The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 38 Incheon Gambling Win (1)
General Douglas MacArthur's strategic success in World War II was entirely dependent on his island-crossing offensive campaign. He used the Marine Corps and Army troops to conduct sudden amphibious operations, bypassing more obvious attack points, and seizing the enemy's rear islands.As mentioned earlier, MacArthur had the same idea immediately on his first field visit to Korea, five days after the war broke out, as a means of defeating his new adversary.As he later expressed it, the idea came to him over the course of 20 minutes, standing on a high ground watching the rout of South Korean troops fleeing south across the Han River.As the North Koreans advance south of the peninsula, their supply lines will be stretched dangerously.Strikes in the North Korean rear would allow the United States to "encircle and destroy the main force with very few troops."

MacArthur was so enamored with his idea that, upon his return to Tokyo, he ordered his staff to proceed with plans for an amphibious landing "near Seoul," without specifying a specific landing site.It's July 7th.By July 4, the staff had drawn up the "Blue Heart Action" plan.The plan would see U.S. forces land at the port of Incheon, about 7 miles west of Seoul, on July 10, where the Army's 7st Cavalry Division would launch an attack.

On the surface, the "Blue Heart Action" is absurd.With few U.S. troops in North Korea at the time and fighting for survival, it would have been impossible to extract another landing force from this small force; and it would have been impossible to organize the logistics of such an operation over a period of 18 days In order to prepare for this, the Navy would have to find and repair rusty landing craft, and convert the ships of the sea military convoy into ships capable of amphibious landings; As one Marine Corps officer explained to MacArthur's staff: "Amphibious landings are not the same as bringing some ships into a port and boarding the docks. Without adequate preparation, we will die on the beach."

Yes, the 1st Marine Brigade was on its way to Asia, and its officers and soldiers knew amphibious tactics, but the Marine Corps officers asked a lot of questions about Operation Blue Heart.What are the tides and beachhead conditions like in Incheon?The rough information at hand shows that the tide there is very strong, with a tide head as high as 35 feet, and there are high stone walls on the shore.The Marines have been outspoken about their disapproval of Operation Blue Heart.

The reality made MacArthur's dream shattered. He gave up "Operation Blue Heart", but he did not give up the idea of ​​amphibious landing.He told his staff to continue planning, pushing back the date of action by a few months. On July 7, the staff proposed a plan called "Operation Chrome Ferro", which had several options: landing at Incheon, while the Eighth Army attacked from the Pusan ​​defensive circle and attacked north; landing at Gunsan, It is also on the west coast; or lands near Juwenjin on the east coast.Both the Far East Command staff and MacArthur were in favor of landing at Incheon, although Navy and Marine Corps officers were skeptical.MacArthur telegraphed Washington on July 23:
The operation planned for mid-September was to carry out an amphibious landing behind the enemy's front with a corps of two divisions, with the aim of encircling and destroying the enemy in coordination with the 9th Army's attack from the south.I firmly believe that early and strong action behind the enemy's lines will cut off his main lines of communication and enable us to deal a decisive and crushing blow to the enemy.The other alternative, a frontal attack, could only result in a protracted and costly campaign.

MacArthur had defined his strategy, he now needed the army to implement it.

mission of the marines
striding in his office one morning in early July, speaking and gesticulating in front of a large map of North Korea, General MacArthur was addressing his guest, Commander of the Marine Corps, Pacific Fleet, Lemuel Jr. Lieutenant General Sheppard made a speech.This Marine Corps is ready for amphibious operations.

"Lyme," MacArthur said, "if I have the 1st Marine Division, I'm going to land here in Incheon."

Sheppard took a few steps forward, looked at the map, and carefully considered the question MacArthur raised.A brigade of the 1st Marine Division was already on its way to North Korea, and Shepard had hurried to Japan to find out what the mission was.As Shepard puts it: "We don't want to send a brigade with arms and legs attached to any Army division and send it there."

Shepard liked MacArthur's invasion plan of roundabout surrounding the North Koreans.He served under MacArthur during World War II and was as interested in amphibious operations as MacArthur was.Sheppard saw this as an opportunity for the Marine Corps to make a big difference in the Korean War.

"General, why didn't you ask to send them?" Sheppard was referring to the 1st Marine Division.

