The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 12 Whale Fighting Shrimp (6)
Revisionist historians in the 70s viewed National Security Council Document No. 68 as the blueprint for US foreign aggression, a document with far-reaching influence that transformed the US into a warring state. "That may be so," Acheson wryly observed in his memoirs, "perhaps fortunate that the authors of these documents were not called in to analyze what would have happened if the United States had not acted. Of course we Still took action."

With the development of the situation, when the war began, the Guoan No. 68 document was still in the formative stage.Acheson owes much of the credit for the document's transformation from plan to reality to the Korean War, stating: "If the Soviet Union had not been foolish enough to launch an attack on South Korea and a 'hate America' campaign, what would have happened in the following years It's very doubtful that things will ever happen."

So, in essence, the Truman administration adopted a two-track strategy in its decision-making.On the one hand, it avoided the Asian continent; on the other hand, it was ready to attack any attempt of Soviet expansionism head-on, and the degree of its response was limited only by the realities of strategy.NSC Document 68 was not intended to automatically bring the United States into a trigger for war; however, the document represented the mindset of an administration that, when challenged, is determined to fight back with all its might.

build the korean army
When the U.S. troops left North Korea, what was handed over to the South Korean army looked at first glance like a sizable arsenal: updated equipment in 1949 worth $1100 million, enough to equip a 5-man ground force with 10 guns , 5000 million rounds of light weapons bullets, 2000 rocket launchers, more than 4 vehicles, and several light artillery and mortars.To the dismay of the South Koreans, the Americans left behind no tanks, planes, or large naval ships.According to the Americans' vision, South Korea only needs to have limited defense capabilities.In a directive dated March 1949, 3, MacArthur stated that the South Korean military needed to be capable of "symbolic resistance" to an invasion, but that it should be "organized so as to clearly state its peaceful Pretext to pose a threat to North Korea."

The Military Advisory Group in North Korea has a total of 472 officers and soldiers, commanded by Brigadier General William Roberts.Roberts, who served as a tank corps officer in World War II, will retire after serving in North Korea.Neither Roberts nor his brethren were happy to be in North Korea.Few Americans speak Korean; they find North Koreans apathetic; South Korean military officers are governed by politics; . "All in all," said a former military adviser, "the whole thing stinks — and I'm not just talking about the South Korean military."

The military advisory group is very pessimistic about the future development of the South Korean army."It is like the U.S. Army in 1949," wrote Lieutenant Colonel Thomas MacDonald in a December 12 report. Another assessment by the Military Advisory Group said: "In addition to its strong national pride, Korea The Army as a military force is lackluster." There was never platoon and company training, shooting was haphazard, and officers didn't know how to lead troops.

These reports were sent to Washington (General Roberts even wrote a 1949-word personal letter to Maj. Gen. Charles Bolt of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March 3, warning of the dire state of the Korean Army).However, the U.S. military has decided to abandon North Korea, and Bolt has no plans to confront policy after Roberts' warning. In testimony before Congress in June 2, Boulter said: "We feel that in Korea the (South Korean) troops are now better equipped than the North Korean troops.  …The goal of building South Korean troops and providing material assistance has been achieved...  …(U.S.) troops can and should leave.”

A year later, on June 1950, 6, three weeks before war broke out, Ambassador Mucho made a more realistic assessment of South Korea.In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, he warned: "In the event of a full-scale invasion of South Korea, the North Korean military would be favored by their irrefutable equipment superiority, especially with the heavy infantry support weapons that the Soviet Union has and will continue to provide , tanks, combat aircraft, etc.”

Around the same time as Muccio's testimony, General Roberts did a farewell interview with Frank Gibney, Time's Far East correspondent.Roberts, who will retire after leaving North Korea, apparently wants his final military mission to be described as successful.Gibney wrote in the article:

At 10, South Korea's army is now considered by most observers to be the largest army of its size in Asia.Its fast and mobile column almost wiped out the few guerrilla units of the Communist Party.No one now (emphasis added by the quoter) believes that the North Korean army trained by the Russians can successfully complete the invasion of South Korea without major reinforcements. ...

1950年6月15日，军事顾问团向国防部提出警告：韩国作战部队的可用补给仅在“勉强可以维持的水平”；还指出，韩国军队15%的武器和35%的车辆已经破旧不堪，韩国军队以其目前手中的装备仅可自卫不超过15天。顾问团指出：“韩国正受到跟降临在中国同样的灾难的威胁。”

However, the U.S. public does not see the DoD cables.Their source was Time, which in turn reported what it had heard from American generals and diplomats.A chance for a sudden awakening ended before June.

Lee Seung-man fidgets

President Rhee made no secret of his eventual intention to take over North Korea (similarly, Prime Minister Kim Il Sung has never given up on taking the South).Ambassador Mu Qiao still remembers the scene of a reception held at the Blue House, the official residence of the South Korean President, at the end of 1949.A South Korean Defense Ministry officer "entered the door excitedly, praising his 'boys' who had just captured Haeju, just north of the [-]th parallel, across from Kaesong...he did not go on to say that they were actually shot dead on the spot. But These kinds of incidents happen all the time on both sides.”

Both the North and the South are constantly harassed by the other side's guerrilla spying and espionage activities. North Korea has a clear advantage in this regard for two reasons. First, the people of North Korea are strictly controlled. There are many difficulties, so South Korea's spy activities have to take great risks; secondly, Rhee Chengman has become increasingly autocratic since he won the presidency. He suppresses any group or individual who disagrees with his policies, and he puts too much Focus on the "communist threat" in the north, and rarely consider various problems in the south.

