The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 35 The Last Stand (1)
Throughout July, the North Korean People's Army continued to hammer Walton Walker's Eighth Army, forcing it to retreat towards the end of the Korean boot peninsula, and the outside world saw that Walker's troops were losing ground.War correspondents reported that the North Koreans had adopted "crowd tactics" and that their forces had a 7:8 advantage on the battlefield.The black lines marking the battle lines in the daily newspaper battle maps always moved south.The British "Politician" published an article slamming Britain for sending a brigade of 4 people to fight in North Korea: "This nonsense can be stopped", "The United States should admit that its defeat is doomed, and stop pouring troops into this bottomless pit in Asia."The communist world was triumphant, as if the North Koreans had secured their victory, while the Soviet Union babbled sympathetically that "the US imperialist attempt to prevent the Korean people from striving for reunification, independence, and freedom has gone bankrupt."

But beyond the intricacies of appearances, certain clear trends bode well for Walker's forces.Most important was the rapid increase in the strength of the United Nations Army, which by July 7 was on par with North Korea in numbers—some 22 troops on both sides.The Eighth Army deployed three American divisions forward—the 9.5th, which was badly damaged in the first days of the fighting but was still fighting; the 8th; and the 3st Cavalry.A US Marine brigade of 24 men and a British brigade are on their way to the field.The South Korean army has rebuilt an army of about 25 through forced conscription.But the combat effectiveness of most South Korean soldiers is questionable—the catchers collect men and teenagers from the countryside and throw them into battle without training.

Along with these new units came the heavy equipment that Walker needed to fight the North Korean People's Army on a close basis - the first tanks were shipped in storage in Japan; self-propelled artillery, heavy mortars guns, ready-to-use radios.Considering the level of recruit training, Walker was far from ready to counterattack.But even if he retreats, he has a well-thought-out idea of ​​where to retreat and what to do after retreat.

Walker intends to establish a line of defense around the southernmost port of Pusan ​​and firmly hold it. Through this opening, his troops can continuously receive supplies of personnel and equipment.He could surrender all of North Korea to the North Korean People's Army, except for this area known as the Pusan ​​perimeter.The area here is 5000 square miles, and the 8th Army held here for 45 days and nights of desperate fighting, and both sides paid the relatively heavy price of casualties in the Korean War. From the evening of July 7st to August 31st, the last batch of troops of the 8th Army withdrew across the Nakdong River and dug trenches along the south bank to defend it.The siege of Pusan ​​lasted until mid-September, and it was not until General MacArthur landed behind enemy lines in Incheon that the tide of battle was turned.

Walker's main objective was to hold on to Pusan ​​and its environ- ment , and the terrain dictated a logical front for that hold: a rectangular strip about 50 miles wide, extending eastward from the Nakdong River to the Sea of ​​Japan, about 100 miles deep.The Nakdong River twists and turns, like a boa constrictor lying on the peninsula.Its downstream, which is of great importance to Walker, varies from a quarter to a half a mile in width and from 6 to 8 feet deep.On both sides of the Nakdong River are sandy riverbanks and rice fields in the valleys. On both sides of the riverbanks, mountains rise and command. The mountains on the east bank along the river towards Daegu are as high as 1 feet, and if they extend a few miles inland, they reach 200 feet. The North Koreans want to attack The west bank is also 2500-foot mountains.

From the end of July to the beginning of August, Captain Mike Lynch, the pilot of Walker's plane, flew him over the Nakdong River many times.Lynch said: "Walker has seen every corner of the Nakdong River. When the battle is on a certain high ground, Walker can immediately imagine the terrain there. This helped him a lot in defensive battles." In Walker's view , the Nakdong River is a huge natural barrier, guarding three-quarters of the Pusan ​​defense circle.

The way Walker deploys his defense comes from the basic textbook for the first year of West Point cadets. He will rely on the Nakdong River in front of him to fight instead of fighting with his back.He deployed his troops on the high ground overlooking the ferry and the road leading to the ferry.During the day (the North Koreans are reluctant to move in broad daylight due to U.S. air superiority), these defensive positions are little more than observation posts.After nightfall, they were reduced to sneak outposts or self-contained defensive strongholds, usually manned by half a squad—that is to say, about six soldiers.These forces are irresistible and irresistible when a superior force strikes, and they are merely an early warning detachment, responsible for reporting on enemy activity.Once they are attacked on a large scale, they immediately retreat to the main US military position.

The main force of the US military is guarding there.It's a fire brigade-style force, always ready to respond to alerts coming from ahead.In the rear position, artillery and mortar crews spent hours setting up artillery positions, ready to fire on known crossings and other possible landing sites, as well as high ground that the North Korean People's Army might occupy.The overall objective was to coordinate infantry and artillery to hold the commanding heights and control the mountains and the dusty easy roads between the rice fields.

