The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 108 The Secret Path of Peace Talks (2)
I will appoint my representatives after I have been notified of your willingness to hold such a meeting, at which time I will propose a date for the meeting of the representatives of both parties.I propose that such a meeting could be held on a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan Port.

Hours before Ridgway's speech, Dean Rusk had explained the wording of the statement to Allied ambassadors, primarily to see if Communist commanders were interested in meeting on the battlefield to discuss a ceasefire. "We think it's critical to continue to see [people] as taking the initiative on this issue," Rusk said. Hopefully the communists will take the blame and let people know they raised this issue."

Making the statement in the name of UNC Commander Ridgway was a way of avoiding the use of the word "government".It was "to take care of each other," Rusk said.There are also semantic nuances that only the diplomatic community can appreciate. "We're not saying there's been an approach with Ridgway himself, but he's been told there's been one. We haven't proposed a date for the meeting, but to move the whole thing forward, we've proposed a venue for the talks — on a Danish hospital ship in Wonsan port. We think it would be convenient for both parties.” Although the ship is serving the United Nations forces in North Korea, the Danish government “would be delighted” to provide it, And fly its own flag for the talks.

Australian diplomat David Williamson McNichol asked if the US would consult with its allies during the talks?Rusk's answer was ambiguous.He will discuss developments with allies "that can reasonably be discussed", but he does not think everyone "willing to see the peace we hope for be destroyed by premature public debate".

In Rusk's view, starting negotiations was the most important thing. "Our choice ... is clearly: either an acceptable ceasefire or an expansion of the conflict." No one disagreed.

The communists responded to Ridgway's broadcast statement in a relatively short time.Radio Beijing said on July 7 that it had received a message from Li Qiwei, and continued:
…We are authorized to inform you that we agree to cease military activity and hold peace talks, and our representatives will meet with your representatives.

We suggested the location of the talks: this kind of talks should be held in Kaesong on the [-]th Parallel.

If you agree to this, our representatives are ready to meet with your representatives on July 1951-7, 10.

This telegram was signed by "Commander-in-Chief of the North Korean People's Army" Kim Il-sung and "Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Volunteers" General Peng Dehuai.

Washington treated the reply with caution.Dean Rusk finds it odd that North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung has been involved in a statement saying "we are authorized" to start negotiations.He was apparently the head of his government.People were hesitant to use Kaesong as the meeting place for military reasons.Kaesong in western North Korea is a few miles south of the 1951th parallel. In July 7, it was under Communist control, and the nearest unit of the Eighth Army was 8 miles away.While the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Intelligence Committee considered Kaesong an "acceptable" location, it warned it offered "clear political and psychological advantages to the enemy".The committee ignored a more important fact: Kaesong had been North Korea's capital for centuries, and holding the talks there could be interpreted as giving the Communists the upper hand in the war.

Several parts of the telegram, especially the proposal for a ceasefire, made Li Qiwei uneasy.In the five months he spent in North Korea, he regrouped the Eighth Army and regained the initiative on the battlefield, all of which he had no intention of giving up.He cabled the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he considered the ceasefire "totally unacceptable" and that he would reject it "unless ordered to do so."Ridgway cited intelligence reports that the Chinese were mobilizing troops for another offensive.If he had to negotiate, Ridgway wanted to negotiate ahead of time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had to coordinate every step of the way with the White House and the State Department, which prevented Ridgway from urging an earlier meeting.Negotiations are almost certain, and the opportunity cannot be missed.The Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote specific wording for Ridgway to reply to the communist broadcast statement.The statement made it clear that the start of the talks does not mean the end of the war.Ridgway's commanded reply stated that "the terms of the truce must be agreed upon before the cessation of hostilities".After some more public exchanges of views, the two sides agreed to meet in Kaesong on July 7th with liaison officers.

