The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 28: Showing off force (4)
"Surge!" - MacArthur

The speed of North Korea's advance made MacArthur panic. On June 6, he boasted to Margaret Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune: "Give me two divisions and I can hold North Korea." The next day, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved He used two of the four divisions stationed in Japan at the time.Just as the advance teams of these two divisions were leaving for North Korea, he asked for reinforcements.On July 29, he called the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "If feasible, request to send a regiment of marines quickly and equip the corresponding air force as tactical support. Since the action is imminent, it must arrive as soon as possible." General Rattermeyer's request to add 7 aircraft to bring the Air Force up to wartime levels.

On July 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the dispatch of a marine regiment. The chiefs of staff of the three services only met half of the aircraft he requested for Strattermeyer.

两天以后，也就是史密斯特遣部队投入战斗当天，麦克阿瑟又恳求参谋长联席会议增兵。这一次他要求增拨第2步兵师、第2特别工兵旅和第82空降师的1个团，供他计划在7月20日至8月10日期间的作战行动中使用。

This time the Joint Chiefs of Staff hesitated. The troops he asked for accounted for a considerable part of the Army's general reserve.There are a total of 6 divisions stationed outside Japan, 1 division is stationed in Germany to perform occupation tasks, and the remaining 5 divisions are all in the United States.The chiefs of staff told MacArthur that although they "considered with sympathy" his request, it made them difficult.No increase in military personnel has been authorized, and the U.S. must maintain a strong military posture outside of North Korea. There were no ships to transport the troops he requested before July 7.The Joint Chiefs of Staff asked MacArthur to sit still and try to estimate how many troops from each service would be needed in total to drive the invaders out of South Korea.

South Korea's army, defending much of eastern North Korea along a more rugged and steeper offensive route, has encountered as much trouble as the U.S. military has encountered in a hasty resistance on the west coast. After the 7th U.S. Division entered the battle on July 5, all areas east of the main road and railroad from Seoul to Daegu were guarded by South Korean troops.

North Korea's central region is steeped in mountains and has two major north-south highways and railway lines, both of which start from Wonju, 45 miles southeast of Seoul.The central corridor from Wonju to Gimcheon runs almost exactly north and south.Another passage not far to the east is slightly to the southeast and connects with Yongchuan.Guarding any of these passages would put the invaders within striking distance centered on Daegu.

Every battle encountered by the 24th Division in the west was the same: the North Koreans first attacked by tanks, and the infantry quickly outflanked them, with absolute superiority in strength and firepower.However, later POW interrogation reports provided encouraging data on the increasing effectiveness of South Korean units (these units were the 2nd, Capital, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 117th Regiment).According to POW reports, the North Korean Supreme Command deposed (and possibly later shot) three division commanders for their failure to advance quickly as planned.

When South Korean troops had a chance to gain a foothold into the fight and engage their meager artillery, they were able to cripple the invaders.For example, the South Korean Capital Division fought fiercely with the North Korean 2nd Division south of Chuncheon for 3 days.South Korean artillery set up an ambush on the edge of Cheongju and waited quietly until the enemy came within range, then fired at leisure for more than an hour, killing 800 North Koreans.

MacArthur scrambled 800 M-6 anti-tank mines to the front, but neither South Korean troops nor their American military advisers had ever seen such mines.Richard Crawford of the advisory group read the instructions attached to each box and set about explaining how to use the strange weapon to South Korean soldiers.Since the battle was imminent and enemy tanks were rumbling towards the training ground, Crawford did not dare to neglect, and only spent half an hour explaining, which was not enough time.When South Korean soldiers planted landmines, they either forgot to install the fuze, or they forgot to open the fuse, even if they were run over by tanks, they would not explode.One of Crawford's soldiers had the South Korean soldiers throw the boxes containing the mines off the back of a truck without even burying them.

When the American method didn't work, the Koreans turned to another method that Crawford dubiously called a "good idea."It looks like this:

Without our knowledge, they prepared explosives, tied them around the waist of a soldier, and formed several "death squads".These daredevils move to the side of the tank and pull a fuse for 2 seconds. The tank may be destroyed, but the man must have gone to see his glorious ancestors.

I never knew how many tanks were destroyed by this method, but I do know that we lost too many "deathmen" in the first four or five days.The Korean engineer commander told me that it was difficult for him to find such volunteers again.

Another American adviser, Major David Campbell, taught the South Korean 6th Combat Engineer Battalion the essentials of booby traps, which South Korean soldiers particularly liked.The infiltrator team slipped across the North Korean front unnoticed, took one wheel off a North Korean supply cart, placed explosives under the cart, and carefully placed the axle on the ground and attached the trip rope . "The booby traps exploded when North Koreans raised carts to install wheels. South Korean soldiers named this brutal device 'razor' because it hit the head."

By mid-July, although the North Koreans were restrained by the above, after a protracted bloody battle, they still broke through two key passes in the high mountains, one was Mungyeong in the central corridor, and the other was Danyang in the east.Marching along the Taebaek Mountains along the eastern coast, several North Korean troops crossed some of the country's most difficult mountainous terrain without encountering any resistance.A North Korean regiment had to march 7 miles in eight days before meeting resistance from South Korean troops retreating from the Danyang area.

