In addition, the departure of the Japanese left the North Korean economy in a mess.

At this very moment, Syngman Rhee, a long-time exile, was spending the first few weeks after the war restlessly in Washington. In June, he asked the U.S. to recognize him as the leader of the North Korean government, since other exiles had given him the title of high commissioner for North Korea in the 6s.However, some mid-level diplomats always portrayed him as a critical old man (Sungman Rhee was 20 years old at the time), who had been away from his homeland for 20 years, and his self-appointed titles were old things, which made people doubtful .The State Department (June 69), at the direction of President Truman, refused to recognize Syngman Rhee's "Provisional Government" (and any other organization); bargain".

But in October 1945, Syngman Rhee suddenly found support from an unexpectedly powerful force.General MacArthur wanted to find a national leader he could trust in North Korea.Therefore, he once asked other Asians, especially Chiang Kai-shek of China: Of all these people who claimed to be the leader of North Korea, who was the most suitable?
Chiang Kai-shek had never met Syngman Rhee at that time, but he knew about Syngman Rhee from some sources he thought were reliable.One of them is Kim Koo, who once served as the "president" of Syngman Rhee's interim government and stayed in Chongqing, the capital of China during the war.Chiang Kai-shek, like Syngman Rhee, was a converted Christian, and the Protestant churches in China spoke highly of the North Korean, and many North Korean exiles who had become rich in business in China tried their best to recommend him.Syngman Rhee's staunch anti-communism was also a selling point for Chiang Kai-shek, whose government was being battered by Communists at home.

Therefore, both Syngman Rhee and Kim Goo returned to Seoul in mid-October 1945 under MacArthur's order.At the same time, the State Department sent MacArthur a comprehensive policy instruction on the North Korean issue, "to create conditions for the establishment of a free and independent country in North Korea in stages"; , the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China under a period of trusteeship, and eventually "achieve...full independence" and join the United Nations.

Regardless of the presence of Kim Koo, MacArthur made it clear that Syngman Rhee would be the ruler.Following MacArthur's orders, Hodge welcomed Syngman Rhee back to Seoul with a dramatic ceremony, and after an impassioned introduction, Rhee emerged from behind the scenes to take the stage.Hodge urged "all North Koreans to embrace their leader Syngman Rhee".

As Truman had declared in June, it was the policy of the US government not to support any individual or group.Hodge sees this policy as dangerous. In December 6, he reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "The North Koreans desire independence above all else, and immediately." Form a coalition government composed of Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, and another resistance leader, Kim Kyu-sik.But Syngman Rhee didn't want to be part of a coalition government. He wanted himself to be supreme. He organized a party called the "Society for Rapid Independence" and held frequent rallies across the country.He sought broad support from all walks of life, but never engaged in any form of alliance with the Communists.

In General Hodge's view, North Korean politics is a quagmire, and it's better for him not to get into it as much as possible. Frustrated by the spat in late December, he suggested to the War Department that the Soviets and the Americans simultaneously withdraw from Korea and leave the country “to purify itself by the inevitable civil strife.”

The Russians have no intention of cooperating.In the months after the war, they quickly established a satellite state on the Soviet model, headed by returned guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung.Thousands of Koreans returned home from exile in "Manchuria" and the Soviet Union, most of whom had been fully communisized during their exile.Opponents were imprisoned or fled to the South.By mid-1946, Kim Il-sung's grip was so tight that the Russians only had to leave an occupying force of 1 in North Korea. (By comparison, Hodge's force has about 4.3 American soldiers).

The most important thing is that in 1945, at the meeting of the four major foreign ministers held in Moscow, the Soviets pushed the United States to the point where it was difficult to parry.The foreign ministers agreed to set up a joint U.S.-Soviet committee to consult with the North Korean leader and create a nationwide interim government.After a "five-year-long" mandate, North Korea will be unified and independent, with a government chosen by the people.

The trusteeship proposal aroused violent turmoil in South Korea, and Hodge had to use the army to take to the streets to suppress the riots.The Soviets cleverly concocted false propaganda that the idea of ​​the trusteeship was concocted by the Americans (Stalin had accepted the idea at Yalta), and that the Americans actually wanted a ten-year mandate.The Soviets also stated (again, speculatively) that they were ready to make North Korea independent at any time.In this diplomatic game, the Russians had the upper hand, and Hodge was furious. In February 1946, he told MacArthur: "The North Koreans think that the Americans have 'betrayed them' again."