Another thing that preceded the negotiations was that the United States avoided an unintentional but potentially gravely dangerous mistake by Dean Acheson.Acheson spoke inaccurately at the MacArthur hearings about a ceasefire along the 8th Parallel—a ceasefire line that recognized the military realities of the time.But in the months that followed, the Eighth Army had expanded its front into a triangular wedge, starting roughly north of Seoul and extending some thirty-five miles north of the 35th Parallel along an eastward slant.The Eighth Army's advance bypassed the Linjin River Basin area, a place criss-crossed by small streams and swamps that had no military value.There is also negotiating value in ceding this worthless piece of land to the Communist Party.The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United Nations intend to negotiate a truce that would keep U.S. and South Korean forces a few miles north of the 8th parallel.The de facto abandonment of the Linjinjiang area can be regarded as a kind of site "deal"-the United Nations army gave up the area south of the [-]th parallel in exchange for the more valuable area north of the [-]th parallel.The center of the UN front was the so-called Iron Triangle, a chain of high ground between Pyongkang (not to be confused with the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, a few miles to the northwest), Cheorwon, and Kimhwa.When Ridgway's advance was first targeted on a map, the front was known as the Kansas Line.For the next two years of the war, the United Nations forces would hold these positions—with a few minor shifts.

Of greatest concern to Ridgway was the deployment of his main force during the ceasefire.He believes that the 20th parallel has no military significance.Initial discussions between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Ridgway over acceptable terms for a ceasefire envisaged the creation of a demilitarized zone 10 miles deep centered around where the troops were when the agreement was reached.Thus, Ridgway's troops would have to retreat about 20 miles.At one point, Ridgway considered pushing further north to capture an area [-] miles north of the Kansas line.But he inspected the terrain there and told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that such an advance, while "presently feasible tactically and logistically, would entail unacceptable casualties."

american terms of peace

In June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Ridgway detailed instructions, drawn up by Pentagon and State Department officials, on how to proceed with the negotiations.There were some minor changes to these directives, but they became the blueprint that Ridgway and his successors followed for the next two years.The highly classified cable begins with a list of "general policies":
Our primary military intent in this armistice is to cease hostilities in North Korea, to ensure that there is no resumption of hostilities, and to safeguard the safety of United Nations forces. …

Whether the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party would be serious about finally reaching a reasonable and acceptable armistice arrangement, and whether they would be prepared to agree to an acceptable permanent solution to the Korean problem, we are not sure of either.Therefore, when considering such a truce, the most important thing is that the truce agreement reached must still be acceptable to us for a considerable period of time. ...

Discussions between you and the enemy force commander should be strictly limited to military matters.In particular, you should not engage in discussions about a final solution to the North Korean issue, or consider issues that have nothing to do with North Korea, such as Taiwan and China's seat in the United Nations.These issues must be addressed at the government level.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted Ridgway to be tough in the negotiations, going beyond the minimum acceptable to the United States in presenting an initial bargaining position.But he must not let the negotiations break down unless the enemy does not accept his minimum terms.He must avoid appearing to be "overreaching" to some extent, which would make international public opinion doubt the good faith of the UN Army.He must not put American prestige in a position from which there is no room for retreat.The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized the difficulty of negotiating with the Communists, but they assured Ridgway that the fact was "fully understood here."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff then set out the "minimum" US position: the truce would be limited to military issues in North Korea and would remain in effect until other arrangements supersede it; the respective commanders would order a cessation of hostilities; a non-military line would be established across North Korea area, the ground troops should stay in their original positions, and retreat if they have advanced to the demilitarized zone; both sides will select an equal number of personnel to form a "Military Armistice Committee", which will "be able to travel freely and without restrictions to any place in North Korea." ", to oversee the armistice; no air, army, or naval reinforcements are permitted, although rotations of troops or personnel are permitted on a one-to-one basis; and the level of combat equipment in North Korea should not be enhanced when the ceasefire takes effect.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff paid particular attention to the Military Armistice Commission, whose freedom of action was deemed "vital" due to the belief that formal agreements were not taken seriously by the Communist Party around the world.The committee must be headed by "capable assistants" assigned by the commanders of both sides and be "sufficiently staffed to enable it to carry out its duties and functions."Until the Commission begins its work, the United Nations will not consider any truce valid.

Another "vital" issue was the establishment of a demilitarized zone, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Ridgway to impose tough conditions on this.The chiefs of staff wanted to establish a 20-mile-wide demilitarized zone "essentially in line with the prevailing positions of opposing forces when ceasefire arrangements are agreed upon." (The UN hoped to bypass Dean Acheson's hasty remarks about a ceasefire at the [-]th Parallel.) The Joint Chiefs of Staff said to Ridgway:

If, for bargaining purposes, you are required to agree to withdraw some UN forces, you may do so provided your current strong military position and ability to carry out your military mission is not compromised.

