The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 107 The Secret Path of Peace Talks (1)
In December 1950, when the Chinese representatives arrived at the United Nations, the United Nations Army was facing a situation of defeat, and could withdraw from North Korea at any moment, and China was sure of victory.The panic-stricken General MacArthur believed that his only options were to either expand the war or abandon it.

At this time, the State Council received a probe from the Chinese delegation, which seemed to intend to start peace negotiations, which surprised the State Council.Probing is done indirectly.One representative on the Chinese side was a member of the China Youth Party, one of several tiny non-Communist groups in the delegation.Once at Lake Success, the individual got in touch with a Chinese student at American University in Washington, who in turn relayed to one of his State Department acquaintances that the Chinese were willing to exchange "information" in an unofficial manner.

The State Department reacted cautiously.China's victory on the battlefield is in sight, so what's the benefit of talking with Washington through the back door?State Department policy planning officer Charles Burton Marshall was tasked with pursuing this lead. "I think it's a typical diplomatic gimmick where they can categorically deny anything that's been said," said Charles Marshall, "because it's very difficult to determine whether the other side is sending you a message or trying to mislead." Charles Marshall Soon It was found that the Chinese "exploration" was indeed well-founded, but the ulterior motives were not drinking: China's intention was to prevent the United Nations from passing a resolution condemning it as an aggressor in the Korean War.The State Department believed that a resolution condemning China as an aggressor was more important than a diplomatic wink, and set out to persuade the UN General Assembly to condemn China.

However, the Chinese "connector" still didn't give up. He sent a message to Charles Marshall that he would "try to maintain contact."In its reply, the State Department included the Chinese army.As Charles Marshall said, if the person had the unofficial authorization of the Chinese government, "they (the CCP) should release an American who is being held in a prison in Shanghai on espionage charges."However, what Washington did not expect was that the American accused of being a spy had been shot.So far, the glimmer of opportunity for Sino-US communication has vanished.

In the spring and early summer of 1951, the "tug of war" raged endlessly as General Matthew Ridgway's Eighth Army slowly regained the initiative in the field.At the same time, the United States continued to test the start of armistice negotiations.One disadvantage is that the government has not recognized the legitimacy of the Beijing regime.As Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk said in May 8: "We do not recognize the self-promotion of the Beijing authorities. It is not the government of China. It cannot even pass the first hurdle. It is not China." Acheson He also said at the MacArthur hearing that the "confusing question" was who to talk to for peace talks.Although the Chinese bear the brunt of the fighting, the North Koreans and the Soviets want a say in any negotiations (although Acheson still sees the North Koreans and Chinese as "Moscow-trained communists" whose " Moscow does what it says”).Acheson made a clear hint to the Chinese that the United States would be flexible."We're going to have to deal with the Chinese communist authorities," he said. Although Acheson saw the Beijing regime as a "fake government," the United States had no choice: "You're going to deal with the authorities that are fighting your military, and I don't see a problem dealing with them if they want a truce."

According to Acheson, the United States was "hunting out like a pack of hounds looking for clues."Kremlin expert Charles Pollan tried for a long time to talk to a Soviet diplomat in Paris, but to no avail.Ernest Gross and Thomas Corey of the U.N. Mission thought they were getting some signals from the Soviets at Lake Success.But before they got to the bottom of it, the New York Times ran a story about the rumored peaceful contact, and the Soviets disappeared.Later that spring, a Western European source "with some solid credentials" hinted that the Chinese would heed a proposal for negotiations.

The State Department discussed the matter for a long time, and then Acheson appointed Charles Burton Marshall to investigate the ins and outs of the matter, but it had to be done in the utmost secrecy. "McCarthyism was very active," recalled Charles Marshall, "and MacArthur's din was very much in the spotlight. In such a sensitive environment, secrecy had to be kept. Not more than five or six people in the administration knew about it." , and only gave an oral explanation."

