The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 122 The Last Peace (2)
In the weeks that followed, on the heels of Stalin's death, the new Soviet leader, Georgi Malenkov, offered signs that his government might be more flexible with the West.The evidence comes in a series of faint signals that only a trained Kremlin expert can decipher.For example, Soviet radio publicly acknowledged for the first time since 1945 that the United States and Britain played a major role in World War II, and the Soviets promised to help the British rescue diplomats and missionaries interned in North Korea.Then, two extraordinary developments occurred.

On March 3, North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung and General Peng Dehuai, the head of the CCP's "Volunteer Army", accepted Clark's proposal to exchange wounded and sick prisoners of war, which surprised him greatly.But they went one step further: this exchange should lead to a solution of the whole prisoner problem, opening the door to an armistice "that the people of the world desire".The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized Clark to continue working on the proposal, but proceed with caution.

On March 3, the Communist Party surprised people even more.Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai said in a Beijing radio broadcast that this initial exchange could be extended to resolve the entire war.Zhou Enlai reiterated his opposition to the retention of any Chinese or North Korean prisoners of war by the UN forces, and he did not admit that any communist prisoner of war had expressed his refusal to repatriate.He then went on to say that any prisoner of war who had refused repatriation should be sent to a "neutral country" for further screening.Two days later, on April 30, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov praised Zhou Enlai's proposal as "totally reasonable" and said he would assist in its implementation.

The Chinese actions are fraught with ambiguity.Which "neutral country" did Zhou Enlai think of?Does he intend to detain these prisoners of war in South Korea, or in a neutral area, or send them elsewhere?How can a "just settlement" be achieved with respect to soldiers who refuse to be repatriated?However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed Clark to study the leads and "take only superficially every suggestion they made to us."Clarke was skeptical, saying that now that the Communists had begun to engage in concrete bargaining, "it would be utterly naive not to foresee any or every form of machinations on our side".

但是，在板门店会晤的联络官们在联合国军称之为“小交换行动”的问题上很快达成了协议。4月11日，他们同意由联合国军交还700名中国战俘和5 100名北朝鲜战俘，同时共产党方面交还450名南朝鲜士兵和150名非朝鲜士兵。从4月20日起，这些战俘被带至板门店。至5月3日，“小交换行动”全部完成。

Many American and South Korean POWs turned up in dire conditions.They were skinny and skeletal, with wounds left untreated for years, some deranged by the stress of captivity or poor treatment.In contrast, the wounded Communist POWs wanted to embarrass the United Nations until the last moment.Many refused to accept the new clothes simply because the shirts did not have the P for "prisoner of war" embroidered on them.They were also unwilling to accept the final spraying of disinfectant powder by the United Nations military personnel.When they left Panmunjom by car, they also threw away the tooth powder, soap and cigarettes issued by the United Nations Army.Some tore and cut their clothes to create the impression of being mistreated by UN troops.

The important point is that there has been the first major thaw in the negotiations.Oddly enough, now that the Chinese had been prompted into serious negotiations, Dulles seemed to have other ideas.In a conversation with Emmett John Hughes, Dulles argued that the United States would not benefit from an armistice in Korea. "We're going to regret it," he said. "I don't think we're going to get a lot out of North Korea unless we give the Chinese a hard time first and show our clear superiority to all of Asia." Hughes Finding the insight incredible, he told Eisenhower about it.Eisenhower exclaimed: "If Mr. Dulles and his worldly advisers really mean that they cannot seriously negotiate peace, then I am in the wrong seat." Dulles, he felt, "was just too worried about being accused In tune with Truman and Acheson."

Now the negotiations on prisoners of war are unstoppable. The Communist Party and the United Nations Army are arguing back and forth on the composition of the "neutral country" committee or the "neutral country" that will accept prisoners of war, as well as the subsequent procedures.The United Nations Army hopes to be a traditional neutral country like Switzerland, and prisoners of war who refuse to be repatriated must not be detained for more than 60 days.Clark was instructed to emphasize the following two points: the United States cannot compromise on the issue of forced repatriation, and the United States "does not approve of protracted negotiations."

On April 4, all representatives met in Panmunjom, which was the first direct meeting between the two sides in six months.However, the talks quickly bogged down again on three issues: the Chinese did not accept Switzerland as a neutral country; they wanted prisoners of war to be removed from North Korea during the screening process; and they wanted six months to persuade their prisoners to return home.Asked to indicate their choice of neutral country, the Chinese finally proposed India, Burma, Indonesia, or Pakistan.America accepted Pakistan.The Chinese then waived their demand for prisoners of war to be removed from North Korea and reduced the six-month screening period to four months.They also abruptly abandoned the idea of ​​a neutral country in favor of a "Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission" consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Sweden, and India.

