The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 120 Changes in government orders (4)
With limited ground offensives, the UN continued to hit the Communists hard with air strikes, paying particular attention to the massive hydroelectric plants along the Yalu River.Over 1952 sorties by naval and air force aircraft over three days in June 6 attacked and severely damaged the largest Sufeng power plant and rendered 3 others unusable, resulting in a two-week blackout in North Korea .British Labor protested strongly against the "escalation" of the war, and there were murmurs of dissent from the French.General Clark was unmoved.These power plants aided the enemy, so they were attacked as a matter of course.

Clark also discovered ways to psychologically harass his enemies.Since MacArthur's success at Incheon, the communists had shown great fear of new amphibious assaults, concentrating coastal artillery and troops on possible invasion sites like Wonsan on the east coast. In October 1952, Clark decided to transfer the 10st Cavalry Division from Japan to North Korea, an operation he saw as an opportunity to intimidate Communist forces. "The more frightened he is, the more he will turn a large number of troops and energy to strengthen the defense behind the front line." Clark reasoned.

The cavalry division then underwent intensive amphibious combat training, culminating in a full-scale landing exercise.Then they boarded the attack transport, armed and ready for battle.Junior officers thought the troops were on their way to a landing operation.Meanwhile, the Air Force and Navy attacked beachhead "targets" around Wonsan in a series of raids that did exactly what U.S. forces had done since World War II prior to the amphibious landings.As the fleet approached Wonsan, some troops left the transports, climbed into assault boats, and circled in the usual formation before launching an assault.

"Our intelligence reported that the enemy was in a mess on the beach near Wonsan," Clark recalled.Communist reinforcements rushed to the area.A few hours later, the American troops re-boarded the transport ship and headed south to Pusan, the real destination.

But when Clark brought back an old, long-settled issue, the use of Chinese Nationalist forces in North Korea, no progress was made. On May 1952, 5, almost two weeks into his tenure, Clark told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he was concerned that there would not be enough troops to carry out his dual mission of defending Japan and fighting in Korea.He believed that the introduction of the Kuomintang troops of the two divisions was valuable both psychologically and militarily.The CIA director, General Walter Biddle Smith, backed Clark, saying that disuse of Nationalist troops in Taiwan was a "wasted asset."He said moving two divisions to North Korea would not significantly weaken the island's defenses.However, Truman was only willing to authorize them to "further study".The State Department explicitly opposed the use of any Nationalist troops, and they cited adverse reactions around the world.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the issue throughout the fall of 1952, finally reaching a decision on November 11: Clark would get the two divisions he had requested.However, Eisenhower was already president-elect at this time, and the Truman administration as a "lame duck" did not want to make such drastic changes in policy. This issue was left to Eisenhower to decide.Eisenhower never seriously considered this question.He has his own plan for peace in North Korea, which does not include the Chinese Nationalists.

truman last chance

Throughout the summer of 1952, the United Nations Army and the Communist Party put forward various subtle suggestions back and forth on the issue of the disposal of prisoners of war, but no progress was made.The ideas put forward by the Soviets and the Chinese seemed promising at first glance, then evaporated.Other ideas came from assorted dignitaries, such as the far-left Progressive Party presidential candidate Vincent Hallinan (who favored declaring a cease-fire first and discussing prisoners of war later), Mexican President Miguel Aleman (who advocated Prisoners of war who do not want to be repatriated are granted immigration status by the United Nations).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the UNC negotiating team, laid out the glaring flaws in these proposals.The communists desperately wanted a ceasefire so they would be spared future air raids by UN forces.Ending the firefight without addressing the POW issue would leave the UN forces powerless to secure the desired terms.After a series of recounts and reclassifications, the Communist Party now demands the repatriation of about 8.3 people, while the UN Army found only about 7 people willing to accept repatriation. (These numbers change every month as deaths, escapes and new prisoners are created.)
In September, pressure mounted on President Truman to break the impasse in the Panmunjom negotiations.Although the position is changing day by day, the State Department, under Secretary of State Acheson, seems willing to accept a form of Mexican President Aleman's plan - an immediate ceasefire and refuge in other UN member states for those who do not want to be repatriated right.This package brought obvious political advantages to Democratic presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, because "stop fighting" would get the bottom line on the main issue that Eisenhower was chasing after.But the Defense Department under Robert Lovett opposed any stopgap solutions that would expose an Achilles' heel and weaken military pressure on the enemy.The concession, Lovett said, "is unlikely to impress the Communists, who are only affected by force."The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, declaring (in the words of Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg) that a truce would create hasty pressure to "send the boys home," as As happened at the end of World War II.

