The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 11 Whale Fighting Shrimp (5)
The question now is how long can the Republic of Korea last in the face of North Korea's growing military might, with U.S. troops withdrawn? General Douglas MacArthur's inauguration of Syngman Rhee in Seoul in August 1948 perhaps inadvertently boosted morale in South Korea.He told the new president: "I will do my best to help and defend the North Korean people. I will defend the North Korean people from aggression as I defended the United States and California."

Of course, MacArthur could not do this at all in fact, because the 4 occupying army has begun to withdraw quickly, leaving only a military mission composed of 61 officers and soldiers as planned.But two major events in North Korea in the autumn of 1948 brought this plan to an abrupt halt.First, the Soviets announced the establishment of a government with Kim Il as prime minister; second, they threatened to withdraw all Red Army troops from North Korea by the end of the year, and suggested that the U.S. troops also withdraw from the South at the same time.Russia's eagerness to withdraw foreign troops has left American officials in Seoul suspicious, fearing an invasion by Kim Il Sung's forces.As a result, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided in December 1948 to temporarily maintain a regimental combat team of about 12 American troops, but at the same time made it clear that U.S. troops would not be stationed in South Korea indefinitely, limited to helping the fledgling The country spends its first few months after independence.

Syngman Rhee Takes Responsibility

The new role of the United States in South Korea was reinforced by the official end of the American occupation in August 1948 and the arrival of Ambassador John Mucho.Muccio, who was 8 that summer, had started his diplomatic career in 48, spending most of his time in Latin America and the Far East.Mucho is a ruggedly handsome bachelor who colleagues say has a refined taste in both women and whiskey ("He's a flirt," one says, "you go to a party with him and watch him flirt with those women You can see that he may have slept with a considerable number of women present.") Mucho has a good friendship with the military, he can drink and chat with junior officers, he is full of manliness, and he is very manly with those gentle diplomats Quite different; professional soldiers tend to dismiss those diplomats as "bare-ass society jerks".

Upon arriving in the country, Mucho is almost immediately bombarded by the moody Syngman Rhee.The senior military officer in the Republic of Korea, Major General John Coulter, is trying to negotiate a treaty for the United States to provide military assistance to the Republic of Korea.In short, what Syngman Rhee wanted was money and equipment, but the US was not allowed to control the use of the equipment.He is very happy for Americans to serve as "advisors" in his army, but he does not want the word "advisor" to appear in the aid agreement.Once this happens, it will give people the impression that he is attached to the United States.The U.S. backed down by dropping the word "advisor" from the agreement, but Mr. Muccio held on to another issue.The United States hopes to maintain control of South Korean troops during the withdrawal period, especially those along the [-]th parallel, in order to prevent a sudden North Korean attack.Syngman Rhee objected to this, but to no avail.

Although these bouts were painful, it also made Mu Qiao appreciate Lee Syngman a little more.His disagreements with the South Korean president were routine and often frustrating after the fact, but at least he understood the man:

Syngman Rhee had fought for so long in what amounted to guerrilla warfare that by the time he was finally officially elected president of North Korea, he was very old. ...he has been unable to transform from ...his revolutionary instincts into an officially recognized head of state.When his frame of mind is logical, he has an excellent view of history. ...but when he got emotional, he fell back on his long-held instinct of survival as a person. ...

Mu Qiao and Syngman Rhee got more and more in touch, and finally turned to support South Korea's request that the US military continue to stay.The contentious issue filled the first few months of 1949 as the State and Defense departments each strayed from their proper roles on the issue—diplomats demanding that U.S. troops stay in North Korea, and generals arguing that they should be withdrawn immediately.The State Department, through Walton Butterworth of the Far Eastern Affairs Branch, argued that the Communist victory in China in 1949 necessitated a new view of North Korea: the Chinese were now able to support North Korea's takeover of South Korea.He speaks of an "increasingly certain notion . . . that the Soviet Union is now determined to destroy the new (South Korean) government as soon as possible.  …"

Deputy Secretary of the Army William Draper Jr. said that from a military point of view, South Korea still had "no strategic interest" to the United States, and the presence of troops would only cause trouble.In addition, the Army did not budget for troops stationed in North Korea after 1949.

