The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 16 The Outbreak of War (3)
Before dawn on Sunday, US time, Dulles' telegram arrived in Washington, and Dean Acheson read it very carefully.Acheson understood that Dulles was the main foreign policy spokesman of the opposition party. This person was not a blind partisan, and his opinions should be taken seriously.Dulles drafted the telegram in his hotel in Tokyo, making him the first to propose in writing that the United States use military force to intervene in North Korea.

President Lee is terrified
Late Sunday afternoon, Communist Yak fighter jets strafed the area around President Rhee's official residence, the Blue House (so called because of its blue roof tiles), the old man panicking at the close attack.He received a report that Seoul might fall, so he decided to run away to avoid being caught without a fight.U.S. embassy official Harold Noble (who was not in Seoul that weekend) later spoke with other U.S. and South Korean officials and argued that the cabinet ministers and Cheong Wa Dae's motley crew "were all terrified and infected with Syngman Rhee." .But Rhee claimed his personal safety was not his main concern, believing that his lifelong pursuit of North Korea's independence would be dashed if the invaders captured him.

When night fell, Syngman Rhee kept thinking whether to leave or stay where he was.At around 9:[-] p.m., Acting Defense Minister Shin Sun-mo invited Mu Qiao to participate in the discussion.Mucho recalled:

As soon as I arrived, President Lee told me that the cabinet had just met and thought that if he fell into the hands of the Communists it would be a disaster for the cause of North Korea; and that their defenses were weak, it would be better to leave Seoul.

Shocked to hear this, I cautiously reminded Syngman Rhee that I had been telling him all day today that his troops had fought fairly well in the face of this sudden attack and that none of them had yet given up resistance.Indeed, some of these troops were wiped out or routed.I agree with him that the worst thing in this world is to fall into the hands of the enemy (communists).We were faced with the difficult time of staying in Seoul as long as possible to galvanize our troops without being captured by the enemy.

Mu Qiao warned Syngman Rhee that if he escaped, once the news spread, "not a single South Korean soldier would resist the North Korean attack", and the entire South Korean army would collapse without a fight.Li Chengman still insisted on leaving.To this, the ambassador replied: "Well, Mr. President, make up your mind, but I will stay here."

Mu Qiao's firm attitude stabilized Li Chengwan, and he agreed to stay in Seoul, at least not to leave that night.

Ambassador Mu Qiao returned to the embassy to consider the issue of the family members of the American personnel.If they leave North Korea, South Koreans may take it as a signal that the United States is abandoning them.All Americans are already on alert.At 1 p.m., the embassy's WVTP radio station asked Americans to either stay at home or stick to their posts, "this is due to the needs of the situation," and said there was "no reason to panic."

A top-secret evacuation plan has long been drawn up, which is the practice of all US embassies abroad.According to this worst-case scenario plan, people were evacuated by air from Gimpo Airport.As long as the emergency code is sent from the radio, the plane will fly from Japan.Mucho is concerned about the effectiveness of the plan, however, because securing a bridge in Seoul leading to the airport could be the difference between success and failure.According to other evacuation plans, family members will be evacuated by boarding a ship from Incheon Port or Busan Port, or evacuating by plane from Suwon Airport.

Mucho assigned Jake Seifert, the naval attaché of the embassy, ​​to the two ports to see what ships were available, fearing that the air evacuation would fail due to fire from Yak planes.However, he will not make a decision to evacuate for the time being.

When night fell, the northern battlefield appeared calm.The night brings a brief respite to Seoul.At this moment, officials in Washington ushered in the dawn of Sunday, but also faced a stark choice.

Acheson takes command

A series of decisions began at a State Department meeting at 11:30 a.m. Sunday.The ranks of the attendees suggest that the Pentagon played a secondary role in the meeting.The State Department was attended by Secretary Acheson, Deputy Secretary James Webb, and Assistant Secretary Rusk, the State Department's No. [-], No. [-] and No. [-] people.The only Pentagon attendees at the meeting were General Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, and Brigadier General Thomas Timberman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, capable officers, no doubt, but relatively speaking The Ministry of Defense has a much lower rank than the diplomats here.

