The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 17 The Outbreak of War (4)
Truman turned to ask about Snyder's real job. "If the situation is serious, what do you think the Treasury Department can do immediately?" A fiscal year budget proposal.Snyder suggested: "If the situation is serious, we should immediately start looking at how much the current tax rate will increase and what new tax items will be established."

Truman agreed, and chatted for a while about "extreme care not to run too large a deficit" should war come.He looked at Snyder and said, "You and I have seen both world wars started by little things."

The fact that the North Koreans had launched an invasion was beyond doubt; Washington's diplomatic and intelligence communities began to ask why.Truman's impromptu judgment that the Kremlin had ordered the new war was widely endorsed in Washington.The sprawling analysis that came out on Sunday began with the assumption that the Soviet Union was responsible.

Symptoms of the Soviet Union's troubles and frequent movements elsewhere are everywhere.George Kennan, the State Department's top Soviet expert (and former ambassador to Moscow), received a message that Truman wanted to hear about the prospects for "further Russian action elsewhere ... whether this is the beginning of a series of actions by the Russians" his opinion.Kennan gathered several other Kremlin experts to review intelligence reports and recent cables.The troubling symptoms are clear.In the past six months, the Soviets have continuously transported a large number of weapons, equipment and supplies into Albania, Romania and Bulgaria by sea and rail.As for the reason, analysts have different opinions: Are these materials only used to replace obsolete weapons, or are they used for summer exercises?Is it used to support guerrilla activities, or is it stored for future use by local troops or Soviet troops?The Soviets had announced that the Black Sea Fleet would conduct large-scale maneuvers in coastal waters near Turkey later that summer.As one intelligence note noted, the exercises "revealed chilling details of a proposed mock attack on Turkey, accompanied by amphibious landing maneuvers."In order to expand the scope of the threat of "invasion", the Soviets planned to use 2500 aircraft and enough landing ships to launch an attack of 2 divisions.Iran, which is deeply in political turmoil and economic turmoil, also provides the Soviet Union with an opportunity to "win without force", if they choose to come here.

But was the Soviet Union responsible for the invasion?That was what Truman, Acheson, and virtually everyone in official Washington had instinctively imagined that Sunday.The evidence for Soviet complicity is weak, but it is unmistakable.Former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev described this scene in his "Memoirs".His memoirs, published in the West in 1970, are of unknown origin but are considered authentic by Soviet experts such as Edward Cranshaw.According to Khrushchev's account, Kim Il Sung visited Stalin at the end of 1949 and told him that "North Koreans want to stab South Korea with the point of a bayonet."An attack would trigger an internal explosion in South Korea and quickly remove Syngman Rhee from power. "Stalin, logically, would not have objected to the idea," Khrushchev commented, "which was more in line with his communist beliefs, because the struggle would be their internal affair, and the two Koreas would take care of themselves."

But Stalin reacted cautiously.He told Kim to go back to North Korea to think over the idea and come over with a concrete plan.A few months later, King returned to Moscow, "absolutely sure of success."Stalin still had doubts.In Khrushchev's words, he worried that the Americans "would jump in."But Kim argued that he could defeat South Korea in one fell swoop, which would avoid American intervention.Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, also spoke to Kim at the suggestion of Stalin.

The final decision was made at an emotional dinner at Stalin's dacha outside Moscow.Kim spoke passionately about how he would govern a unified Korea—in which the industry of the North would complement the agriculture of the South.Khrushchev commented: "We wish Kim Il-sung every achievement, toast all the North Korean leaders, and look forward to the day when their struggle will be victorious."

However, Stalin took one last step, showing that he still had misgivings about the plan and was clearly wary of being drawn into a direct confrontation with the United States.The Soviets had as many as 150 advisers at every level of the North Korean army, down to the battalion level; there were more than 7000 advisers nationwide.Just as Kim Il Sung was preparing to march south, Stalin ordered most of his advisers to return to the Soviet Union.This "incomprehensible" decision surprised Khrushchev, who asked Stalin for advice.

Stalin immediately responded: "It is too dangerous for our advisers to remain there, they may be captured. We do not want to be there to be accused of involvement in this matter. This is Kim Il Sung's business."