MacArthur waved to the Marine and said, "Sit down and write a telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for me, requesting that the 1st Marine Division be sent to the theater under my command."

The request shocked Shepard. "I was looking at MacArthur's desk -- it was a huge desk -- and the big chair where he wanted me to sit and write an unwritten telegram to the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Sheppard De had to think to himself: "This is a tricky telegram. I'm here asking for a division of Marines to be sent to North Korea, and the (Marine Corps) commander doesn't know what I'm doing here. I'm here. Hell, but the ball was in my hands and I felt I had to run with it."

MacArthur had another problem.He intended to start Operation Incheon on 9 September, 15 days later.Will Shepard be able to fill up the division and ship it to North Korea?

Shepard considered the request carefully.He knew the formation of the 1st Marine Brigade, which was largely drawn from the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, leaving the division with less than a regiment left.Making it fully staffed means recruiting hundreds of men from factories, villages, towns and college campuses, outfitting them with full gear and shipping them 6000 miles away.

It could be done, Shepard replied, and he could get the division on time for the counterattack.

But a few days later, some other people who visited MacArthur were not very optimistic about the Incheon plan.Army Chief of Staff General Collins and Air Force Chief of Staff General Vandenberg made a special trip to Tokyo to listen to MacArthur's views.Collins is outspokenly skeptical.When he heard that MacArthur wanted to add two more divisions to the already promised troops, he couldn't help shaking his head.

"General," he said, "you will have to use your troops in Japan and Korea to win this war."

MacArthur shook his head with a smile and said, "Joe, you're going to have to change your mind."

The next day, Collins once again warned MacArthur's aides at a staff meeting that the resources of the United States were insufficient. "Don't be too extravagant," he said.

Collins found the naval commander, Admiral James Doyle, to be less than enthusiastic about the Incheon landings.When Collins asked about landing in an area with a tidal range of 35 feet, Doyle replied: "It was extremely difficult, and there were considerable early losses when coming ashore, but it was doable. "

Years in the military had given Collins an ear for the evasion.What Doyle was implying was that, while he was not prepared to argue with MacArthur—not at this stage anyway—Operation Chrome was a reckless plan.However, if he is ordered to do it, he will do it.

After a quick visit to the battlefield, Collins met with MacArthur again, this time in private.He thought it possible to move a whole division of Marines to the Far East, but he still had doubts about landing at Incheon, mainly because of the high swell there.

MacArthur did not get to the bottom of this issue at the time.He'd already had hints of sending him Marines.Once he gets the Marines into theater, he'll be back to deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Incheon.

Doubts abound at the Joint Chiefs of Staff

However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded indifferently to MacArthur's request to transfer the 1st Marine Division.This hostility to the Marine Corps was no less hostile to the Incheon landing plan.General Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a two-footed veteran with a lot of dissatisfaction with the Marine Corps.In a congressional budget hearing in October 1949, he said bluntly that the time of the Marine Corps was over and that "there would never again be . . . large-scale amphibious operations."In his speech, Bradley touched on the inter-service rivalry that the National Security Act's joint-service provisions failed to resolve, saying "this is not the time for those 'flashy athletes' playing in the They don't go all out in every game unless they hit first base." New York Times reporter William White wrote: "The senior officers in the Navy and Marine Corps were the ones who were the target of Bradley's harsh words, and they listened. "Sitting pale and furious at one of the most amazing reproaches ever delivered to a senior officer from such a rostrum." (MacArthur dismissed Bradley, a continuation of World War II rivalry between the European and Pacific theaters. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he told a visitor, was "a dirty farmer." He told General Marshall Disapprovingly, saying "his aristocratic Virginia squeamish nose can't stand the stench of Asia day in and day out.")
In any case, Bradley and General Vandenberg, another Navy and Marine Corps foe in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now have the opportunity to witness their predictions that the two services will "be gone."Surprisingly, even the representative of the Navy, Admiral Sherman, was skeptical.Costing the entire Marine Corps to bring the 1st Marine Division back to combat would seriously impair the service's ability to perform its other duties.He was referring specifically to the Atlantic Fleet Marine Corps, stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.So the Joint Chiefs of Staff told MacArthur on July 7 that he could not get the 20st Marine Division until November.

How could MacArthur tolerate this situation!In an exasperated telegram on 7 July, he reiterated his plea for the division to be dispatched quickly.He argued, "It is unlikely that there will be a need to use this force elsewhere, which is consistent with the urgency with which this force is considered for urgent combat missions."

