The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 113 The Secret Path of Peace Talks (7)
The sudden change in negotiation strategy made Ridgway very angry, and his answer was both firm and sharp. "Premature acceptance" of the current front regardless of any later adjustment "must inevitably delay the possibility of consensus and a dignified truce".After reviewing the previously abandoned positions, Ridgway said in a MacArthur-esque tone:

I think that announcing to the Communist side the positions you have indicated will most likely strengthen the Communist Party's uncompromising positions and weaken our future positions on every substantive issue.Having experienced this developing situation firsthand, I have a strong inner belief, no doubt based on the comparison of the situation in North Korea with the situation in the world, that is: a little more steel and a little less silk, a little more U.S. Straightforward adherence to the unshakable logic of our positions will achieve what we have honorably fought for.

On the contrary, I believe that the direction you set will lead step by step to the sacrifice of our fundamental principles and the cause to which so many brave men and women have given their lives.We are standing at a critical juncture.If we stand firm, we gain a lot; if we back down, we gain nothing.In all my conscience, I appeal to us to stand firm.

However, Ridgway's appeal went unheeded.Again, the Truman administration bowed to international pressure and prioritized events threatened elsewhere over the urgency of the Korean War. On November 11, in an order approved by the President (but curiously not specified in the text of the order), the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered Ridgway to accept the Communists' proposal, a deadline for agreement on other issues of the armistice for one month.

Ridgway was heartbroken by Washington's decision.He felt that he was in the position of a card player who had to constantly ask permission to play his cards.Admiral Joy dealt face-to-face with the Communists and was familiar with the nuances of their negotiating positions.Ridgway cannot put a "final position" on the negotiating table and then support it.Joy felt deeply about this pang, as he wrote in his memoirs of the Armistice: "The delegation, even General Ridgway, never knew when another order from Washington would send us to a respectable, The basic goal of a stable armistice has changed again," wrote Joy:
Under such circumstances, it is extremely difficult to formulate a sound plan, to present an opinion convincingly, to demonstrate an unassailable firm position, and to ultimately speak and act.

In our view, the U.S. government does not understand exactly what its political goals in North Korea are or should be.As a result, the United Nations delegation was always looking back, lest a new order came from afar, and this order called for actions that were very different from the current practice.

Years later, Army Chief of Staff General Lawton Collins admitted that Ridgway had good reason to complain.The instructions issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Ridgway are often "hesitant" and appear "lack of firmness", which of course distressed Ridgway and the UN Army delegation.Collins wrote: "I must admit that the Joint Chiefs of Staff occasionally feel this way about our consultations with the State Department and those civilian leaders who have more direct political responsibilities to the American people. But we must admit that, We cannot guarantee the success of a military operation endorsed by General Ridgway or ourselves."

Ridgway, the loyal soldier, carried out the order, though reluctantly. On November 11, his negotiators told the Communist side that the UN forces would agree to the current line of contact as a demarcation line, provided that other issues were resolved within a month.The Communists, feeling they had the upper hand, disputed this.Even beyond the one-month deadline, they insisted, the demarcation line cannot be changed until all other issues on the agenda are resolved.According to the instructions, the United Nations delegation had no choice but to start checking the contact line against the field map.

Ridgway was also disappointed on other issues.He spent the fall trying to persuade the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take a firm stand on what post-truce verification methods he should demand against the Communists.Ridgway repeatedly warned the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Chinese would use the lull to strengthen their forces.He hopes to carry out inspections in three ways: the establishment of joint observation teams at import seaports and transportation hubs throughout North Korea, where they can move freely on the lines of communication; joint aerial observation and aerial photographic reconnaissance throughout North Korea; joint observation of non-military Area.As a final stand, he could forego aerial observation.He called for an immediate decision on Nov. 11.In a cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he noted that experience had taught him that UNC negotiators would be at a disadvantage unless they could have confidence in a "firm national policy."The Communists became aggressive whenever they saw the representatives of the United Nations Army wavering slightly.Ridgway pleaded to make a decision anyway, and if Washington did not support his position, "I beg to be told as soon as possible what my position should be on this issue which will be accepted as a final concession.  …"