The NSC (and Truman) leaned toward the military's opinion after months of study. National Security Council Report No. 1949/3, approved by Truman on March 23, 8, emphasized the need for the United States to help the Koreans build up their military forces and that the danger of North Korean invasion "exists at all times for the foreseeable future with ".The National Security Council cited concerns that U.S. forces "would either be wiped out or inevitably abandon North Korea in the face of a massive onslaught. Either scenario would seriously damage the reputation of the United States."The National Security Council set June 2, 1949, as the deadline for troop withdrawal.The South Koreans will be supplied with supplies for six months and American advisers will help them build a military force of at least 6 men.

The significance of the NSC's conclusion is that it represents the second time in three years that the government has decided to oppose a further US military role in South Korea.The NSC staff made these decisions after months of rigorous research.But as we shall see, by June 1950, US policy had turned 6 degrees in just 24 hours.

Mucho attended the final days of discussions on the withdrawal in Washington, then returned to Seoul on a mission to satisfy Rhee with the decision.He asked to keep quiet "until I have a chance to fool Syngman Lee".Muccio is determined to give the South Korean president a trick:

The first thing I did when I returned to North Korea was to point out to Syngman Rhee the enormous progress (and good progress they had) made by the newly created South Korean security forces.

Syngman Rhee soon bowed again and again, and boasted in front of everyone that his boys did a good job and could control the situation.As soon as he made such a public statement, I started to fool him. "Yeah, now is the time to withdraw our troops." He was extremely angry, but it was too late to stop.

However, Rhee could use the withdrawal of US troops as a condition, demanding far more weapons than Washington would (or could) provide.He wants to establish a "regular air force" with 2 fighter squadrons and 1 bomber squadron, a total of 30 P-51 fighters and 12 B-25 bombers, as well as 2 escort destroyers, 2 submarines, 5 Minesweeper and several support ships.He wants to create an Army force of 10, plus a reserve force of 5, all with modern American equipment.These demands were all rejected by the United States.As the time limit for troop withdrawal on June 6 approached, Syngman Rhee suddenly played a new trick. He wanted to publicly embarrass the United States.

In a public statement, Rhee angrily accused the Americans of abandoning his country.He also said that there would have been no Communists in the North had it not been for the Americans, who "were invited here because of the agreement between Russia and the United States ... our country was divided ...".The usually unflappable Dean Acheson asked Mucho to warn Rhee that such an outburst would jeopardize future U.S. aid.Acheson sent a telegram saying that Syngman Rhee "should drop his illusion that we would do anything to gain his approval.  …"

Li Chengman fell silent. On May 5, when he invited Muccio to meet with members of his cabinet, the South Korean government was informed for the first time that the last US troops would be withdrawn "in the next few weeks".Rhee, who has proposed a Pacific treaty organization like NATO, has pleaded for his country to be protected in case of violation.

Mucho can't make any promises.The last batch of U.S. troops evacuated by boat on June 6 as scheduled, and the only U.S. soldiers left in South Korea were a small advisory group.

Recast U.S. Strategy
In August 1949, the Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear warhead test.A few months later, Mao Zedong's army took over China.All this led the United States to put into action a series of plans: without changing the current so-called deal with North Korea, which is only to ratify some provisions, these plans must be crucial if there is a war there.

The first policy document was NSC Document 48/2, approved by the NSC and President Truman on December 1949, 12.The document proposed a policy of "containment" against Soviet expansion in the Far East.The document established that the basic goals of the United States were to consolidate a decommunized Asia and to weaken the power of the Soviet Union in the Far East.To use non-military means, mainly to promote economic and political development, and to promote regional alliances of friendly countries.South Korea was included in the list of countries receiving U.S. military and economic aid.The United States will "develop and strengthen the security of the Far East from external aggression and internal subversion by the Communist Party."Therefore, the United States should "improve" its position in "Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines."Due to negligence, South Korea was excluded from a series of protected countries.

