The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 48
MacArthur took advantage of the loophole
The order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that only South Korean troops could be used in the northernmost part of North Korea, but MacArthur's last sentence bypassed this directive, and he later quoted Marshall's telegram as his reasoning even after China's large-scale participation in the war. to justify the continuation of military operations.Acheson (who said he had not read Marshall's telegram before it was sent) also found Marshall's ambiguity dangerous. "It seems to me," he wrote in his memoirs, "that the telegram seemed designed to assuage MacArthur's compulsion to submit a plan of action. MacArthur was confirmed, and Washington wanted him to push northward unfettered unless it was for him to There are restrictions in the order." Unfortunately, Acheson could read Marshall's telegram, but could not guess MacArthur's mind.

MacArthur's telegram of September 9, calling for "military action throughout Korea" and playing with the orders given to him, was not disputed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which considered it a trivial matter one pile.MacArthur said he intended to publicly explain his plans, but that it would be "unwise" for him to do so.Instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised MacArthur to push north, "without further explanation or statement, and to let action determine everything. Our administration hopes to avoid making the 30th Parallel a one question".

While the semantics were being debated, the State Department tried to defuse the issue by having MacArthur make a radio address asking the North Koreans to lay down their arms in view of their inevitable "swift and utter defeat."MacArthur did not expect the North Korean command to accept the request.In fact, MacArthur's radio speech on October 10 received no response.He was already working on a plan to attack the North. On Sept. 2, in his usual fashion, he outlined his plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in broad strokes and promised to "report in detail" later.MacArthur, as usual, did not intend to give Washington the opportunity to dictate his plans.

flimsy strategy
MacArthur's offensive plan, although only an outline, gave Pentagon planners pause.MacArthur planned to let General Walker lead the 8th Army to launch an attack from Seoul to the northwest, cross the 10th parallel, and take Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea.The 10th Army commanded by General Almond will withdraw from Incheon, then bypass the Korean Peninsula by sea, and conduct an amphibious landing at Wonsan.The Tenth Army would advance westward to join the Eighth Army.The two armies then advanced north to the narrowest line across North Korea, from Hungnam on the east coast via Ningwon to Cheongju on the west coast.This front was about 8 miles north of the 100th parallel, and only South Korean troops could take action north of this front.

MacArthur had reason to disperse his forces.Although Tenth Army quickly captured Seoul, it was unable to block all retreat routes of the retreating North Korean People's Army.Although two-thirds of the enemy force had been wiped out, many senior officers had escaped through the mountains or along the coast.MacArthur was annoyed that thousands of enemy troops escaped across the border unscathed.He believed that landing at Wonsan would cut off the retreat of these enemy troops, and would also obtain a good port on the east coast for future operations in the north.

Terrain is also an important factor.The Taebaek Mountains are rugged and steep, towering into the sky, overlooking the corridor from Seoul to Wonsan, forming what one military historian said "a backwater with almost no road to the border of 'Manchuria'".Major rail and land routes pass through the valley from north to south.In the whole of the North, practically the only passable east-west overland road and railway is between Wonsan and Pyongyang.MacArthur intended to take this route.Without a supply base (ie Wonsan) on the east coast, the UN forces would find it very difficult to conduct military operations in the interior of North Korea.

MacArthur believed that Wonsan would be a more effective supply base than Pusan.With its devastating strikes, the USAF nearly destroyed all rail and road bridges north of Pusan's defensive perimeter, and it would take weeks to repair them, so Pusan ​​could not be counted on as a major port for incoming supplies.Incheon was too small to resupply Eighth and Tenth Armies for the lightning attack MacArthur wanted.

There were also opposition to MacArthur's plan, but with little success.Colonel John Dabney of 8th Army G-3 (Operations Branch) echoed the concerns of many of his colleagues, arguing that the logistics of pulling 10th Army out of North Korea would delay the pursuit of the retreating North Korean people Army, will also hinder the advance of the 8th Army.He and other staff believed that South Korean forces could advance to the east coast and capture Wonsan far faster than Tenth Corps could land there.The staff of the 10th Army put forward an option: assign the 8th Army to the 10th Army and attack Pyongyang and Wonsan by land at the same time.

These thoughts were written into a memorandum, which Colonel Dabney presented to General Walker.After reading it, Walker said that he agreed with these views, but he did not intend to give it to MacArthur.He told Dabney that he had "made his point," but had been ordered to the contrary, and that he did not intend to argue.In addition, MacArthur was determined to keep two separate forces in Korea, despite the urging of his staff (mainly Generals Hickey and Wright) to combine the Tenth Army with the Eighth Army after the capture of Seoul.

