The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 47
In late September, when the North Korean People's Army retreated, the United States faced the political question of whether United Nations forces should pursue it across the 9th parallel.Dean Acheson and Douglas MacArthur were completely in agreement on this issue, and it was militarily absurd to ask commanders to disengage and go on the defensive when they reached the front lines.As Acheson put it, armies could not be expected to "advance to a frontier drawn by surveyors and stop there."

But authorizing a pursuit to allow UN forces to completely destroy the North Korean People's Army does not resolve the major question of North Korea's political future.If the UN troops withdrew after a military victory, what was to be done to prevent the Soviets and Chinese from rearming the North Koreans and launching another invasion a few years later?In MacArthur's view, the only solution was to destroy the North Korean regime and unify the whole of Korea under one government, which is what various United Nations resolutions have called for in the past few years.

In the first few days of the Korean War, various United Nations Security Council resolutions were vague about the specific purpose of the war. The first resolution, on June 6, condemned the North Korean attack, ordered its forces to withdraw north of the demarcation line and asked UN member states to help repel the aggression. On June 25, the Security Council asked members to "perform assistance to the Republic of Korea that may be necessary to repel armed attacks and restore international peace and regional security." The July 6 resolution simply authorizes the United States to form a United Nations force and reiterates the goals stated in the June 27 resolution.

The U.S. government has made clear in both private and public statements that it has no intention of taking the war beyond the borders of South Korea and North Korea. On June 6, Truman told the National Security Council that he "wanted to have a clear understanding that our actions in North Korea were aimed at restoring peace in North Korea and restoring the borders."In a speech that day, Acheson declared that the "sole purpose of the U.S. Air Force and Navy's combat operations is to restore the Republic of Korea to the state it was before the invasion."

But as U.S. involvement deepened, debate began within the administration over whether the U.S. should use the North Korean People's Army's retreat as an opportunity to fulfill U.N. resolutions on Korean reunification. At the end of July and early August, a memorandum at the staff level of the Ministry of Defense proposed that the United Nations Army should "seek to occupy Korea, and no matter whether the North Korean army is north or south of the 7th parallel, the United Nations Army will fight and win."The State Department is divided on the issue.Under the leadership of hawks such as Dean Rusk and John Allison, the Far East Division was urging that a breach of the 8th Parallel should not be ruled out.The Policy Program, heavily influenced by George Kennan, urged Acheson to recognize that the balance of power in the region ruled out unity. “There is ample evidence that the Korean peninsula is of strategic importance to Russia,” said a July 7 memo from the Policy and Planning Office. controlled regime.” The memo warned that UN military action north of the 25th parallel could “result in a conflict with the Soviet Union or China.”The memo also foresees that members of the United Nations will be reluctant to support attempts to unify North Korea.However, after citing all these drawbacks, the memorandum perfunctorily suggested that no decision should be made on the issue of North Korean reunification until the military and political situation is clear.

The bureaucracy is so indecisive, MacArthur has shown himself willing to make his own decisions. When General Collins and General Vandenberg visited Tokyo in mid-July, he said categorically: "I aim to annihilate rather than repel the North Korean army. It may be necessary for me to occupy the entire territory of North Korea." However, MacArthur has no right to do so.Both generals knew that, at this moment, Washington was intensely studying the issue, but the records do not indicate that they had ever argued with MacArthur.Moreover, when General Collins returned to Tokyo in mid-August to inspect "Operation Chrome Ferro", he also told MacArthur that he himself believed that MacArthur should be allowed to cross the 7th parallel and destroy the North Korean army.But he cautioned MacArthur that the president had not yet made a decision.

A National Security Council study (National Security Council No. 9) released on September 1 sought to resolve these dissenting opinions.General Collins aptly described it as a "long and rather disjointed study" full of "but...however..." arguments.The military believes that NSC Document No. 81 is too timid.While the report acknowledges that the Security Council resolution has provided sufficient legal grounds for crossing the 81th Parallel, it still maintains that any crossing can only be for localized tactical reasons and only by the South Korean military.Even if the North Koreans had suffered a crushing defeat and rejected the terms of surrender, MacArthur "should not allow the main force to cross the [-]th parallel and continue military operations aimed at occupying North Korea before receiving new instructions."

