The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 40 Incheon Gambling Win (3)
Even Collins, who was full of doubts, was moved by it after the meeting, but still had reservations.The next day, Admirals Sherman and Redford spoke with two Marine generals, Oliver Smith and Lemuel Shepard, who had been excluded from the meeting.Based on naval reconnaissance received in the past few days, the Marine Corps believed that Posung, 30 miles south of Incheon, was a better place to land, where the water was deep and landings could be made at any time.

Almond would not listen to any alternatives outside Incheon, and the more he talked, the angrier Smith and Sheppard became.Almond told them, "All this amphibious stuff is just a mechanical action."

Smith understands that. "I was trying to tell him the hard truth, and it pissed me off that he was defiant and called me a 'kid'."

The generals of the Marine Corps asked to see MacArthur and finally got permission, but he didn't have the heart to listen to more objections.He had convinced more people the day before, and he now wanted the Marines to keep their mouths shut and carry out orders.MacArthur said the capture of Incheon, and then Seoul, would quickly end the war. "For a five-dollar bet," he said, "I have a chance to win $5. I've made up my mind and this is what I'm going to do."

Sherman finally met with MacArthur.What they discussed is not recorded, but Sherman did say later, "I wish I had the same faith as he."

President's thumbs up
The dispute over Taiwan in early August, which infuriated President Truman (see Chapter 8), now provided General MacArthur with a channel through which he could speak directly to a White House envoy on Operation Chrome Opinions, thus effectively bypassing the chiefs of staff of the joint meeting, this cannot but be a great irony.One may recall that Truman sent his own adviser, Avril Harriman, to Tokyo to counsel General MacArthur on his support for Chiang Kai-shek.

Harriman had only heard the rough outlines of the Incheon plan.He asked more detailed questions in a long talk with MacArthur and was satisfied with the answers.Although MacArthur's arbitrary interference with national policy made Harriman angry, he believed that on military issues, "political issues and personal considerations should be put aside. Our government (should) regard General MacArthur as a great national treasure. , he is indeed a national treasure."

Harriman's enthusiasm was not without effect on the president. Fortunately for Operation Chrome, Generals Collins and General Vandenberg had not returned after listening to MacArthur's briefing in Tokyo. Truman had listened to Harriman's opinions on the plan for several days.Truman emphasized to Secretary of Defense Johnson that MacArthur should be allowed to proceed with his counteroffensive plan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wisely chose not to contest the matter with Truman, though they still had significant reservations about Operation Chrome. On August 8, the chiefs of staff of the Joint Conference sent an extremely vague "approval" to MacArthur.They were careful not to endorse a specific landing site, and they also bluntly stated that MacArthur should consider landing at a location other than Incheon.This order could indeed be interpreted as a strong recommendation for MacArthur to change his plans:

After reviewing what General Collins and Admiral Sherman had brought back, we agreed to prepare and execute a turnaround operation with amphibious forces on the west coast of Korea.The landing site was either at Incheon, if the enemy's defenses in the vicinity of Incheon proved to be weak, or at a more favorable beachhead south of Incheon, if such a beachhead could be found.We also agreed to proceed with preparations for an encirclement tactic with amphibious forces near the mountains, if the Commander-in-Chief Far Eastern Command so desired.We believe that alternative options should be developed to make the most of the changing situation.

We hope to be able to provide information on the situation in the area of ​​​​probable landings, and to keep you informed of your intentions and plans in terms of offensive operations.

Another suggestion brought back by Harriman and Ridgway and their accompanying observer, General Lauris Nostad of the Air Force, was rejected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.They urged the removal of General Walton Walker as commander of Eighth Army.Their shared perception was that Walker was exhausted and incapable of coping with the kaleidoscopic problems a large army faced on the battlefield.No one doubted Walker's bravery.If anything, they accused him of often taking too much risk in frequenting combat zones.Two months of war had exhausted the man physically and mentally. “It was obvious to all three of us,” Harriman said years later, “that Walker was not up to the job.” But the Joint Chiefs of Staff let it go.Moreover, according to Harriman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feared a "negative reaction" from MacArthur if it ventured to fire MacArthur's most eminent field general.

