The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 119 Changes in government orders (3)
But Syngman Rhee, not wanting to be intimidated, hinted at withdrawing South Korean troops from UN command.He hinted to Ambassador Muccio that he was "very happy to see evidence that he was letting other countries" "take pains to speculate" about his actions.One of his official spokespersons even declared that South Korea would veto any armistice agreement signed under "disgraceful circumstances" and that the South Korean negotiator could not actually represent his country because the representative was appointed by the UN forces .In a public statement on April 4, Rhee dismissed the ceasefire. "I remain against any ceasefire that divides our country," he said. "No matter what other people's arguments may be, we are determined to unite our country with our own hands."

However, even his ability to maintain control over South Korea is problematic.Many South Koreans harbored resentment against Syngman Rhee's authoritarian methods, and this animosity was about to flare up in the National Assembly in the summer of 1952.Under North Korea's constitution, the president is elected by lawmakers, and this summer there were signs that Rhee would not be able to regain power.With his inherent contempt for political opponents, Rhee demanded that the National Assembly amend the constitution to provide for a universal suffrage, confident in his ability to shape public opinion.When the assembly refused, Rhee declared martial law in the Busan area (where the assembly was located) and arrested more than two dozen members of parliament on apparently false charges—rebellion and communism.He cited "military necessity" and claimed the support of General Van Vleet, saying his troops had been harassed by guerrillas in the area. (General Van Vleet denied any such support.) Telegrams flew between Rhee, Truman, and the State Department.Syngman Rhee escalated the crisis to another level, threatening to withdraw South Korean troops from the combat area to "protect the order in the Busan area."The United Nations Army protested against the Martial Law, but Syngman Rhee was unmoved.

General Mark Clark was at his wits' end. He had to engage in a war and appease Syngman Rhee.He warned his superiors on May 5 that it might be necessary "to put up with Syngman Rhee's hideous actions and endure the embarrassing political incidents he has created alone."But when Rhee's machinations threatened Clark's military situation, the latter was prepared to take one of two actions: keep urging him to moderate his repression, with "a glimmer of hope" that he would listen to reason; or " Take over and install some sort of transitional government”—in other words, a coup to oust Syngman Rhee and install a more compliant leader.

But Clark is pessimistic when it comes to dealing with Syngman Rhee.He has placed one of the Army's regimental combat teams on alert, ready to sail from Japan to North Korea.He also talked with the chief of staff of the South Korean army about how to guarantee support for the South Korean army if Syngman Rhee attempted to use the army against internal enemies.Any South Korean units whose combat missions were canceled would lose logistical support from the United Nations, and the Eighth Army would prevent them from moving to the Pusan ​​area, Clark said.Clarke, however, cautioned Washington against "hasty action . . . Deal with massive civilian unrest behind us."He suggested that the United Nations Army temporarily swallow their anger until Syngman Rhee used "illegal and vicious actions" to create an intolerable situation in the military.At that point, Clark said, he would concentrate all forces, impose martial law or establish a military junta if necessary, and take "whatever steps" are directed by the U.S. government to reverse the situation.

On June 6, Generals Clark and Van Fleet met Syngman Rhee in person and pointed out the danger that the Communist army might take advantage of the chaos to launch a major offensive.Li Chengman was indifferent.He can control any situation and not disturb the war, but he "will obey the will of the people".He was so emotional that American generals wondered if he had lost his mind.Syngman Rhee even once accused the United States of gathering Japanese troops to "take over North Korea" after the withdrawal of American troops.Clark was willing to give Syngman Rhee more time, although as he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
… until we are forced to take extreme military action, we must also put pressure on Syngman Rhee through diplomatic channels.I also believe that I cannot take any partial action, such as providing protection to members of the National Assembly, without causing unrest.Such upheavals may require us to exercise total control, which again we cannot afford.

Ambassador Mucho, probably Syngman Rhee's friendliest and most patient friend among Americans, has made no progress with this president.Syngman Rhee did not intend to deal with the National Assembly because "the Communist Party controls it" and the mass demonstrations he directed had an unflattering anti-American tone. On June 6, Muccio threw up his hands and told the State Department that the time had come for UN forces to directly threaten to intervene.He could use South Korean troops as proxies, operating under UN orders communicated through the 14th Army.

