The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 110 The Secret Path of Peace Talks (4)
As the days wore on in July, the Communist Party softened its stance on the withdrawal. "Foreign troops" are "those troops sent to North Korea at the behest of their governments."But this cannot be accepted by the UN Army, because the Chinese still insist that their troops in North Korea are volunteers.So the Chinese changed the definition: Foreign troops mean "non-Korean and not in the North Korean army" soldiers.Dean Rusk remained skeptical because the change "opened the door for the Chinese to infiltrate the North Korean army."Rusk called the issue "very tricky," but told allied ambassadors on July 7 that the U.S. would work on compromising language.

On July 7, Nam Il challenged the sincerity of the UN Army's negotiations. "War is not tourism, and the military is not tourists," he said. "If a ceasefire is ordered and achieved, (but) foreign armed forces remain where they are, the purpose is obviously ... not ... to make them appreciate North Korea's Beautiful scenery..." The UN Army delegation believed that this statement was intended to create political pressure to force the UN Army to accept the content of the Communist Party's agenda.

General Ridgway had complained to the press in early July about "bringing the lads home" and "military weariness".Ridgway intends to put an end to such talk among his troops. "If it's 'mind control,' then I'm all for it," he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "To ignore it is to cowardly surrender everything we've fought and prepared to fight. ’” But Ridgway could not suppress the rumors in the press that a truce was imminent.The State Department asked the ambassadors of allied countries to exercise restraint. The United States did not want to be pressured to make concessions on substantive issues, which is exactly what the Communist Party is looking for.Australian Ambassador Percy Spencer strongly agreed, apparently expressing the wishes of the other envoys as well.If the U.S. decides to break off negotiations on troop withdrawal, the "public must" be "prepared" for such contingencies.However, the United States does not intend to engage in a propaganda war with the Communist Party, and any public statements should come from Ridgway, not officials in Washington or elsewhere. (The State Department did note that the Soviet propaganda media simply repeated the North Korean statement on the issue of armistice negotiations without adding comments that might have involved the Soviet government in any particular position.)
In the first weeks of negotiations, the Chinese sent reinforcements and supplies to North Korea at a faster pace.Intelligence agencies estimated in mid-July that the Communist Party had 7 divisions and 71 brigades, with nearly 3 soldiers (North Korea had 50 at the front and 6.1 at the rear; the Chinese had 15.9 at the front, 6.5 people in the rear, and 20 partisans).About 7 tons of supplies are brought in every day, which exceeds the daily requirement.Based on previous combat experience, the communists had amassed enough ammunition to support an offensive of 000 divisions for 600 to 45 days, or 9 divisions for 11 to 71 days.So the longer the negotiations drag on, the more the military suspects that the Chinese are using a break in fighting to prepare for a powerful summer offensive.

Ridgway proposed using superior U.S. air power to induce the Chinese to cease their "obstructive and intransigent" maneuvers.He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 7 that he intended to use 21 bombers and fighter jets to "conduct an all-out air strike on Pyongyang."Leaflets will be dropped before the strikes to ensure "unnecessary killing of non-combatants".The airstrike would be "...a devastating blow to ... the build-up ... of supplies and personnel in ... this ... critical area".But the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered it "questionable" to conduct an air strike "at this time," and Truman agreed.The air raid was called off.Li Qiwei now knows that he cannot support his toughness on the negotiating table with his toughness on the battlefield.

But on the key issue of the negotiation, Li Qiwei did not make any concessions.He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff on July 7 that he intended to order Admiral Joey to inform the Communists that unless they dropped their demand for a withdrawal, the UN forces would cease negotiations until some "new and constructive "thing.The deadline Li Qiwei set for the Communist Party was 20:7 am on July 21.He told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he was confident that the other side would not "break off" negotiations on the issue.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to send Ridgway's proposal to the State Council for approval.Because of the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, the State Department learned of the proposal just two hours before Ridgway's deadline.Dean Rusk vehemently disagreed.The move, which has been proposed, could stall negotiations and challenge the party's reputation so directly that it will be difficult for them to make concessions.In addition, such an action would create the appearance of major concessions by the Communist Party in public.The Joint Chiefs of Staff told Ridgway not to issue his ultimatum and await further instructions.

