The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 49
Bradley ignored the British request.He told Ted that what Ted was asking for was "pretty much what we're doing."The British calmed down, at least temporarily, and agreed to try their best to pass a General Assembly resolution for Washington as a political guide for continuing military activity.Britain, along with seven other friendly nations, submitted a draft resolution calling for "all appropriate measures ... to ensure a stable situation throughout North Korea", the election of a unified government under UN auspices and the immediate withdrawal of troops.The resolution passed on October 7 with 10 votes in favor, 7 against, and 47 abstentions.

On this issue, Acheson was so hotheaded that he forgot the common sense of being a lawyer.Acheson (and his staff) were determined to obtain UN sanction for military activity north of the 1945th parallel, and thus were extremely loose in their wording, a mistake that caused serious problems for the United States for the next two months.The resolution talks about establishing a "stable situation".But since [-], North Korea has been obediently under the rule of the Communist Party. Isn't this "situation" already existing?Why does the North Korean government expect to cooperate with the North Korean government, which has turned its back on the United Nations in the past, even refusing to allow UN representatives into the country?If North Korea does refuse, what are the "all appropriate measures" that the UN is willing to take to ensure a "stable situation"?The resolution says nothing about it.

Acheson later explained this, although not convincingly.He believed that the 1947 United Nations resolution to conduct elections for the reunification of Korea had been blocked by Soviet military power. "There are only a few stragglers left in the North Korean People's Army. We hope that those who launched this aggression will be encircled or surrendered. This will enable the implementation of UN resolutions...and...try to unify the entire country." "If It is just that South Korean soldiers want to establish a certain degree of order in this barren and barren country in the extreme north." Then, it is "conceivable" that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese are likely to intervene.

To his dismay, as Acheson puts it, MacArthur "immediately stripped the resolution... Accepted".Acheson specifically referred to MacArthur's October 10 broadcast calling for North Korea's surrender.Citing the United Nations resolution, the general declared:

In order to implement the resolutions of the United Nations...I...for the last time request you and the troops under your command...to lay down their arms and cease hostilities immediately. ...unless you respond immediately...I will immediately take all necessary military action to carry out the UN order.

Acheson said that MacArthur's remarks made people no longer doubt that he was ready to use his "terrible sword" to establish a "unified, independent and democratic government" throughout North Korea.In the spring of the following year, when MacArthur testified in the Senate after being dismissed, he succinctly defined his mission: "Sweep across North Korea, unify and liberate the entire territory of Korea." Although Acheson was frustrated, MacArthur's explanation was by no means Just talk about it.The preamble to the Oct. 10 U.N. resolution cites three past resolutions (7, 1947 and 1948) calling for the unification of Korea, and notes that goal has not yet been achieved.Based on these provisions, and the ambiguous language of the operative part of the October 1949 resolution, MacArthur would understandably conclude that the UN did want him to unify Korea.But, as General Collins pointed out, MacArthur's "commands never included an order to unify Korea."

What Collins said is true, but in general incomplete.President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff watched as MacArthur prepared to move north, and they had at least a month to withdraw his orders if they wanted to.They didn't.As we shall see later (in Chapter 11), China has repeatedly warned that it would intervene if the US military crossed the 10th parallel.All concerned—Truman, Acheson, and MacArthur—sneered at the warnings.Even after the Chinese Volunteers entered the war on a small scale in late October, the orders given to MacArthur remained unchanged.Both Truman and Acheson were convinced that since the United States had no intention of attacking Chinese territory, the Chinese should believe in their motives.However, the Chinese did not believe them.All in all, the Truman administration (the President, Acheson, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) erred on a par with MacArthur.Truman's apologists unfairly blamed MacArthur for the ensuing rout.However, Washington must also share the burden.

After the Incheon victory, MacArthur's spirits were lifted. Even if General Almond failed to provide General Walker's "hammer" with the "anvil" to crush the North Korean People's Army, it did not restrain him.He now faced only a defeated and demoralized enemy. In early October, General Douglas MacArthur was preparing to march north.

red spies in washington
Unfortunately, MacArthur's plan to move north was hampered by Communist restrictions on MacArthur's forces (notably the prohibition of United Nations troops, other than South Koreans, from approaching the Yalu River frontier), and by Washington's restrictions on The unease about the wisdom of taking any action is well known.The sources of this intelligence were three well-buried Soviet spies who held high positions in the British government: "Kim" Philby, who was an intelligence officer at the embassy in Washington, Guy Burgess, the second secretary of the embassy, ​​and Donald Maclean, North American Department, UK Foreign Office.All three were products of the British establishment, who had converted to communism while they were at university in the 30s, and agreed to serve as Soviet intelligence agents as they rose through the ranks.Philby's position was particularly favorable.His busy schedule in Washington included maintaining ties with the CIA, and he interacted frequently with senior officials in the Defense and State Departments.