The plan for Charles Marshall was to travel to Hong Kong incognito and "find" "four possible intermediaries" provided by the CIA.Charles Marshall carried a message intended to convince the Chinese that Washington and Beijing should iron out their differences and that the Soviet Union was the "real strategic enemy" of both countries.Charles Marshall was going to remind the communists that the United States had intended to keep its embassy in China after the war was over, that it was the United States that had originally refused to guarantee a sanctuary for the Nationalists in Taiwan, and that the United States was not directly involved in China civil war.Charles Marshall recognized the new Chinese government's "psychological need to find an external enemy," and with that role falling to the United States, both sides would surely feel the "painful effects" of the Korean War for a long time to come.Nevertheless, "China should not side with the Soviet Union in a war against the United States".Charles Marshall predicted that once the present hostilities eased, the two sides would establish a relationship at a distance, during which time "the Soviet Union would very likely replace the United States and eventually become China's external enemy," which would create a new relationship between "the United States and China." Openly improving the relationship" presents a "logical opportunity".

Marshall was out of luck, however, and was unable to relay his message upon his arrival in Hong Kong.Two of the four ties provided by the CIA were of questionable reliability and contact could only be made through a third party. (The passing of the message through a third party kept Charles Marshall from face-to-face contact. This way, if the Chinese claimed that their enemies were praying for peace, the United States could "deny it outright.") Charles Marshall believed that their message was "too uncertain ’, but he ended up leaving messages for the editor-in-chief of a non-Communist newspaper and a distant relative of Mao Zedong’s wife.At best, however, these pipes are like stuffing a letter into a bottle and throwing it overboard from San Francisco's docks.There were later vague and scattered indications that Charles Marshall's message reached the Chinese leadership, but there was no public reaction.Therefore, Washington believes that it is necessary to find opportunities for peace talks elsewhere.

Kennan's way

In mid-May 1951, Freeman Matthews of the State Department came up with an idea.George Kennan, a former official of the State Department's Policy Planning Service and the top Soviet expert in the US government, is on leave to write a book on US-Soviet relations at Princeton University's Institute for Advanced Study.As a result, Kennan was not then an official member of the American diplomatic community.He was someone the Soviets trusted, and they respected him as a scholar and diplomat with objectivity and candor, not as a man of empty words and lies.With Acheson's consent, Matthews proposed that Kennan go to see the Soviet ambassador to the United Nations, Yakov Malik, and bring him a message, roughly as follows: The United States and the Soviet Union seem to be heading for conflict over North Korea, and Americans believe that neither country wants this to happen.Both countries appear to be being dragged along by the Chinese.Wouldn't it be preferable if a cease-fire and a cease-fire were to be achieved in North Korea, perhaps along the front lines where troops are currently deployed?Kennan was going to ask how Moscow viewed the situation.As Acheson outlined his instructions: "If there is to be an end to hostilities, now is an opportune time to begin to end the war."

Kennan handwritten a letter to Malik asking for an unspecified meeting with him.A few hours later, Malick called and invited Kennan to lunch at his summer residence on Long Island.Their meeting on May 5 went well, except for a slightly awkward start when Malick knocked a fruit and wine tray over his lap.In a sense, Kennan had trained for this day since he became a diplomat in 31.He spoke to the ambassador in fluent Russian, knowing that Malik was unlikely to make any promises on such a sensitive matter in such a tentative interview, and he touched the subject in a roundabout way.Malik asked a few questions after listening to Kennan, and then offered to "meet again after he had considered Kennan's questions"—meaning he had to ask Moscow for instructions.

The Soviets were quick to respond, showing that the Soviets were as eager to make peace as the Americans.In less than a week, that is, on June 6, Malik invited Kennan to his office again and told him that the Soviet government hoped to resolve the Korean issue peacefully.But since the Soviets were not directly involved in the war—a claim too formalistic for Kennan to dispute—any solution would have to go through the Chinese and North Koreans. "None of us doubted the veracity of the message," Acheson wrote in his memoirs, "but it still had a nagging tone that kept us wondering what it portended, and we went down to What to do next step."

During the first few days of June, the State Department kept its contacts with Malik hidden from allied ambassadors for two reasons: to avoid creating false hope and to prevent leaks that might have undone the initiative.Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, for example, warned ambassadors not to listen to anything in the press about "peaceful temptations." When another assistant secretary of state, John Hickson, asked allies for their views on the peace talks on June 6, he made no mention of the gesture to Malik.The question now was, should President Truman make any speeches on the terms of peace?If necessary, should he do so in the name of the 6 countries fighting in North Korea, or in the name of the US unilaterally?Hickson said the U.S. must be careful not to lock itself down beforehand.The US thinking, therefore, is that the specific terms of the ceasefire "should be expressed in general terms" and details should be waited for when the enemy shows readiness to begin negotiations.Hickson did say that if the Chinese were willing to stop fighting and agree to a settlement roughly along the 8th parallel, that would lay the groundwork for negotiations.But with the Chinese still fighting, he sees no hope of an immediate ceasefire.Hickson further said: "We have not drafted any statement, we are willing to discuss all possible courses of action, and we have no established position on this, just to make the enemy realize and be willing to stop until there is a decent negotiated settlement. fighting."