The composition of North Korean guerrilla forces before the war reflected the level of discontent with the Rhee government.For example, intelligence officials at MacArthur's Far East Command in Tokyo estimated that the trainees of the main guerrilla training base in the north, the Gangdong Political School, "are almost all South Koreans who defected to North Korea."A small number of South Koreans who crossed the border to the North "for personal reasons" were captured and forced to enlist.Far East Command G-2 said that about 60 percent of the entire northern guerrilla force was made up of those still living in South Korea.Some of them were just doing things like recruiting spies and looking for supplies, while others cooperated with the northern guerrillas to actively participate in some small-scale conflicts. Their weapons were often only bamboo sticks and sticks they caught temporarily.Only about 1 percent joined the guerrillas out of necessity, young people who had been captured and joined the Communist Party "for fear of execution or family reprisals."

G-2 believes that the northern guerrillas wantonly plundered and looted villages in South Korea and failed the people's support for them.The raids often drew regular South Korean troops and resulted in brief but violent skirmishes, usually with the guerrillas taking advantage.In addition, many villagers in the demarcation line area helped the guerrillas sneak into the south because they "sympathize with the guerrillas and ... hope to get benefits".South Korea's navy is ineffective at stopping North Korean infiltrations because its patrol boats "will gladly send [guerrilla] ships into southern waters for money."

In addition to the above activities, Kim Il Sung also used 1949 and the first months of 1950 to strengthen the strength of his army.Contrary to the low-key support of the South Korean military by the Military Advisory Group in South Korea, the Soviets controlled the North Korean military.They sent an estimated 3000 troops to the country (there were fewer than 500 Americans in the South Korean army), with 15 Soviet officers for each division of the North Korean People's Army.The Soviets also supplied the North Korean People's Army with heavy tanks, heavy artillery, self-propelled artillery, and about 180 aircraft, including 110 fighters or bombers.The end of the Chinese Civil War gave the North Korean People's Army even more strength - about 29500 war-hardened North Korean soldiers returned home.According to U.S. intelligence reports, as of the spring of 1950, the North Korean People's Army had 13.5 troops, while South Korea had only 64697.

The North Koreans were even ahead in terms of equipment, especially with Soviet-made heavy and medium tanks.An officer on a military advisory group asked General Roberts why he did not insist on supplying South Korean troops with tanks to counter North Korea.Roberts patiently explained that South Korea's terrain is not suitable for tank operations. There are few and narrow roads here, and tanks cannot pass through rice fields and mountains.He said that if any army brought tanks into South Korea, it would be defeated within a few hours.

North Korean psychological warfare
In the spring of 1950, American diplomats and military officers in South Korea noticed a rapidly rising tension.The country celebrated its first extra-large rice harvest since the end of World War II, and then faced a bout of severe inflation fueled by a surge in money.Ambassador Mu Qiao worried that this would affect the economic aid program to South Korea, so he put pressure on Syngman Rhee to implement price controls.The unpopular move coincided with national assembly elections in May, which elected an anti-Ree majority.The newly elected majority, wary of Syngman Rhee's strong grassroots support, took no action to remove him from the presidency, but the election made Rhee pay more attention to public opinion.

The U.S. military suspected that Kim Il Sung might take advantage of Syngman Rhee's political weakness and the withdrawal of U.S. military forces in the spring of 1950 to launch an operation to unify Korea.The North Korean media talked a lot about the "Fatherland Front", which would achieve a peaceful union between the North and the South, and only Syngman Rhee and a small group of "pro-American and pro-Japanese traitors" would be eliminated.Before this, South Koreans had heard so many threats and promises that no one seemed to take Kim Il Sung too seriously.So did the U.S. embassy and the South Korean military. In June 1950, they were both basking in the languid ennui of early summer.

However, on June 6, something unexpected happened.The North Koreans announced that three representatives of the Fatherland Front would travel to the demarcation line to meet any South Korean leader willing to discuss reunification.Radio Pyongyang stands firm on its commitment to free elections, reunification and land reform.Although Ambassador Mucho dismissed these as propaganda, he also said that its "superficial plausibility may appeal to those South Koreans eager to eliminate the artificial 10-degree dividing line".He proposed—and the State Department agreed—that John Gaillard of the UN Commission on Korean Affairs go to the border to receive North Korean documents and also submit a UN General Assembly resolution on Korean reunification.Gaillard had to struggle to get past the South Korean soldiers tasked with firing on communists who crossed the line.He walked to North Korea and found Fatherland Front representatives waiting for him at a table at the train station.They gave Gaillard a lengthy statement recommending unification, but refused to accept the UN document.A somewhat puzzled Gaillard returned to Seoul to discover that the so-called "statement" was just a copy of the original broadcast by Radio Pyongyang.

To the surprise of the U.S. embassy, ​​the next morning (June 6), Pyongyang Radio announced that since the "pro-Japanese imperialist Syngman Rhee regime" would not allow any South Korean officials to go to the north, at 11 a.m. that day , representatives of the Fatherland Front will be invited into South Korea.They did go, but were immediately arrested by a Korean patrol waiting there.The Koreans were furious.According to Harold Noble of the U.S. embassy, ​​South Korea's acting defense minister, Shin Sun-mo, roared that he would immediately court-martial the men and shoot them dead, "This is a military zone and they... violated basic laws , they are communist agents. The easiest thing is to arrange a firing squad".Noble insisted that shooting these men would only make them martyrs and that they should be interrogated first to see what information they could provide.

Under interrogation, it turned out that these people were only low-level officials who had only come to deliver news and knew very little about the documents they brought to the south.Interrogators from the South Korean military and the U.S. Army's counterintelligence team believe that the Kim Il Sung regime sent these men to the south as "sacrifices."

(End of this chapter)