Even the document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff admits that it was the State Department who "proposed a plan of action for the United States to assist the South Korean forces under great pressure".Although other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff received calls for comments during the meeting, the State Department's "recommendations were ultimately adopted," even though most of them would call for MacArthur's implementation.These suggestions are as follows:
- The U.S. Air Force and Navy should establish a protective circle around Seoul, Gimpo Airport, and Incheon Port to ensure the safe evacuation of American dependents;
-- Authorize MacArthur's forces to supply North Korea with any equipment recommended by the local U.S. mission, independent of current programs;

- U.S. military advisers must remain in place as long as South Korean troops remain combat-ready;

- MacArthur's authority should include directing all US military operations in North Korea;

— Once the United Nations Security Council votes to take joint action in North Korea, "authorize and instruct" MacArthur to use all forces, including the 7th Fleet, to "stabilize the situation, including, where feasible, the restoration of the original dividing line of the [-]th Parallel ".

It should be emphasized that none of these "recommendations" were submitted to the President for approval.As for what power Acheson had to call the shots at the meeting, neither he nor Truman mentioned in their memoirs.Both men's memoirs say the big decisions were made by Truman and his top advisers at a meeting at Blair House later that day.However, by the time the meeting was held in Blair House, the "suggestions" made at the State Department meeting in the morning had been sent to MacArthur in Tokyo by teletype conference, or teleconference, which was held on Washington time It started at 7:30pm. (In a teletype meeting, participants thousands of miles away sit in a conference room and "talk" via a teleprinter, and the conversation is projected onto the screen by a projector so that all participants can see the conversation.)
These instructions are indeed evasive.It noted that these proposals had not yet been approved by President Truman and were communicated to MacArthur only "for planning purposes."However, the State Department recommended that MacArthur send an "observation team" to South Korea to determine how large a force would be needed to hold the retreat route from Seoul to the port of Incheon.

The teleconference went on to say:
Washington

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department are meeting with the president.The content of this telex conference is only for you to understand the current thinking here and the serious situation.

Tokyo
Come on, do it with us.We applaud your course of action, which will help turn the tables.thanks.

This effusive closing is typical of Douglas MacArthur.

develop a response plan
When the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally held a roundtable discussion on North Korea on Sunday morning ET, Dean Acheson had come to the fore, asking the U.N. to adopt a diplomatic solution, appearing to be the centerpiece of Washington's crisis. The person in charge of the aspect.The meetings of the chiefs of staff were casual. They had no interest in American military intervention.They had drawn up a contingency plan for an invasion months earlier.This plan was not an impromptu decision made under the pressure of the crisis. The staff officers reviewed the US policy towards North Korea elaborated by the National Security Council and President Truman, and believed that North Korea had no "strategic interest" for the United States.The contingency plan (approved by Truman) was as follows: In the event of an invasion, the United States would evacuate all military personnel, diplomats, and civilians as soon as possible, using air cover if necessary; the United States could not be involved in the Korean War under any circumstances.

On the Sunday of the crisis, and in the days that followed, the Chiefs of Staff's attitude toward the crisis seemed to be a desire to carry out that contingency plan.They were given no instructions, suggesting that no one in Washington believes this carefully crafted policy of non-involvement should be changed.

General Bradley also saw no need to make a fuss about it.Earlier that day, before a meeting with his colleagues, Bradley had drafted a memo describing his trip to the Far East.In North Korea, he once talked with General Roberts, who was reappointed as the head of the military advisory group in South Korea.General Roberts apparently had no doubts about the combat effectiveness of the ROK Army, which he had expressed in his pessimistic letter to General Bolt on March 3 (see above, p. 8).If he's telling the truth, he's tacitly acquiescing that his mission (perhaps ostensibly an impossible mission) to build an elite South Korean army has failed.So he took the approach of saying what his boss wanted to hear: Reporting that everything was going well.This statement is so inaccurate that it is almost fabricated out of thin air.

Bradley also has the tendency of casual interviewers to take what they believe, leaving Asia optimistic about South Korea's viability and skeptical about North Korea's military strength.In the memo to his colleagues, he wrote: "I do not think South Korea will be vulnerable to the current offensive unless the Russians actively participate in the fighting." However, if South Korea falls to the enemy, the United States should reinforce Taiwan to protect offsetting adverse effects on the rest of Asia.

That afternoon, General Bradley and Secretary of Defense Johnson, convinced that they did not need to stay to deal with the crisis, flew to Norfolk, Virginia, to attend a pre-arranged meeting of various dignitaries.