In Khrushchev's view, the withdrawal of Soviet advisers doomed the North Korean invasion from the outside.In the first few weeks of the war, the North Korean People's Army advanced rapidly, and then in mid-August, it was blocked by the United Nations defensive positions near the southern port of Pusan. "If we had not denied Kim qualified personnel to help deploy troops and direct the battle," Khrushchev said, "North Korea would have won without a doubt." Khrushchev did make a point in his memoirs : "This war was not Stalin's idea, but Kim Il Sung's. Kim was the initiator. Of course, Stalin did not try to dissuade him."

For the first few hours of Sunday afternoon, Dean Acheson had been busy with meetings in his office, hammering out ideas for an evening briefing to the President.At about 3:30 p.m., he sent out the participants one by one, claiming that he wanted to be alone in dictating documents.Acheson's memoir gives a somewhat confusing account of this period, saying he was collating proposals to present to the president.In fact, of course, his first proposals, those "references" sent to Tokyo this morning, were already on the desk.That afternoon, Acheson was preparing arguments for tougher military action.He did not hesitate to condemn the Soviet Union for launching the offensive, and considered it an "open and naked challenge" to the United States, and retreating would greatly damage the strength and prestige of the United States.He believes that "the influence exerted by power ... has great deterrent significance".

Left alone in his office, scribbling in a yellow lawyer's notepad, Acheson argued that America must exert such a powerful influence—he wanted to act with the United Nations, but if necessary, alone, He knew that any troops supplied by the Allies would be "military insignificant".Neither Acheson's memoirs nor the State Department minutes of that day reveal concerns that the United States might not be able to raise enough troops if it decided to go to war in South Korea.Recruitment capacity became an acute issue in a series of critical moments that arose over the next few months.However, Acheson chose not to consider this and hastily pushed the United States into the Korean War.

Later that afternoon, the State Department's Intelligence Research Service scrambled out a gloomy forecast report.Given the South Koreans' military inferiority and limited supplies, they could only put up limited resistance.In a few days their defenses would surely collapse, with the result that Seoul would fall and organized resistance would collapse. "When military defeat is inevitable, the South Korean people's will to resist may also be lost. The withdrawal of the United States will mark the end of organized resistance in South Korea." According to Moscow's instructions, it is "absolutely impossible" to start this war.Therefore, this action...must be seen as Soviet action, part of the "increase in military power that has been a clear sign of Soviet policy over the past 18 months."However, the only difference is that "this time there is a clear risk of ... an all-out war".

But did the Soviets realize the great danger posed by this invasion?Acheson set out to warn Moscow that the US government did not believe that the Soviet government was aloof from this conflict.Alan Kirk, the ambassador to the Soviet Union, received a telegram: He should immediately meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky to formally inform Vyshinsky of the invasion.Vyshinsky should actually be told that the Soviets should get their puppets to stop. "It is well known that the Soviet Union has a decisive influence on the North Korean regime. In view of this, the U.S. government demands that the Soviet Union bear unshirkable responsibility for this unprovoked and unreasonable attack, and at the same time demands that the Soviet Union exert influence on the North Korean regime. Make it withdraw the invading force immediately." If Vyshinsky did not receive Kirk, "give the letter to any official you can make an appointment with."

The telegram was sent from Washington at 4:6 p.m.At 48:[-] p.m., Counselor Walworth Barber of the U.S. embassy in the Soviet Union called back to say that none of the senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could be found, and that important figures were "all said to be in the city."

Mu Qiao alternately reports on the retreat plan, and alternately reports on his attempts to cheer Syngman Rhee up.In a telegram sent to Seoul, Acheson emphasized that it was necessary for the "south Korean army" to "mobilize all forces for short-term resistance, so that the United States has time to make decisions, take actions, or provide assistance."He promised to decide within a few hours to authorize MacArthur to provide ammunition and weapons to South Korean troops, asking the South Koreans to make "extraordinary efforts to hold out until other aspects start to work."Acheson was ready to take a risk.

United Nations Resolution

Meanwhile, on the shores of Lake Success in New York, the effort to bring the war to the United Nations Security Council is apace.The U.S. delegation, led by Charles Noyce, found resistance to a State Department-drafted resolution condemning North Korea's "unprovoked aggression" and calling on the United Nations to stop the war.