A long telegram sent to Ridgway on July 7 included comments from the State and Defense Departments and was approved by President Truman.The Telegram pledged its full support for Ridgway's position on the troop withdrawal, but also warned that the issue could also become a "breaking point" due to hardline positions on both sides. "If the negotiations break down, it is crucial that the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations should be clearly and fully borne by the Communist Party," the Joint Chiefs of Staff said.The cables also outlined a new negotiating position that would allow the enemy to express its views unilaterally on the withdrawal without requiring the UN forces to agree to accept those views.

The communist side agreed not to insist on the withdrawal of troops on the agenda, but in exchange for ensuring that the issue was discussed at the government level after the armistice.At a meeting on July 7, the two sides reached an agreement on this.Thus, item 26 of the agenda became a very vague sentence: "to make recommendations to the governments of the two countries concerned." countless.The question now facing Washington and other U.N. capitals is: Will the Communist Party come up with a counter-proposal to gain the upper hand in the negotiations?

draw a dividing line
With the troop withdrawal issue on the table, UN negotiators hoped to speed up the process, but they were disappointed.The Communist Party immediately renewed its request to use the [-]th parallel as the dividing line after the signing of the armistice agreement.It is not too much to say that the Communist Party is stubborn. No matter what the United Nations requests, they point to the [-]th parallel line and say that they only consider this line, and refuse to discuss the matter further.The [-]th parallel "consistent with the facts of history is fundamental to the armistice negotiations".The war started when one of the belligerents breached the [-]th Parallel (South Korean Army according to the communist side), so it cannot be stopped while the belligerents are still crossing the [-]th Parallel.Finally, since there is no solid front, the [-]th parallel is the best dividing line, because both sides have troops on both sides of the [-]th parallel.

The United Nations Army delegation argued hard, but the Communist Party seemed to turn a deaf ear to it. In July and August 1950, when the United Nations troops were defending the Pusan ​​defense circle, would the Communist Party accept the 7th Parallel as the dividing line? When the United Nations Army reached the Yalu River in November 8, would the United Nations Army accept the 1950th Parallel as the dividing line?Joy argued that, in terms of military reality, the war had three zones: the airspace, where the UN forces controlled the air as far as the Yalu River; the sea, where the UN forces controlled the seas unchallenged; North of the Eighth Line.To withdraw U.S. naval and air forces, North Korean and Chinese forces would have to withdraw accordingly to the north, far from their current positions.So the United Nations delegation strongly advocated the establishment of a 11-mile wide demilitarized zone, the southern limit of which should roughly follow the current battle lines.In exchange, UN forces will cease air operations from the northern limit of the DMZ to the Yalu River, and naval operations from the southern limit of the DMZ to the Tumen River on the east coast and the Yalu River on the west coast.Dean Rusk told allied ambassadors on July 20 that the United States intended to uphold those terms.He heard no objection.

The Communist Party responded with the strongest language since the negotiations. "Given that you have made such absurd and arrogant statements," Nam Il asked Joy on July 7, "what on earth are you here for? Are you here to negotiate for peace, or to find an excuse to continue the war?" ?” Joey suppressed his anger, answering Nam Il’s “inappropriate, irrelevant and impolite question” only because he was asked to give a specific answer.The presence of the United Nations delegation in Kaesong is itself evidence of its willingness to find a dignified and just basis for an end to hostilities.Joey will not tolerate further vulgar invective from the Communist side, and if Nam Il persists in his "brutal, disrespectful, and reckless discourse," the UN Army will consider the Communist side not to be negotiating seriously, and "the prospects for peace in Korea will be greatly dimmed." ". (Joy's remarks were based on estimates by the U.S. intelligence community that the Communist Party wanted the talks to continue and would be pressured to eventually back down.)
After that, Nam Il's tone became "patient and reasonable", dropping harsh words, although he still stuck to his previous negotiating position. (Joy is still skeptical, thinking that Nam Il is either testing whether the United Nations will compromise, or waiting for further instructions from Beijing. At this point, the admiral has discovered some patterns in the rhetoric of the Communist Party: every adjournment Two days later, Nam Il will speak out strongly about the issue under discussion. Once the UN side makes a new proposal, he will falter and kill time. Obviously, Nam Il has no right to bargain without authorization from his superiors.)
The sticking point in the negotiations is that neither side is willing to talk about choosing an alternative line (although UN representatives have contingency plans to discuss bumps in any final ceasefire line, subject to the dynamics of the battlefield at the time of signing).In fact, in a discussion on August 8, Admiral Joy at one point "expressed his willingness to discuss any demarcation line related to the current military situation other than the 1th parallel."

