The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 103 Open the secret (4)
"I can't imagine that the enemy can be in a state of war after being expelled from North Korea." MacArthur said that if the Chinese finally believe that they cannot hold the area south of the Yalu River, "I believe that a reasonable agreement can be made with them at that time." treaty".But Johnson has made his point: A war with China involves far more than dropping a few bombs across the border.On further questioning, MacArthur was unwilling to even estimate whether his plan called for sending an additional 10 or 50 people to Asia. "I believe the number one priority right now is to lift the ban and let us use the maximum force we have."

"However, General," said Johnson, "if we accept the plans, we have to estimate the number of men we need. We not only need to estimate the number, but we need to be able to provide it. When you propose an aggressive plan — as you have suggested — our responsibility is to ensure that we have the forces and strength we need to carry out this plan."

In a lengthy discussion with Senator Morse, MacArthur completely dismissed the fear that the Soviet Union might enter the war, whose support had been "eclipsed" as events progressed.He had seen intelligence reports on supplies to the Chinese, which "seems to me to be quite weak support if China is going to come under strong pressure".

MacArthur said that when the war began, many people worried that the Soviet Union would intervene in direct combat.But the Soviets showed surprising restraint, even when an American plane accidentally bombed a Russian airfield.Although the United States apologized for the lapse and promised compensation, the Soviets never sent a bill.American reconnaissance flights near Siberia did not cause "the slightest increase" in the number of Soviet troops there.Although the Soviets were clamoring at the United Nations, "on the battlefield, it was the exact opposite," MacArthur said.

In a prescient remark—more farsighted than the State Department had at the time—MacArthur saw the Soviet Union's fear of "this new monster that was taking shape in China and emerging from its head."He did not believe that the Soviets wanted the Chinese to become strong enough to challenge the Soviets; on the contrary, Moscow wanted to bring China under its control.

麦克阿瑟的作证终于在5月7日晚上7时10分结束。麦克阿瑟在证人席上待了差不多23个钟头，他的证词长达787页打字纸。他离开时，耳畔萦绕着委员会成员们恭维过度的赞美之词。

Douglas MacArthur had bluntly documented his views on conducting the Korean War and his policy differences with the Truman Administration.As a matter of personal reputation, he first wanted to make it clear that he was not in disobedience to President Truman.He said later in the day:

Every nerve in my body resents any assertion that I have somehow disobeyed or disobeyed the President of the United States, or the policies of this country, or even the policies and directives of the United Nations. respect.

Now the stage has turned to others, the architects of the government's military and foreign policy.

it's the government's turn
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their officers spent a weekend analyzing MacArthur's testimony word for word.The main point of the question they agreed on was that MacArthur repeatedly asserted that they had "agreed" to the four-point action plan proposed on January 1951, 1, namely, strengthening the economic blockade against China, imposing a naval blockade, and canceling aerial reconnaissance in "Manchuria" restrictions on the movement of Chinese Kuomintang troops.MacArthur had stressed that he felt these steps were established policy.Is it possible that he misunderstood the options when General Lawton Collins outlined the options to him in Tokyo in mid-January?No, General Collins replied that, on the contrary, he had read the JCS document directly to MacArthur to avoid any possibility of misinterpretation by other staff members.It was MacArthur's fault, not Washington's, if he did not recognize the memo as an "option."That leaves the Joint Chiefs of Staff with no choice: They must come to the unsavory task of showing a national hero wrong.

On Monday, May 5, Secretary of Defense George Marshall led the charge for the military.He began by saying that it was a "painful need" for him to have to testify "almost directly against the many, many opinions and actions of General MacArthur."He referred to the general as "a brother officer in the Army, a man whom I have the utmost respect for."Then, hour after hour, he refuted MacArthur.