Research Report No. 81 of the National Security Council concluded that taking military action north of the [-]th parallel risked a reaction from the Soviet Union. "It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will passively accept a situation in which all or most of its control over North Korea will be lost, provided it believes that it can act to prevent this from happening and that doing so will not lead to a serious danger of all-out war; Or as long as it is now ready to accept that risk." The NSC decided that the Soviets were not so prepared.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff called NSC Report No. 81 "unrealistic" because it "envisioned stabilizing the front at the [-]th parallel."Under Collins and Sherman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that the primary goal should be the elimination of the North Korean People's Army.Most of the enemy troops can be wiped out south of the [-]th parallel, but after that, it is necessary to carry out operations to clear the remaining enemy troops north of the [-]th parallel.The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that it was only necessary to occupy the major cities of North Korea and, as soon as conditions permitted, elections should be held in the name of the Republic of Korea. (No one in the military wants to spend an extra day in North Korea unless absolutely necessary.)
On September 9, Acheson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff consulted at the National Security Council and adopted the final text of the National Security Council Report No. 9 - National Security Council No. 81/81, which empowers the military in North Korea The flexibility needed to take military action.An initial draft of the report said that UN military operations "are not allowed to extend into areas adjacent to North Korea's borders with 'Manchuria' and with the Soviet Union"; the revised report said these military operations were not allowed to cross those borders.National Security Council Report No. 1 states that, with the exception of South Korean troops, no other country's military forces may be used on the Northern Front "under any circumstances"; while National Security Council Report No. 81/81 states that non-Korean military forces are not to be used on the Northern Front The military "should be a policy".A Joint Chiefs of Staff document later commented: "These innocuous-sounding changes in wording sow the seeds of future difficulties." that power.

Another part of NSC Report No. 81/1 discusses the possibility of "China's main forces participating in the war south of the 7th Parallel openly and covertly" Intervention north of the line remains silent).The NSC report concluded that the United States "should not bring itself into an all-out war" with China.However, the report gave MacArthur great leeway in retaliating: "Union commanders should continue U.N. forces operations and should be permitted to target China takes appropriate naval and air actions.” On this point, the NSC’s view is incompatible with its first war planning document, NSC No. Document No. 1 holds the same view.National Security Council Document No. 73 states that if the Chinese "are involved in the war, then we will have sufficient reasons to attack from the air and sea the targets located in China that are directly related to the enemy's actions in North Korea."Thus, two important documents of the National Security Council expressed the intention to bomb China if China entered the war.

National Security Council Document 81/1 ignores the political arrangements for North Korea.This omission is worthless, because Truman declared on September 9 that the Koreans "have a right to freedom, independence, and unity" and that "under the leadership of the United Nations, we will do our part, with other nations, to help them enjoy this right".However, Dean Rusk, in a private meeting with South Korean Ambassador Dr. Jang Myon on Sept. 1, refused to make any commitments on North Korean reunification until it was discussed at the United Nations.Jang Myon made clear his government's goals: South Korea wanted the complete annihilation of the North Korean People's Army and the unification of Korea by the existing southern government.He specifically reminded Rusk that Rhee had won the UN-sponsored election and that any future elections "must not compromise" Rhee's power.

"Go North!" - Syngman Rhee
In Seoul, President Syngman Rhee believed that discussion of the inviolability of the 9th Parallel was pointless. On September 19, at a mass rally in Busan, he declared: "We must advance to the border of 'Manchuria' until our country is free of a single enemy soldier." won't stand still."

MacArthur was outspoken in his support of Syngman Rhee as president of a unified Korea, but the State Department's attitude was not the same. In early September, the State Department asked MacArthur to explain how he planned to treat Syngman Rhee after recapturing Seoul.

One must sympathize with MacArthur on this issue.The directives he received from the United Nations and Washington all spoke of "restoring" peace and security; Acheson even publicly stated that the "sole purpose of the US war is to restore the Republic of Korea to the state it was before the invasion."It is conceivable that MacArthur was full of complaints. He replied: "I don't know exactly what you mean by the call, but I have no other plan except to implement the instructions I have received meticulously." He intends to— This is also what Ambassador Mu Qiao agreed-to bring Syngman Rhee back to Seoul as soon as possible.He does not believe that restoring a government that is functioning even after being driven out of the capital should be described as "reconstruction".