Doubts deepen at Joint Chiefs of Staff

On August 8, MacArthur issued a huge operational plan for the Incheon landing, which was widely distributed in the Far East Command.But he failed to send Washington a copy of the plan, despite the specific orders given to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an Aug. 30 directive.

As mentioned earlier, the situation around the Pusan ​​perimeter took a sharp turn for the worse on 9 September.A North Korean general offensive opened several holes in the Allied positions, and the 1st Marine Brigade, which had been withdrawn for the Incheon landing, was rushed into battle again.General Walker was already considering further shrinking his already overcrowded positions.

Concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent another cable to MacArthur on September 9 asking about Operation Ferrochrome and reminding him that they "wanted to be informed of the possible any modifications made to the amphibious operations plan".

MacArthur simply replied that "the general outline of the plan is as stated before," and that he had sent a courier to return a copy of the combat order and other relevant documents, and that the courier would arrive in Washington around September 9.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now worried that MacArthur is on the mend and the consequences could be catastrophic.One dire possibility was that if the Eighth Army was driven out of the Pusan ​​perimeter, MacArthur's counterattack force would be divided and wiped out.The Chiefs of Staff of the Joint Conference reiterated in a telegram of 8 September that they supported a counter-offensive "at the earliest opportunity possible", but did he think that if virtually all of the 9th Army's reserves were brought into the fight, would it be possible? Will "Operation Ferrochrome" be successful?The Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded him that the 7nd Airborne Division is the only one currently remaining in the United States, while units of the recently mobilized National Guard will take four months to train and transport.

MacArthur later wrote that the telegram "chilled my bones" because it implied that "the whole operation should be abandoned."He thus changed the purpose of what was previously called Operation Ferrochrome.The Eighth Army did not have to go north to attack the North Korean blockade positions around Seoul, and the plan was no longer a hammer and anvil operation, whose success did not depend on a quick rendezvous of the two forces.All he wanted was to capture the supply lines around Seoul.Once this has been achieved, "the enemy will eventually be destroyed by its logistical support and disintegrated by our combined operations. While the rapid convergence of our two forces will dramatically symbolize the total collapse of the enemy force, it is not the an integral part of combat."

The shipping of counteroffensive forces and the bombing preparations of the naval and air forces were "on schedule," and he reiterated that success was absolutely assured.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now have no choice.Later that day, they sent another telegram to MacArthur. "We approved your plan and reported it truthfully to the President," the cable said.

It was only at this time that MacArthur set out to send a messenger to Washington, as he had promised a few days ago.The Joint Chiefs of Staff had requested a senior staff officer.MacArthur carefully weighed the ranks of officers in his command, and then selected a young Lieutenant Colonel Lynn Smith from his planning staff.

Late at night on September 9, MacArthur called Smith to the First Building.At this time, the Marine Corps had boarded the ship in Busan, and the supporting bombing force was also ready.

"Do you personally believe in the plan we are going to implement?" MacArthur asked Smith.

"Yes, sir," Smith replied.

"Very well, you leave for Washington tomorrow—but don't get there too soon."

MacArthur asked Smith to take the battle plan and other documents—11 volumes and weighing 35 pounds—to the Pentagon, hand them over to the joint chiefs of staff, and answer their questions.

The general added: "If they say it's a big gamble, tell them, I say it's a big gamble. Washington's decision to commit American troops to the Asian continent is the biggest gamble."

MacArthur made no arrangements to make Smith's trip comfortable and smooth.Instead of taking the military mail plane, Smith waited all night near Tokyo before boarding a weather-beaten DC-4 with his paper bag at his feet for the long transpacific flight .The plane stopped at Wake Island for refueling, meals and minor repairs before continuing across the Pacific Ocean with another stop on Oahu before flying to Travis Air Force Base in California.

At the same time, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were anxious about the whereabouts of the battle plan promised by MacArthur, and MacArthur's attack fleet was ready to go.

counterattack plan
As needed and arranged, paperwork related to landing was kept to a minimum.Nonetheless, during the first week of September, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps joint planning staffs had developed a basic landing plan.Landing will be done in stages.

