The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 111 The Secret Path of Peace Talks (5)
At the same time, the Communist Party began to apply pressure, accusing the UN Army of violating the neutral zone around Panmunjom.They accused U.N. soldiers of shooting at Panmunjom in mid-July; a few days later, U.N. planes strafed one of their trucks near Kaesong.Then, during the lunch break on August 7, another company of heavily armed Chinese soldiers marched through the armistice zone, less than 8 yards from the house assigned to the United Nations delegation.Joy protested strongly to Nam Il that no army other than the military police would be allowed within half a mile of the armistice zone.Li Qiwei believes that the nature of this matter is extremely serious, and it is necessary to call Washington.He wants the Communist Party to explain this and apologize, or stop the negotiations.Ridgway said that diplomatic rhetoric is "inappropriate and ineffective" in negotiations. "Sitting with these people and treating them as representatives of enlightened and civilized people is tantamount to abandoning self-esteem and causing them Acts of treachery ultimately brought disaster to us".Ridgway intended to tell his negotiators to stand up to the Communists "in terms and in such a way that these vile savages can never be misunderstood, fully understood, and respected."In his cable, he cited a host of insults used by the Communist Party and reiterated his belief that the Communist Party saw a truce as the shortest way to achieve its goals at the lowest cost.

Truman, however, was not prepared to let the negotiations collapse.He still believes that the Chinese are "sick of the whole thing and wish they hadn't been in North Korea in the first place".Ridgway was ordered not to threaten in this way, he should demand an explanation from the other party, and if the other party provided an explanation and agreed to abide by the rules, he should agree to resume negotiations.The Communist Party offered a low-key explanation of their "mistake," calling it "trivial."Still dissatisfied with this reply, Ridgway again asked Washington to refuse to negotiate until he received firm assurances that there would be no future violations.Failing that, he hopes to find another venue for negotiations where the UN forces themselves can "guarantee that there will be no further violations."But Washington has again taken deliberate steps of action.The Joint Chiefs of Staff telegraphed Ridgway: "Introducing new conditions now will make it difficult for us to justify ourselves in many important respects." He should send the negotiators back to Panmunjom, but warn them against further violations.

Meeting no resistance after intimidating Washington, the Communists continued to accuse the United Nations of "aggressions" and made new accusations almost every day. At midnight on August 8, the Communist Party made the most frivolous accusations.Colonel Zhang, the Chinese liaison officer, notified Colonel Andrew Kinney of the United Nations delegation through a walkie-talkie, claiming that U.S. aircraft had strafed the Kaesong meeting site.Kinney got Joey's approval and braved the wind and rain to lead the team to the scene.When they arrived at the scene at 22:1 past midnight, they found Colonel Zhang and a group of Communist Party reporters and photographers already on the scene, "in a state of high arousal."

According to Zhang, "everyone" in Kaesong heard the sound of an approaching plane and then a bomb went off.He insisted on presenting dubious "physical evidence": a crumpled piece of metal (Kinney said it resembled fragments of an airplane fuel tank), and a small crater in the ground, about 30 inches wide and 10 inches deep, with no signs of burning.Kinney suspected the crater was caused by a hand grenade buried shallowly in the ground.The Chinese also talked vaguely about a rocket launch, but they couldn't produce evidence.Kinney also noticed that the so-called "napalm containers" were made by the flush riveting method, while the napalm containers used by the Far East Air Force were relatively rough in workmanship because they were only for one-time use.Kinney soon had enough of the Chinese show.

“I’m so impatient with the nonsense,” Kinney said, before a Chinese soldier stepped forward and declared that he had seen a U.S. plane “with its lights on” during an air strike.From Kinney's point of view, this was ridiculous, since no pilot would leave his plane with lights on when entering combat.When Jinny turned to leave, Zhang reached out from his coat pocket and took out a stack of prepared statements.He announced that the armistice negotiations were suspended indefinitely.

The propaganda color of the pre-dawn confrontation, as well as the so-called "evidence" that was shoddy, made Ridgway believe that the Communist Party fabricated this scene out of thin air as a prelude to stopping the negotiations.He's guessing why.Ridgway felt that the Communists wanted to hold back the progress of the armistice talks until later in the year when peace talks with Japan began, and they hoped that Beijing would get something out of the outcome - an armistice in North Korea in exchange for war with post-war Japan play some role.But the episode appears to have been orchestrated to hold UN forces accountable for sabotaging the peace talks.

