The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 23 "Police Operations" (3)
U.S. stepping up intervention
On Wednesday, June 6, the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces studied the situation on the front line all night and finally admitted that the situation in South Korea cannot be saved by the navy and air force alone.Air Force fighters and bombers could destroy North Korean tank columns during the day, but they could not stop 28 infantrymen from attacking a South Korean force a quarter of its strength.at a meeting in the morning, the joint chiefs of staff directed the joint strategic studies committee to look at, within 10 hours, what course of action should be taken from a military standpoint if the current course of action in north korea yields little answer.The committee should consider air force actions north of the 48th parallel and other actions "that do not include sending ground troops."Rear Admiral Arthur Davis, the chief of the Joint Staff, emphasized the latter point in a note ordering the Joint Strategic Studies Board, cursively writing that the Joint Chiefs of Staff "do not advocate the use of forces."

But less than 24 hours later, the chiefs of staff realized they had no choice.The first reports from North Korea by General Church's investigative team stated in a nutshell that the South Korean army had been reduced from 10 to 2.5, and North Korean tanks were still advancing.In an urgent report, Ambassador Mucho said MacArthur made "vital recommendations" on the direction of the war.The United States asked two days ago whether the Soviets intended to restrain the North Koreans in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions, but has yet to receive an answer. (A few days later, the Soviets replied, denying any responsibility for the war, and pointed out that the North Koreans had crossed the border in order to retaliate against the South Korean invasion. Lies.) Although the CIA did not find any abnormal movements of the Soviet Army and the troops of the Eastern European satellite countries in Europe, people in Washington, shrouded in anxiety, always believed that the North Korean invasion was to test the determination of the United States to resist the expansion of the Communist camp. Or a prelude to an all-out war.

Whatever the Soviet motives, the Communist intervention in North Korea had American strategists scrambling to reexamine their plans. Prior to June 1950, the U.S. combat plan code-named "offtackle" was based on a concept of "strategic defense in the Far East and strategic offensive in Western Europe" summarized in a Pentagon staff report.If possible, keep Western Europe and use it as a base for attacking the Soviet Union.The document states: "Western Europe has the greatest strategic value to the overall security of the United States, and this must be repeatedly emphasized." Priority must be given to defending a line of defense "to the west not beyond the Rhine River", and to deploy troops in Northwest Africa to ensure that the Western Mediterranean unimpeded.The plan, which also applies to defense in the Western Hemisphere, recommends "fighting a pre-emptive nuclear attack" and protecting vital lines of communication.The Far East was neglected; the first priority in the region was to defend Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, and to prevent Taiwan from falling into the hands of the Soviets or the Chinese Communists.The Asian portion of the plan did not call for an offensive east of China or the western Soviet Union.

1950年6月，美国陆军总兵力约59.1万人，共10个作战师。大约36万人分布在美国大陆，即本土防区（军事上简称ZI）。其他23.1万人驻扎海外，执行占领任务。驻远东的兵力最多，达10.85万余人。在欧洲，8万人驻在德国；9 500人驻扎奥地利；驻的里雅斯特约4 800人；7 000余名士兵分散在太平洋区域；阿拉斯加驻军7 500名；另有1.22万人驻在加勒比地区；其余数千名军人参加各种使团，担任武官、警卫和辅助人员。

步兵的力量如此单薄，美国能给朝鲜多大帮助呢？10个步兵师中有4个师在日本执行警备任务，它们是步兵第7师、第24师、第25师和第1骑兵师（也属步兵，沿用历史名称）。第5团战斗队驻扎夏威夷；第29团在冲绳。各部队均未满员：驻日本三个师的人员各在1.2万至1.3万人不等；第四个师有1.5万人。他们的坦克、迫击炮、无后坐力炮、枪支和车辆等装备大多是第二次世界大战时期的旧货，而且保养不好。驻日本的四个师主要是防范日本军国主义死灰复燃，称它们为战斗部队可谓夸大其词。

However, these are all the forces at the disposal of the United States.The previously cited Pentagon Papers have noted that the deployment of these forces to North Korea would have immediate strategic consequences.The attrition "would seriously affect our readiness" if troops stationed in Japan and Western Europe were drawn to fight in North Korea.In view of the Soviet Union's absolute superiority in the number of ground troops in Eastern Europe (40 people confronting more than 10 Americans), the position of the United States in Western Europe has become fragile.The basic plan of European defense, "offtackle", was based on "the assumption that Western Europe could fall to the enemy at the beginning of the war".Transferring troops to North Korea "would further deplete an already strained force, making it difficult to save our European allies in the event of a hot war."