Clark found this concession important, and although some parts were still unclear, he took it as a sign that the Communists really wanted a truce.The main unresolved point, according to Clark, was that the screening period was too long, and he feared that the Chinese would divert the issue of POW repatriation to a post-armistice conference.Nor did he see the possibility that the south Korean government would allow armed personnel from the communist satellite state to work in the country.

Although Clark felt that his negotiators were on the brink of success, he asked Washington to allow him to make a final proposal: a neutral country to screen prisoners of war in Korea for 90 days, or his troops would die in 30 days. It will unilaterally release North Korean prisoners of war (referring to those unwilling to repatriate) within days, and will begin to "increase military pressure" on the enemy.

The proposals made by Clark are quite sensitive.Planes from the U.S. Far Eastern Air Force have bombed North Korean dams, causing floods to wash away roads and railroads.On May 5, for example, planes struck a dam north of Pyongyang, causing flooding to wash away or damage six miles of railways, five railway bridges, and two miles of critical highways.About 13 square miles of rice fields were also washed away.Now Clark wanted to go further: bombing dams with the express purpose of flooding crops and cutting off food supplies for Communist troops and civilians alike.The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not object, and Clark now had a new card against the enemy.

As the Communists mull over Clarke's final proposal, the UN forces are suddenly confronted with a new crisis that could derail the entire armistice negotiations: the outright rebellion of President Syngman Rhee.

Syngman Rhee's Last Stand

For several months in the spring of 1953, Rhee was miserable, confused, and unhappy.For almost three years he has been a puppet president on his own soil, a man whom Americans cajole at times but ignore him when they care for themselves.Ambassador John Mucho was probably his most trusted American, but he left in November 1952.His replacement, Ellis Briggs, was a seasoned diplomat but a stranger.Syngman Rhee knew very well that the new President Eisenhower's intention was to achieve peace and leave North Korea still divided.So he got completely frustrated with the Americans and set out to sabotage the peace talks.

Syngman Rhee has repeatedly stated his position forcefully, either personally or through his spokesman.He will "never" agree to a truce that does not require all CCP troops to withdraw from North Korea; he calls for the reduction of North Korean troops; clearly stipulates that no "third force" is allowed to help North Koreans in any international conference to solve the North Korean problem; completely Recognize and protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of South Korea.Of course, the Communist Party did not accept such a condition, especially when Syngman Rhee still had more than a dozen heavily armed divisions, the Communist Party could not accept North Korea's unilateral disarmament.A historical document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said in painful words: "No amount of reasoning, persuasion, or protest by the United States or the United Nations has been able to persuade the stubborn President Rhee to abandon his willful Potentially suicidal approach."

The closer the meeting seemed to be to success, the more Rhee would complain and complain.His anti-American rallies have become more frequent and larger, calling on the North Korean people to take unilateral action.At a rally in early April, he declared: "No matter what happens in Panmunjom, our goal remains the same. Our eternal goal is to unify Korea from the south to the Yalu River. You must continue to fight until you reach the Yalu River."

In General Clark's view, there was an imminent danger that Syngman Rhee would remove his representatives from the United Nations negotiating team, a move that would almost certainly cause the Communists to abandon the talks.Clark also worried that the South Korean army would break free from the command of the UN forces, which would pose a danger to the military situation.He did admit that there was some truth to Rhee's fear.For example, in the face of the reality of Soviet and Chinese powers, if war breaks out again, will the United States provide assistance to South Korea?Yet Clark had no doubts that if Syngman Rhee thought he had a chance of achieving his goals, he would use his army alone.Clark telegraphed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 4, saying: "He is very dangerous, usually elusive, and has a tendency to act sometimes recklessly." The economic aid and military aid, and made a commitment to continue to seek the reunification of North Korea by political means and peaceful means.

The last time Syngman Rhee confronted the United States, the domestic situation was precarious.This time, by contrast, he clearly has strong, if not unanimous, support from other North Korean politicians. On April 4, the National Assembly supported Syngman Rhee's goal of unifying Korea by invading the North.Relying on this trust, Syngman Rhee informed President Eisenhower three days later that if the UN forces allowed the Chinese to remain south of the Yalu River, he would separate his troops from the command of the UN Command and fight alone.