Despite Philby's high profile, America's counterintelligence agencies aren't entirely reassured about him.During World War II, several major leaks of British and American security intelligence were found to have come from the British embassy. Philby was working in the embassy at the time, and he was one of the suspects.So when he returned to Washington in mid-1949, the FBI placed him under less stringent surveillance.Still, Philby obtained all the intelligence passing through the embassy through his position, including details of U.S. military and strategic plans in North Korea.

The information that Philby missed would go through the hands of Guy Burgess, who was the biggest headache for security officials.An alcoholic and a homosexual (both traits he makes no secret of in his words and deeds), with a notorious record in other countries, the US posting was his "last chance".Many at the embassy did not want to deal with the drunken redneck, who often embarrassed them with his anti-American rhetoric (on North Korea and other issues).British and American counterintelligence agencies consider him an out-and-out security risk.Strangely, however, no one doubted him when he probed North Korea, which had nothing to do with his mandate.Burgess' excuse (which is not convincing) was that he wanted all the information he could find on the Korean War scandal and "how the big fool MacArthur dragged us into the war."

One insider Burgess was planning to use was an official at the Foreign Policy Institute in Washington, a private research institute.Burgess confessed to the official that his job at the British embassy was to analyze the motives and trends of the US Far East policy. He had to understand not only the official point of view, but also the views of the American public.According to this source, Burgess seemed "restless and agitated" and insisted that the United States was "doomed because it ... was caught up in Eastern affairs."Burgess appeared "quite tolerant of Russia's role in world affairs."

Burgess is an idle spy.He could drink six whiskey-and-sodas in one gulp without changing his face, but he walked about unkempt, with dirty nails, and refused to pull the top of his convertible even in winter.He called the congressional investigation of homosexuals in the State Department a "public affront to the individual," and he was so impassioned indeed that the Foreign Policy Institute official concluded (quite accurately) that Burgess himself was a gay.But Burgess did envy some of the comforts of capitalism: At one point, he actually inquired about joining the exclusive Washington Mets.

The last line of defense for Burgess and Philby was Donald MacLean in London, who checked all telegrams from the Washington embassy.McClain, like his old friend Burgess, was a drinker and gay.He has been undergoing rigorous psychiatric treatment for the past few years, but neither US nor UK security agencies have ever suspected him, and he transcribes important documents that pass his hands day after day.

According to a former CIA counterespionage expert: "Because of the problems Britain caused in our security sphere during and after World War II, we had to assume in our dealings with them that Soviet spies were still in the Foreign Office and the British Secret Intelligence Service. However, the U.S. government had no choice but to share a wealth of secret intelligence with a country that was our ally in the Great War and, in fact, sent troops to the war.” But the CIA did impose a limit , it did not notify Philby of covert operations against mainland China, although he was still allowed access to much of the intelligence the CIA gathered around the world.

How important was the information that Philby and others passed on to their Soviet masters?Years later, a State Department official said: "The most important inference about the U.S. government is that the U.S. really wants to contain the war, and we don't plan to fight the Soviets for another 30 months. But political decisions will come through There are clues in the developments. Anyone who reads the public news reports and observes MacArthur's actions can deduce what Washington intends to do. Nevertheless, I would pay any price to get three of these spies to do things for me. "

However, it turns out that there is an important mystery.The United States had informed the British embassy and the public that it had no intention of going further against China, but in October and November 1950, the Chinese reaction to MacArthur's move north seemed to be that they were about to face an American invasion.There are several possibilities here (that's the only way to call them): first, the Soviets did not believe the information provided by their spies, and found it to be unreliable; people; again, the Chinese got this information and ignored it.

Of these possibilities, the second is the most plausible.Dragging the U.S. into a proxy war in North Korea, with the Chinese and North Koreans bearing the sacrifices, was what the Soviets would have liked best.The war made China more dependent on the Soviet Union, which prevented China from growing into a significant world power; while the Soviets could sit back and watch, convinced that the United States did not want a global conflict.Such was the value of the information gathered by the Philby-Burgess-McLean spy team.

(End of this chapter)