According to Walker's staff, the split made Walker resentful.In the first few months of the war, he did the drudgery of bloodshed and used both strategic intelligence and military skill to keep the disintegrated South Korean Army.With only a handful of American troops, he was able to emerge victorious in a last stand on the Pusan ​​perimeter and avoid another dreaded Dunkirk.According to Walker's press officer, Melvin Voorhis, Walker's "bruised pride and resentment" came when X Corps invaded Incheon as a separate force.When MacArthur later made the X Corps a separate entity, Walker suffered even more.He called Almond's force acerbically the "Public Relations Brigade" and believed that MacArthur had misused it after the Incheon landing.According to Voorhis, in Walker's view, after the capture of Incheon, MacArthur should have ordered Almond to go directly across the narrow strip of South Korea to cut off the North Korean People's Army's retreat.However, MacArthur chose the symbolic goal of Seoul.

At this point, Walker was once again exasperated by the disruption to his forces as X Corps was evacuating through the congested port of Incheon.This decision also angered the commanders of the 10st Marine Division, who hoped to continue to pursue and fight the North Korean People's Army. "Logistically, it was quite difficult," lamented General Oliver Smith.But the Marines obeyed. On October 1, the 10st Marine Division handed over its positions outside Seoul to the 3th Army and returned to Incheon.

Marine Corps commanders couldn't help but look at their operational picture.The South Korean army has broken through the [-]th parallel on the east coast and is advancing rapidly towards Wonsan.The Marines would find out that they were "invading" a North Korean port already in the hands of South Korean troops, were they on a futile expedition?Smith believed that military common sense dictated that his troops pursue the North Korean People's Army overland rather than disengage for two weeks.

An army divided in two, marching in two at a time, advancing through the rugged and steep mountains, the only hope is that they can cooperate.In this way, MacArthur's hasty actions laid the seeds for the subsequent military disaster.

In order to defuse North Korean resistance during the advance, the UN forces again used the young Navy Captain Eugene Clark, who had completed invaluable intelligence work before the invasion of Incheon.Clarke was on a threefold mission this time: to locate and pinpoint the center of mine-mining activity off North Korea's west coast; to gather accurate intelligence on developments in the Yalu River region, with an emphasis on Chinese activity; Equipment for action.

On October 10, Clark and more than 15 South Korean guerrillas (150 of whom were women) left Incheon by boat.A five-man special agent team landed on the first night and conducted reconnaissance of Pyongyang in order to survey the strength of the North Korean People's Army and mark out defensive positions.On the second night, Clark's guerrillas were even more daring. Twenty guerrillas armed only with hand grenades boarded the coast without anyone noticing under the cover of night, and walked around villages and alleys under the nose of the North Korean People's Army. .They told the residents that there would be a massive attack on Pyongyang at dawn; that the United Nations forces would be overwhelming;They described the devastation and heavy casualties of the Incheon landing, and suggested to the villagers that they, too, might be doomed.If the North Korean people demand immediate evacuation, they are doing the North Korean People's Army a great favor.The female secret agents showed their talents, because they could talk to the peasant women. (In rural North Korean society, women are very cautious when speaking to strange men.) So the common people fled.

Hours after North Korean intelligence agencies learned of the incident, they dispatched troops to the village.As a result, U.S. and United Nations forces advanced quietly around the village through holes in the North Korean People's Army's defenses.

Britons are timid

Meanwhile, Washington sought to calm the anxieties of its staunchest supporters yet, the British. On October 10, the British ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, asked Dean Rusk a lot of questions about military operations north of the 4th parallel.Franks is concerned about whether the United States believes that such action is authorized by existing U.N. resolutions.

Rusk's answer is yes.The North Koreans are still fighting, and MacArthur is chasing them fiercely; and, although only South Korean troops have crossed the border at this time, "there are still hostile troops on the battlefield, which are still firing at the United Nations forces"; It is necessary to continue fighting in whatever way he sees fit."

The next day, the senior British military representative in the United States, Air Vice-Admiral Lord Ted, met with General Bradley and told him that the British military command organization and the Foreign Office expressed doubts about the wisdom of crossing the 9th parallel.London's view is that the main goal should be to confine the war to North Korea and prevent any danger of protracting the conflict.The British believed that sending UN forces to North Korea risked expanding the conflict.The British Chiefs of Staff recommended that UN forces stop at the 28th parallel for a week or so and warned North Korea that UN forces would attack unless its troops surrendered.In the face of fait accompli, the British plan did not blame the South Korean army (the South Korean army had crossed the [-]th parallel on September [-]).

(End of this chapter)