The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 112 The Secret Path of Peace Talks (6)
With Western European countries looking forward and backward, another more pressing factor was the indecision of the Soviet Union.The Soviets were appalled that the U.S. Congress allocated $10 billion in October to provide technical and military aid to friendly nations, primarily to strengthen NATO membership.A few days later, NATO voted to admit Greece and Turkey as members, a major expansion of NATO's area of ​​responsibility and strength.The Soviets did not remain silent.They exploded their second and third atomic bombs in October and announced an ambitious nuclear program.Joseph Stalin publicly pledged friendship with China and published a telegram from North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung thanking Soviet aid.Alan Kirk, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Moscow, received a dismal reception during his final visit to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky.In response to a blunt question, Vyshinsky said the Soviets would not pressure Communist negotiators in North Korea to revise their negotiating positions.

The intention of the Soviets is obviously a challenge to the determination of the allies.Congress can approve appropriations, but will NATO members spend the money?The Soviets went on the offensive at the UN General Assembly opening in Paris on November 11. (For the first few years of its existence, the United Nations held its General Assembly in rotation among its main member states each year, though it retained a permanent seat in New York.) Vyshinsky, the Soviet foreign minister, brought with him a barrage of obscenities intended to intimidate the Soviet Union's neighbors. s country.He wants NATO to disintegrate; he wants the United Nations to ban nuclear weapons (an action that would deprive Western Europe of the only meaningful means of defense against Soviet attack); warring fact); finally, he demanded a Korean armistice along the 6th parallel and the withdrawal of all foreign and "volunteer" troops within three months.

Leaving aside the propaganda nature of Vyshinsky's rhetoric, it did create serious political problems for the United States.Relations between the United States and the United Kingdom have improved significantly since the Conservative government came to power and Winston Churchill became Prime Minister.Still, Acheson was uncertain about keeping European support for the Korean War.Although 14 of NATO's 11 members have troops fighting there, Europeans are more worried about their own borders than the distant theaters of Asia.

However, Acheson did manage to secure a major promise from the new British government. At a meeting at the US embassy in Paris in early November, Acheson told the current British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, that he believed "very frankly" that the Chinese would not accept any verification of their compliance with the terms of the armistice .With the truce broken, Acheson hoped to let the Chinese know in "unambiguous language" that the U.S. response "would not be limited."He talked about bombing Chinese military bases ("not necessarily limited to air bases on the other side of the Yalu River") and blockading mainland China.That night, Eden reported these carefully considered "draconian actions" to Prime Minister Churchill.The British supported Acheson only partially.They will support the bombing, only asking for prior consultation.But perhaps Churchill, mindful of Hong Kong's fragile status as a coastal enclave, would not support a naval blockade.Nonetheless, Acheson was encouraged by British support for the bombing issue, and he proceeded to implement an armistice on dire terms.

Ridgway was actually told of the unalterable position of the UN Army: the ceasefire must go hand in hand with the demarcation of the military demarcation line.And now the United States (that is, Acheson) is retreating from this position. On November 11, the opening day of the General Assembly meeting, Ridgway was ordered to accept "in principle" the military demarcation line drawn along the front line, and proposed to discuss other issues.If the Communists categorically reject this proposal, Ridgway will have to make further concessions, which is what the Communists still demand: if they accept a military demarcation line on the front line, Ridgway will agree to return to Kaesong for negotiations.But the Joint Chiefs of Staff added a crucial caveat.With ground forces remaining in place, the United Nations would no longer have its valuable air and sea superiority.Therefore, accepting a ceasefire along the front lines must have a time limit to complete all items on the agenda.If this is not met by the deadline, the military demarcation line will face revision.

Realizing that they now had a propaganda advantage, the Communists quickly moved to try to put the United Nations in a politically untenable position. On November 11, they proposed an immediate cessation of fighting and the withdrawal of all troops by 7 kilometers. The monitoring team went to the battlefield that day to check the contact line according to the map.The proposal, while attractive on the surface, harbors enormous troubles.Either side can veto any adjustments proposed by the other over the line, and there is no practical mechanism for resolving disagreements over such changes.Ridgway told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that what the Communist Party is seeking is a "de facto ceasefire" and he intends to unswervingly adhere to the principle established by the United Nations Army at the beginning of the talks: the contact line on the day the armistice takes effect should be military demarcation line.Otherwise, the communists could take advantage of the lull in the fighting to fortify their positions in the face of the Eighth Army and bring in men and supplies for a new attack without the risk of any American air attack.Ridgway insisted that if the Communists really wanted peace, they should be forced to accept the whole package, not just a few points of immediate military value.The absence of a common monitoring team would have caught the UN forces off guard in the face of a surprise attack.

U.S. diplomats found allied ambassadors vacillating over Kaesong.Von Rodger of the Netherlands believed that the United Nations "overemphasized the question of whether to stay in Kaesong, and continued fighting ... is actually unnecessary".The British and South Africans also had reservations, saying in effect that drawing any line would mean less fighting.But John Hickson of the State Department defended Ridgway's point.Lowering the level of fighting, while tempting at first glance, would also reduce negotiating pressure on the Communist Party.The situation would have been different if the Communist Party had shown an intention to tackle all problems immediately after accepting the armistice line.But they showed no such intention.Hickson said that if the actual demarcation line is established immediately, "it will be almost impossible to maintain the morale of the troops", and no matter how the United Nations forces advance in the future, they will also have to give up what has been acquired when the war finally ends.About 6 of the enemy's divisions have been "depleted" since negotiations began in June, and they must be rendered untenable if negotiations are to succeed.

But Allied unease confronted the Truman administration with an obvious choice: support Ridgway, its commander in the field, or make concessions to restive European ambassadors.Li Qiwei failed, and the government gave him a bottom line. This was neither the first time nor the last time.The Chiefs of Staff of the Joint Conference telegraphed Ridgway on November 11, saying: "It is considered of considerable importance that we agreed earlier on those guiding principles in choosing the line of demarcation which would satisfy our main requirements. They are also worried that the Communist Party has made what are considered to be major concessions, and if they are rejected, they may return to their original demand, which is to use the 9th parallel as the dividing line.

Li Qiwei objected.In a telegram reporting to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an armistice negotiation on November 11, he said the Communists had been so aggressive that they had been “brutally rude” and insulting to representatives of the United Nations forces.A Communist officer called the Eighth Army's deputy chief of staff, Major General Henry Hodes, a "bastard," which is a very insulting word in Chinese.Another Chinese officer referred to Admiral Joy, not without contempt, as "that old representative ... I forget his name."Li Qiwei begged for a little room for maneuver.Why force him to make concessions to an opponent who openly insulted his officer?He wanted "a little more steel and a little less silk" in the US position.Because of Acheson's dominant role in this debate, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had only concerns, not real options. On November 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Ridgway to accept the current line of contact as the demarcation line, and agreed that if other issues were not resolved within a month, the demarcation line would be renegotiated; reaching an agreement did not mean a ceasefire, Ground operations must continue.The telegram was approved by President Truman.

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