Matthew Ridgway didn't mind that.His Eighth Army continued to make good progress on the battlefield, although it did not attempt to secure any significant advances.In the summer, the most important harvest is that the combat effectiveness of the South Korean army has been greatly enhanced.Its officers and noncommissioned officers are trained in military training courses, and their ranks are determined by military skill rather than the whims of a political figure or immediate superior.The capability of the United Nations artillery gradually increased, enough to turn the intensive Chinese attack into intensive suicide.The American and South Korean troops are now battle-tested and no longer panic in the face of the Chinese attacking horns and whistles.They hid in deeper reinforced concrete bunkers and called for a hail of shells.When winter descended on the barren Asian wilderness, improved logistical support meant United Nations forces were better equipped to withstand the bitter cold.

Still, there were disturbing ominous signs on the battlefield.In the last few weeks of August and the first few days of September, the Communists added a remarkable 8 troops, bringing their total army to around 9.Moreover, many of the newly arrived troops were what U.S. intelligence agencies called "Soviet and/or other Caucasian troops."The tasks of the Soviets were only a step away from direct participation in the war: air defense and coastal defense specialists, security forces, counterintelligence agents, military advisers, and signal and radar personnel.The nationalities of the other whites cannot be ascertained, and they were all assigned to the artillery, medical and auxiliary units.Because intelligence coverage varied from time to time, neither the CIA nor Far East Command could completely rule out the possibility that the Soviets were already on the front lines.In another disturbing sign, air activity on the enemy's side appeared to be steadily extending southwards, suggesting a significant increase in Communist air power.As U.S. diplomats told allied ambassadors at a briefing in Washington on Oct. 6.1, the Communist Party has effectively taken control of airspace in northwestern North Korea.However, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted that UN forces believed that unless peace was achieved, "the coming winter will be severe for the enemy."

On the diplomatic front, the United States and its allies are eager to let the Chinese know that they cannot expect to attend meetings about Japan.China is positioned as an aggressor by the United Nations and will not be welcomed in any peace talks until it ends the Korean War.On the military front, China's leaders apparently recognized in just a few short weeks that their troops were woefully ill-prepared for another winter on the Korean battlefield.They were quick to find an excuse to hide their desire to reopen talks they had resolutely abandoned.

Ironically, they found a pretext when the UN forces admitted that an American fighter jet had accidentally strafed Kaesong, but caused no casualties.The UN Army quickly apologized for the incident, blaming it on pilot error.This is September 9th.

Meanwhile, Ridgway had been arguing with Washington, who demanded that the UN forces refuse to return to Kaesong under any circumstances.Going back to the old place and following the old rules will only lead to more of the same trouble.He hoped that the authorities would demand that the Communist Party accept another negotiating venue, otherwise no further negotiations should take place.Ridgway once again found that Washington was very worried about taking responsibility for stopping the negotiations.During the first few days of September, the government, in a series of telegram exchanges, reluctantly authorized Ridgway to propose finding a new negotiating location that would provide some security, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff still refrained from allowing him to refuse to return to Kaesong .

The accidental bombing of September 9 occurred during these maneuvers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately saw an opportunity to reopen negotiations.They told Ridgway that the UN's apology (no one doubted that the American plane had violated the rules) would give the Chinese a chance to save face.If the Chinese still do not give a satisfactory answer within a week, then the Joint Chiefs of Staff will reconsider Ridgway's opinion and demand the termination of Kaesong's neutral status.

After exchanging letters and meetings with several military officers, Ridgway believed that the Communist Party did not intend to return to Kaesong with sincerity, and he used the reopening of negotiations to challenge his superiors in Washington.Li Qiwei made it clear in his telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, first and foremost, he was determined not to conduct future negotiations in Kaesong unless he was directly ordered.And even if negotiations resume, whether in Kaesong or elsewhere, he has no intention of making further concessions.He said in a telex conference with the Pentagon on Sept. 9 that he felt strongly that the Communists "needed a truce imminently" because the military situation was against them and winter was coming.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with Ridgway, largely because Ridgway had earlier reported that the Communists continued to build up their military presence.Ridgway also pointed out in other cables that the armistice negotiations were beneficial to the Communist Party due to the neutral status of the Kaesong area and the psychological relaxation of the UN troops when the negotiations began.Apparently disturbed by the domestic and international political consequences of failed negotiations, Truman spent the last days of September sending Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Charles Pollan of the State Department to the Far East to see for himself what was happening there. situation.This trip to the Far East played a key role in turning the government in favor of Ridgway.Pollan later admitted that he left Washington convinced of the "extreme urgency" of achieving an acceptable truce.But after visiting troops on the battlefield and speaking with commanders, both he and Bradley believed that the United Nations had a great military advantage and that it would be better for the United States to withdraw from the negotiations for strategic reasons.Pollan also backed Ridgway on the location of the negotiations, saying that "under the current circumstances," Ridgway "should never" be forced to resume negotiations in Kaesong.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff thanked Ridgway for resolving his differences without resorting to public protest.General Lawton Collins, the Army chief of staff, told a subordinate: "If MacArthur was still there, he would have put it in the papers and we would have been accused of doing all kinds of bad things. Ridgway was different. He was a Soldier, he presented his opinion, then accepted the decision of his superiors, and carried out the order, and kept his mouth shut."