First of all, it is necessary to conduct saturation bombing and naval artillery fire assaults on Incheon and its surrounding areas, and concentrate on bombarding the threatening sea fortress Wolmido Island.Artillery preparations would last until the seconds before the landing of the assaulting Marines.

Since Wolmido is in a dominant position, it will be captured first by an invading force taking advantage of the early tide.The vanguard is a battalion strength, supported by engineers and tanks, which will enter the port aboard the High Speed ​​Auxiliary Patrol Destroyer, an escort convoy rebuilt for small force assaults and landings.

The plan hopes to firmly control Wolmido Island within a few hours, and the first battalion to land can resist the North Korean People's Army until a large number of landing troops break into Incheon with the high tide of the night-some of them rushing to the Red Beach, and the other to the Blue Beach. beach.The two night landing attack troops will join the Marines following along the causeway from Wolmido Island in Incheon, and attack Yeongdeungpo eastward.

The Navy expected trouble.Because of the narrow channel, the lumbering landing craft - some of them carrying 500 tons each - would have to creep up to the beach, line up one after the other, dig their bows into the sand like giant turtles, and fight at the same time There will be intense action on the seawall.

The landing force is two regiments of the 1st Marine Division, and there is another regiment of the Korean Marine Corps as a reserve.After completing the combat mission of clearing the periphery of Incheon, these forces will advance and cross the Han River, capture Gimpo Airport, occupy Seoul, and then establish an arc of blocking positions north of Seoul.

The Army's 7th Infantry Division would land with the Marines and advance from the Marines' south flank, eventually joining the 8th Army, which hoped to break out of the Pusan ​​perimeter and advance north.

That's the whole battle plan, and now all parties must be put into position.The 1st Marine Brigade withdrew from Pusan ​​on the night of September 9-5; the 6th Infantry Division, led by the practical Alabama native Major General David Barr, was supplemented by conscripts from the Continental American Academy and the streets of Pusan , and began boarding transport ships at Kobe.

But as planning progressed and D-Day approached, the discord between General Sheppard of the Marine Corps and General Almond of the Army intensified.Years later, Shepard candidly said that he "quickly lost faith in the senior commanders there".Almond was 58 years old at the time. He was a veteran of two wars with outstanding achievements. He had served under MacArthur since 1946 and became the chief of staff of the Far East Command in 1949. However, he was not in the Far East Command. unwelcome.In MacArthur's kingdom, according to the careful words of Army historian Roy Appleman, he was both feared and obeyed.Almond was so energetic and irascible that some officers shuddered at the sight of his blazing, cold eyes.

The first disagreement between the two services occurred in mid-August, when MacArthur casually told Almond that he intended to create a new offensive force, the 8th Army, under Almond's command.Walton Walker's 10th Army continued as a separate force, with both 8th and 8th armies reporting directly to Tokyo.Who will be the chief of staff of the Far East Command?Almond asked. "Oh, you can hold two positions," MacArthur said, "Incheon and Seoul will be over soon, and then you can return to Tokyo." Far Eastern Command will also provide most of the staff officers for the landing operations. (MacArthur's decision to create another unit surprised General Walker, who told a visitor, "I'm just a Confederate general who has lost a battle." Walker now has no doubts that he was under MacArthur's Serving hours are numbered.)
This decision to disperse forces was one of MacArthur's (many) major mistakes during the Korean War.The immediate effect of this was to start some sort of discord between Almond and General Oliver Smith, who would lead the 1st Marine Division.

The two generals were far apart in body and temperament.Smith, a native Texan, was fifty-seven years old that summer, distinguished himself in both wars and a sort of scholar. While serving at the U.S. Embassy in Paris in the 57s, he spent two years at the Ecole Military Academy in France and headed the Marine Corps school after the war.Smith was gentle in speech and demeanor, tall and agile, with a delicate face, but his hair was premature.Some gruff Marines occasionally mistake Smith's suave appearance for cowardice, but not the frail Oliver Prince Smith.

Smith agreed with Admiral Doyle that Incheon was "a terrible place to land," admitting, "I'm not very happy with it, but we're still getting ready." He was soon at loggerheads with Almond over part of the strength of his troops.

(End of this chapter)