The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 102 Open the secret (3)
MacArthur: But, Senator, I actually think everybody realizes that there are risks involved.When we first entered North Korea, there was this inherent risk, and the risk we took was carefully considered.

McMahon: Now, of course, we cannot fully agree that there is a possibility of Soviet intervention if we follow the proposals that you have us put into practice.

MacArthur: This possibility exists, but there is also an inevitability... If you do not implement these recommendations, you will lose thousands of Americans every month. ...

What you insist on, I believe, is a matter of possibility...everyone will admit it.But what I insist on is a matter of necessity.

There is no question that North Korea is at war.There are big questions about whether this war will expand elsewhere.You've got a war in your hands now, so you can't say, "Let this war go on indefinitely while I prepare another war." Unless you're paying thousands and thousands of dollars for it Thousands, tens of thousands of young American lives.

That is the responsibility of those who make this decision.For my part, I repeat, this is a responsibility that I do not wish to rest on my shoulders.

Your policy, as you have articulated here, Senator, means—

McMahon: I haven't clarified yet, I'm just asking for material on your point of view.You see, General, what I want to know from you is that if you happen to be wrong this time, and we're going to fight an all-out war, I want to know how you're going to suggest...to defend America against that war.

MacArthur: That's just not my responsibility, Senator.My responsibility is in the Pacific, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and various government agencies are working around the clock to find a comprehensive solution to global problems.

Now I have an understanding of their research work.I wasn't a part of it, I was obsessed with what was going on on the other side of the world. ...

McMahon was not relenting.MacArthur's knowledge of U.S. nuclear capabilities "is no more than that of the average military officer."MacArthur had inquired about the "potential use of the atomic bomb in my own theater of operations," but said he never suggested its use.MacArthur did not mention that he had advocated in January 1951 to set up a "radioactive waste exclusion zone" along the Yalu River.Although the general was not familiar with intelligence on Soviet nuclear capabilities, he did not see enemy nuclear weapons as a major threat in North Korea. "I cannot believe for a minute that ... the enemy is likely or inclined to use his limited nuclear weapons in ... North Korea or China."

McMahon then made MacArthur admit that he knew "only generally" about the civil defense program.

McMahon: Have you considered the possibility of the Russians launching a sneak attack on the United States and its vital industrial centers through atomic sabotage?
MacArthur: Just generally.Again, this is not my responsibility, Senator.

McMahon: I know, General.I just wanted to present some considerations that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their Commander in Chief must keep in mind to determine what action should be taken in any given theater.

McMahon continued to dig deeper.He reminded MacArthur of a government statement made a few days earlier (by Director of Mobilization Stewart Fulmington) that the United States would not be strong enough to resist a Soviet attack before 1953.MacArthur interrupted him. "So in two years," he asked, "what's the casualty rate for American boys in North Korea?"

McMahon replied, "Well, General, I ask you, if they did a...atomic attack...what would be our casualty rate in Washington, D.C....let alone the logistics of running troops deep into China Those American lads who are going to die in the air and at sea in support." McMahon hoped, "Before we commit ourselves to a cause that might catch us off guard and into danger, stop and look and listen. Listen, look where we are."

MacArthur said: "Senator, the only thing I want to do is to settle the matter in Korea. . . . I believe it will have a decisive conclusion without the disaster of World War III." The war will continue Longer fights, greater risk, "if we practice appeasement. ... That's all I have to say. I say this with the keen awareness that North Korea is engaged in a tragic killing today. … MacArthur calculated the total casualties to date as: 6.5 American and over 14 Korean, plus untold civilian deaths; North Korean and Chinese casualties were estimated at 75, plus 14 Shut up "within the bars of our prison".In other words, in less than 11 months, more than 100 million people were killed, wounded or captured.MacArthur said:

I have never seen such havoc.I think I've seen as much blood and devastation as anyone alive.The last time I was there, my stomach constricted.I threw up when I saw the ruins, the thousands of women and children and everything else.

