The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 39 Incheon Gambling Win (2)
MacArthur's plan called into question

Colonel Alpha Bowser's three-day transpacific flight from California to Japan took him almost three nights without sleep.Nevertheless, a car from the Far Eastern Command Staff Office met him at the airport and rushed him to Building 2, the first time a Marine Corps officer had been briefed on the Incheon landing.At 2 a.m., Bowser went to a combat readiness command post on the USS McKinley Hill, and he worked for several hours until he fell asleep, "But as far as I am concerned ... there was Countless questions have been left unanswered at all."With less than a month to go until MacArthur's planned landing date, his staff members still couldn't answer a lot of questions raised by Bowser: "What is the bottom of the tidal flat when the tide is low? Is it passable? Will it be trapped?" Live in an amphibious landing vehicle? Will the landing craft stick to the bottom at the next high tide? How high is the high tide from the top of the sea wall? 20 feet or [-] feet? No one can answer these questions."

After a very uncomfortable sleep, Bowser set out to gather the exact situation about the port of Incheon, but he was disappointed. "The army should have these conditions. We have been in Incheon for many years." Fortunately, the army quickly found a second warrant officer from the transportation team, and he used to work at the Incheon port.Bowser said: "In my opinion, this guy is a living dictionary." The Air Force and Navy also began aerial reconnaissance at this time.

Thus, Bowser had a little of the Incheon situation on hand when General Smith flew to Tokyo on August 8.Smith spoke first with Bowser and then had a long talk with Admiral Doyle.Smith said Doyle's response was, "It's a horrible place to land, but he can't say no to land. I'm not very happy about it, but we still get to work."

MacArthur poses a problem to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were displeased with both MacArthur's endless demands for additional troops and a plan for a counteroffensive that seemed increasingly implausible.MacArthur continued to demand more troops from the Pentagon throughout the summer, and finally stalked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to compromise.To the dismay of the joint chiefs of staff, MacArthur gave the most arbitrary interpretation of what they intended to restrict.

One of those things was the decision on August 8th (made by the White House) to transfer to MacArthur the Army's 10rd Infantry Division, one of the few remaining units in the U.S. General Reserve -- which were to stay in the continental United States , for use in an all-out war situation.General Collins, conveying the order, warned of the extent of the danger involved:
In withdrawing the division from the general reserve, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had accepted the consequences: a further severe reduction in the ability of the United States to meet other possible demands on the ground combat force in the months to come, and the Army's additional training for your theater The capabilities of the troops were further severely weakened. ...

In the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this division should serve as your theater reserve because, according to your report, you intend to engage in your proposed offensive all combat reserves currently in your theater or en route.We further believe that, except for the most pressing reasons (emphasis added), you intend to allow this division (which will arrive at your theater with very low combat effectiveness) sufficient time to train to an acceptable Minimum training level.

Throughout July and early August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew increasingly disturbed by MacArthur's whole approach, especially their lack of any definite facts about the Incheon landing, all they knew was when and where.Collins and Vandenberg speculated after visiting Tokyo on July 7 and 8 that MacArthur was deliberately tight-lipped because he feared Washington would spill the beans.Even after this visit, MacArthur continued to keep the lid on as he tried to persuade the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transfer him the 7st Marine Division, he exhorted Washington in a telegram detailing The plan to use the force was "unwise".

Pressed during a telex conference on July 7 whether a mid-September landing was still possible, MacArthur replied that his chances were "very good"—but he had to get the 24st Marine Division.MacArthur once again emphasized the issue of secrecy. "The Spokesman of the War Department can reveal nothing of our grand strategy," he admonished Washington.

In early August, discussions of MacArthur's strategy reached the White House.At a meeting on 8 August, Admiral Sherman was "quite confident that General MacArthur would use the force well, but that the Joint Chiefs of Staff must agree to his plans for amphibious landings."As late as August 8, the Pentagon's G-10 (Operations Branch) also believed that the landing would not be possible before mid-May 8, because "it has not received" MacArthur "a plan for the Korean campaign."What the G-7 didn't realize, however, was that MacArthur had no intention of letting the Pentagon know about his strategic plan.

