The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 24 "Police Operations" (4)
Collins asked whether allowing a regimental combat team could handle the situation.He believes that by the time the operation is completed, the President should have made a "final decision" on the request to send two divisions.He asked again: "Does this meet your current requirements?"

Apparently, the question mark at the end indicated that Collins was waiting to speak back, but there was no reply.Minutes passed and the teletype remained unbearably silent.MacArthur replaced the answer with haughty and contemptuous silence, putting Washington clearly on the defensive.He has asked to send in what he says is needed to avert the immediate military catastrophe; if he is refused, the hands of those in the Pentagon (not the commander in chief of the Far East) will be stained with blood and blame."We took this silence as General MacArthur's urging that we make a decision 'without delay,'" Collins said. After a brief discussion with his aides and State Department officials, Collins finally backed down.He will "immediately pass" Secretary of the Army Pace to the President for approval to send a regimental combat team directly to the combat zone.He promised to reply "as soon as possible", "estimated half an hour".

MacArthur still did not reply.Collins walked out of the conference room to call Pace.Pace had been informed that the teletype meeting was taking place and agreed to forward the request to the president.

Truman also knew that dealing with the crisis that night might require his own decisions.So he woke up early, shaved, and when the phone rang at 4:57 a.m., he was sitting in his bedroom in Blair Tower.At this time, the dawn of the city has not yet come.

Truman grunted and grunted as Pace dictated MacArthur's cables.What about the Joint Chiefs of Staff?Not all its personnel have been consulted.Due to time constraints, Collins decided to bypass his colleagues, but he and several War Department officials felt that the request should be granted.Without hesitation, Truman ordered a regimental combat team into action and said within hours he would make a decision to send two additional divisions.

Meanwhile, Pentagon officials attending the meeting routinely asked MacArthur a host of questions during teletype meetings.Airstrikes on North Korean airports have been carried out, but with "unspecified effect"; the navy operating in North Korean waters has so far "also not achieved positive results" due to the lack of targets; there are now few obstacles to prevent North Koreans from crossing the Han River MacArthur was unwilling to estimate how long it would take to send a regimental combat team to the front; airlift was not feasible due to the lack of security at Suwon Airport.

The recreational chat lasted for more than half an hour and ended when Pace conveyed the president's decision to General Collins.Then another message was sent:
War Department No. 10

Your request to send a Regimental Combat Team to the theater has been granted.Let me know about other future transfers.

Far East Command No. 8

grateful.Are there any other new instructions?

War Department No. 11

Here, everyone admires you for quickly grasping first-hand information about the situation yourself.Congratulations and best wishes.We have complete confidence in you and your troops.

No further instructions.Finish.War Department No. 11.

As soon as the meeting was over, Collins briefed the other chiefs of staff by phone.Naval Chief of Staff Admiral Forrest Sherman agreed.Now that the order has been issued, there is no choice, but he is puzzled by such a sudden escalation of the war.He recalled his reaction months later:

The decision (to send troops) was made on the advice of MacArthur, who was there in person.I had doubts about this, and in the next few days, I felt that the decision was wise and that this was the general trend.But I was also fully aware of the risks of fighting Asians on the Asian continent, something that I, as a naval officer, believed all my life to avoid as much as possible.

Another aspect of the decision worried General Collins.MacArthur delayed the report for hours, forcing his superiors in Washington to make a big decision in the middle of the night.MacArthur's strategy is like a policeman, getting people out of bed and questioning them.The person being interrogated will often do whatever the interloper asks in order to go back to bed.MacArthur, a military strategist as well as a seasoned bureaucrat and politician, took his cue from a cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that only defensive missions would be allowed in the Pusan ​​perimeter: with dramatic action, he could get what he needed force.What could be more dramatic than getting the President of the United States out of bed at 4:[-] a.m.?

MacArthur's scheme succeeded, but at a high price.Had he made the request during the day, the president and the Joint Chiefs of Staff would likely have agreed unanimously.Because in the past two days, their thinking has been changing.However, MacArthur's petty actions were so blatant in the eyes of Collins and other superiors that they seriously damaged his reputation.

However, President Truman had prepared to give MacArthur more than two divisions. Just after 7 o'clock, he called Secretary of Defense Johnson and Secretary of the Army Pace, asking them to "consider giving MacArthur the two divisions he wanted, and consider the feasibility of accepting the two divisions provided by the Chinese Kuomintang government".Truman believed that Chiang Kai-shek's government was still a permanent member of the Security Council, and the use of his troops was justified.Truman's reason was: "Britain, Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands all sent ships and planes to the war, and we should probably also use Chinese ground forces."