So, are you going to use any sophistry reason or possibility to continue all this? ...What are you going to do?I repeat the question again, what is our North Korea policy?
If you go on indefinitely, you will perpetuate a massacre such as I have never heard of in the history of mankind. ...

Your whole tendency has been to do nothing but to fight, to die, to shed blood.I think we should make some kind of extraordinary effort to end this.

MacArthur continued to insist that the United States was militarily capable of defending both Europe and Asia. "If you say we're not capable, you're admitting defeat. If the enemy is capable, and spread out on all these fronts, we should be capable of dealing with it." Once again he traps himself, and McMahon is clever. Tightened the noose tightly.Does MacArthur think that "today we have been able to withstand the Russian attack on Western Europe"?MacArthur replied:
Senator, I have begged you several times not to involve me in any issues other than my own war zone.My thoughts on global defense are not what I'm here to testify about, and I don't want to pretend to be authoritative on these issues right now.

When I was Army Chief of Staff 20 years ago, this was my question, and I will answer it.The Chiefs of Staff, or anyone else here, should answer this query, not me.

Through these words, MacArthur inadvertently admitted the view that the President, Acheson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had always insisted on: he was an annoying good guy who didn't know anything about the things he was involved in.He was blind to needs outside of his own Far East Command.

McMahon went on to ridicule MacArthur, an expert on China.First, he induced MacArthur to make a comment that he himself was "well-informed" both two or three years ago and now.McMahon then read a letter from the general to the House Foreign Affairs Committee dated March 1948, 3, in which he responded to a request for his opinion on Asian affairs.MacArthur replied that China, as the military area assigned to the U.S. Navy, "is not within the control of my existing sphere of authority."He had no representative there, and "except for general background knowledge, most of the detailed information I got was provided indirectly."MacArthur was neither aware of government research programs nor had he been able to visit China for "many years" (not since 3, according to his later testimony).Against this backdrop, he wrote, "you will readily recognize that I am not in the position to offer an authoritative opinion on the multitude of details upon which clear policy for this unique region must be built."

MacArthur only nodded to admit that he had written the letter.At the end of the first day of testimony, his further confrontation with McMahon did not help him either.McMahon asked if he believed in the idea of ​​collective security?

"What do you mean by 'collective security'?" MacArthur asked.

McMahon asked again: "Do you believe in the idea of ​​collective security upon which our foreign policy is based?"

"What do you mean by 'collective security'?" MacArthur asked again.

"I mean trying to put together a military alliance to keep the peace, like we're trying to do in NATO," McMahon said.

"I only know some superficial NATO, Senator." MacArthur replied. "I am not going to discuss it in any way, in any form, in any style." (This convention was one of the major military-political events of the late 40s, and has been discussed incessantly in the popular and professional press.)
"Neither its terms nor its implementation is discussed?" McMahon asked.

"I have only a general understanding, which any officer has," MacArthur replied, "You have experts in this area." He pointed out that the Senate had recently heard the testimony of General Eisenhower and others.

Through his own testimony, MacArthur put himself on the hat of "a commander with narrow interests and knowledge".He could no longer pose as the masterful world strategist whose views in the sanctuary of the First Building were then paramount to diplomats and other professional soldiers.

Meetings on the first day ended at 6:10 pm.The general shoved past the waiting reporters without commenting.He flew back to New York.

MacArthur made his appearance in front of unimpressed, probing senators for a day, and he lost appetite for further inquiries.He returned to the Senate the next morning as scheduled, but Adjutant Courtney Whitney approached Chairman Russell before the session began and asked for a favor.Can the lunch break be canceled so that MacArthur can finish the hearing on this day without having to come back?Coffee and sandwiches could be delivered to the hearing room, as on the previous day, but Whitney suggested questioning could still take place over lunch.Russell agreed not to take a lunch break, but told Whitney to continue the inquiry for as many days as the senators deemed necessary.

