The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 123 The Last Peace (3)
In this way, while the armistice negotiations were going on, the U.S. military command began to plan a two-pronged strategy to deal with Syngman Rhee-carrots and sticks.Clark and the other officers understood (but did not mentally accept) Washington's explicit instructions to them.Eisenhower won the election on the basis of popular expectations that he would end this unpopular war.He was proceeding to do so on terms that the relatively weak Truman administration simply could not accept politically.

One of the two-pronged strategies, the "big stick" policy, has been planned in the Far East.On Clarke's instructions, General Maxwell Taylor (a veteran Airborne officer who had succeeded Van Fleet as commander of Eighth Army in February 1953) began planning what the military considered a "worst-case scenario" ", that is, in response to Syngman Rhee's possible command to withdraw South Korean troops from the United Nations forces.The "always ready" plan written by Eighth Army headquarters was approved by Clark and then sent to Washington.This plan is even tougher than the plan to get rid of Syngman Rhee first studied in 2, when the Truman administration considered removing the South Korean president by force. The "always ready" plan envisions three contingencies: (8) the South Korean military ignores the instructions of the United Nations forces; (8) the South Korean military acts alone; UN forces are in "open hostilities".

In the first scenario, U.S. and U.N. forces would move to defend key areas around major cities; the navy and air force would be put on alert; and intelligence activity against the South Korean military and government would increase.In the second scenario, some kind of "protective" retreat would be made to secure the base; the South Korean guard would be replaced with reliable UN forces; and the movement of civilians would be controlled.

The third scenario calls for the most extreme measures.Clark outlined this part of the "always ready" plan in a May 5 cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

President Syngman Rhee will be invited to Seoul or elsewhere - anywhere that will get him out of Busan (the interim capital of South Korea).The United Nations Commander will move into the Busan area at the right time to arrest 5 to 10 senior South Korean officials who were leaders in Syngman Rhee's autocratic actions... and take over martial law through the Chief of Staff of the South Korean Army until until the time of cancellation.

If Syngman Rhee refuses to accept the UN armistice terms, "he will be placed in protective custody, in solitary confinement...." UNC will proceed to form a government headed by Prime Minister Zhang Zexiang; if Zhang refuses, a A military government under the South Korean military or directly under the UN forces.

The "always ready" plan was embraced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and State Department officials before being sent to Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson on May 5 for approval.There was a lot of defensive caution in their decision, and they did not directly authorize the part of the plan that called for the detention of Syngman Rhee.But Dulles and Wilson did order the Joint Chiefs of Staff to inform Clark that, in cases of "extreme urgency," he had the authority to "take necessary action to safeguard the integrity of your force."With the gist of the action Clarke suggested, these words constituted a de facto mandate to get Syngman Rhee out in an emergency.Clark also understood it this way.

At the same meeting, Dulles, Wilson, and the generals also discussed another of the two-pronged policies, the "carrot," which might induce Syngman Rhee to change his mind in a way that did not cause him to lose face.One legitimate worry that lingers on Rhee's mind is whether South Korea will be able to defend itself once the fighting is over and the United States begins to reduce its military capabilities.Syngman Rhee clearly felt that the U.S. and United Nations forces had betrayed him by not striving for a military victory in the war in order to reunify Korea.So Dulles and Wilson asked Clark through the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether Syngman Rhee supported an armistice in exchange for a long-term security treaty.Under the treaty, the United States would guarantee South Korea's defense in the event of future Communist attack.Clarke agrees, arguing that this has the potential to bring Syngman Rhee "in sync."He also felt that now Syngman Rhee would not take "serious unilateral action" without first warning the UN forces.

The next day, May 5, President Eisenhower decided to make the provision of a security treaty a formal precondition for Rhee's acceptance of the terms of the armistice.But he did not want to make this proposal public, so as not to become entangled in the peace talks.

At the same time, negotiations in Panmunjom are progressing rapidly. On June 6, the Communists hinted that they generally agreed with the UN Army's May 5 proposal.Apparently, it only takes a few trivial details to get the official sign off.General Clark hurriedly dispatched to inform Syngman Rhee of the upcoming situation. He knew that this would have a serious psychological blow to the elderly president, and he wanted to ease it up.