The big picture on paper is always better than reality. In early August, U.S. and South Korean intelligence agencies collected disturbing estimates from across the Nakdong River: The North Korean People's Army had assembled at least 8 divisions of about 10 troops for an offensive.Army Chief of Staff General Lawton Collins, who was observing the readiness in Washington, realized: "If the enemy decides to attack with all his strength anywhere along the river, he will certainly be able to break through. The important task before the Americans and South Koreans is to implement counterattack and drive the North Koreans down the river, causing heavy casualties and loss of a lot of equipment." Whether the defense line of the Nakdong River is stable or not depends on whether Walker can reasonably mobilize his understaffed reserve team. Put it into battle at the right time.

unlucky team

Walker's immediate priority was to prevent North Koreans from entering Daegu, a city 55 miles north of Pusan, a road and rail hub with the only usable airport north of Busan.Walker doesn't want North Korean airstrikes to cause more chaos.The task of guarding Daegu was undertaken by the 25th Infantry Division commanded by Major General William Keene.General Collins described General Keene as a "loyal, dependable, indomitable soldier with a steady character".He served as chief of staff under General Omar Bradley in World War II, fighting in North Africa and Europe.Although he had been an active duty officer for 31 years (he graduated from West Point in 1919), the 25th Division was his first combat unit command.

Walker ordered Keene to form a position north of Daegu to prevent the North Koreans from sweeping the Nakdong River valley.Keen led his troops to the place overlooking Sangju City.Sangju is a hub of mountain roads in that region, located 45 miles north of Daegu in the Nakdong River valley.There, what the U.S. military saw was a chaotic scene. Refugees and fleeing South Korean soldiers mixed together to form a dusty flow of people.

On July 7, the 20th Infantry Division went into battle.The first task, guarding the small town of Liquan, was undertaken by the 25th Infantry Regiment—an all-black force formed by an act of Congress in 24.The 1878th Infantry distinguished itself in the war against the Indians in the 19s and 80s, but since then the unit has fallen prey to the racism that prevails in the U.S. military.Soldiers were used for service jobs, ridiculed and scorned by other troops, and treated as "secondary soldiers" no matter how well they behaved.Therefore, the attitude of most people in the regiment was: these guys don't treat us as human beings, why should we go to die for them?What happened in the first few months of the 24th Regiment's entry into the government showed how absurd the segregation of troops was, and it also accelerated the mixing of black troops with other troops, so that black soldiers were treated like other soldiers.

On the first day of the battle at Liquan, the 24th Regiment suffered from bad luck.After fighting for only a few hours, the troops fled in a panic.Officers claimed they had encountered the overwhelmingly superior North Korean People's Army.But the next day, a reconnaissance unit found no sign that the North Koreans had been to Liquan, which had apparently been hit by American artillery fire.An inquiring commander of the 35th Infantry on the flank complained that he was "not getting valuable information" from a battalion commander of the 24th.

In the next few days, the officers and subordinates of the 24th regiment did not regain confidence.As the 2nd Battalion advanced along a mountain road, it was suddenly attacked by a light mortar and one or two automatic weapons.The accompanying South Korean military officer thought it might be a small roadblock and suggested a detour, but the commander obviously didn't understand what he meant, and the U.S. military retreated "in a mess".It was not until the battalion commander arrived that the "shocked" soldiers were calmed down. (The next day, a South Korean force swept the barricade, capturing two light machine guns, a mortar and more than 2 guerrillas.)
Two days later, South Korean forces moved east to outflank the North Koreans advancing south along the coast.Only the 24th Regiment was left alone to defend the road into Sangju from the west.By any standard, the 24th had once again brought on itself a disgrace.The Army's official sources, while reluctant to criticize troops or individuals, write:
第24步兵团在尚州以西几乎所有的战斗中，都蔓延着惊慌的情绪。士兵们擅离阵地，溜向后方。他们把武器丢弃在阵地上。有一次，第3营从一座高地撤下来时，扔掉了12挺0.30口径的机枪和3挺0.50口径的机枪、8门60毫米迫击炮、3门81毫米迫击炮、4支3.5英寸火箭发射筒以及102支步枪。

On another occasion, Company L entered position (at the front) with 4 officers and 105 enlisted men.When the company withdrew from the position a few days later, only 17 men remained in the foxhole.During this period, only 1 officer and 17 soldiers left the position due to casualties and other reasons.Three officers and 3 soldiers are missing.

On the way down the mountain, the retreating team of 17 soldiers continued to expand. When they reached the foot of the mountain, they already had 1 officer and 35 soldiers.

