The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 30
MacArthur would "seize any ship in the Pacific and send reinforcements and supplies to the Far East."He will not "start cautiously", but "go all out from the beginning".As MacArthur put it: "Do the trick, and to hell with that notion."

In his eloquent speeches, he also expressed a desire to go beyond Truman's and the United Nations' directives to expel North Korean troops and restore peace in South Korea.According to the minutes of the meeting: "He wished to destroy North Korea and cut off any possible aid from 'Manchuria' or China—he was certain that reinforcements would be poured in, but he also believed that reinforcements could be stopped by moderate bombing. He Convinced that the Soviets would not intervene in the war at this time, although he thought they would be doing their best in the dark."

MacArthur recognized the responsibilities of the United States in the rest of the world.But he was "convinced that a victory here would delay the Communists' advance on other fronts."He explained by analogy that if a city is divided into four districts, the first district is the most important, and the fourth district is insignificant. "If a fire in the fourth district cannot be extinguished because you leave the fire-fighting equipment for the first district, by the time you get the equipment to the first district, you will find that the fire is out of control." (Washington's Visitors do not need to use notes to understand the meaning of the analogy: the Far East is District [-], Europe is District [-].)
MacArthur ended his high-spirited speech, and then answered questions.General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, asked about the possibility of the Chinese Communist Party intervening in the war. "Do you envision stopping them at the North Korean border, or US troops entering 'Manchuria'?"

"I will stop them in North Korea," MacArthur replied, "in North Korea, I envisage a way to kill the enemy. 'Manchuria' and Vladivostok (Vladivostok) and the only passage between North Korea There are many tunnels and bridges. I think the atomic bomb has a magical effect here, and it takes them six months to repair it just by blowing it up."

"Maybe with a rotation approach and a bigger role for my B-29s (which we'll return to the Air Force), we can isolate the Korean peninsula."

General Collins asked when MacArthur could launch a counteroffensive and how many troops would need to remain in Korea after these operations were completed.

Although MacArthur believed that the situation could be "stabilized" once the three divisions arrived, he said he could not give a definitive answer.He repeatedly emphasized his intention to wipe out the North Korean Army.He said that once the front line stabilized:
My purpose is to infiltrate north and pursue any retreat of North Korean troops.In order to conduct an amphibious operation, we will need reinforcements.

My goal is to annihilate, not repel, the North Korean army.It may be necessary for me to occupy all of North Korea.The question after the above actions is the reconstruction and unification of Korea (of course, this is all speculation at this point).

Again, MacArthur's words went far beyond the authority granted by Truman and the UN Security Council.Nevertheless, neither Generals Collins nor Vandenberg expressed dissent.When they reported to Truman after returning to Washington, they agreed with MacArthur that the Busan bridgehead could be held, but urged "immediate reinforcements."

Yet at the same time, the U.S. Army suffered some of the worst defeats in its long history.

The Fall of an American Battalion

Of the many disasters that befell the U.S. Army in July 1950, the 7rd Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, was perhaps the hardest hit, its demise proving in excruciating fashion how poorly trained and equipped Soldiers going into battle inevitably lead to disaster.More precisely, this "regiment" that was originally performing security duties in Okinawa should be called a battalion, because it only reached about half of the 3-strong establishment.Nevertheless, in mid-July, the unit was ordered to leave for Japan and was guaranteed six weeks of training before being transferred to North Korea.

No doubt the regiment needed some preparation.Soldiers spend little time in field training, some of whom know only by hearsay how to operate the Army's basic weapon, the M-1 rifle.As a garrison force, they only dealt with daily public affairs and public security. No one in the Far East Command had ever thought of using the hundreds of troops on this occupied island, because they really couldn't be numbered.

MacArthur's sudden need for troops—any troops would do—brings attention to the 29th. At noon on July 7, a transport ship sailed into Okinawa and brought 20 untrained recruits to supplement the regiment.The recruits were only allowed to remove their toiletry items from the boats, and they marched in scattered formation to the supply depot, where they were replenished with the regiment's only 400st and 1rd Battalions.Quartermasters issued them weapons and field equipment.A few hours later, they returned to the transport ship and headed to North Korea instead of heading to the training ground in Japan as originally promised.

Officers strongly objected.Maj. Tony Rebow, acting commander of the 3rd Battalion, complained to his Eighth Army superiors that most soldiers had only eight weeks of basic training, leaving few with combat skills.After hard work, he got permission from Colonel Alan McLean, Assistant Director of the Eighth Army G-8 (Operations Division), to undergo a three-day intensive training in Busan before entering the battle.

Promises are quicker to come and quicker to cancel.After the troops arrived in Pusan ​​on July 7, they were ordered to go to Jinju, the center of the war zone.Colonel Aaron MacLean was clearly under pressure from General Walton Walker—and Walker was constantly urged by MacArthur—so he was in no mood to consider the regimental commander's suspicions.As a result, the promised 24 weeks and 6 days of training never materialized.In contrast, the regiment's two battalions were pushed forward in a rush, with untested rifles and mortars, and .3 caliber machine guns still covered with a thick layer of protective oil.