The burden of making the decision fell, of course, on President Truman, and the State and Defense departments were at odds.The president often pointed to a sign on his desk to visiting guests: "Duty to Duty." Today's responsibility was neatly settled on Truman's desk, and his decision heightened the prospect of a doomed Stevenson campaign.Truman agreed with Secretary Lovett that he saw "no real prospect of an armistice" unless military pressure continued.He hoped to make "further military efforts" to compel the enemy to accept the "reasonable proposals" that the UN forces had made.Truman ordered the negotiations to be postponed indefinitely so as not to give the Communists the impression that they could count on reopening them at some future date to obtain concessions.

At another meeting two days later, on September 9, Acheson warned that taking an indefinite recess might cause diplomatic problems at the United Nations.Acheson showed personal tension.His knack for persuasion had already brought America into this war;Now, Acheson seemed determined to end the war before he left office.He saw countless political problems if the United States did not secure a ceasefire, and the UN General Assembly could set up a commission to steer the battle that would "make it impossible for us to fight effectively there".Noting his tough Republican opponents behind him, Acheson said an indefinite suspension of the peace talks would create evidence that the administration was at a loss as to what to do in North Korea.The "impatience factor" that has been advocating that the UN forces "get things done" in North Korea may be revived again.Acheson obviously wanted to get out of the war.

Truman firmly disapproved.The United States faced the question: "Are we going to do something in the world to get out of North Korea?" On this point, he was much tougher than Acheson.Truman was unwilling to seek an armistice "just for the sake of an armistice", especially if he had worked so hard for "seven years to avoid a third world war" if China was still in a position to resume war.Accepting a truce of the kind proposed by the State Department (who politely did not name Acheson) would return the country to the situation it was in September 1945, when "we dismantled a gigantic war machine," And it should have been kept intact.Accepting a sham truce would mean undoing all the gains America had made in North Korea since June 9.Then Truman invited everyone to comment.

Spokesmen for the Pentagon applauded Truman's tough approach.William Foster, speaking for the Department of Defense, proposed increased military pressure, including the use of Chinese Nationalist troops (which Truman objected to), increased bombing, and the expansion of the South Korean military.General Walter Biddle Smith, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, believed that as long as China "has the potential for further disruption," there will be no real truce in North Korea, and all means of exerting pressure on China should be used.Smith said that the Chinese Nationalists were "a pistol in the head" aimed at the CCP.

Truman listened to the debate, then took the military's side firmly.United Nations negotiators will come up with a proposal against forced repatriation based on a list of prisoners of war already compiled.The lead negotiator, Major General William Harrison Jr., put the proposal on the table and then gave the enemy 10 days to respond.If the Communist Party rejected the proposal, the United States announced an indefinite adjournment and was "prepared to do other things that may be necessary."Truman bluntly refused to defer the issue of prisoners of war to future political discussions.In a private telegram to General Clark on September 9, Truman repeated these instructions, adding that they "must be expressed with the utmost firmness, leaving no room for further debate."Military pressure "should not abate" during the 26-day waiting period.

On Oct 10th, General Nan Il, the chief communist negotiator, rejected the UN Army's proposal as "unacceptable".General Harrison then adjourned the meeting until "you are ready to accept one of our proposals, or you make your own constructive written proposals which will lead to a respectable truce."Dean Acheson adjourned the meeting in Washington, insisting on the principle of voluntary repatriation. “We will not trade human lives,” he said. “We will not forcibly hand human lives into the hands of the Communist Party.”

Hugh shocked the Communist Party, because now they lost the propaganda platform of Panmunjom.However, a note issued on October 10 by North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung and the head of the Chinese "Volunteer Army" Peng Dehuai further confirmed the futility of continuing the talks.The note called for an immediate resumption of peace talks and a truce based on the "full repatriation of all prisoners of war."In this way, the talks came to an end, and diplomatic activities also entered a dead end.

(End of this chapter)