At formal negotiating sessions in January and February 1946, the United States proposed an annexation, but the Soviets did not want their tightly controlled satellite state to disintegrate.The intentions of the Soviets were completely exposed to MacArthur, Hodge and American diplomats.As long as the unrest in South Korea intensifies and the United States becomes increasingly unpopular, a pro-Soviet communist regime will emerge as the times require.

There are many reasons why Americans are in a dilemma.No government could have been created amidst the political turmoil engulfing South Korea at the time to match the disciplined North, which was already working on raising an army.MacArthur's initial choice of leader, Syngman Rhee, was an unreliable figure.For example, in December 1945, a counterintelligence unit of the Army's security agency routinely tapped the phones of the elderly Syngman Rhee and intercepted his letters while he was planning a trip to the United States.Syngman Rhee sent tributes to such figures as Franklin D. Roosevelt's widow Eleanor Roosevelt, United Nations General Assembly President Paul Henry Spark, United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Rye, and Francis Spellman of the Catholic Archdiocese of New York. The archbishop and other dignitaries sent letters. In December 12, William Longdon, a political official in charge of occupation affairs, sent a telegram to the State Department summarizing Rhee's various intentions.Syngman Rhee's intention to "break and disintegrate" the United States' attempt to impose a trusteeship was aimed at gaining public opinion in the United States and the United Nations to end the American occupation. (Syngman Rhee managed to get access to the figures he sought to curry favor with in his letters, but no one would help him.) Hodge believed that Syngman Rhee had deliberately undermined U.S. policy, so the occupying authorities had to pick someone else.Kim Koo, a one-time Rhee ally who was in China during the war, is a tamer alternative. In December 1945, political adviser Longdon sent a classified cable back to the State Department setting out pragmatic reasons for America's firm principles for any new Korean government:

The old local regime was feudal and corrupt inside.But the record shows that it is the best in dealing with foreign interests in the three countries of the Far East, protecting the lives, property and businesses of foreign nationals, and respecting treaty and charter rights.I am sure that at least we should rely heavily on the aforementioned local regimes...

But Kim Koo failed to win the support of the people.He chaired a "committee" that the occupying authorities had hoped would transform into a government, an idea that fell through after only a few weeks.By early 1946, the occupying authorities felt exhausted and unable to establish any kind of transitional government.The all-pervasive Syngman Rhee has political cunning to stir up riots in the streets and take on other leaders, even though he can't say anyone is following him.An outside observer, Mark Gaine of the Chicago Sun-Times, considered him a "sly and cunning dangerous figure, a relic of the past who stumbles into this age, using clichés and democratic mechanisms to achieve its baseness." shameless authoritarian purpose".In Gaeun's eyes, Syngman Rhee was a puzzling figure, a thin man with thinning white hair, pale lips, sparse eyebrows, and narrow eyelids that always covered his eyes, making him appear to be in a coma. drowsy.The language he spoke was, as one North Korean described Gaine, "Pidgin Korean with a Hawaiian accent."One of Hodge's political advisers assured Gein that Syngman Rhee was by no means a fascist, "he was 200 years before fascism—a real ultra-conservative."

But Syngman Rhee has set the bottom line: North Korea, a small shrimp, will never again be crushed to pieces in a whale fight.

american get away
In the next two years, from 1946 to 1948, there were so many telegrams between the State Department and the War Department and the occupation authorities that it was easier to measure them with a ruler than with page numbers.The cables read dry and the same, all written by diplomats and military officers about finding solutions that people knew at the end of the day to be a waste of time.What the occupation authorities are dealing with are political grievances and disputes that have been forged for decades. There were as many as 113 "political parties" in South Korea at one time, and almost none of them were willing to join hands with others.Regular consultations with the Soviets about hosting all of Korea were fruitless.Intelligence from North Korea convinced Hodge that the threat of southward invasion was "not just a rumor."The political officials of the occupation authorities believed that the Soviets had established themselves in a war of attrition, and they were sure that the Americans would eventually give up and leave Korea.Hodge realized in mid-1946 that "although North Korea is far from being on the agenda of American foreign policy .

