The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 29
As the initial euphoria over intervening in North Korea subsided, the national security establishment began to reflect soberly on America's obligations.On July 1950, 7, the CIA presented a more pessimistic assessment.Because the CIA was fledgling, small and still outnumbered by the intelligence agencies of the State and Defense Departments, it played a minor role in key meetings where decisions to intervene were made.Now that the United States has entered the war, it finally has the opportunity to comment analytically, but its views are met with cold reception in either the State Department or the Defense Department.The CIA believed that, with the United States already involved in the war, "voluntary or forced withdrawal ... would be a disaster".America's foreign commitments will be broken, because allies will not believe that the United States will use military force to fulfill its promises, and friendly countries such as Iran and Indochina "may lose political control ... or be forced to seek reconciliation with the Soviet Union."The United States is facing a series of explosive events provoked by the Soviet Union, because "if the Soviet Union does not assess the seriousness of the risk of global war, it will continue to instigate limited aggression similar to the North Korean incident. . . . encourage rather than prevent the Soviet Union from provoking limited war elsewhere.”

In the eyes of the CIA, a retreat would likely provoke a strong reaction from the Soviets.The analysis report pointed out: "The United States should carry out internal mobilization to support the intervention of the United States and the United Nations in North Korea, instead of mobilizing after the withdrawal, which is much more beneficial politically and psychologically." If the United States withdraws and then implements partial mobilization , "then the Soviet leader was more likely to expect war to be directed against the Soviet Union, without considering whether the mobilization of the United States was to support a United Nations intervention in Korea. If the Soviet Union expected a global war, it would likely attack The U.S. preemptively strikes."

Ray Klein, the CIA's China analyst at the time (retired as deputy director in 1969), like many rank-and-file CIA officials, supported Truman's decision to intervene, calling it a "courageous stroke" , is imperative.But Klein has reservations about the steps the government is taking. “Decisions were made without a series of rigorous analyses,” he said. “It became a pre-emptive thing.”

At the time, the CIA's main job was to look for signs that the Soviets would attack in response to American intervention.Signs of a country's readiness for war are the destruction of archives in foreign embassies and the evacuation of essential personnel, women and children. (A classic example of intelligence delay: In the early hours of Dec. 1941, 12, FBI agents observed smoke rising from the courtyard of the Japanese embassy in Washington, D.C. The Japanese were apparently destroying large quantities of documents. Surveillance officers made notes. When he sent By the time of the report, Japanese aircraft had already destroyed the main body of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.) As the crisis in North Korea intensified, the CIA and FBI kept a close eye on Soviet diplomatic missions around the world.Agents have amassed a large collection of odds and ends:

——At 7:4 p.m. on July 10th, agents noticed "thick smoke billowing from the Soviet Legation in Havana and the smell of burning paper."Prior to this, "a box containing six Leica 30mm cameras was brought into the legation, suggesting that microphotographing may have been done before burning the documents".

— On July 7, personnel from the Soviet Consular and Cultural Relations Office in Tokyo were "observed packing up personal belongings."

— On July 7, the FBI reported that at the Soviet embassy campsite in Woodland Beach, Maryland, across the Chesapeake Bay, "the women were told to attend a meeting at the embassy the following evening."In addition, according to the source, Boris Sokolov, first secretary of the Soviet embassy and member of the Far East Committee, heard the sound of hammers being tapped "at his home in Northwest Washington", possibly packing or packing .

- CIA agents report that in the past 6 weeks Soviet ambassadors to Washington, France, Japan, Turkey, India, Syria-Lebanon, Siam (Thailand), Poland and Czechoslovakia have returned home.

Neither the CIA nor its director, Rear Admiral Hillen Cote, analyzed these unconnected situations, but put them together and sent them to the White House.President Truman watched and grew angry: "I think the CIA is an intelligence agency, not a bulletin board." He called General Marshall.Marshall, who served as Army chief of staff during World War II and later as secretary of state, was retiring on his family's farm near Leesburg, Virginia.Truman said: "I really want to find another person to run the CIA. What do you think?" Marshall said let him "think about it."As a result, until mid-September, Marshall never had the opportunity to make a recommendation.During this period, the CIA received little attention from Truman.