Another major decision made by the United States is that it will not assume the military defense obligations of the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang regime that was expelled to Taiwan. On January 1950, 1, Truman publicly stated that the United States had "no intention of seizing" any territory in China, which was an indirect way of saying that he would not try to reverse the Chinese revolution by force.The KMT regime is strong enough to defend itself, and the United States will provide economic help, but not military assistance.

The United States has unabashedly announced new areas of Asia that it intends to directly defend. On January 1, Secretary of State Acheson emphasized the importance of defending Japan in a speech delivered by the National Press Club, which cannot be given up under any circumstances.He said: "The defense line runs from the Aleutian Islands to Japan and then continues to the Ryukyu Islands. We have important defensive positions on the Ryukyu Islands and will continue to maintain these positions... The defense line also extends from the Ryukyu Islands to the Philippine Islands." Acheson was ambiguous about America's obligation to defend "the rest of the Pacific," but he did declare: "It must be made absolutely clear that no one can insure these areas against military attack . . . should an attack occur . . . Rely on the resistance of the people being attacked, and then on the commitment of the entire civilized world guided by the Charter of the United Nations."

When the Korean War broke out six months later, Republican critics castigated Acheson for "inviting" the Communists to invade the South.General Matthew Ridgway (then just a staff officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and later the Korean field commander) thought this was an "overblown and misleading simplification."However, he also said that the timing of Acheson's statement could indeed be criticized, "We have made it clear that we have no intention of defending North Korea, and we have not allowed the enemy to pause even for a moment."

General Douglas MacArthur argued in his memoirs that Acheson had "followed bad advice" on Far East affairs because he kept Taiwan and South Korea out of the line of defense.It seems that MacArthur's memory is not good.About ten months ago, MacArthur outlined a very similar line of defense in a conversation with the British journalist Ward Price."Our line of defense consists of a chain of islands fringing the coast of Asia," he said, citing the Philippines, the Ryukyu Islands, Japan and the Aleutians.Like Acheson, he also left out Taiwan.The only difference between the two statements is that MacArthur listed the islands from south to north, while Acheson listed them from north to south.

Acheson's omission of North Korea in his speech went unnoticed by the public at the time.Indeed, very little attention is paid to North Korea on any occasion.In fact, the House of Representatives rejected a bill to provide $1 million in aid to North Korea in late January while protesting the administration's decision to withhold military aid to Taiwan.Truman and Acheson personally lobbied to get the case passed by the House of Representatives.Ironically, the same Republicans who had been the first to oppose aid to North Korea were the ones who, months later, led the charge that Truman had "abandoned" North Korea.

National Security Council document No. 48/2 deals only with the Far East.Another NSC study, Document No. 1950, prepared in April 4, was in response to the Soviet Union's test of a nuclear warhead in August 68, earlier than expected by the United States several years.Analysts at the State Department and Defense Department (Paul Nietzsche was the head of the State Department) examined the options: a full withdrawal of U.S. troops to the homeland; a preventive war; a dramatic increase in U.S. aid to allies.The last decision was chosen, which was the means by which the United States could deal with the Soviets from a position of strength.The assumption was that no other deterrent would convince the Soviets that the US was serious about global defense.This was expected to be costly. The Truman administration's fiscal budget for 1949 was just over $8 billion. NSC Report 1950 called for an annual budget increase to $130 billion, or about 68 percent of GNI.It foresees four years before the United States and its allies reach full power, and these four years are the "dangerous stage".The report unhesitatingly accepts the idea that Soviet Russia sought world domination through direct aggression and gradual subversion.

Although the 151-page document was only released in 1975 and had been classified until then, its basic spirit was revealed in the speeches of Acheson and other government officials.They believe that it is necessary to create some public opinion so that the public can accept such a huge military expenditure, which is also their main concern.Acheson hoped to win public acceptance of the principles set out in NSC Document 68 before considering the specifics; otherwise, as he put it, "the rats in the Bureau of the Budget would eat up the will of the decision." In the spring of 1950, Acheson made frequent speeches to the public, the central content of which was to oppose isolationism. In a speech in Dallas on June 6, he said: "We shouldn't have the blinds drawn down, sitting in the living room, waiting with a loaded shotgun." doctrine".

(End of this chapter)