For US purposes, the important issue is that the ambassadors of the allies have given Washington the freedom to seek a truce.Ambassadors want to be informed of what happened, but the specifics should be handled by the State Department.

All Washington could do now was to wait for a further reply from the Soviet Union.The Soviets had to confer with the leaders in Beijing and Pyongyang.The silence did not alarm the State Department.In fact, the Soviets responded faster than expected, and from an unusual pulpit.Since its inception, the United Nations has sponsored a weekly public affairs radio program that is available to all member states.The Soviets have always dismissed it.Now, Malik is asking for his time on the June 6 show.In his speech—grammarists might call his speech the first national person—the "Soviet people" believed that the war could be quelled.Malik went on: "The Soviet people believed that, as a first step, the belligerents should begin discussions on a cease-fire and a truce, provided that both sides withdraw their troops from the 23th parallel." Could such a step be taken?Malik asked. “I think it can,” he asked himself, “as long as there is a sincere desire to end the bloody fighting in North Korea.” (In the eyes of American analysts, the word “bloody” indicates the heavy casualties of the Chinese on the battlefield.)
Malik's reply surprised the State Department.When the United States learned of Malik's request for time on a United Nations radio program, it expected nothing but propaganda rhetoric.But for analysts, what happened after the radio speech was significant.According to Dean Rusk, the way the speech was handled by the Soviet press and radio was "excellent performances".Two days later, the Beijing newspapers actually announced that the Chinese authorities agreed with Malik's proposal.But after that, the attitude of the Chinese was ambiguous.Radio Beijing said that if the Americans wanted peace, they could accept the Chinese terms.Ambiguity abounded in Malik's speech, which puzzled American diplomats.When Marek refers to the "Soviet people," does he really mean the "Soviet government"?He also denied any Soviet involvement when speaking of "belligerents," while the Chinese insisted on being called "volunteers."According to Dean Rusk, "The extent to which there was mutual coordination and understanding between China and the Soviet Union was also an extremely important mystery." At the time, it was impossible to get any clarification from Malik, because the ambassador " unwell," a diplomatic way of avoiding unwanted conversation.Rusk pointed out something dubious that the whole thing might have been propaganda: “The people in the Kremlin are masters of propaganda, and propaganda is a major tool of their foreign policy.”

The position of the Soviets was revealed bit by bit.US Ambassador to Moscow Alan Kirk was allowed to meet with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko after repeated requests.Gromyko believes that the military representatives of the two warring parties in North Korea should reach a military truce only on military issues, not political or territorial issues.Gromyko insisted that he was completely unaware of China's attitude to the ceasefire talks.

The State Department believed that the Soviet Union's reply was a signal that the Chinese were willing to get closer to the United States, and set out to seek support among allies.U.N. legal counsel Abraham Feller was the first to respond to the U.S. request.He believes that the United States has the right to reach a ceasefire or truce without authorization from the United Nations, as long as the negotiations are limited to military issues and the results of the negotiations are reported to the Security Council.Ambassadors from countries with troops in North Korea have unanimously endorsed negotiations.

But the Pentagon is getting in the way. On June 6, at a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department, Rusk outlined a proposal for Ridgway to make a radio address inviting Chinese military commanders to a meeting.General Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, did not like this approach because it would put the UN Army in a position to beg for peace.Vandenberg was vehemently questioning the practice of stopping fighting when the enemy was being "battered."But Bradley believes that if the United Nations misses this opportunity to achieve peace, public support for the war will be very problematic.Collins and Sherman agreed, and Vandenberg held back.The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed a task force to work with the State Department to draft a radio speech for Ridgway.

Ridgway delivered a radio speech at 6 a.m. Tokyo time on June 29, and it has been carefully crafted:
In the name of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Forces, I have been ordered to inform you of the following matters:

I understand that you may wish to hold a conference to discuss the question of an armistice, provided that hostilities and all armed actions in Korea cease, and that full guarantees are given for the maintenance of the armistice.

(End of this chapter)