For negotiating purposes, your initial demand could be that Communist forces must withdraw 20 miles or more along the entire front.

If Communist commanders refer to statements by U.S. government officials that the United States is prepared to accept a settlement at or near the [-]th parallel, you should take the position that such statements do not apply to a truce on the battlefield, but may It is an issue that is being negotiated between governments for a political settlement.

You should further clarify that the military arrangements you propose will actually involve certain areas south of the [-]th parallel that are under the military control of the Communist Party (as mentioned earlier, referring to the alluvial plain of the Imjin River northwest of Seoul), as well as the three Certain UN-controlled areas north of the Eighth Parallel.The final outcome, although military in nature, should not prejudice political and territorial issues, which should be further considered by the relevant authorities.

Another issue in the negotiations was the exchange of prisoners of war, which seemed like a trivial issue at the time.Prisoners should be exchanged "on a one-to-one basis as quickly as possible".Until the prisoner exchange is complete, representatives of the Red Cross should be allowed to "visit all the camps and offer the assistance they can".Dean Rusk told Allied ambassadors on July 7 that the one-on-one exchange of prisoners of war was necessary "because the full repatriation of the prisoners ... would restore the North Korean army to its full strength at the time of its aggression ... And that will completely change the military landscape."The situation was "difficult" because the UN forces held some 3 Communist prisoners of war, while the Communists held "less than 15 UN personnel."

The directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contains the seeds of a future truce to resolve the North Korean issue, but there is room for bargaining.Over the next two years, the Communist Party and the United Nations would quarrel seemingly endlessly over these issues—the location of the ceasefire line first, and the handling of prisoners of war in the second.But at the end of June and the beginning of July 1951, neither issue seemed to matter much.The important fact is that a negotiated end to the war now seems within reach.

to the negotiating table

When General Matthew Ridgway was selecting to head the United Nations negotiating corps, he was looking for a senior officer with the self-control who could endure hours of communist abuse without losing his temper, and who, at the end of the talks, would not lose his temper. Can answer with strong words.The UN Army's negotiation strategy will be specially formulated by Washington, and the text of the UN Army's daily speeches will be conveyed in detail by telegram.Ridgway expected that the Communists would try to bring the United Nations to its knees through negotiations, winning the negotiations through fatigue tactics.Li Qiwei wanted to find an opponent for the Communist Party, as he said to a deputy: "That person can sit for 6 hours straight, neither blinking nor trying to take time to urinate."

In this way, Ridgway selected Admiral C. Turner Joy, a veteran of the Second World War who made great contributions in the battlefield, and now commands the Far East Naval Forces.Joey spends his non-combat duties researching explosives.His experience of war led him to conclude that the best way to strike an enemy was to destroy it.He personally loathed the Communists and their ideology as much as other U.S. military commanders did, and was less than happy with politically limiting the Korean War, but he did his best not to complain publicly.

Ridgway used the veterans of the Second World War to form the negotiating team of the United Nations Army.Major General Henry Hodders, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Eighth Army, who commanded an infantry regiment in Europe; Major General Lawrence Craigie, Deputy Commander of Far East Air Forces, who commanded a fighter wing in North Africa; best known as the chilling Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, deputy chief of staff of the Far East Navy, was known around the world under the name "8 Burke" for his bold use of destroyers in the Pacific campaign.The South Korean army selected a commander, Major General Bai Shanye, and the Americans were very impressed with him, thinking that he was "perhaps the most talented officer in the South Korean army."

Asia experts took pains to give Ridgway's negotiating team psychological advice on dealing with the Chinese and North Koreans: Care must be taken not to make them lose face unnecessarily.The Orientals wished for a "golden bridge" of retreat through which to evacuate uncomfortable places without appearing to abandon it.Inter-translation between English, Korean and Chinese is essential, which implies semantic and linguistic issues.Ridgway cautioned: "Inexact translations will lead to fundamental and lasting misunderstandings."

Li Qiwei has high hopes for the negotiation.If the negotiating team can manage the truce skillfully after the Communists' military defeat, "then history will record that the Communist Party's military expansion reached its limit in Korea. From then on, Communism itself began to decline in Asia."

(End of this chapter)