In his memoirs, MacArthur accused Washington of "three weeks of silence" after he had told Collins and Vandenberg roughly of his intentions.Washington's view has taken a 180-degree turn.Feeling they had been left out, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, furious, decided to send General Collins and Admiral Sherman across the Pacific again.They set off on August 8, and MacArthur was furious at the news. "As soon as they got there," he said, "it was clear that their real purpose was not so much to negotiate as to dissuade." Collins disagreed with MacArthur, as he testified at the Senate hearing the following spring According to the above, the trip to Tokyo was to "learn what the battle plan really is. Frankly, we were kept in the dark.  …"

MacArthur's "Brilliant Statement"

At 8:23 p.m. on August 5, they met in a paneled conference room on the sixth floor of Building One, the most spectacular gathering of senior officers since the outbreak of the war.Representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff were Admiral Sherman, General Collins, and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Idwall Edwards; representing the Navy were Admiral Arthur Radford, Turner Joy Naval Admiral and Admiral Doyle; MacArthur's side had Generals Almond, General Doyle Hickey, General Clark Laffner, General Edwin Wright.Relations between Almond and the Marines' Generals Shepard and Smith were strained, as indicated by the absence of the two officers.The actual landing, the most dangerous and complex part of the operation, would be carried out by the Marines, yet their representative was only a lieutenant colonel who had attended the meeting as one of Doyle's briefing officers.The oversight was trivial, and Shepard later noted in his diary: "The Marines were not a likable role in Tokyo in those days."

The navy first introduced the situation. There were 8 people in total, and they walked into the conference room one by one, with an interval of 8 minutes.They did not talk about MacArthur's grand strategic plan, but introduced the immediate security issues limited to actions."We listed every conceivable and natural handicap—Incheon has it all," said Artillery Support Officer Major Allie Capps. Lt. Col. Monroe Kelly said, "Then you get a true picture of the Incheon operation. A lot of us who planned it thought that if the Incheon operation was successful, we would have to rewrite the textbook."

The main problems for the Navy in Incheon are tides and terrain.The average tide rise and fall there is 20.7 feet, one of the largest in the world.But on the day of the scheduled invasion, there will be a tidal range of around 32 feet due to the phases of the moon.When the tide is low, the mudflats accumulated over hundreds of years extend more than 2 miles out of the harbor.With the ups and downs of the tide, when the tide rushes through the narrow and curved "Flying Fish Gorge", the best channel leading to the land, its speed can reach 6 knots per hour.Navy mine experts say Flying Fish Strait is a natural site for mining, and any ship sinking there would block the channel.When a ship enters the strait, it is like entering a "dead end", where the ship cannot turn around.One immobilized ship will hold back an entire fleet.

The first high tide would be at 6:59 am; however, within two hours the tide would recede, leaving the attack ships stranded on the muddy shore, good targets for North Korean coastal artillery.They will run aground until the next high tide, at 7pm, half an hour after sunset.Therefore, the amphibious force had only two hours to cross the channel of the strait. At the same time, it had to suppress and occupy the frightening Yuemido Island, which was heavily defended and overlooked the entire Hong Kong, and transported in enough supplies to supply the whole day.

Troops landing at night also had only two hours.The land force was to establish a beachhead, bring in supplies, and establish a defensive position to withstand North Korean counterattacks until the next morning tide.

The Navy was reluctant to let troops land in the city center because every dock, warehouse and building could become a stronghold of North Korean resistance.Since Wolmido Island must be bombarded with heavy artillery, it will not be able to cause surprise tactically.

The main landing site is the Green Beach on Wolmido Island, which is a 200-yard long stretch of sandy beach and rocky beach.On the mainland, the red and blue beaches are four miles apart on opposite ends of town, separated by dreary industrial estates and marinas, with crumbling piers and a high sea wall at the port front.At low tide, Red Beach appears to be a 4-foot stretch of sticky, semi-fluid mud.Its consistency, wrote Marine Corps historian Robert Debs Heiner, was "like that of solidified chocolate fudge, but with a very different taste."At the other end of town, Blue Beach is fronted by 1 yards of mudflats with seawalls as high as 000 feet.

A few months later, even General Almond believed that Incheon was "the worst place we could conduct an amphibious assault."But just because it was the worst place, it might also be the best place militarily, if MacArthur could turn what appeared to be a disadvantage into his advantage.