Thus, the decisions that President Truman and those around him had to make involved a wide variety of factors.The size of the military is constrained by financial constraints imposed by Congress, which in turn accommodates political constraints imposed by the populace, and the limitations of military power in turn determine the limits of diplomatic activity.Decision-makers in the US government—first and foremost the president—have identified Europe as a priority.North Korea has been cast aside as a corner with no strategic value.Since Sunday, the United States has been hesitant to gradually move toward direct military involvement in North Korea.Time to take the last few steps?Should the United States change its established policy and enter North Korea to fight a ground war?

Approval for the use of ground forces
In a fundamental shift for the chiefs of staff, a staff committee submitted a cautious escalation recommendation on the morning of Thursday, June 6.For two days, the Joint Strategic Research Committee struggled to balance various long-term strategic goals with the imminent war.While ambiguous, its recommendations were bolder than actions approved so far by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: MacArthur should be authorized to use sea and air power to "provide the fullest possible support" to the ROK Army.The United States "would be in a strong political position" if it expelled the North Koreans without pushing the war north of the 29th parallel.However, if MacArthur judged that the bombing of North Korean bases "could avoid the serious danger of the fall of South Korea", then he should be approved to carry out.Even then, he has to get approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (As noted, MacArthur had ordered bombing north of the [-]th Parallel on his own initiative, while Washington was kept in the dark.)
The proposal sparked heated debate between the chiefs of staff of the armed forces and Defense Secretary Louise Johnson.The consensus that emerged after the debate — “rather grudgingly,” in the words of a Joint Chiefs of Staff document — was that the committee was not strong enough and that the time was ripe to commit ground forces.At Johnson's suggestion, the meeting was moved to the White House to continue, and Secretary of State Acheson joined other diplomats in the discussion.Johnson spoke first.He proposed that ground forces should be used just to establish a secure base from which the air force could operate.Aircraft flying in from bases as far away as Japan have limited time to operate in targeted airspace and cannot communicate with the South Korean forces they are supposed to support.Johnson also complained about restricting naval and air force operations south of the [-]th parallel, allowing North Korean supplies and reinforcements to move southward safely.The establishment of a protected air base would not only encourage the South Koreans, but also ensure the safe evacuation of American personnel there should the need arise.In short, Johnson argued: "We must have at least one American foothold in South Korea."

Truman worried that the Soviets would take these forceful actions as a sign that the United States was trying to attack the Soviet Union.Although he was prepared to take all necessary actions to drive the North Koreans across the [-]th parallel, he did not want the United States to become so involved in the Korean War that it was "unable to cope with similar situations that may arise later."Truman did not want to show "the slightest sign of preparing for a war with the Soviet Union."Johnson and the chiefs of staff told him they didn't want any hints of that either.

Secretary of the Army Pace also expressed caution in taking actions north of the [-]th parallel.Truman should have allowed the aircraft to operate in the northern half, but only to "destroy military supplies."Acheson seems to be more courageous. He believes that the Air Force "do not mechanically regard the [-]th Parallel as a limit line when performing missions", but the actions cannot spread to "Manchuria".

Acheson reported to the conference in a nutshell the State Department's estimate of Soviet operations.Two days earlier, the United States had sent a note drawing the attention of the Soviets to the Security Council resolution and urging them to use their influence to stop the North Korean invasion.In their reply, the Soviets blamed the invasion on the South Koreans, but said they would abide by the "principle that foreign powers must not interfere in the internal affairs of Korea."According to the State Department, the quote suggested that the Russians would stay out of North Korean affairs.

"This means," Truman commented, "that the Soviets will have the Chinese and the North Koreans fighting for them." Acheson said that although the State Department and the CIA have not found any indication of Chinese interference, they "may "Will go to war.

In the end, the meeting decided to authorize the air force and navy to attack military targets in North Korea, and quickly sent ground troops to North Korea to defend the ports, airports, and communication facilities around Pusan.This, Acheson noted, was "far south of the operational area."Washington would inform MacArthur that he would defend his troops if the Soviets intervened, and would report to Washington, who would issue further instructions.If the United States were to go to war with the Soviet Union, the decision would be made in Washington, not Tokyo.The instructions sent to MacArthur did not determine the number of ground troops he could send to North Korea, which would be based on recommendations made to Washington by MacArthur after his visit to North Korea.