"I've made my position," Nam-il replied.The Communist Party's willingness to cede "military valuable" areas south of the [-]th Parallel is evidence of its good intentions (in fact, the territory occupied by the Communist Party south of the [-]th Parallel is the worthless river network west of Seoul), the United Nations The demarcation line proposed by the United Nations Army "is only beneficial to the defense purpose of the United Nations Army, so it is not equal to both sides."

Will the Communist Party make other suggestions on the demarcation line?Joey asked.No, Nam-il replies that his position is “unshakable.”

However, Joey still insisted on his mission, and he hoped to finally find a gap in the logic of Nan Ri's position.The area occupied by the United Nations forces north of the [-]th parallel is twice as large as the area occupied by the Communists south of the [-]th parallel.But the United Nations Army is not interested in territory, it is concerned about military security during the armistice.The [-]th Parallel was unrealistic because it was "unrecognizable on the ground" and it was the source of much of the pre-war border incident.

U.S. intelligence agencies believed that Beijing Radio’s broadcast in the first two days of August was the Communist Party’s preparation for the interruption of negotiations in the world.A broadcast said: "The troops of the United States and Syngman Rhee violated the Kaesong neutral zone 8 times." ".

On August 8, Joey felt extremely frustrated after listening to Nan Ri's statement on the 11th Parallel issue. Nan Ri said all "old-fashioned arguments".Nam Il concluded by saying, "We have nothing more to say at the moment."

"We have nothing to say," Joey replied.The two sides sat there without saying a word for a full 2 ​​hours and 11 minutes.Then Joey broke the silence and said, "Are you going to say anything else?"

"I have nothing to say at the moment." Nanri replied.At the end of the meeting, he said that he planned to continue discussing the [-]th Parallel issue the next day.

Reporting the matter to Washington, Ridgway argued that the enemy's position "has not changed, or appears likely to change."

(The United Nations Army delegation) is convinced that now is the time to intensify efforts to influence world public opinion, pointing out the arbitrary, stubborn and unreasonable attitude of the Communist Party delegation. If the United Nations Army does not meet their original demands, they will obviously Hope the negotiations stalled. ...The record so far shows that the Communist Party has no sincerity in the negotiations, and more recently has been deliberately trying to force us to either make concessions on the [-]th Parallel issue or terminate the negotiations.

Ridgway was again prepared to risk a breakdown in negotiations to force a change in the Communist Party's uncompromising stance.He intended to instruct the delegation to meet again with the Reds on 8 August and tell them that the United Nations had "categorically, formally and finally" refused to consider the 11th parallel as a military demarcation line.The meeting will discuss an armistice line based on the real military situation, or put the issue of the armistice line on hold.If a satisfactory answer is not obtained within 72 hours, the UN Army "will consider the talks to be terminated due to the deliberate actions of the Communist Party."Li Qiwei requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or issued "other instructions" by urgent telegram.

The chiefs of staff of the joint meeting immediately stopped Li Qiwei. "You have been instructed not to interrupt the talks without prior instructions from Washington," General Bradley telegraphed August 8 (Washington time). "You shall continue the talks until further instructions are received." The Joint Chiefs of Staff, while sympathetic to Ridgway's frustration, worried that he would put himself in what the Communists called a bluff and break off negotiations. On August 10, the president approved a long telegram to Ridgway reiterating Washington's desire for negotiations to proceed.

In view of the potential for delays in communications and the need for consideration at the highest level, you should not initiate any action inconsistent with the above order without authorization from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Breaking off negotiations is a major matter for the government and should not be contingent on urgent approvals, or communication within some deadline.

If negotiations do fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff want clear accountability on the part of the Communist Party, and any issues that bring down the negotiations must make the Communist Party internationally infamous. "It is not enough for us to say that the Communists have gone awry because they disagreed with us," said the cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "but it must be fully demonstrated that we have persevered and Be patient, and these conditions are reasonable, fair and correct in the eyes of world public opinion." The chiefs of staff pointed out that the Communists could still find some reasons to justify their hard line: Secretary of State Acheson and UN Secretary-General Lie in the In the spring statement, the Communist Party mistakenly believed that the United Nations Army would agree to use the [-]th parallel as the military demarcation line.The Communist Party will need time to adjust.At the same time, Li Qiwei needs to be patient and firm.

(End of this chapter)