Opposition mainly comes from the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Norway and India.How can the United Nations determine which side started the war based on the sporadic intelligence it received at noon on Sunday?Some people think, "This is the North Koreans fighting a war" and it should be regarded as a civil war.Egyptian representative Mahmoud Fazzi Bey suggested that the word "unprovoked" be deleted, given the long-standing hostility between the two North Koreas.French representative Jean Chauvre proposed a change to the proposal, ordering both parties, not just the North Koreans, to cease fire.Noyce "argued vigorously" against the revision.Instead, representatives of Turkey and Australia called for a resolution "to take a hard line".

Norwegian politician and UN Secretary-General Trygf Lie worked among the hesitant delegation.In his view, North Korea’s behavior was “an unmistakable aggression — obviously calculated and well-planned, with all the elements of surprise that remind me of the Nazi invasion of Norway.”Lie was personally outraged at the hospitality he had received during his visit to Moscow just a month earlier, when the Soviets talked up their will for peace.He felt that the Soviets "had been creating an atmosphere of peace solely for the purpose of launching this unexpected attack."

The final text of a resolution that would satisfy the State Department passed the Security Council by a 6-9 vote around 0 p.m. Sunday, an hour before Truman returned to Washington from Independence.The resolution expressed "great concern" over the "armed attack on the Republic of Korea" by North Korean troops and called for an "immediate cessation of hostilities" and that North Korean troops should withdraw to the [-]th parallel.

It is not surprising that the Soviet delegation did not return to the Security Council for a vote, thus losing the opportunity to use the veto to kill the resolution.What the resolution enjoined on the UN was nothing more than moral support (Australian representative Shane argued that it was "obvious" that the communists were ignorant of the resolution).But Acheson was content that the resolution had the force of law in assigning responsibility for starting the war to the North Koreans.Fooling the United Nations into making stronger orders is a complex task that must be done on a whim basis.

Decision made by Blair House
President Truman returned to Washington at about 7 p.m. on Sunday, and during the short drive to Blair Tower, Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louise Johnson, and Deputy Secretary of State James Webb briefed the president.Truman nodded again and again, expressing his satisfaction with the Council's voting results.When he arrived at Blair Tower, he found time to call his wife to say that he had arrived safely (Mrs. Truman was nervous about flying, and Truman always had to call her to say she was safe).He then went downstairs to the living room, where 13 senior officials in charge of the country's military and foreign affairs were waiting.Eight people from the Department of Defense attended: Johnson, Secretary of the Army Frankland Pace, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finlett, Chief of Staff of the Army, Navy and Air Force Lawton Collins, Forrest Sherman and Hoyt Vandenberg, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley.On the State Department side were Acheson, Webb, Rusk, Hickson, and Philip Jessup (the latter serving as secretary of records).Neither Rear Admiral Hillencott, the CIA director, nor George Kennan, the State Department's leading Soviet expert, were invited.In Washington that night, there was little intelligence about developments in North Korea and the Soviet Union's role in the invasion, so the absence of the two men was conspicuous.

Oddly enough, the session got off to a point right from the start.Johnson and General Bradley had returned from the Far East the day before.During the visit, MacArthur forced them a long memorandum on Taiwan.At the meeting, Bradley (at Johnson's request) began to read.What the attendees heard was MacArthur's urgent call for Truman to reverse his January announcement that the United States had no intention of defending Taiwan.MacArthur compared the island to an "unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine supply ship" and believed that giving it up to an unfriendly regime "would be a great disaster for the United States."MacArthur expressed willingness, even urgency, to visit Taiwan and investigate the "requirements and extent of military assistance" needed to defend the island from encroachment.The arguments had already been heard and sniffed at by the congregation, so no one chimed in or commented on them.Acheson wondered why Johnson insisted on raising this question at this extraordinary meeting.

After Bradley finished speaking, Alonso Fields, the butler who had served the president since the Hoover administration, interrupted the meeting to call for dinner.The Trumans were not supposed to be back until another day, and Fields was secretly elated that his clerk had been able to prepare dinner according to orders sent only a few hours earlier.

The conversation at the dinner table was limited to general issues: the chances of direct Russian or Chinese intervention; Man saves himself.

After the meal, remove the cups and plates, and this oval mahogany dining table becomes a formal meeting table.The president spoke first, saying he was "out of the box" and open to any insight into the situation, and that he had no intention of making any major decisions just yet. (Earlier, Deputy Secretary of State James Webb had whispered to Truman: "Let's not go too fast." "Don't worry, I won't," the president replied.) Then he asked Acheson to describe North Korea's situation.

(End of this chapter)