The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 121 The Last Peace (1)
The hours before dawn on November 1952, 11, were the quietest hours in New York.Some bleary-eyed people, dressed in winter travel clothes, quietly came to the designated spots all over Manhattan, individually or in twos and threes, waiting for the cars coming from the darkness.Charles Wilson, who would serve as Secretary of Defense in the new administration, waited alone on the southeast corner of 29th Avenue and 5th Street, unpacked.Thirty blocks north of this, Herbert Brownell, the soon-to-be attorney general, walked out of his house.The largest crowd, reporters and photographers sworn to secrecy, surrounded press secretary James Haggerty as they emerged from the cavernous Penn Station, up a ramp normally reserved for postal trucks.Finally, at 58:30 a.m., a special agent slipped out of Ike's home at 4 Morningside Avenue, and he lured the uniformed patrolman on duty into a corner over there for a casual conversation. something made up.As soon as the patrolman's back was turned, Eisenhower hurried out the door and walked to a waiting car.The president-elect is heading to North Korea to fulfill his campaign vows.Its security is so tight that not even uniformed New York police officers can know what he's doing.

Because of the inherent security concerns of a head of state visiting a war zone, the Secret Service devised a plan to cover up Eisenhower's trip to North Korea until he returned.Treasury Secretary George Humphrey called the package "the most insidious 'cloak and dagger' operation you will ever hear in your life.  …" As Ike flew to North Korea, some Visiting dignitaries streamed through Morningside Heights, giving the press the impression that they were discussing business with the President-elect.In fact, by noon on Saturday, Ike's Constellation was well over the Pacific Ocean.

Ike flew away amidst the minor contentious cacophony of critics, including some in his party, who insisted the trip was not worth the risk.But Eisenhower emphasized that he intended to keep his vow.He has no "magic bullet" solution to the Korean War, but he wants to understand the situation.To break his promise to the American public from the very beginning of his election would bring him the stigma of being "just another politician." (The security work proved to be entirely justified: on December 12, an hour after Eisenhower returned home from his first mission, 5 Communist fighter jets attacked Seoul airport.)
In any case, however, the trip was at best a political stunt, of little value mainly for public relations purposes, as an outraged Truman had accused him during the campaign.Ike pissed off President Rhee from the start.Rhee's thinking: He could use the prestige of his visitors to revive his own waning popularity and rekindle war enthusiasm among the weary North Korean people.Syngman Rhee planned to have Ike stay in North Korea for a full week, addressing the National Assembly and presiding over huge military discussions.Ike's advisors would not allow this arrangement with the general.Eisenhower intended to spend only 72 hours in South Korea, mostly with his military leaders, chiefly General Mark Clark, commander of the United Nations Forces, and General James Van Fleet, commander of the Eighth Army.Eisenhower's frenetic drive to sweep North Korea reminded UPI's Merriman Smith of the just-concluded campaign.Ike inspected the troops near the front, crunching across the frozen and snow-covered battlefield.He was talking with wounded soldiers in a US mobile Army surgical hospital, and the sound of shells exploding in the distance could be heard clearly from time to time.During these three days, he only had one hour with the unhappy Rhee, and it was during two meetings.

Syngman Rhee also found little solace in the general comments Eisenhower made at the press conference at the end of the day of his trip.Haggerty wanted to prevent Ike from being asked about specific plans, so he didn't allow the reporters to ask questions.Ike believed that it would be difficult to end the fighting "with a positive and certain victory" "without taking the serious risk of possible expansion of the war"; ".The visit did force him to conclude (as he put it in his memoirs): "We cannot stand forever on a stationary front, continuing to suffer casualties without any visible result. A small fight on a hillside Little brawls don't end wars." Eisenhower now clearly saw what John Foster Dulles saw as the need for a rather big gesture to get the Communists to accept peace, but Ike looked beyond conventional infantry action.Before Eisenhower arrived, General Clark's staff had worked out a contingency plan to keep the war going, which included increasing the size of the South Korean army from 16 to 20 divisions (64 men); problems with Chinese Nationalist forces, and "serious consideration" of the use of atomic weapons.However, Clark was not given the opportunity to discuss these contingency plans, code-named "OPLAN 8-52," with Eisenhower.In Clark's view, this was "the most important thing about the president-elect's visit. ... The question of how much it would cost to win this war was never raised. In our many conversations, it quickly Clearly, he will seek a respectable truce."