At the next day's hearing, MacArthur reversed his categorical opposition to sending U.S. ground troops into China when questioned by Senator Estes Kefwell of Tennessee.He believes that if Chiang Kai-shek takes action against the mainland, he has no objection to the United States sending, say, 500 advisers to participate in the action.He doesn't think it's a big deal to have "a few hundred technicians ...".

MacArthur did not accept the assumption by the British, Indians, and others that American support for Chiang Kai-shek would weaken American prestige in Asia. "To the average Asian, Chiang Kai-shek stood out as a great symbol of anti-communism. . . . Those who leaned toward communism opposed him completely and utterly.  …" Supporting Chiang does not mean agreeing with "what he said and did Everything he does, but it does mean that he is assisting us against this worldwide threat. Any choice we have between him and communism will end up naturally in his favor.”

But Senator Henry Cabot Lodge expressed doubts about the consequences if Chiang Kai-shek counterattacked the mainland and was driven out.Wouldn't Taiwan fall by then?MacArthur called the question hypothetical and thus unanswerable, but "under no circumstances" would he allow Taiwan to fall into Communist hands.

MacArthur had convinced Chairman Russell by late afternoon that his reasons were justified.As early as August 1950, Russell was "deeply fearful of a large number of Chinese swarming in and interfering in the war ...".Back then, MacArthur could have pulled out of North Korea and then imposed a land and air blockade on China until they stopped "predatory attacks on North Korea."He doesn't like "reciprocating tug-of-war with ground troops in North Korea", and attacking the Chinese "will definitely prevent our soldiers from being slaughtered on the ground", so why not withdraw and punish the Chinese from a distance?

Russell's advocated actions against China baffled the administration.As chairman of the Armed Services Council, Russell exercised unique authority over military spending; in turn, his control of the purse gave him considerable influence over military policy.As the administration has made clear, the United States does not want an all-out war with China.However, just as MacArthur was about to end his testimony, he got the approval of the most important request of him to change the war policy, the top figure in the committee (and also a Democrat).

Senator Wayne Morse saved the day for the administration.Russell agreed that MacArthur would not testify further—this was at the end of a second long questioning day—at which point Morse insisted on continuing to testify until all members had been questioned to their satisfaction.After a brief but heated debate, Morse prevailed.MacArthur had to make one final run in the whiplash of the crossed lanes.

The third and final day of MacArthur's testimony began with Chairman Russell's affectionate apology for making him attend a "marathon meeting."Then the younger Democrats took over, already digesting MacArthur's testimony and the cables of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, their notepads filled with questions posed to them by Pentagon staff officers.

Senator Lyndon Johnson led the way.He tried his best, but failed to get MacArthur to make any substantive comments on the need for more Americans to serve and the benefits of universal military training.Once again MacArthur was aware of the wavering mood of his Republican supporters, and despite the resulting inconsistencies, he refused to lean on either side of the party debate.MacArthur talked about the various problems he encountered: improving the combat capabilities of the divisions in the army, and incorporating poorly trained South Korean troops into his divisions.But he said he did not understand the overall troop problem.

Johnson suddenly turned to the most important question that had been pointed at MacArthur for the past three days: "I want to ask you this question, General. Suppose we accept your plan, if the Chinese are driven back to the side of the Yalu River, if they refuse Signing a treaty and refusing to make an agreement on what they're going to do going forward, what course do you propose?"

MacArthur tried to avoid answering, saying that the question was hypothetical. "I don't see at all the possibility of the enemy being driven back across the Yalu River and still be on the offensive."

Not intending to be contradicted, Johnson brought up "the see-saw thing you're talking about," when the two sides alternately push and back. "Suppose now that we proceed with the plan you advocate, and assuming it has all the elements of success you imagine, and they return to the other side of the river, where they still retain a large number of regiments, what course are you going to take?"

"I don't think they can." MacArthur insisted.

"Do we have to keep a lot of troops out there to defend our positions?" Johnson insisted.

(End of this chapter)