After several meetings with Syngman Rhee, Clarke concluded that Rhee was trying to scare people, albeit a bit too much.In discussions with the president, Clark emphasized that he supported the South Korean army having 20 divisions, and that a formal security treaty with the United States, which Syngman Rhee demanded, could be discussed after the armistice. At the meeting on May 5, Clark had apparently convinced Rhee that the United States was determined to sign an armistice, regardless of whether the South Koreans agreed to it or not.Clarke telegraphed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "He is now negotiating for a security treaty, for more financial aid, and for his people to feel that he has a say in the armistice negotiations."

POW deadlock broken
After the “small exchanges” were over, on April 4 the Communists took the talks a step further—to “strike while the iron is hot,” in General Clarke’s words—with a comprehensive proposal.The Communist Party formed the largest delegation since the start of the war, including for the first time a reporter from the Soviet newspaper Pravda.General Namil proposed that, three months after the signing of the armistice agreement, prisoners of war who refused to be repatriated and requested political asylum would be transferred to a neutral country.During the next six months, agents of the prisoners' governments could try to persuade them to return home.Any POWs who refused to be repatriated would remain in custody pending a "political conference" to decide their fate.

Clark thought the suggestion was ridiculous. "At the end of the day," Clark said, "what this means is that a prisoner of war has to spend at least nine months after the armistice in order to get political asylum, and then the United Nations and communist politicians . . . He'll be in the camp indefinitely while there's agreement on the issue." There was no certainty among the prisoners that such a meeting would take place, and Clark saw no chance of it happening.In the end, in order to get out of the prisoner-of-war camp, the prisoners of war had to accept repatriation.

Nan Il's suggestion wiped out the optimism generated by the "small exchange" operation, and Clark complained that the Communist Party had achieved a "diplomatic surprise".Furthermore, POWs released during Operation "Small Exchange" reported that some 400 American and Korean wounded and sick POWs had not yet returned.The breach enraged U.N. negotiators.

Nam Il realized he had hit a dead end and revised his advice on May 5.During the screening period, the POWs would remain in North Korea, but they would remain under the supervision of the Indians and counseled by agents of their government.Clark made a counter-proposal: the Chinese would be handed over to a neutral country, and the Korean prisoners who did not want to be repatriated would be released on the day the armistice was signed.Nam Il called the proposal "a step backwards," and his negotiators scolded the U.N. Army negotiating team for four days before announcing an adjournment.

Then came Washington's decision, which shocked Clark and convinced him that the Eisenhower administration had decided to make previously unacceptable concessions:
I was instructed to agree to turn over all North Koreans and Chinese who did not wish to be repatriated to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, which led many in the South Korean government to believe that we had betrayed them.In addition, I have been instructed to agree to the Communist Party's request that disputes in the Repatriation Commission be decided by a majority vote rather than a unanimous vote.This approach gave the Communist Party an advantage as India - despite its avowed neutrality - recognized and sympathized with Red China.

But Clark still wanted to insist on the principle of no forced repatriation, and promised not to intimidate prisoners of war.In addition, only India is allowed to send its only neutral armed forces in North Korea.If the UN Army's proposal is not accepted by the Communist Party, the talks will be terminated.

Clark and Briggs had the unpleasant task of informing President Rhee of the change in U.S. negotiating policy.As expected, Rhee's reaction was to fly into a rage. "I am extremely disappointed," he told the Americans.He will never allow Indian troops or any other "neutral country" troops to stay in the South Korean rear area.He concluded by saying:

You can remove all UN troops, remove all economic aid.We will determine our own destiny, and we ask no one to fight for us.We may have made a mistake in the beginning and relied on diplomacy to come to our aid.

I'm sorry, but under the circumstances, I cannot assure President Eisenhower of my cooperation.

As Briggs later put it: "This respectable North Korean statesman put us in a bind, and he knew it." Clark agreed: "With all the threats Rhee said and didn't say, Behind the scenes, he just wanted us to take a psychological toll. He knew that no matter what happened, after three years of war with so much blood and wealth lost after all, we wouldn't be upset over 'intra-family' squabbles. Leave North Korea alone and let it fall into the hands of the Reds." However, since South Korea provided two-thirds of the front-line personnel, Rhee's sudden decision to withdraw them from the command of the United Nations Army will plunge the military situation into chaos .

(End of this chapter)