Later events showed that the Communist Party was prepared to compromise on the location of the negotiations. On October 10th, Li Qiwei asked the Communist Party to propose a new meeting place in the middle of the two fronts.Three days later, the Communist side suggested Panmunjom, a small village six miles east of Kaesong.Liaison officials unanimously agreed to set up a circular meeting place with a radius of 4 yards, off-limits to all armed personnel except gendarmes.The same rule applies to a 6-mile circular area centered on Munsan, where the UN Army delegation is headquartered, and Kaesong, where the Communist Party delegation is headquartered.To get to the negotiation site, you have to go through the Wenshan-Panmendian-Kasong highway, and the neutral zone is within 1 meters on both sides of the highway.After the meeting place is determined, the warring parties can discuss issues again.

Communist Compromise
Now, some of the more sophisticated haggling in the peace talks begins.The Communists immediately departed from their earlier positions, and at the same time sought to seize new advantages.But after resuming negotiations, the most important first step is that the Communist Party no longer insists on the 10th parallel as the armistice line.After talks resumed on October 25, the UN Army reiterated its proposal: a demilitarized zone along the line of contact.The Communists rejected the U.N. proposal the next day, but for the first time made a counter-proposal, offering theirs a truce line not far from that which the U.N. had said was acceptable.The Communist plan called for the United Nations to cede a large swath of favorable terrain in exchange for the worthless territories of the Wengjin and Yan'an peninsulas.But both Ridgway and Joy saw the proposal as an opportunity to bring the negotiations out of a dead end.

In the days that followed, the main issue was control over Kaesong, the ancient capital of great symbolic importance.As Ridgway's telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it: "From the perspective of Asia, the control or demilitarization of Kaesong by the United Nations Army is a damage to the prestige of the Communist Party and can enhance our own prestige.  …" Due to the opening The city was located on the main attack route leading to Seoul, dozens of miles to the south, so Ridgway hoped that it would either be controlled by the United Nations forces or be made a neutral zone.He was almost on the verge of capturing Kaesong in midsummer 1951, and he did have a few battalions approach the city, but they were held back because he considered neutralizing it if it were to be the site of armistice negotiations.Now, Li Qiwei does not intend to hand over Kaesong to others.

Li Qiwei attached so much importance to Kaesong that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to warn him again not to put himself in an uncompromising negotiating position.As Ridgway had told General Bradley during his autumn visit, he intended to make a "final proposal" to the Communists on the question of the military demarcation line.Li Qiwei always felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported him.In a cable dated 10 October, he said: "Except for the consideration of continuing the advance of the Eighth Army, I do not intend to change our proposal for the demilitarized zone." The president-approved cable warned him that no one had approved the UNC's present proposal as "final," and emphasized that he should be willing to make minor adjustments if necessary to reach an agreement with the communist side .The Joint Chiefs of Staff did recognize the difficulty of getting a field commander to relinquish "hard-earned ground"; but they also noted growing public opposition to breaking off negotiations on Kaesong.Why, for instance, did the New York Times plausibly ask on Nov. 28 that delegates backtrack on “seemingly innocuous issues” when agreements had already been reached on “big issues?” The New York Times does not understand why Ridgway insists on getting a defensible peace line, so this editorial is misleading.But it also showed the public's eagerness to compromise and end the war.It appeared to the public that the Communists had agreed to essentially stop the war along the front lines, which was what the United Nations was after; now it was time for American negotiators to resolve the specific issues and sign a peace treaty.

(End of this chapter)