Ridgway was greatly disappointed when the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed Ridgway on November 11 that, while ground and air observations were desirable, neither was worth interrupting negotiations.Ridgway protested that the U.N. Army delegation had been instructed to adopt a position "more favorable" to the Communist side than even the Communist Party's own proposals.A cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff also said it was not in the "military interests" of the United States to be "tethered indefinitely" to North Korea.Ridgway was also appalled by the language, saying any withdrawal from North Korea within 16 months of the armistice would result in "immeasurable damage" to the U.S. standing in the Far East and would amount to a betrayal of the North Korean people.

In a series of conciliatory cables, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to reassure Ridgway that it had no intention of "immediate troop withdrawal," and that while military and diplomatic realities might lead to a "phased withdrawal" of U.S. forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assured that it would not Sudden abandonment of Koreans.The joint chiefs of staff reiterated their main point: They did not want the talks to be disrupted by the verification issue.

As Ridgway predicted, as negotiators attempted to draw a line on the map, they clashed bitterly with the Communist Party over control of specific parcels.At one point, both sides claimed control of a highland in central North Korea.General Henry Hodders was so sure that UN forces occupied the disputed heights that he arranged for the American commander there to be on the phone with a UN "verification team."Yes, the American commander replied that his forces held the high ground.A U.N. interpreter overheard a Chinese negotiator whispering to a staff officer, "It doesn't matter, it's going to be ours tonight." The U.N. force was warned of an attack.Nevertheless, the Chinese took the high ground.

By November 11, the dividing line was finally established.The agreement states that both sides accept the principle of using the contact line as the military demarcation line, and after the armistice agreement is completed, the two sides will retreat 27 kilometers to establish a demilitarized zone.Should an armistice be signed within 2 days, the line of contact established by the staff officers of the UN Army and the Communists should become the demarcation line, regardless of the changes in the fighting situation during this period.Ridgway made it clear that his troops would continue to fight for 30 days.

It is now conceivable that the war will end within 30 days.Despite Ridgway's wishes, the incident quickly spread among American soldiers.This mistake was obviously related to the inaccurate words used by General James Van Fleet, commander of the Eighth Army.In his order to the corps commanders, Van Vleet said that while his troops should be aware that hostilities would continue, the Eighth Army should "clearly demonstrate its willingness to come to an agreement."When this order reached the company level, someone told reporters about the incident, and the Associated Press issued an article saying: "The United Nations troops on the Western Front were ordered today to stop all offensive fire against the Communist Party and only in self-defense. The fire was fired." The order "was issued some 8 hours after UNF and Communist negotiators had reached an agreement on a temporary ceasefire line," the message went on to say.

The news was not true, and it gave the impression that Ridgway was worried: that an agreement on the military demarcation line would mean the end of the fighting.Telegrams flowed between Washington, Tokyo, Rome (where Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Bradley was visiting), and Truman, who was on vacation in Key West.The Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged "confusion and emotion here" and asked Ridgway whether he or Van Vleet "could have sparked these reports."Both have denied responsibility. (The Eighth Army later tracked down a company commander apparently responsible for this, who unconsciously spoke to an Associated Press reporter about the order he had just received.)
This news report, and the troops' reaction to it, strongly supports Ridgway's argument that he is opposed to the administration's negotiating tactics.Truman reacted infuriated by dismissing Ridgway's arguments with reference to the opinions of Dean Acheson and other advisers, attacking the press rather than addressing the consequences of his administration's vague and confusing negotiating skills. irreparable situation. “I hope everyone understands by now that there is no cease-fire in North Korea, and there will be no cease-fire until it is signed,” Truman said. “Any premature failure of morale will, in the long run, increase unnecessary American casualties.”

As such, the government and UN forces can now just wait and see if the concessions bear fruit.

(End of this chapter)