The chiefs of staff of the armed services, informed of the development by telegrams to and from Tokyo, did nothing to prevent the movement of the troops, which every indication pointed to would be disastrous.

On July 7, just a few hours after reaching the front line, the 26rd Battalion entered a North Korean ambush near Hadong.Machine guns set up on both sides of a ravine swept across the U.S. troops. The officers frantically called for U.S. planes that could be seen overhead to bomb, but the radio failed and the plane flew away. No one noticed the tragedy on the ground. .American infantrymen scrambled across a deep 3-foot-wide creek in a deep ravine, throwing off their combat boots, clothing and even weapons in order to swim.North Korean soldiers rushed to the edge of the stream and wiped out a large number of Americans without haste.According to one survivor, "They came after us like they were shooting rabbits fleeing wildfire."

According to the roster, the 3rd Battalion entered combat with approximately 757 soldiers.When the U.S. military recaptured the Hedong area two months later, the death registration team found 313 dead American bodies, most of which were scattered along the riverside and in the rice fields.A North Korean prisoner confessed that his comrades also captured about 100 American prisoners.

MacArthur did tell the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he intended to trade blood and life for time (and space).This time, at the cost of the most brutal bloodshed, he threw into battle those inexperienced soldiers, their weapons were still coated with protective oil, and the army was completely disorganized.However, the Hadong Massacre, which killed more than 300 Americans, was nothing in the whole war, and even MacArthur never mentioned it in his memoirs.In this way, the United States did pay some of the price for cutting its military budget in the late 20s.

an unarmed army
The military officers in charge of preparing to transport the US divisions from Japan to North Korea were also troubled by the lack of military readiness.Troops lacked heavy weapons, ammunition, mortar tubes and tripods, trip wire flares, hand grenades, and even rifle clear rods.A typical example is the 35st Battalion, 1th Infantry Regiment, which is equipped with only one recoilless gun, which is the basic anti-tank weapon issued by infantry.The barrel of a machine gun is easily damaged by heat in a fierce battle, but the battalion did not have a spare barrel.Most of the M-1 rifles and M-1 carbines used by soldiers were not suitable for wartime use.

The condition of the vehicle was even worse.All vehicles are at least WWII vintage.Some of the trucks were so dilapidated that they wouldn't start themselves and had to be hauled into transport ships; their water tanks clogged and their engines overheated and burst at the slightest run; and old tires and inner tubes couldn't withstand North Korea's rough roads for long.Although North Korean maps show that major cities are connected by "roads," the name is misleading. North Korean roads are designed for ox carts, not modern military vehicles.Even the main highway from Busan to Seoul - the only way the United States would have to take it to retake the capital - is an unpaved, rocky, potholed road with steep shoulders.

The condition of General Walton Walker's troops is not much better than that of North Korea's roads.In the past 18 months, no recruits have been called up.As the postwar economy grew more optimistic, the Army was forced to recruit whatever recruits it could, with shorter service periods and lower mental and physical standards.When the Korean War broke out, 43 percent of the Army's active duty members of the Far Eastern Forces met only the lowest grades 4 and 5 on the Army's General Aptitude Test—a group of bumbling idiots referred to by training sergeants as wooden men or bald marksmen.Although Walker tried to hone the pampered soldiers who had been pampered during the occupation mission, by July 1950, no field exercises of battalion size had been held.Therefore, the regiments and divisions went to the battlefield without any coordinated combat training.

The army authorities have various explanations for this: the frequent movement of army officers and soldiers in peacetime; the lack of field training grounds in crowded Japan, and the loss of Japan's medieval road network if the army used tanks and other heavy vehicles; There was also a thought among the troops: the atomic bomb had rendered infantry useless—why would the United States have the ultimate weapon, why would infantry go into battle and shoot in the rain?

The attitude of these soldiers who went into battle was also hardly encouraging.Kim, a veteran Associated Press correspondent in Japan, was surprised when he interviewed the vanguard of the 24th Division arriving in North Korea.These young American soldiers almost unanimously admitted that they were reluctant to go to Korea to fight in Korea because they were nostalgic for the fun and easy life in Japan.One of the young lads said to Kim:

I just want to go back to my Sasebo Saidi in Japan.I lived with one of the prettiest baby moose you'll ever see for over two years.The place I was looking for was much better than Enid, Oklahoma, where I lived for 15 years.Someone cooks the meal, someone takes care of the washing, someone mends the socks, and someone obeys the order. I have become a MacArthur, no one contradicts me, and everything goes smoothly.Did you know you can pay $37 a month for all of this.I've never been that comfortable.

Of course, this feeling didn't last long.The ill-trained, frail young man from Oklahoma was about to do battle with enemies who weren't intoxicated by creature comforts.