The tactic of the 24th Regiment was to stand firm during the day and escape at night. During the daytime on July 7, North Korean mortar fire continued, and there was an "inexplicable panic" among the soldiers of the 29st Battalion, and they fled overnight.Only a field artillery battalion and an engineer company remained in the position—mainly thanks to an incredible 1 howitzer rounds, most of which were fired directly at the North Koreans, and they held the position that night.

The officers of the regiment, disgusted by this, finally established checkpoints behind the lines.Regimental personnel officer Major John Woolridge stopped any vehicles leaving Sangju.He intercepted an average of 75 deserters every day, and caught 150 deserters in the most day.

By 7 July, the 30th had withdrawn to the last line of defense just 24 miles west of Sangju.Knowing that the regiment was doomed, Keene ordered a battalion of the 3th Infantry into position behind the regiment.The next day, the North Koreans attacked again, targeting the security positions in front of the main position.

The company commander, Lieutenant Leon Gilbert of Yorkshire, Pennsylvania, who was guarding the security position, fled timidly, followed by 15 soldiers.Colonel Houghton White, the regimental commander, and other officers ordered Gilbert to return to his position, but Gilbert refused, saying he was terrified.A non-commissioned officer returned to the position with the soldiers.

The 24th has never been able to wash away its reputation as a "runaway" unit - a name American soldiers like to give to units that are prone to collapse.A year later, the armbands of the 24th Regiment on military uniforms will also attract ridicule from other troops, and sometimes a sarcastic ditty "Rock and Roll":
Chinese mortars roar,

The gentlemen of the 24th regiment ran away. ...

The performance of the 24th regiment accelerated the pace of mixing whites and blacks.General Lawton Collins pointed out: "Negro soldiers, provided they are well trained and completely mixed with their white comrades, can be equally brave and good at fighting, and can be treated as equals."

Private First Class William "Willie" Thompson from New York City in the heavy machine gun company of the 3rd Battalion of the regiment. In early August, during a battle in the high mountains north of Pusan, two other companies of the battalion panicked in the exchange of fire and fled hastily.One officer later said he had been knocked down three times by soldiers from his company's rout.Not so with Thompson.When his company was ambushed by the enemy in the assembly area, he set up a machine gun and fired violently at the attacking enemy.The platoon leader ordered to withdraw to a more favorable position, and Thompson continued to shoot and cover the retreat.A sergeant tried to pull him off his machine gun, but he pushed him away.

He said: "I may not be able to break through, so I must kill a few more to pay for my life."

As the rest of the platoon scrambled to safety, they still heard the click of Thompson's machine gun, followed by the explosion of a North Korean grenade.His gunshots died away quickly.A year later, the War Department posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor to Private First Class William Thompson, Company M, 24th Infantry.

Tactics of the North Koreans

After a month of fighting, the fledgling U.S. troops had learned a bit about the deviant tactics of the North Koreans.

——The enemy soldiers stripped off their clothes and covered themselves in mud, trying to sneak into the American positions.

- 10 enemy groups of 8 soldiers attack first and then feign surrender by raising their hands.When the Americans stopped firing and came out to accept the surrender, "a company-sized North Korean force attacked from a concealed position."

——North Korean troops of more than 50 people launched a suicide attack.While the American soldiers concentrated fire on this force, other enemy units took the opportunity to outflank the attack.

-Many North Korean soldiers carried civilian clothes (a white pajama-like southern traditional attire) that they took off when they didn't want to be seen, or wanted to hide in supposedly friendly villages.

The North Koreans took advantage of the chaos to send psychological warfare experts into the south.The emphasis of the propaganda varies according to the circumstances of the battle.For example, in early August three themes were emphasized: North Koreans have taken Busan; , because they are here to liberate you, to bring you freedom."The North Koreans invented a primitive visual identification system that allowed their plainclothes agents to recognize each other.For example, in the Chungcheong area, male agents have to tie a white bandage with blue ink on the little finger of their left hand.The female spy will wear a black jacket and shirt, and carry a white cloth and two apples with her.

Relying on their superior weaponry, the North Koreans pressed on against the American and South Korean defenders, slowly squeezing them into the Pusan ​​perimeter.In mid-August, however, intelligence analysts, while studying the interrogation records of North Korean prisoners of war, discovered a serious weakness in the enemy—a problem that will become even more apparent as the United States marshals its forces for a counteroffensive.

Some North Korean POWs were as young as 16 years old; "a large number of recruits" were recruited in early 1950 who received only four to six weeks of basic training before being assigned to combat companies; Basic training was also dispensed with; shooting training was "extremely limited".

(End of this chapter)