Doyle, who will command the navy, said it was dangerous to steer ships into narrow waterways.Sherman snorted and said, "I wouldn't hesitate to put a ship there."

"You speak as if you are Van Riegart!" MacArthur said with approval.

In his speech following the Navy briefing, General Collins expressed concern about the Eighth Army's ability to break through the Pusan ​​encirclement.Before the meeting, Collins paid a quick visit to General Walton Walker, commander of the Eighth Army.Walker was "too busy plugging the holes in his battered defense to think about breaking out in the future".In addition, since the 8st Marine Brigade would be drawn from Walker's force and assigned to the counteroffensive force, his strength would also be weakened.

Collins warned that if the Eighth Army could not move north, it would "perhaps be disastrous" for the forces invading Incheon.He proposed the mountains as an alternative location.The seaport is located 8 miles south of Incheon, without the unfavorable natural conditions of Incheon, close to the North Korean People's Army's supply line through Nonsan and Daejeon, and closer to the Eighth Army's front, thus bringing the two armies of the United Nations Army closer. Easy to join forces.Sherman agreed.He asked MacArthur to forget Incheon and attack the mountains.

MacArthur sat there silent and expressionless, smoking his pipe while listening to the naval staff, Collins and Sherman.After their speeches, MacArthur was silent for another moment, as if to maximize dramatic effect.Many in the room had experienced MacArthur's eloquence before, and they knew his love of hyperbole.Still, they couldn't help but be moved by it.

MacArthur appreciates this tantalizing part.He later wrote: "Almond shifted uneasily in his seat. If there was ever an intriguing silence, it was this moment. I could almost hear my father's voice, as if he had He told me that way: 'Doug, the council of war produces cowardice and defeatism.'" For the next 45 minutes, MacArthur spoke, initially in a flat tone, before gradually "emphasizing the point with dexterity."Collins later wrote: "Even apart from obvious dramatic effect, this is a brilliant statement of his determination to take the risk and land in Incheon."

The room was silent except for MacArthur's voice, and wisps of cigarette smoke hung in front of the huge military map hanging against the wall.MacArthur did not use scripts when he spoke, but no one at the meeting questioned the accuracy of what he told from memory.

Since most of the North Korean forces were concentrated in the Pusan ​​defensive circle, MacArthur was convinced that "the enemy ... has not prepared as it should for the defense of Incheon."The arguments against landing at Incheon "in my opinion were precisely the factors that helped to secure this surprise victory," and no enemy commander would have thought that the Americans would be so "recklessly" risking such an attack.He cites the example of the British surprise attack on Quebec in 1759, when a small party of horses scaled a high bank that was considered impassable and caught the French off guard.

MacArthur acknowledged the Navy's objections were "substantial and pertinent," but "not insurmountable."He trusted the Navy, and probably "more than the Navy trusted itself."The Navy had overcome similar difficulties in amphibious operations in World War II, and it could do the same in Incheon.

MacArthur went on to say that the mountains, another proposed landing site, would be less dangerous, but also less valuable.Attacking there would not disrupt the North Koreans' logistical supply lines. "A flanking movement like this would be better left undone." He also saw no need for a "bloody but inconclusive" attempt to free Walker's Eighth Army from Pusan, "the enemy was only at their supply lines and communications It's just going backwards online."

However, capturing Incheon and Seoul would cut off North Korean supply lines and blockade the entire southern part of the peninsula.The further south the North Korean People's Army went, the weaker the supply lines became, and all the supply lines converged in Seoul. "After capturing Seoul, I will completely paralyze the enemy's supply system," MacArthur said. "Without arms and food, the North Koreans will soon be isolated and fragmented, and easily defeated.  …"

MacArthur's only other option was to continue the war of attrition at Pusan. "Are you willing to let our troops sit in that bloody perimeter like cattle in a slaughterhouse?" he said. "Who wants to be responsible for such a tragedy? Of course, I would never."

MacArthur's speech was close to a climax. "I can almost hear the second hand of fate ticking. We must act now or we will perish." He concluded:

If my estimates are wrong, and should I be put in an overpowering defensive position, I will ... personally withdraw our troops to avoid a catastrophic defeat.The only loss then would be nothing more than my personal professional reputation, but the Battle of Incheon will not be lost.The Battle of Incheon will surely be won and it will save 10 lives.

(End of this chapter)