Eisenhower flew from Seoul to Wake Island, where he boarded the cruiser USS Helena for a three-day relaxation cruise to Hawaii.Most of the future cabinet (including John Foster Dulles, who had remained in New York as part of the swindle) were on board, and the press gave the impression of a high-level strategic meeting, in which the centered on the Korean issue.Emmett John Hughes attended some of the meetings, and he found "a certain startling contrast between the real substance of these meetings and their public image".Dulles was a dominant figure, and he could rant for hours on foreign policy or any other subject. "Dulles clearly exerted a consistent influence on Eisenhower," concluded Hughes. "He put up with him."

As Eisenhower made his first voyage back to the mainland, he received advice from a predictable figure—General Douglas MacArthur.He told a national convention of the National Association of Manufacturers that he had a plan for ending the war, which he would present to Eisenhower if he was asked.Ike immediately sent a telegram accepting MacArthur's idea to "hold an informal meeting at which my colleagues and I may benefit greatly from your insights and experiences." On December 12, (at a meeting at the conveniently neutral location of the Dulles mansion) MacArthur handed Eisenhower a memorandum of several thousand words, the key points of which were between Eisenhower and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin "Bilateral Meetings".The United States would demand the unification of Germany and Korea, with the guarantee of their neutrality, as well as that of Austria and Japan, by the two great powers.If the USSR does not accept:

We are ready to wipe out the enemy troops in North Korea. This intention can be realized by the following methods: bombing enemy military assembly points and military installations in North Korea with atomic bombs, spreading an appropriate amount of radioactive substances by-products of the manufacture of atomic bombs on the battlefield, and sealing off the The Yalu River leads to the enemy's main supply and communication lines to the south, while amphibious landings are made on both coasts of North Korea.

Chinese military and industrial facilities will also be bombed.

Eisenhower listened without comment, obviously afraid of saying something to encourage or deny MacArthur.He concluded by saying:

This is something new, General, and I shall have to see how this war is carried on between ourselves and our allies.If we're going to bomb the bases on the other side of the Yalu, if we're going to expand the war, we have to make sure we don't offend the whole... free world, or betray our beliefs.

The person who least liked the news about MacArthur's "secret plan" was Truman.At a press conference, he challenged MacArthur or anyone with a "reasonable plan" to present it to him "immediately."Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sent MacArthur a courteous note asking him to send his insights to his superiors (although Bradley did not specifically emphasize that, as a general officer, MacArthur is still subject to military discipline. When a general is no longer in active duty, he is still an officer).MacArthur's reason for not doing so was somewhat flimsy: the Truman administration did not have enough time to make any worthwhile use of his plan.Truman had his own opinion: he believed that both Eisenhower's trip to North Korea and his meeting with MacArthur were "grandstanding".

But as 1953 began, Eisenhower faced the same problem that the outgoing administration had faced: how to devise a peace plan that would uphold the principles that brought American and United Nations forces to war while allowing a Difficult foes rejoice.

"Asians beat Asians"

The change of administration gave the Joint Chiefs of Staff an opportunity to broadly re-examine war policy, and the generals and Pentagon staff officers quickly recognized the new president's immediate intention: He would bring the war to "North Korea" as quickly as possible. to replace the leading role currently played by the United States.As Ike said in a campaign speech:
It simply doesn't make sense that the United Nations -- and with the United States at the forefront -- has been compelled to send personnel to these front lines.This is the job of the North Koreans.We don't want Asia to feel that white westerners are its enemies.If there must be war there, let the Asians fight the Asians, and we are on the side of freedom.