He did foresee a backlash for doing so. "We don't know what this will mean to Mao Zedong. We must be careful not to cause a full-scale war in Asia." Truman still believed that North Korea was just a feint and that the Soviet Union's main spearhead could be directed at the Black Sea region or the Persian Gulf , namely the Balkans and Iran. "As far back as Peter the Great, he coveted these two places. Today, he is held as a hero in the Soviet Union along with Stalin and Lenin."

At 9:30 in the morning, Truman's War Council met at the White House, and Truman sought advice on MacArthur's request for two additional divisions.He could not make up his mind whether it was "worth it" to accept Chiang Kai-shek's offer of an army of 3.3 men.The troops could be shipped on board within five days, and the President believed that "time is of the essence."

Acheson did not want any Chinese involved.He pointed out that accepting Chiang Kai-shek's army risked introducing the Chinese Communists into North Korea or Taiwan.In addition, if Chiang Kai-shek sent troops to North Korea, it would certainly weaken the ability to defend Taiwan.The Communists will take advantage of this opportunity and force the United States to decide whether to intervene in Taiwan while intervening in North Korea.

The chiefs of staff of the three armed forces made it clear that Chiang Kai-shek should be avoided.Chiang Kai-shek's troop equipment was comparable to that of the South Koreans, who had proved no match for the North Korean armored forces.In addition, the use of his troops would require the use of transport vehicles that would be more efficient at transporting U.S. troops and supplies into North Korea.

These reasons convinced Truman.He would reject Chiang Kai-shek's proposal, but in a "polite" tone.

The issue of sending two divisions to North Korea aroused little debate.This is different from the China issue, where there is no dissent.Truman announced that he would grant full powers to MacArthur, who would control the ground forces under his command and send an unlimited number of American divisions into North Korea.He also agreed with Admiral Sherman's proposal for a naval blockade of the North Korean coast.

It took less than half an hour to reach these important decisions, and the United States took another major step toward total war.

republican objection

Truman also lost further unreserved support from Congress.late Friday morning he invited congressional leaders to the cabinet room for a somewhat confusing briefing on some of his recent decisions and focused on bombing targets north of the [-]th parallel .

Nebraska Republican Sen. Kenneth Wheely expressed dissatisfaction.He got up from his chair and walked around the room, as if he were addressing an issue in the Senate.He wondered whether Congress should be consulted before sending ground troops to North Korea.Truman replied that there were already some ground troops there; if an "emergency" did arise, he would consult Congress.Wheelyman grumbled displeasedly that he "thought" the president "should have consulted with Congress" before taking such a move.In his own defense, Truman said he acted during a crisis over the weekend "when there was no time for a full discussion. I had to act as Commander-in-Chief, and I did. I directed MacArthur to save the North Koreans, and implement the directives of the UN Security Council".In a cunning trick, Vice President Alben Buckley wanted a presidential statement that Truman was in charge of the armed forces and had the authority to issue orders to them.

"It's a very delicate matter," the president replied, "and I don't want to go around saying that I want MacArthur to act. He's not an American general now, he's acting for the United Nations. If we say he's only doing what we tell him to do , then things will fall apart." Truman admitted that this was deception: "Of course, MacArthur is obeying (my) orders, but we must be careful not to leave such an impression on the outside world." For such blatant inconsistencies , no one in the Congress questioned that the U.S. military was in North Korea to implement the order of the UN Security Council without the approval of Congress, and the president at the same time admitted that the U.N. military was purely fictional.

Immediately after the meeting, Truman read a forthcoming statement that concluded with the following passage: "General MacArthur has been authorized to use certain supporting ground forces." These reserved words are by no means sufficient to describe the authority actually conferred on MacArthur, Especially the line "Use the Army units at your disposal".The four-division force makes up about 40 percent of the U.S. Army.If this fact were revealed to members of Congress, there is no doubt that Senator Wheely would not be the only one who questioned Truman.

Another Republican senator, Alexander Smith of New Jersey, asked whether it was a good idea for Congress to approve the actions the administration had taken?Acheson cleverly avoided answering.The issue "requires serious consideration," he said.

The questions raised by lawmakers were brushed aside, prompting Truman's henchmen to debate whether Congress should be asked to formally authorize the declaration of war.Averill Harriman, with a keen sense of politics, wanted to capitalize on the growing public support for the government, arguing that "President Truman could command overwhelming support from the public, enough to silence future critics."

