The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 34
On the evening of Friday, August 8, Michael McDermott, the deputy press officer for the State Department, stood at the National Press Club building, sipping a drink and reading a newsletter on a tape receiver.He saw a message about a statement MacArthur had sent to the United States, which would be submitted to the Veterans of Foreign Wars Conference to be held next week.MacArthur's public relations officer forwarded copies of the statement to various publications, including U.S. News & World Report.The magazine's editors decided to publish the full statement, from which the Associated Press story was based.McDermott felt there was a policy problem.He tore the message off the machine and called Acheson immediately.Acheson replied that he would go to his country home immediately.

Acheson read MacArthur's statement, his beard trembling.This statement was a comprehensive criticism of the government's Far East policy.Acheson was particularly disgusted by one passage: "Nothing could be more absurd than the platitudes of those who preach appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific, who think that if we are to defend Taiwan, we are abandoning the Asian continent." MacArthur It is declared that the psychology of Orientals is to respect "leaders who are enterprising, decisive and energetic" and to oppose leadership characters that are "hesitant or timid".He concluded by saying that the Far East had been encouraged by the determination of the Americans to "hold" the strategic position of the United States in the Pacific, and that "any other course ... would push any future theater of operations 5 miles eastward to the American continent." coastal".

In Acheson's words: "Yes, we used to defend Taiwan. No one said we shouldn't defend Taiwan. The 7th Fleet is defending it there. It seems that before the Korean War, the government was completely Unnecessary blunder."

Early the next morning, Acheson spoke to Harriman and Dean Rusk about the news, and it was agreed that the matter should be reported to the President.Johnson also came to the White House."He was clearly very angry," Truman read over the statement.He said to Johnson: "I want this letter to be retracted. I want you to give MacArthur an order to retract this letter. This is my order. Do you understand?"

Johnson replied: "Yes, sir, I understand."

Truman continued: "Then do it, that's it."

Incredibly, as soon as Johnson arrived at his Pentagon office, he tried to find a way to revisit what had been done.He called Acheson to say that he had "been mulling over" the issue of ordering MacArthur to withdraw that statement because doing so "would cause great embarrassment."He and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had another idea: They would tell MacArthur that if he made that statement, "we (Johnson and the Joint Chiefs, obviously)" would issue a disclaimer, "declaring that it was just him." It is not the official policy of the government".

Acheson strongly disagreed. This matter "is already related to who is the president of the United States."What MacArthur said ran counter to the US policy toward Taiwan that had been announced by Truman and Warren Austin, the ambassador to the United Nations.Simply claiming that this statement is just a personal opinion would make the president and administration "completely confused" on these issues.Which parts of the statement are not official policy?How much did the government know before the statement was made? "There is no other way but for the president to maintain his authority."

Johnson asked Acheson if he thought "we're really going to telegraph MacArthur saying the President directed him to withdraw his statement."Acheson "sees no other way".

Johnson continued to argue.Acheson recalled:

He thought the president's order was unreasonable. You can't withdraw a letter that has been sent on the telegraph.I said, "Louis, don't argue with me about the merits of the president's order. I heard he gave you the order and you accepted it. Whether it works or not, you'd better do it. He wants the order delivered. MacArthur."

Johnson was still insisting on his point of view, and Acheson hung up the phone.

Throughout the day, the debate continued on the phone between Acheson, Johnson, and Harriman, occasionally joined by Johnson's deputy, Stephen Early.In Acheson's words: "Everyone knew that, at the very least, it was going to cause a big mess."

Harriman was aware of the consequences, which Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently did not want to say: "It could mean MacArthur's dismissal. But not doing so means that there will be endless troubles that can never be remedied."

As the controversy continued, word of Johnson's disloyalty reached the White House.In the afternoon the President called Johnson and dictated the exact wording he would send to MacArthur:
In view of the fact that many things related to Taiwan are contrary to the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations, the President of the United States of America has directed that you must withdraw your letter to the National Veterans of Foreign Wars Camp (Congress).