Clark knew right away that the meeting would be difficult.Whenever Syngman Rhee was in a peaceful mood, his Austrian-born wife Francesca joined their conversation in a flowing Korean dress.Mrs. Lee was not seen that day, only the president and a puppy were present. (“Only the puppy seemed happy to see me, maybe thinking of me as a kennel companion,” Clark recalls.)
As Clarke put it in a cable to the Joint Chiefs later that day, he made "no progress" in persuading Syngman Rhee to accept the terms of the armistice. "I've never seen him so disoriented, emotional and sentimental. He told me he wasn't feeling well, was very tired and stayed up all night."

Clark tried to reassure Syngman Rhee again, but was unsuccessful.However, Clark emphasized: "Our government is determined to move forward and sign an armistice agreement on the terms of May 5. An agreement on the issue of prisoners of war is about to be reached, and now only a few issues remain to be resolved." Brig Ambassador Stuart will bring with him later in the day a personal letter from Eisenhower outlining the steps the United States will take to support South Korea, "which does not include safeguarding the reunification of Korea by means of continued warfare."

Rhee responded excitedly: "The United States has made a big mistake in adopting this appeasement strategy." The South Korean government will never accept these armistice conditions. Late to lead the fight", he now feels "free to take such steps as he sees fit".

Clarke asked him to elaborate on that last point, but Rhee was "too emotional to do that."He was evasive when asked specifically whether he would keep South Korean troops under the command of the United Nations.Clarke told him "how futile it would be to go it alone, he... without the necessary logistical support would lead to his own and the country's destruction".Rhee retorted that his country "will become another China (referring to the communist country), it is inevitable, and he and his people will die now and die later".

Reporting the conversation to Washington, Clark emphasized that while he was not yet sure that Syngman Rhee had made up his mind to disrupt the peace, "he did have the ability to violate the terms of the armistice and embarrass the UN forces."The South Korean president "doesn't make sense at all and can't come up with any reason, only he knows how far he's going to go. But there's no doubt that he's going to bluster until the end."

"I can't see any solution at the moment, it's better to wait for the development of the situation." This "development" will come soon.

Syngman Rhee 'solved' the POW issue

On June 6, the United Nations delegation and the Communist Party delegation finally negotiated successfully on the issue of repatriating prisoners of war.Any prisoner of war who wished to return could do so within 8 days, and no coercion or threat of any kind could be used to influence or prevent repatriation.Those who do not want to be deported within 60 days will be referred to the Commission of Neutral Nations for 60 days.During this time, the POWs would receive a "description" from their government in the presence of a neutral representative.After this 90-day period, those who would not return would be detained for another 90 days while their fate was discussed at a political conference (assuming there was one).Those who are still unwilling to return after this period will be declared to have the status of civilians, and the Neutral Nations Committee will assist them to resettle elsewhere.

Debate over voluntary repatriation has delayed peace for more than a year.During this period, more than 10 UN troops and countless Chinese and North Koreans were killed or injured.While the resulting package is complex, it does offer the protections the US sought in the first place (although Clarke is skeptical that the Chinese who refuse to be deported will survive the communist talks that come to screen them rhetoric of the author).There are still some specific measures to be resolved, mainly the establishment of a neutral country screening committee.Then President Rhee made a bold surprise move that made the already exhaustive negotiations largely empty talk.

General Clark had feared for weeks that Syngman Rhee would order the mass release of North Korean prisoners of war who would not return home, and Washington had also warned of such a move, but he was powerless to prevent such an action: the prisoner-of-war camps were guarded by South Korean troops, only A handful of Americans performed administrative duties at camp headquarters.Clark did not have the manpower to replace the Koreans with more reliable guard units.In addition, he firmly believes that "people who are openly anti-communist should not be fired upon, they are basically on our side. I don't want to be the one who uses the machine gun to massacre these people."