As the informal meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded, the Pentagon's telecommunications center began to receive a steady stream of telegrams from Seoul.In the words of General Lawton Collins, most of the telegrams "did not contain excessive warnings."At 10:35 in the morning, the Military Intelligence Branch of the Joint Chiefs of Staff received an intelligence summary from MacArthur's headquarters-although the content was not very accurate, it was extremely exciting.The report estimated the balance of power between the two sides, 3 North Korean divisions against 4 South Korean divisions, and the 5th South Korean division is heading to the front.In fact, North Korea invested at least seven divisions of troops to attack the four severely understaffed South Korean divisions.Territories lost so far are expected in contingency defense plans, which is not "the same thing".MacArthur's command argued that although North Korea's offensive was "violent" and tactically sudden "in view of the forces and strategic intentions invested by North Korea," its ultimate goal was in any case unclear.MacArthur reported that he had ordered the delivery of ammunition to South Korea, and suggested that the 7th Fleet, which was assembled near the Philippines at that time, go to North Korea just in case.

But the upbeat telegram did not provide a moment's relief, and even before the receipt of the telegram, direct contact with Tokyo indicated that the realities of the North Korean situation suddenly became clear to MacArthur and his staff.Contact was made via a teletype conference with General Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence officer.

Willoughby sounded alarmed.Two North Korean divisions were advancing along the road toward an important road junction at Uijeongbu.40 tanks were reported to have moved within 5 kilometers (a little over 3 miles) of the city.He warned: "The breakthrough of the tanks by the Ui government has become a general trend." But Willoughby still offers some optimism: South Korean troops are retreating in an orderly manner, civilians are in good spirits, and "it is reported" that the government "has a good command, Internal order is in order."

truman breaks off furlough

Because of the upbeat tone of Truman's first reports in Independence, officials in Washington were reluctant to interrupt the president's vacation.At around 10 a.m., White House deputy press secretary Eben Ailes drove to Truman's residence and chatted with the president in his library.Ailes said: "The president is not a person who is worried about everything. He will not get emotional or lose control of any incident. ... As long as a person is president, he will not fidget and turn around in a hurry. Or overexcited. He just wants to keep his head clear."

After the talk, Ailes came out to meet the reporters clustered outside the gate.He said the president was "concerned, but not alarmed."

President Truman had gone to his brother Vivian's farm for a Sunday evening seder as planned, but instinct drove him back to his home in Independence before noon. "I thought Acheson would call, and he did." At 12:35 noon, Acheson suggested that the president return to Washington "as soon as possible."

After some fuss, Truman gathered his entourage and hurried to the Kansas City airport. At 1:57, the landline "Independence" lifted off.The accompanying journalists were scattered all over the place because there was no news to report this weekend, so the charter flight booked by American Airlines could not take off until 5:[-] pm.Several of Truman's aides also awkwardly boarded the reporters' charter plane, caught off guard by the president's sudden departure.

Reflecting alone on the flight back to Washington, Truman concluded that the attack had been instigated by the Russians.He said: "I'm sure ... an eye for an eye has to be fought. I've come to the conclusion that strength alone is the only language the Russian dictators know. We have to strike head-on and defeat them on the basis of strength."

To while away the hours of the flight back to Washington that Sunday afternoon, Truman recalled what he considered to be relatively similar past crisis scenarios: Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931; Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie's protests to the League of Nations Cold reception; Hitler's advance into the Saar Basin "could have been stopped by France and England if they had acted in unison".Truman believes: "If the Russian autocratic state wants to follow in the footsteps of the Hitler and Mussolini dictatorships, it should let them suffer a head-on blow in North Korea, just like forcing them to withdraw troops from Iran after the war and later issuing 'Li Astor ultimatum' that way...”

During the flight, Truman sent a telegram asking Acheson, senior military officials and diplomatic advisers to hold a strategic meeting at Blair Building that night.While the White House was under renovation, the Truman family lived in the Blair Building, a luxury hotel usually reserved for VIPs, just a block west of the White House.

Truman then beckoned Treasury Secretary John Snyder to his cabin."I don't know how serious it is," the president said. "They seem to think it's pretty serious in Washington," he said aloud to himself. "I don't really understand," he said to Snyder, "I don't really know to what extent the Russians are involved in this. We know that the Koreans have been trained by the Chinese and have been well supplied with— —the Russians supplied them with tanks, planes and trained their pilots. However, I also know that the Chinese have a lot of manpower there that they can use in case of serious trouble.” Truman believed that the invasion allowed “the United Nations to protect its Agreement among member states to protect themselves from aggression faces a test."

(End of this chapter)