After several rounds of telegrams, the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually backed down.They would transfer the Marine Division to MacArthur, but this did not include the Marine Brigade that was going to North Korea-in fact, the brigade was equivalent to two-thirds of the division.MacArthur could now start seriously planning for the Incheon landings, but the Marine Corps must first form the Marine divisions it had promised.

mobilize the reserves

Raymond Davis, a lieutenant colonel (and later commander of the Marine Corps) at the start of the war, was a typical active duty officer cadre responsible for the rapid integration of reservists of various specialties into combat division.Davis worked with reservists in the Chicago area, and the main problem he had at first was that many of them didn't want to leave civilian life to fight in Asia, and the doctors who did the medicals listened sympathetically to the reluctant soldiers their narration.

I forget what the doctors said about it, but they found all these people unfit to serve in the army.I checked out a lot of them (reservists who were eliminated), and I know some of them, but I can't trust the doctor's conclusions.

The two doctors are staff physicians at Haines VA Hospital.Later I learned that reports came about them too, that they were not fit for the army either.It turned out that they checked each other, and then proved each other that they were not suitable for military service.

So I got another doctor and had him examine all the disqualified people, and they all qualified for the military.We drove those two doctors away.

Davis's 9th Battalion was a unit from Chicago, and he was thankful that his unit had completed its annual summer training a few weeks earlier.Thus, the battalion arrived at Camp Pendleton fully equipped, trained, and ready for battle.But to Davis' dismay, his troops disembarked from the train at night, were organized by staff officers into groups of 75 men, scattered into other units, and disappeared into the darkness.Another battalion officer told Davis, "I watched them go into the darkness, and I never saw them again." Soldiers, files, and equipment were scattered across Camp Pendleton's expansive encampment.

Davis was therefore tasked with rebuilding his battalion as completely as possible.Normal methods were failing, and Davis and his officers managed to get some trucks and drove around the camp looking for volunteers. "Sometimes they find a bunch of people working somewhere," Davis said, "and they'll drive over and say, 'Anyone want to go?' And in less than a day, they've got a job done." Got all the Marines we needed to replenish, that's it."

Meanwhile, at Camp Pendleton, California, Colonel Alpha Bowser, the operations chief of the 1st Marine Division, was scurrying around the camp searching for equipment.Camp Pendleton had a place called Camp Palgus, which was the main storage area for equipment, which had been neglected for many years, "the equipment sleeping among the weeds and vines."The landing craft to be used in the landings have been stacked in the arid desert near Barstow, California, since 1945; now they are being rushed to ports in southern California without time for even the most rudimentary inspection drive.The Marines thought—and they were promised so—that they would have time for such a test during their short stay in Japan, but that was not the case.As the division commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver Smith, recalled: "Get them to Kobe, fill them with fuel, hoist them out of the bilges, put them in the water, and [they] float up to the beach—that's all. Nothing for Incheon landing drills. The next time these amphibious vehicles are activated, they will gallop out of the tank landing ship and rush from the water to the beach." Andrew Gill, Marine Corps historian, commented: "These landing craft have experienced There are more old boats from the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa than there are veterans of those battles among the men who piloted them."

Despite all the confusion, General Smith and Colonel Bowser managed to assemble a division and set sail on August 8-14, a voyage Bowser called "the most chaotic voyage of the worst kind."Only one thing was left unaccounted for: any information on where the division was thrown into battle.The Joint Chiefs of Staff knew that MacArthur still insisted on landing at Incheon, but Washington was only told the expected date of landing, and even this was not given final approval.General Smith was quite curious about what he would do after he arrived in the Far East, so he sent Bowser to Japan by plane in early August, and he himself followed after the Marines boarded the ship.Smith realized he couldn't allow himself to sit comfortably on a boat for three weeks.

Colonel Davis is also unwilling to waste time, because he also knows that the 1st Marine Division is by no means a force just for viewing.Training begins as soon as the ship leaves port. "We brought sandbags and set up mortars at the stern to shoot. It was the first time for the boys to fire mortars." The commander of the fleet was "quite surprised by the noisy practices."That's how the Marines go to battle, dropping boxes from the stern and firing trainer mortar rounds at them.

(End of this chapter)