President Truman agreed with Mucho. On June 6, the State Department prepared a directive to Generals Mucho and Clark, which was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President.They will conduct consultations "as early as possible" to prepare plans for military and political actions, so as not to interfere with the military operations of the United Nations should intervention be required.Intervention would preferably be ordered by Truman, but Clark was empowered to act on his own in an emergency.The action plan is summarized as follows:

If Rhee takes any action that jeopardizes the U.S. war effort or imposes further restrictions on the National Assembly, Clark and Muccio will demand on behalf of the U.S. and the U.N. that he stop.If Syngman Rhee refused, Clark would order the South Korean Chief of General Staff to take control of the South Korean army and take control of the Pusan ​​area.The powers and functions of the South Korean government will remain as long as possible, and the constitutional government will remain unchanged.

With power in his hands, Clark prepared a contingency plan for a coup d'état.Syngman Rhee will be invited to Seoul under some pretext.As soon as he left, UN troops marched into Busan by force to capture Syngman Rhee's key supporters, seize important institutions such as government and communication facilities, and take control of the existing martial law government through the South Korean Chief of Staff.Ordering Syngman Rhee to announce the end of martial law and allow freedom of action for the National Assembly, if he refuses he will be placed in solitary confinement under close guard, the Prime Minister will make the expected announcement.

To Clark's relief, the coup did not have to happen. On July 7, the National Assembly reversed course and voted to amend the constitution to allow the president to be elected by popular suffrage.The detainees were released, and Rhee also canceled the martial law on July 3. On August 7, Syngman Rhee was re-elected with an overwhelming advantage.In this way, the imminent crisis was averted.But President Truman had made a fundamental policy decision that would guide future action: He would not hesitate to remove Syngman Rhee by force if necessary for the achievement of America's war goals.

A Stalemate Battle: "Tunnel Warfare"

After all this mass of events on the sidelines—the U.S. election, the stalemate in negotiations, the diplomatic issues with President Syngman Rhee, etc.—the war itself had practically braked to a halt.The two hostile armies looked at each other, like two giants who were cautious and tired of irritability. They just did some reconnaissance and sent some patrols, but they were always strengthening the defense.On the front line, the United Nations Army built tens of thousands of reinforced bunkers in the Korean mountains, connected by a series of traffic trenches, which is very similar to the front line during World War I.Neither the United Nations nor the Communist forces had any intention of crossing the line agreed upon in November 1951.In General James VanVleet's view, even the smallest offense "looks like it won't pay off."

General Matthew Ridgway was politically sensitive about the Truman administration's intention to withdraw from the war.In a lengthy telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated March 1952, 3, he laid out his rationale, effectively summarizing United Nations operations for the remainder of the war.Li Qiwei's main conclusions are as follows:
In North Korea, a major ground offensive aimed at the mass destruction of enemy personnel and materiel would require us to accept the serious risk of a successful counteroffensive by the enemy, which could inflict significant materiel and personnel losses on our forces.

Even if our actions are successful and an enemy counteroffensive (if at all launched) fails, these actions will still require significant U.S. combat casualties.

Using all ... available forces to accomplish this endeavour, even if the operation was successful, would at most inflict a crushing blow on the Communist forces ... and not result in a decisive military defeat.

The chances of success offered by a major ground offensive in the absence of significant organized reinforcements were too slim to justify it.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff accepted Ridgway's assessment, and one of the powerful new factors was the dramatic increase in strength on the enemy's side. An intelligence estimate circulated at the Pentagon in April stated that from July 4 to April 1951, the Communists had increased their troop strength from about 7 to more than 1952, with additional improvements in armor, artillery and unit There has also been a major improvement in firepower.The long lull in the fighting allowed the enemy to refine its supply routes (despite ongoing UN air and sea raids) to the best state of affairs since the start of the war.Intelligence Service estimates also indicated that there were other Communist forces in the Far East, including 4 million Chinese regular troops, and about 50 Soviet divisions, or 86 men.In total, the UN Army has 360 troops - 33 Americans, 33 South Koreans and 54.71 troops from other UN member states.

(End of this chapter)