By the end of the White House meeting, it was nearly dusk in Washington, and it was 10 am in Tokyo.Although MacArthur had been back in Tokyo for more than 12 hours, he had said nothing to his superiors in Washington about the collapse he had seen in North Korea and his vision.

Inexplicably, the chiefs of staff of the three services communicated the results of the afternoon meeting to their field commanders and waited for his reply.

MacArthur requests reinforcements
A 2-word telegram from MacArthur finally reached the Pentagon between midnight on Friday, June 000, and 6:30 on July 7.MacArthur described the rout of South Korean troops as "completely incapacitated to fight back."The only hope of holding the present front (then only south of Seoul) "was to commit U.S. ground combat forces in the Korean area of ​​operations."Without ground forces, the navy and air force alone may not be effective.He recommended the immediate dispatch of a regimental combat team of approximately 1 personnel to North Korea.Subsequently, he hoped to "draw up to two divisions from the forces in Japan for an early counter-offensive".

MacArthur's telegram ended with a phrase that General Lawton Collins called "do it or take it down," which became an annoying (to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) style in many of his later telegrams : "Unless ground, sea and air combat forces are prepared to be employed to the fullest in this war-torn landscape, our mission will needlessly cost lives, money, honor and, at worst, failure."

A Pentagon duty officer roused General Collins from his bed, and the Army chief of staff hurried to his office to read MacArthur's telegram in one breath.He was "so agitated by the serious situation described in the telegram and by MacArthur's urgency" that he decided to speak to General MacArthur himself.Collins ordered a teletype meeting at 3 a.m. Washington time (5 p.m. Tokyo time).

Collins summoned his men to a conference room on the basement floors of the Pentagon.This is the war room, linking this military institution with the theater commanders.There are maps and (in 1950's) advanced communications equipment everywhere.Collins sat at a long low table flanked by his deputy, General Alfred Grunther, and several generals from the Army General Staff.While all decisions are purely military in nature, State Department officials including Dean Rusk and North Korea's Niles Bond were in attendance.Half a world away in Tokyo's Daiichi Building, General Almond gathered his five senior staff officers in a similar but much smaller room.

At 3:40 in the morning, the teletype meeting started, 40 minutes later than planned.As the room dimmed, Collins handwrote the first question of the interrogation and handed it to the communications sergeant.The sergeant typed rapidly on a keyboard not unlike an office typewriter, and the words were instantly projected on a screen for everyone facing the Pentagon, as well as on the same screen in Tokyo.Needless to say, everyone knew the seriousness of the situation - in the middle of the night it would be decided whether or not to send American soldiers to fight and die in North Korea."There was a lot of tension," Collins said. ...Unconsciously, our voices were muffled. ...Our minds were filled with images of the Tokyo venue, and the responses from there would greatly influence our decision to participate in this strange event. A new war." Washington first sent a telegram:

War Department No. 1

The authorization proposed by your C56942 cable will be decided by the President, which will take several hours for his consideration.In the meantime, (per instructions sent to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff earlier that night) you have been authorized to send a Regimental Combat Team to Pusan ​​Base.This point will be elaborated on in the teletype meeting (to be held at 8 am that day).

MacArthur's reply seemed very impatient.He has made specific demands and hopes to make a decision on the spot.Alarming the Pentagon in the middle of the night was not on his mind.

Far East Command No. 1

Your mandate now establishes the groundwork for the use of ground combat forces in North Korea, but does not allow sufficient latitude to operate effectively in the current situation.The basic request posed by my telegram remains unfulfilled. …Time is running out, and a clear decision is imperative without delay.

Collins suggested that if MacArthur didn't push the president too hard, the chances of getting what he wanted were more likely.He managed to explain the dynamics of official thinking in Washington and the deliberation with which Truman made major decisions.

War Department No. 2

I was present at the White House meeting on the afternoon of June 6 when the President made a decision authorizing action under the authority established by Joint Chiefs of Staff Document 29.I think the spirit of the decision shows that the President wants to deliberate with his top advisers before authorizing U.S. combat forces into theater.

(End of this chapter)