But Truman believed that Congress did not need to act. He was exercising the legitimate powers given to him by the Constitution, and he hoped to preserve the power of the president, as Harriman said, "from the interference of all outsiders, including Congress."Harriman said Truman told him, "We must not do this, or the hands of the next president will be tied."

The State Department also sided with Truman.Lucius Battelle, Dean Acheson's main aide, pointed out: "Since the president is performing his duties, why should he question whether the president should do so? The president's actions are approved, and everyone has no reservations. So there's no problem." Battelle and Acheson worry that if Congress were given the opportunity to debate a bicameral resolution, "there would be a possibility that the President would What he did in the circumstances was questioned."

According to Truman's adviser George Elsey, "the first few days of the war were chaotic," with the president and his key advisers "so busy thinking about military action and action at the United Nations" that Congress was not seriously thinking about it. "The president's motivation is to stop the aggression, not to prepare for future political struggles." Moreover, the president "does not have strong leadership in Congress to promote a bill."The issue was largely raised during the "Republican smear campaign" that began in early July.Even then, Acheson remained against attending Congress.He likened the situation to that faced by a lawyer confronting an opposing witness: "Would you like to ask one more question—but that question could kill you." Acheson elaborated:

The president's policies have the unanimous approval of all parties in both houses of Congress.We have to do this (referring to intervening in North Korea); we have done it, everything is going well.

The question now is: should we propose a common resolution...to approve this policy?I feel the dangers in this far outweigh any possible benefits. . . . If a joint resolution is made, the Armed Services Committees of both Houses will have to hold frequent hearings, and each participant will ask a variety of dry and annoying questions.By the time you pass this level, I am afraid that the originally clear situation has been messed up beyond control.

Therefore, I suggest to put this idea aside, because the immediate pressure is at best so great, and we should act according to our will.

Acheson also cited another set of reasons: the military department could not estimate how long the war would last and how many troops would be needed in the end. "What you need to do now is to act immediately and complete it in the fastest and most effective way. If you stop to analyze and study your own actions, then you will be in a cocoon. ... All this will only weaken your will and make nothing happen. "

However, Acheson neither disdained to listen to the "boring and annoying" questions from the committees of both houses of Congress, nor was he willing to stop to "analyze and study his own actions", which showed his contempt for Congress and cost the government dearly. cost.

A brief review of the decisions made between Sunday, June 6 and Friday, June 25 shows four distinct phases of the full American reputational and military involvement in the defense of South Korea:

— provide sea and air protection for the evacuation of U.S. civilians;
— Naval and air operations against North Korean forces south of the [-]th parallel in support of the ROK Army;

——Expand the sea and air operations to the north of the [-]th parallel, and partly attack from bases in South Korea;
— Deploying U.S. ground forces into the theater of operations.

According to the analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second phase is critical, and it departs from the stated policy of several years ago that there is no strategic reason for the United States to become involved in the defense of South Korea.What Truman and his chief adviser in the first days of the crisis, Acheson, did not realize was that once the United States had crossed the threshold of war and opened fire on enemy troops, it would have to go on irrevocably.If the second step is to stop the North Koreans, the remaining few steps must be continued.Those steps kept U.S. forces in North Korea for three years, ending the deadly military standoff with an unsatisfactory armistice.

Truman and Acheson had made a political decision.North Korea is blatantly opposing the United States and the United Nations. If it does not take a head-on blow, it will have serious consequences for future world peace.

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff acknowledged, Truman's military advisers were not the primary movers in making these decisions in response to the invasion, but they did not voice their dissent.A year later, as both parties in Congress were busy sternly questioning why America was mired in an undeclared war, Louis Johnson stated:

Neither I nor any member of the military unit suggested that we go into North Korea.This suggestion came from the Secretary of State, but I repeat: it was not opposed by the Department of Defense; all members of the Department of Defense individually pointed to troubles, pains, tribulations, and difficulties.

But once a political decision is made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff implement it immediately from a military perspective.Their initial hopes of repelling the invaders with naval and air power were quickly dashed.Theater Commander MacArthur outspokenly proposed the use of ground forces.He wanted infantry, and in large numbers, so the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent him.

The cold war between the United States and the Soviet bloc has now turned into a hot war, and there is no guarantee that it will remain a limited war.

(End of this chapter)