The first is MacArthur's claim that Marshall suppressed the Joint Chiefs of Staff's objections to handing over Taiwan to the Chinese Communist Party and granting the Chinese Communist Party a seat in the United Nations.MacArthur made the remarks while commenting on the peace proclamation that President Truman intended to issue at the end of March.Marshall testified that what the administration was effectively saying was that the United States would "have no objection to discussing these issues."He went on to say that the long-term policy of the United States is to "resist the handing over of Taiwan to the CCP and oppose giving the CCP a seat in the United Nations." There is no "any deviation from this policy." Other decisions have not wavered.Putting these issues on the agenda is a realistic decision, as other parties will surely raise them as well.But discussing it is not the same as agreeing.

Regarding the January 1 option, Marshall gave a lengthy account of the dire military situation in early 12, when the United States "faced the very real possibility of having to withdraw our troops from Korea."The guidelines of the Joint Chiefs of Staff cited by MacArthur were put forward as a stopgap measure and could only be considered for implementation "once this possibility became increasingly close to reality".At about the same time that the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum was sent to the National Security Council for review, the military situation changed dramatically as Ridgway regained the initiative, making it unnecessary to implement any of these plans. "None of these proposed courses of action has been rejected or disapproved by me or by any higher authority," Marshall asserted. It was simply unnecessary, or rather, ill-advised at the time."

Over the next few days, other chiefs of staff echoed Marshall's statement about the January 1 document.The most detailed speech came from Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.He said the chiefs of staff, as early as late November 12, were leading a staff committee examining possible actions if the United States and China were involved in an all-out war.The preamble to the committee's concluding report stated the contingent nature of this qualification, but in the final memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the restrictive language was deleted for unknown reasons, leaving only a statement that the listed course of action had been " Temporarily agree" (emphasis added by the citer).But it was absolutely clear to Bradley (and his colleagues later) that the memo was merely a "research report" and not an order or set of instructions to MacArthur.Nowhere in the memo does it say that these decisions are final.

Marshall essentially disagreed with nearly every argument MacArthur had on how to conduct the war, nor did he agree with MacArthur's belief that the proposed actions against China would not lead to expanded war:

The risks he (MacArthur) wanted us to accept involved not only an extended war with Red China, but an all-out war with the Soviet Union.He wants us to do it, at the cost of losing our allies and damaging the League of Free Peoples all over the world.He wanted us to do this, regardless of the consequences of such an action would expose Western Europe to Soviet attack, their millions of troops were on standby in Central and Eastern Europe.

Marshall went on to say that there is a fundamental divide between a theater commander with a limited mission and the president, secretary of defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who "have to align our interests and goals in one part of the planet with those of another." objectives to be weighed . . . in order to arrive at the best overall balance".

Marshall believes that it is understandable that "a theater commander could become so preoccupied with his own goals" that the orders he received from higher authorities "are not in his own mind." is full of such examples.But the novelty of MacArthur's case was the "unprecedented situation in which a theater commander publicly expressed dissatisfaction and disapproval of U.S. foreign and military policy."Marshall went on to explain the root cause of President Truman's dismissal of MacArthur:

the point was already evident: general macarthur had developed such disapproval of established united states policy that there were serious doubts about whether he would ever be allowed to exercise the power of decision which is bestowed upon a theater commander by normal command duties of.Under the circumstances, there is no other option but to dismiss him.

The other chiefs of staff also confirmed in turn that they supported the decision to dismiss MacArthur on strictly military grounds.No one accused him of disobeying military orders.Virtually everyone insisted that the cumulative effect of his various statements (culminating in his March 3 ultimatum to the Chinese to capitulate and his letter to Martin) left the President with no choice.While there was much criticism of some of MacArthur's tactical actions, most notably the separation of Eighth and Tenth Armies, the Chiefs of Staff seemed reluctant to question the judgment of a field commander (although Collins and Bray De Lidu insisted that their deployment could have been different).Confronting Senator Alexander Wiley, Collins was vague on his views on MacArthur's entire method of conducting the war. "From a purely military point of view," Willie asked, "would you be willing to say that General MacArthur's leadership of the Korean War is comparable to his . . . "

"That's a hard question to answer, Senator," Collins replied.