After revisions and adjustments to numerous staff studies and position papers, the MoD agreed that the government should increase the ROK force to approximately 65.5 men, including 20 Army divisions and 1 Marine division (earlier this year , the South Korean Army has 14 active divisions).It is hoped that these new additions will allow the United States to begin withdrawing some of its own soldiers, although their equipment will remain in Japan for emergency use.The annual cost of supporting this expanded South Korean defense establishment was about $10 billion, an amount that Eisenhower's budget planners balked at.But by March 1953, plans were in place to massively strengthen South Korea's military.

Then, on March 1953, 3, came perhaps the most important event of Eisenhower's first year in office in dealing with the Communist world: Joseph Stalin, the unshakable Soviet strongman for almost three decades, died suddenly of a cerebral hemorrhage.Eisenhower immediately saw his death as providing a pathway to peace.He wrote in his memoirs: "No matter how closely the new leadership of Russia may be associated with the Stalin era, they will not follow a dead man completely blindly."

But weeks of careful and fruitless diplomatic, political and military maneuvering will be required before peace in North Korea can be achieved.Unbeknownst to the enemy, however, the United States now has an important new nuclear weapon in its arsenal.In mid-January of that year, scientists at the New Mexico nuclear test site excitedly reported the first successful detonation of an atomic warhead of a caliber suitable for field artillery, which meant that nuclear weapons could be used for both strategic and tactical purposes .The news prompted an immediate reconsideration of nuclear policy by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which had frequently considered the use of nuclear weapons over the past two years but rejected the use of atomic bombs as unrealistic.Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not yet ready to make a formal recommendation for the use of this new tactical nuclear weapon, a carefully worded passage in a May 1 research report indicates a clear change in their thinking:
The multiplier effect that atomic weapons can have in advancing U.S. goals related to North Korea points to the need for a reassessment of the current policy of restricting the use of atomic weapons in the Far East.

From the broad point of view of establishing an effective conventional capability in the Far East, the timely use of atomic weapons should be viewed as targeting military targets that influence North Korean operations, and operationally as similar to targeting China and Manchuria An integral part of any possible military action plan related to direct action.

Another staff study at the same time pointed out the need to convince the Chinese and North Koreans that if the armistice talks were not resumed and concluded, the UN forces intended to launch a major offensive. On May 5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed air and naval action "directly against China and 'Manchuria'," including the use of atomic weapons.The Joint Chiefs believe that timing is paramount.All necessary actions, including the "widespread strategic and tactical use of atomic bombs," must be conducted with "maximum suddenness and impact," beginning with a naval blockade and progressing to a ground offensive The escalation approach will greatly reduce the chances of success.The next day, May 19, the National Security Council approved the recommendations.

Coincidentally, when the NSC took this action, Dulles was on a tour of the Middle East and Asia, and he picked India as a forum from which to warn of the use of atomic weapons.In a conversation with Prime Minister Nehru, Dulles said that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai should be warned that if an early armistice agreement was not reached, the United States would bomb the sanctuaries of "Manchuria" north of the Yalu River.Dulles also mentioned the United States' successful test of a nuclear artillery shell, and his tone strongly implied that the United States would not hesitate to use such weapons in North Korea.

In yet another move against China—and this was done in full view—Eisenhower announced that the 7th Fleet would no longer be stationed between Taiwan and the mainland. "This order shows that we have no aggressive intentions," Eisenhower said, "but we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation that is fighting us in Korea." These guerrillas were armed, trained and transported by Americans.The official Xinhua News Agency was quick to complain loudly that "adventurous U.S. imperialism supports the vicious lackey Chiang Kai-shek".According to the statistics of the Chinese themselves, in the first five months of 1953, there were more than 200 such attacks against the mainland.

The new government was clearly giving the communists an incentive to find a way out of the war.It won't be long before the signal is coming.

"Small Exchange Action"

When the Red Cross Federation met in Geneva in December 1952, it urged the United Nations and Communist forces to consider exchanging wounded and sick prisoners as a "gesture of goodwill" for peace.Both the Soviets and the Chinese voted against the resolution, which received little public attention.But in Tokyo, General Mark Clark saw the possible publicity benefits of pushing the idea forward. On February 12, 1953, this was already done by Clark.

(End of this chapter)