Insufficient troops
At the time, Truman and his advisers were too preoccupied with more pressing issues to keep intelligence in check. On July 7, MacArthur cabled Washington, acknowledging that four divisions would not be enough to stop the North Koreans, and he demanded four more divisions be sent "with all available means of transportation without delay."The telegram stunned the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for MacArthur had doubled the number when, just two days earlier, he had suggested that four divisions would be sufficient.The Joint Chiefs of Staff could not ignore this basic strategic calculation: If all of MacArthur's demands were met, the entire U.S. Army would go to war in Korea, leaving no soldiers in Western Europe or the American continent to defend. The hasty judgment made in late June always looked like a far-fetched decision.At least one of the chiefs of staff, Army Chief of Staff General Collins, wished he had spoken out against intervention.

However, the uncooked rice was ripe, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had nothing to do.The plight of North Korea was described by MacArthur so seriously that the chiefs of staff felt that they had no choice but to collect as many soldiers as possible for him and airlift them to North Korea as soon as possible.

They began by drawing from the General Reserve (the last available emergency force based on the elite 101st Airborne Division) the technical officers and unsuspecting officers who normally train recruits, reservists, and conscripts. Commissioned officer.Cadres, as the military calls them, are servicemen who pass on their experience to recruits and prepare them for combat.In the month from June 6 to July 25, the number of general reserves fell from 7 to 25.Even that number is questionable, with 14 of the 9 remaining in the strategic reserve engaged in basic administrative and clerical duties to keep the army running.Transferring MacArthur personnel therefore meant removing about half of the combat and support units from the general reserve.

The only solution to the undefended country is to restore conscription.Coincidentally, on June 6, less than two weeks before hostilities began, the Selective Service Act expired.When war broke out, Congress hastily extended the statute for a year, which provided the legal basis for conscription.

At the same time, Congress authorized Truman to call National Guard individuals and units to active duty, which Truman did not want.Part of Truman's reluctance to use the National Guard was due to political considerations. In the words of military analyst Colonel Roy Flint: "The federalization of the National Guard is a politically sensitive operation. Its forces Subordinate to the states and their governors, mainly responsible for internal policing and general mobilization, part of the mobilization is none of their business."

Congress, however, favored federalizing the National Guard to avoid expanding the size of the standing army, fearing peace would be weighed down by a large military force.However, North Korea's success has made these disputes empty talk. On July 7, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson ordered the mobilization of four National Guard divisions and two regimental combat teams.

不过，征兵是获取兵源最迅速的途径。各兵役局已有18个月未征集任何人服现役，但他们一直在把刚满18岁的年轻人登记入册。现在国防部下令征兵：9月征兵5万，10月征兵5万，11月7万。海军陆战队征召了4.7万名官兵；海军3.9万名。为了让更多的军人去作战，国防部还雇用了23万平民从事原先由军人担任的工作。

While the American public largely supports intervention in North Korea—as many as two-thirds, according to an August Gallup poll—young people generally do not enlist in the military.Major General Lewis Hershey, director of the Service Bureau, put it succinctly: "Everyone wants to get out, and nobody wants to come in." The biggest grievances were among National Guardsmen and reservists, all of whom served in World War II, and many Already a husband and father.Why, they asked, did they fight for the young?
One answer: They already enjoy reservist and National Guard salaries and benefits, and the possibility of a comfortable retirement once their service is complete.Many people think of Reserve "missions" as a kind of weekend entertainment.Said one unsympathetic MP: "They've been taking government money for years, they've been playing soldiers, and they don't know why Uncle Sam is so generous - it's for some kind of grown-up Scout camp?"

Young people also do everything possible to avoid conscription.Some enlisted in the Reserves and National Guard, intending to opportunistically escape mobilization.Others decide suddenly in midsummer to apply for college, knowing that the draft will mostly not interrupt their studies.