"Would you like to answer?"

"If you insist, I will answer it, but I would prefer not to," Collins said.Willie didn't insist.

Marshall devoted the largest part of his testimony to a detailed review of the administration's decision to limit the Korean War in order to buy time to mobilize sufficient military strength to counter any Soviet action, a process that would stretch into 1953.During his testimony, Marshall questioned several assertions made by MacArthur as indisputable fact.

Among MacArthur's very problematic claims, the most important point is probably the combat capability of the Chinese Kuomintang.MacArthur said that as long as this 60-strong army receives logistical support from the United States, it is fully capable of taking action against mainland China.Some of his reservations about the fighting prowess of the Kuomintang were only expressed in general terms, so that they were meaningless.However, Marshall gave a more accurate picture of the Nationalists.

MacArthur once testified that when he went to Taiwan in August 1950, he thought the Chinese Nationalist Army was "excellent."They lacked trucks, artillery, and other "modern sophisticated equipment," but they "could make a very good force. . . . This force represented the potential of 8 first-rate combatants."

MacArthur's assessment was based on field observations during a one-day, largely courtesy visit.In testimony, which was removed for reasons of secrecy from the records of the 1951 hearing, Marshall outlined the findings of a team of 1950 military officers sent by MacArthur to Taiwan in late August 8.The investigative team reported that the Nationalists were "so poorly trained and equipped, whether ground forces, air force, or navy, that they could not be expected to defend the island."What MacArthur called the "37 troops" could not even be expected to hold their stronghold, let alone go to foreign countries to fight.

On the other hand, MacArthur underestimated the extent of the Nationalists' equipment shortage.Never mind that from the 60 people there can always be found enough weapons and other equipment to send 3.5 to 4 troops to North Korea.Marshall took the opposite view. "Under the current situation in Taiwan," he said, "such a small force represents the very core of Taiwan's defense. To extract such a force from Taiwan, even if it exists at all (emphasis added by the quoter) ), it seems to be a big problem." The Joint Chiefs of Staff also saw no reason to waste precious American equipment on the Kuomintang.An internal Joint Chiefs of Staff memo of November 1950 stated that "the record of the Nationalist Army in losing equipment provided to them [in the war against the Communists] made the Joint Chiefs of Staff more Use them in battle".Marshall did not believe that the Nationalists could keep their morale up once they fought the Communists, to whom they had just lost their ignominious defeat a few years earlier.

General Bradley went even further, saying that their morale was so bad that they might defect to the Communists at the first chance.Bradley testified that if a Communist army could manage to land on Taiwan, they could have acquired the island simply by the surrender of the Nationalists.General Collins felt the same way: "We very much doubt that we can get anything more from these Chinese (KMT) than from the South Koreans, since they are the ones who were driven out of mainland China."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also did not support MacArthur's contention that the Nationalists could mount any meaningful action against the Continent.Marshall also argued: "The Nationalists do not have the capability to sustain an operation without us being compelled to get involved in supporting them." Neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the CIA see any possibility—if Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to return to the mainland would still have meaningful popular support.With his limited strength, Chiang Kai-shek would never have succeeded without the support of the Chinese people.And Bradley thinks that's unlikely to happen.

The problem here is that Chiang Kai-shek is not accepted by most Chinese. … Chiang had a great chance of winning in mainland China, but he failed to win.In my opinion, from a military standpoint, I don't think he can do much to lead the Chinese right now.

It is true that some (among mainland Chinese) are growing weary of the Communist Party and are now more loyal to Chiang Kai-shek than they were in the past.But, in my opinion, he is not in a position to rally the Chinese people against the Communist Party, even if we can get him to the mainland.

(End of this chapter)