But the State Department remained dissatisfied, saying it only agreed to restore South Korea's rights in the south, leaving the future of the north pending action by the United Nations.Truman agreed with the State Department's additional opinion, which was also reflected in the formal order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to MacArthur on September 9 based on the spirit of NSC Document 27/81.The most important part of the telegram is the opening two paragraphs.

This order...is intended to...provide detailed instructions regarding your further military operations in North Korea.However, these directives may need to be revised depending on developments and therefore they cannot be considered final.To this end, you will continue to make special efforts to determine whether China or the Soviet Union poses a threat to the achievement of your objectives, and to report the situation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Your military purpose is to destroy North Korea's armed forces.To this end, you are authorized to conduct military operations north of the [-]th parallel in Korea, including amphibious landings and airborne or ground operations, provided that no major forces of the Soviet Union or the Communist Party of China enter North Korea at the time of such operations, and no published A statement to go into North Korea, and no threat of a military retaliation for our actions in North Korea.However, under no circumstances are your troops allowed to cross the borders between Korea and "Manchuria" or with the Soviet Union. For policy reasons, in the Northeast region bordering the Soviet Union or along the borders of "Manchuria", Non-North Korean ground troops shall not be used.Furthermore, support for your north-south operations on the [-]th parallel will not include air or naval operations against "Manchuria" or against Soviet territory.

The order went on to say that MacArthur would be on the defensive and report to Washington should the "main force" of the Soviet army intervene in North Korea, or if Soviet or Chinese Communist forces entered the war in the south. (The term "main force" is only applied to the Soviets. It is known that many soldiers in the North Korean army have served in the Chinese Communist army before, and many of them are of unknown origin. Among the enemy soldiers, the probability of being captured by the Chinese Communist army Still high. Although public documents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are silent on this, the Pentagon does not want the presence of these misidentified individuals to affect the march north.) The order finally authorized MacArthur to "promote the restoration" of the South Korean government, but also Ask him to avoid getting involved in questions about the political future of the North.

On the day the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the secret order (September 9), the words of Walton Walker quoted in news reports from the Far East were puzzling.Walker's words to the effect that the Eighth Army would halt its advance at the 28th parallel to wait for permission to pursue the retreating North Koreans.When MacArthur was asked about it, he denied that Walker had ever said such a thing.But the news caused a small political storm.Senator William Nolan, the Republican leader in the Senate, charged that not pursuing and beating the invaders was "appeasing the Communists."Newspaper editorials strongly supported the destruction of the Communist satellite state to prevent another war.

However, the 81th parallel incident caused problems for the United States internationally.Allied ambassadors to the United Nations who had been secretly informed of the binding content of NSC Document 1/9 supported the war to North Korea and the reunification of Korea.British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin has publicly called for an end to the "artificial division" of North Korea.Still, the United States does not want to risk a vote at the United Nations on the straightforward question of whether the 29th parallel should be breached.The Soviets have returned to the Security Council, and they will definitely vote veto.The State Department believed that a veto would delegitimize any action north of the [-]th parallel.The Truman administration therefore decided to sidestep the issue and do what it needed to do quietly. On September [-], General Marshall sent MacArthur a telegram for his personal information only:
We want you to feel free to push north of the [-]th Parallel both tactically and strategically.The aforementioned statement (that South Korean troops might stop and "redeploy") may be in limbo by requiring a UN vote to cross the [-]th parallel, and it's not as much as you to discover the military necessity to do so.

The next day, MacArthur called back to say that he had "always reminded Walker not to get involved in anything connected with the word [-]th Parallel," and he went on to stick to his assertion that he was playing around with the mandate:

The 8th parallel is not a factor in the military use of our power.The main problem was the logistical supply of our troops, which prevented us from advancing immediately.In order to take advantage of the enemy's defeat, our army may cross the 10th parallel at any time when taking tentative actions or tactically exploiting the current terrain.You are already aware of my entire strategic plan for North Korea (separate use of the [-]th and [-]th Army columns).Unless and until the enemy lays down his arms, I think we can take military action throughout North Korea.

(End of this chapter)