However, the main force of a North Korean division in the coastal area moved extremely slowly and cautiously. As a result, it missed a good opportunity to drive straight to Pohang and attack the South Korean troops and the entire front of the US military on the peninsula from the flank.The delay came from the commander, who decided to send a reconnaissance patrol into the steep pass in the mountains to make sure there was no ambushes.U.S. Army war records describe the delay as "one of the enemy's major tactical errors" in the Korean War.For this reason, South Korea was able to hastily deploy a regiment of the 3rd Division into position.Colonel Kim Jung-woo, who commanded the regiment, was extremely tall and tall, and he was extremely brave in combat, earning him the nickname "Golden Tiger".He stopped the North Korean advance north of Pohang.Meanwhile, General MacArthur sent a battalion of fighter jets to an air base near Pohang; General Dean sent an infantry battalion there;

Even so, some South Korean troops couldn't stand it on July 7 and withdrew their command post and everyone to Yingdeok.The commander of the Korean Army Division quickly solved the problem: he ordered the military police to kill any Korean soldiers they found in the city.The stragglers immediately returned to the front line.

However, neither the South Korean troops nor the U.S. military could hold out.From the Yellow Sea to the Sea of ​​Japan, North Korea's entire defenses are crumbling.By mid-July, the key question was: Can it hold out until reinforcements arrive?

Seoul's Red Regime

As soon as the Rhee government fled Seoul, the Communists set about establishing their own regime in South Korea, using as many friendly southerners as possible.The North Koreans were full of confidence. They felt that the people in the south hated Syngman Rhee's "gangster government" and welcomed them.They rallied many converts, and Won Se-hoon, a member of the National Assembly in Seoul, agreed to preside over the trials of "suspected anti-communists" and former South Korean officials. On July 7, General Song Hoo-sung, the commander of the South Korean 4nd Division, who was dismissed at the beginning of the war, announced on the North Korean state radio station the establishment of the "People's Volunteer Corps" to fight with the North Korean People's Army.According to CIA analysis, Song's speech foreshadowed to the North Koreans and the world the psychological and propaganda measures that North Korea will take in the future. Every effort will be made to establish an 'interim' government representing all of North Korea."With the collapse of the South Korean army and government, the accusation of the Communists that Rhee's Republic was a "puppet regime" and that the Americans did everything possible to impose its will on the entire Korean people "grew more weight."At the same time, the CIA also received reports that some prominent anti-communists had been executed in Seoul.

A few days later, as the CIA had predicted, the North Koreans formed a Seoul People's Committee, all but the Chairman composed of South Koreans, many of whom had been imprisoned by Syngman Rhee as communists administrative officials and members of the National Assembly.

The communists immediately began to "recruit" soldiers and strong men for hard labor, mainly responsible for transporting emergency supplies to replace equipment destroyed by the US Air Force.The People's Committee has also begun a census of family members of South Korean military, police and government personnel.

But they don't always need to be coerced.The CIA report concluded that the South Korean government's "past failure ... to win the support of a restless student class" had resulted in more than half of Seoul's students "actively supporting the Communists, many volunteering for the Northern Army, apparently under the control of a The charm of the victorious army attracts. Once the situation is serious, their morale will plummet."The CIA noted similar discontent among the rest of Seoul's burghers: the working class "generally supported the North Koreans, the businessmen remained neutral, and the intelligentsia remained pro-South."A former Seoul policeman reported to the CIA that the North Korean army and police in the city were "not very noticeable"; while shops were mostly closed, "the streets were . . . demonstrations."

The implication of the CIA report was clear: A considerable number of Seoulites rejoiced in the downfall of Rhee and his government.

In propaganda broadcasts directed to the South, North Korean radio warned that the United States could not be trusted.Northern broadcasts and publications said that the United States had helped Chiang Kai-shek in China, but that the Communist Party withdrew as soon as it gained the upper hand.They claim that the United States will withdraw from North Korea as long as the northern forces continue to push south.

However, whatever opportunities the North Koreans had to drum up support for them, those opportunities were quickly wasted.Due to the logistical problems of the North Korean People's Army, this army can only "rely on the mountain to eat the mountain", and the soldiers searched for rice from house to house in Seoul.The Central Intelligence Agency reported that "the residents of Seoul have no rice and barely survived", and the price of food has skyrocketed.According to reports from refugees sent to the CIA, the price of rice in Seoul was seven times that of Busan and 7 times that of Daegu at the end of July.

In July, when the North Koreans clearly had the upper hand, Pyongyang radio repeatedly trumpeted the doom and gloom of South Korea's backstage bosses.Radio Pyongyang also broadcast a document said to be jointly signed by 7 former members of the National Assembly who are still in Seoul, calling on Daejeon lawmakers to stop supporting Syngman Rhee and side with "the people."For the sake of international public opinion, North Koreans also invited journalists from Communist Party newspapers from France, Britain, and China to come to North Korea to denounce the crime of bombing the North by the United States.As the Americans dropped their bombs "from the clouds," the reporters wrote, they were clearly conducting "terrorist bombings designed to kill peaceful residents."But by mid-August, the CIA reported: "While propaganda about bombing and land distribution continues, propaganda about 'victory' is no longer present. North Koreans have also tried black propaganda," Spreading false news of the United Nations victory, when these reports were proved to be false, the morale of the American army was severely damaged."

Although the North Korean regime had no intention of rationing food, it executed some black market traders and hoarders in an effort to alleviate food shortages.The new regime, through neighborhood committees at all levels, systematically recruited unwilling laborers to repair the Han River Bridge.Because of the incessant bombing by the U.S. military, no one wanted to do the job.A CIA report in early August pointed out that the leftists who initially supported the communist regime were “loosed” by the U.S. bombing. They doubted whether North Korea could win the final victory, so they “teared off their armbands and restrained their behavior. too much".

But for the beleaguered defenders who are still retreating toward the end of the peninsula, the specter of North Korean victory remains all too real.

(End of this chapter)