The main reason for the poor quality of troop training should be attributed to MacArthur.MacArthur blamed the State Department in his memoirs for preventing the building of a strong South Korean army, but he kept silent about the poor quality of the American troops in Japan (he called them "my troops").He poured all his heart and soul into diplomatic and political details, always complaining about how the State Department and an unknown force called "Washington" disrupted his rhythm of life. Fulfill the basic duty of a military commander himself to oversee the condition of the troops.Due to his dereliction of duty, thousands of American youths paid a heavy price on the Korean battlefield.These uninstructed, innocent youths deserve better training from professional officers.

At the beginning of the war, Associated Press reporter Relman Morin encountered the medical plane carrying the wounded US soldiers back to Japan:

A black infantryman lay on a stretcher, moaning softly.A bearded American soldier, with his legs in splints, yelled hoarsely for water.A pale, dazed, fair-haired lad murmured, "He's covered in bugs. He's just lying there covered in bugs. Oh my god, these bugs... ..."

Morin noticed that many people in Tokyo were saying that the occupying forces were "baptized" in combat, in military terms, that they were gaining combat experience.But as Morin writes: "Officers at headquarters used the word more than soldiers in the field."

The Far East Command scoured for soldiers and equipment.Clerks, cooks, yard repairmen, chaplain's assistants, officer's assistants, they were all ordered to leave their posts, pick up their rifles, pack their field gear, and board the plane or ship.MacArthur also ordered a general to clean up military internment camps, where detainees were "reinstated" and sent off to fight.Many soldiers who had committed crimes awaiting trial were acquitted because witnesses were suddenly on the front lines.In order to expedite the processing of the case, the Ministry of the Army authorized the Chief of the Military Police of the Eighth Army to decide to release the prisoner without following the framework of the Army Regulations.The quest, officially called "Operation Drive," resulted in a total of 8 soldiers heading to North Korea.

事实证明，为第8集团军装备作战物资，跟准备一个酝酿良久的家庭野餐的物品清单没有什么不同。运输清单上有一些鲜为人知的部队番号：第95兽医食品检验分队、第55工兵应急桥梁连、第8080陆军邮政部队、第56陆军军乐队，每支部队都为战争效力。要求供应的种类也无奇不有：第8集团军的财务部门要求生产15个野战保险柜，供第179财务出纳处使用，“这样克莱因斯少校就可以用它们运送钞票”（发给部队）；阵亡登记队要求4套指纹印用品和100把锁；军需部门要领25把锁用来锁仓库；信号团申请44.4吨干电池。

The troops already on the battlefield sent a telegram, asking not to forget the supplies available for enjoyment in a hurry: "The quartermaster wants to send 2.5 boxes of beer to North Korea, of which 1 boxes need to be shipped immediately." This is one per person per day. The number of jars required. (Supply officials in Tokyo shopped around and found a brewer who promised to "supply 2.15 cases of beer immediately at $10 a case.") "Reading for recreation" was shipped to North Korea in seven crates, each containing "a set" of 7 paperback books, 25 sets of magazines of 50 copies, and 22 sets of phonograph records in sets of 25.A supply official in Tokyo plans to buy 10 million bags of North Korean biscuits, each weighing 100 grams.After consultation with the health department of the Eighth Army, the quartermaster determined that the mobile ice factory to be established in Daegu would only need one tablespoon of calcium hypochloride to chlorinate every 250 pounds of ice produced.

Despite its haste to go to war, the U.S. Army has operated with undisputed efficiency as a well-trained machine.The question now is, can the United States' unrivaled material superiority be brought into full play before South Korea completely collapses?
U.S. military overbearing
Meanwhile, in Busan, U.S. military commanders have so disregarded South Korean sensitivities that their relationship with President Lee has broken down.The old man's dignity was bruised, and he was compelled to surrender the actual power of ruling the country to the Americans, living in a hut in Busan, and even his own people ignored him.But Syngman Rhee wanted to send telegrams as a gesture to U.N. member states that had promised to help.For convenience, he offered to have the telegram relayed by his embassy in Washington.However, North Korea's telephone and telegraph facilities, and even the commercial telegrams from Busan to Tokyo are controlled by the U.S. Army, and telegrams can only be sent with the permission of the military.

Syngman Rhee summoned Harold Noble of the American embassy to his temporary office and explained his intentions to him.Can Noble send a telegram to the South Korean embassy in Washington, D.C., from a military facility?
Noble thought the request was reasonable and took the message to the 24th Division Communications Office.A sergeant told him to send the telegram as soon as the military line became free.The next day Noble came to check that the telegram had been sent as promised.No hair.The division's press officer withheld the telegrams on the grounds that Rhee had criticized the Soviet Union in certain telegrams sent to other heads of state, "which contradicted the policies of the higher authorities and the exact instructions received by the division."

(End of this chapter)