Johnson continued to hold his ground.He said in another conversation with Acheson that he, Early, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored alternative Johnson-style language that would negate "something" (unspecified) in the statement , and treat it as "only a personal statement, not from the US government".Early stated the technical impossibility of withdrawing a statement that had been widely disseminated by newswires and would appear in a national magazine already in print."Perhaps the president could talk to MacArthur on the phone," he suggested. Acheson rejected the idea: "It would put the president in a position of pleading. He wouldn't think it was wise." Acheson said , a written order must be issued, "cannot wait for a call to make a decision".

At this point, Harriman was so frustrated with Johnson's obstructionism that he suggested that they "go back to the President" and discuss it.However, MacArthur interrupted the debate.In a telegram received Saturday night, MacArthur said that if the president wanted him to retract the letter, he would do so.But, according to Acheson, he "didn't know what he was doing wrong. He thought he was stating government policy, and he didn't understand what was going on."

Looking back on the matter, Harriman believes that this episode set an important precedent for the tit-for-tat confrontation with MacArthur.He was forced to obey the president's orders, "this is what MacArthur has never experienced."

The result of this dispute was Johnson's resignation.Truman's first impulse was to remove Johnson immediately and nominate General Marshall to succeed him, but he found out that Marshall was on vacation in northern Michigan.When he called to find Marshall, the general's side was overheard by curious farmers in a country shop.So when Truman asked him to come to the White House, Marshall could only grunt and mumble.

The actual handling of Johnson was as muddled as the events that led to it.Truman's idea of ​​Marshall's replacement leaked to the New York Times, and the Secretary of Defense called the White House to find out.Truman said to him, "Come over around four o'clock and we'll talk."

"Louis came in refreshed and full of energy," Truman said that night. "He didn't know what was wrong. I sat him down and I said, 'Louis, I have to ask you to resign.'"

"He collapsed and was silent. He was sprawled on the chair and I thought he was going to pass out. He said: 'Mr. President, I can't talk.'"

Truman did what he could to appease Johnson's ego by not telling him the truth—that Johnson had been fired for incompetence and disloyalty.Truman said he "could no longer bear the pressure" of Johnson's resignation.

Johnson wanted to argue the matter, but Truman said to him, "Louis, I've made up my mind that it must be."

Johnson asked "for two days to think about it," and Truman agreed (although he had no intention of reversing his decision).When Johnson finally left, he was "really devastated," Truman told his press secretary, Charles Ross.

"I don't feel good about myself," the president said. "This is the hardest job I've ever had to do. I feel like I beat my daughter Margaret."

But the stupid Johnson still clings to his post. When he came to the White House for his weekly meeting on Tuesday, Sept. 9, and brought Air Force Secretary Thomas Finlater with him, Truman made no mention of resigning.But as soon as Johnson and Finlater left, Truman called Stephen Early and urged him to "get on with it and get this thing out of the way."Early and several other advisers wrote Johnson's letter of resignation for a cabinet meeting at 12 p.m.

The result is another branch.After the meeting, Johnson handed Truman his resignation letter.The letter was not signed.

"Louis," the President said, "you haven't signed it. Sign it."

Johnson broke down in tears as he scribbled his name. "I didn't think you'd let me do that."

That same day, Truman called General Marshall and asked the veteran to come back to replace Johnson.That night, Truman wrote in his diary that 32 years earlier, he had been a captain in the Army while Marshall was a staff officer under General John Pershing.Truman wrote: "September 1950, 9 . . . General Marshall and I switched roles, still working together to save this country and our way of life."

new ghost chief

When Johnson left office, Truman struck while the iron was hot, and in one fell swoop completed a long-suspended concern: the removal of the CIA director, Rear Admiral Hillen Cote.In its first three years, the CIA has performed poorly due to a lack of strong leadership.At the urging of General Marshall, Truman selected General Walter Biddle Smith as the new director of the CIA.Smith was General Eisenhower's chief of staff during World War II and later served as the U.S. ambassador to Moscow.

A scrawny, sickly man, Smith was a man of great intellect and managerial prowess, and was a highly respected, if not popular, figure in professional military circles.As Ray Klein, a CIA subordinate, said of Smith a few years later: "Beatle (his nickname) was a very consistent man, he was always angry." But Smith's presence in the CIA , which means that this ghost agency is no longer an orphan suffering from the cold reception of the military and the State Department.

(End of this chapter)