Just after midnight on June 6, Sergeant Tim Maddox, who was on duty at the sprawling POW camp in Busan, decided to walk a few hundred yards to his barracks to pick up a paperback novel to pass the pre-dawn hours.He heard the soft footsteps and excited murmurs of hundreds of people.Maddox hurried to the fence of the main camp. "The gate was open," he said. "North Korean prisoners of war were rushing through the gate with their grocery bags. I ran up to a South Korean sergeant who was just standing there watching, and I asked him what was going on. He just shrugged and smiled."

Maddox called all the Americans in the camp, but there was nothing they could do.Within hours, it, like the other three prisoner-of-war camps elsewhere in South Korea, was emptied.A total of 2.5 North Koreans who did not want to be repatriated disappeared into the night.

In North Korea, no one down from Syngman Rhee even tried to pretend that the exodus was unauthorized.South Korean soldiers and policemen met the fugitives outside the camp, gave them clothes and food, and directed them to hide in private homes.Government radio directed civilians to give them asylum and warned them to be wary of American soldiers who were coming to hunt the prisoners.Probably fewer than 1 fugitives were captured.In the hours that followed, the guards were replaced by U.S. troops, who were instructed to use non-toxic tear gas to prevent further escapes.But the escape continued.Four days later, the number of North Koreans among prisoners of war had dwindled from 000 to less than 35.

Eisenhower and Dulles, dumbfounded by Syngman Rhee's wantonness, immediately feared that the Communists would use the escape as an excuse to ruin an armistice that seemed within hours' reach.In a public talk, Dulles angrily denounced Syngman Rhee's actions as an "infringement of the authority" of the United Nations Command.He was actually asking the Communist Party not to blame the United States for what Rhee had done: “We have negotiated in good faith to reach a truce, we have and are acting in good faith.” Ike wrote in a private The telegram sternly told Syngman Rhee that his "deviant behavior ... had created an unimaginable situation for the United Nations Command. If continued, this course of action could only lead to Everything that North Korea has won is unnecessarily lost."Eisenhower warned that UN forces stood ready to "implement an alternative arrangement" to end the war, meaning that any future such action would leave South Korea isolated from American assistance after the armistice.

Of course, the biggest unknown is the reaction of the Communist Party.Analysts anxiously monitored the broadcasts over the next few days. On June 6, Xinhua News Agency stated: "Sungman Rhee's 'tail' is raised very high, and he has pushed the armistice agreement to the edge of the cliff. Is the 'head' directing the 'tail', or the 'tail' directing the 'head'? It remains to be decided and answered by Washington." Analysts interpreted the statement as a hint that the Communist Party would be happy to hear an explanation of the incident in Panmunjom.This explanation was quickly made and accepted. Another Xinhua broadcast on July 28 said that the United States had the responsibility to ensure that "similar incidents do not happen again," that is, China was willing to let this episode pass.

But can Syngman Rhee be persuaded not to cause other troubles?Eisenhower had urged him to visit Washington for a private conversation, but Rhee declined, citing the urgency of the war.Thus, on June 6, Eisenhower sent a special envoy to South Korea, Walter Robertson.The elegant, grey-haired Virginian wears the title of Assistant Secretary of State and is known for his extreme tact and patience.Robertson's mission is one of the most delicate in the history of American diplomacy, as in the coming days his rhetoric will determine whether the Korean War continues or ends.

What Walter Robertson brought to North Korea was indeed a strong message: If Syngman Rhee remained obstinate about respecting the armistice agreement, the UN troops would leave North Korea.The UN is fully prepared to strike a deal with the Communists alone, without South Korea, to remove all UN troops and further resolve the POW issue.The rationale for this is that if Syngman Rhee can finally be convinced that the United States means what it says on the issue of troop withdrawal, then he may change his attitude.

But communicating that threat involves tricky politics.The Communist Party would never have imagined that in order to ensure the truce, the United Nations Army was prepared to leave Syngman Rhee alone if necessary.It is recalled that a key part of the post-truce strategy of the UN forces was the statement of the so-called "greater sanctions", which warned of the consequences of a new war by the Communists.The Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded Clark that if the South Koreans did not pledge to abide by the armistice agreement before it was signed, the other countries at war would not follow through on the statement.

(End of this chapter)