But Truman realized that the military needed much more than a handful of conscripts and reservists assigned to the federal government.Given the unforeseen circumstances that the United States will have to face in the coming months, the nation must prepare for war. On July 7, he delivered a jaw-dropping address to Congress.He asked for $19 billion in emergency military appropriations (the FY 100 budget passed on July 7 was only increased by $1 billion), wanted the removal of the 1951 military personnel cap, and authorized him to increase military and economic aid to struggling Allied forces , implementing a series of wide-ranging economic and procurement programs, raising taxes to pay for defense, and acquiescing to government control of strategic industries.

Even Republican lawmakers stood and cheered when the congressional staff read the message to Congress on the day that a wave of public support for the war was in the ascendant. Time magazine reported: "Republicans are ahead of Democrats, eager to give President Truman everything he thinks he needs to win the Korean War and prepare for the next North Korea -- whenever and wherever it reappears. "In a few days, Truman got $110 billion, more than he asked for.The Pentagon is authorized to increase the total number of servicemen and women to 320 million.Newly-elected Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas summed up the national mood in an impassioned speech.North Korea, he shouted, would go down in history "as the slaughterhouse of democracy or the graveyard of invaders."Another congressman, Irving Brewster of Maine, proposed to allow MacArthur to use the atomic bomb at his own discretion.As a result, Truman gained economic powers, including: rationing and restricting credit, being in charge of the distribution of strategic materials, controlling prices and wages, and other powers, which were comparable to those exercised by President Roosevelt during World War II.

In the space of a month, the United States has begun to reverse the tendency of the past five years to neglect its armaments.The machine that won World War II was rusting, but by the end of the summer, it was running again.MacArthur had bought the time he needed, and now a large army was on his way.

Visit MacArthur
Now that Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to place the vast majority of the U.S. Army forces under MacArthur's command, they decided in mid-July that they needed to learn more before trying to satisfy him that he was clearly unable to fill up both manpower and equipment. appetite.To this end, Generals Collins and Vandenberg, accompanied by staff officers, flew to Tokyo to meet with MacArthur, General Walton Walker and their subordinates.

MacArthur impressed Collins with "poise and poise".MacArthur, as usual, was pacing up and down while talking.“He always gave me the impression that he was speaking not just to the people in front of him, but to a large, invisible audience,” Collins said.

Today (they met on July 7), MacArthur no longer sees the North Korean army as a disorganized and poorly trained rabble from the East.Instead, North Korean soldiers were "tough opponents well commanded" who blended Japanese infiltration skills with Russian World War II tank tactics.The North Koreans were able to mobilize, march, and attack organically at night, something even MacArthur admitted he "never was able to do."The ability of the North Koreans to use tanks has reached almost "the level of the Soviet army."

MacArthur defended Far East Command's intelligence agencies for failing to predict North Korea's intentions and South Korea's combat capabilities.North Korea has duped him by splitting its power in two.One is the regional border patrol force, which is not much different from the South Korean army, but the North Koreans have assembled an offensive field force in the rear in an "extremely secretive" way.

MacArthur went on to say that what he had done so far had been a "defensive maneuver of the rear . . . putting all the forces in Japan into the fight."He understood the nature of these troops "designed for occupation and not for war," but he threw them into battle "as quickly as possible."The same is true for the Air Force, even guiding heavy bombers to cover infantry, "it is all unconventional."

Subsequently, MacArthur turned the topic to his long-term strategy.He needed troops and fast, and the extent to which he lost or delayed his victory "will depend directly on the speed with which the United States sends reinforcements." "August will bring in the largest force from Japan - and if the United States goes all out from here on, victory is unquestionable."

Then, he talked about another possibility.His argument angered members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in later months: If he did not receive "full ... support ... the consequences would vary and depend directly on the degree of support received."If MacArthur's opinion is sought, his opinion is:

Timing is of the essence in this matter.The speed at which you move your troops will measure the strength of your strikes.Admittedly, we have a bad hand here, but long-term experience has shown that...in the long run, what counts is: watch how you play your bad hands, not your good hands.

(End of this chapter)