Washington's final decision was imperative: the United States would have no other choice but to discharge its obligations to South Korea.The main reason was the drastic downsizing of the U.S. military in the postwar years.On this point, Truman fully echoed the voice of the people, who cried, "Let the lads go home!" Hundreds of pairs of baby shoes were also given to members of Congress to emphasize that they expected their husbands and fathers to return home as soon as possible. Home. On the day of victory against Japan in August 1945, some 8 million men and women in the United States were serving in the military. In January 1, Truman notified the Pentagon of his intention to maintain a standing military force of 200 million men (the generals hoped to add another 1946 million).But Congress, which pays more attention to public opinion than the president, has gone further on this issue. In the spring of 1, the appropriations committees of both houses of Congress limited the number of troops (of all services) to no more than 200 million by July 100, 1946.Thousands of ships, tanks and planes will be mothballed, and the army will become a garrison, mainly for occupation and training.

During the first few months of 1947, the State and Defense departments primarily considered how to deploy these limited forces, and there was no doubt that Europe had to take precedence.After the war, the Soviets had consolidated their hold on Eastern Europe and showed every sign of attacking the weakened France and Italy.As a counter force, the U.S. military can use no more than 2 divisions—more than 2 soldiers, no more than a thousand people—while the Soviet army and satellite country troops in front of them amount to 65 divisions.

On September 1947, 9, a memorandum signed by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dwight Eisenhower, on behalf of the chiefs of staff, was presented to Secretary of Defense James Forrest.On this basis, the United States made an important decision.The memo concluded that maintaining military bases and troops in North Korea "has little strategic significance" given the limited U.S. military capabilities.The National Security Council and Truman agreed.Forrest gives the following reasons:
In the event of war in the Far East, our present troops in Korea would be a military burden, and would be difficult to sustain without substantial reinforcements before war breaks out.Moreover, most of the United States will bypass the Korean Peninsula if it launches any offensive operations against the Asian continent.

Forrest acknowledged that enemy naval and air bases in North Korea could interfere with U.S. operations in the region.However, these bases are "vulnerable to paralysis by air strikes."He claimed that air operations "are more feasible and less expensive than large-scale ground operations."The 4.5 U.S. troops stationed in North Korea "can be used in other regions," and the withdrawal of these troops "will not weaken the military strength of the Far East."According to the phased withdrawal plan, more than 4 U.S. occupation troops will be withdrawn by June 1950.The significance of this action is that the United States is moving away from its responsibilities to North Korea.

However, the United States has no intention of completely handing over the Republic of Korea to the North Koreans themselves. In October 1947, the United States asked the United Nations to form a committee to hold elections throughout North Korea by March 10, 1948.An elected government would take control of the country, while American and Soviet troops withdrew.The Soviets argued that the UN had no right to exercise jurisdiction over North Korea because North Korea was not a member of the United Nations.Although the U.N. General Assembly passed the U.S. proposal, the Soviets stated that they would not participate in any elections.

The United States will not fall into the trap of the Soviet Union.Although a February 1948 CIA report estimated that "after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, it would be difficult for any South Korean government to maintain its independence," the State Department informed the United Nations to proceed with elections in southern Korea to select members of the National Assembly and Organize the government.The Communists were the first to boycott the elections.However, with more than four-fifths of eligible North Koreans registered to vote, the communists' boycott campaign failed and they turned violent on election day, May 2, killing more than 5 people in and around polling stations.Even so, more than 10 percent of the registered electorate turned out to turn out, and the UN committee later called the election "an effective expression of the free will of the electorate."

Syngman Rhee was the clear winner: He won more than 90 percent of the vote, securing a seat in the National Assembly representing Seoul. On May 5, the National Assembly held a meeting, and Rhee Chengman was publicly elected as the speaker and proceeded to formulate a constitution.The constitution was promulgated on July 31, 1948, and three days later, Syngman Rhee was elected president of the Republic of Korea.After more than 7 years of struggle, the old man finally won the country's independence.

(End of this chapter)