The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 55
From the first days of the war, U.S. intelligence agencies had been tossing and turning whether the Soviets and the Chinese—or both—would take an active part in the war.And from the start, analysts have always come to strikingly similar conclusions: Both the Soviet Union and China were capable of going to war, but probably would not, for reasons of international politics.

The CIA first focused on Soviet intentions, as Washington unreservedly accepted the argument that the Kremlin had instigated a North Korean "puppet" to launch the invasion.A June 6 CIA memo concluded that the Soviets would fully support the North Koreans in "protracted civil war and the maintenance of North Korean positions south of the 28th parallel," but the CIA did not believe the Soviets will be directly involved.Although the CIA believes that the Soviets will be able to land 10 or 11 divisions (121 million men) in Japan with a sea assault and a massive air attack, the CIA also does not believe that the Soviets will take action against Japan. action. Another CIA research report on July 7 concluded that the Soviets might "use the Chinese Communist Party's forces secretly or openly," but the Soviet Union did not participate in actual combat.The CIA has no doubts that the Chinese will follow suit, analysts said in a separate intelligence assessment in July:
Whether the Soviet Union would compel the Chinese communists to openly support North Korean military action or to take new steps elsewhere in the region is unclear.The Beiping regime could not have put military force into battle outside of China on its own initiative, but if the Soviet Union demanded military action, the Chinese would almost certainly follow suit.The strength and deployment of the Chinese Communist Party's military allows it to intervene in North Korea...without warning. ...

On August 8, CIA Director Rear Admiral Hillen Cote sent President Truman a report.He tacitly stated in the report that the CIA was not in a position to assess this.The intelligence agency memo says:
一份最近的战地报告中包括了外国军队准备进入北朝鲜的一个可能但又不确定的迹象，即1950年7月1日，在汉城成立了一个由50名俄国人、20名中国人和50名北朝鲜人民军人员组成的“最高军事委员会”。

Since North Korea has had a liaison office with the Chinese Communist Army since 1946, and since the formation of the People's Army, North Korea's general headquarters has had Soviet advisers, so even if this report is accurate, it does not necessarily Show what progress is being made in cooperation between the Chinese, Russians and North Koreans.

Then, also in August, a top-secret CIA report was circulated at the top of the government.According to the report, the Soviet Union was "accelerating the implementation of its war preparation plan, especially in the processing of oil, the completion of the conversion plan of factories, the production of aircraft, the construction of airports, and the storage of materials".The researchers concluded: "In doing so, Soviet leaders must have assumed that the remainder of 8 would present a substantial risk of an all-out war, triggered either by the handling of events in Korea or by new A major deterrent to the Soviets, according to the CIA, was their inability "to conduct a large-scale atomic bombing campaign in 1950," although the Soviets "currently possess an estimated 1950 atomic bombs , and can be used against the continental United States".The report concluded that the Soviet Union would likely use Tu-25 bombers, "probably disguised as U.S. symbols, to carry out one-way bombing missions, and possibly to secretly transport nuclear weapons into major U.S. ports by merchant ships."

CIA files, which were made public as of early 1980, do not explain why this gloomy assessment never made it to the official "National Intelligence Estimate" level.A person familiar with the state of the intelligence community at the time wrote: "You have to realize that the CIA was an eccentric organization in those days, with lots of people peddling their best work. You can find bits and pieces Field reports, no matter what you're trying to sell, you can set up a project on almost any program."

The reports provided by the CIA in early fall were so contradictory as to be meaningless.For example, the CIA told the White House in a daily roundup on September 9 that it had received "numerous unconfirmed reports" that Chinese leader Mao Zedong and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov met in Beijing in early August. top-level talks.Since then, Chinese propaganda tools have ramped up their attacks on the United States as an "aggressor" in North Korea.The CIA report concluded that:
Therefore, the Chinese communists have everything ready to intervene or participate in the Korean War in some form.Openly engaging with regular troops would prevent the United Nations from accepting Communist China, while covertly engaging with "Manchurian Volunteers" might ensure the continued localization of the conflict.

Initiating intervention can prevent further US "aggression", restore peace, and can complement the peace movement initiated by the Soviet Union.It was not yet possible to determine whether a decision had been made.

In short, some form of armed assistance to the North Koreans seems imminent.

However, other CIA reports later in September shared a common view: there was no "indication" or "evidence" of any Soviet or Chinese intent to intervene.Indeed, the CIA seemed more concerned with the possibility of Soviet action in Eastern Europe, Iran, or elsewhere.For example, the CIA reported in a September 9 report that, in Eastern Europe alone, Bulgarian citizens were being evacuated from areas bordering Yugoslavia; a bridge across the Danube was being built "with little commercial value" In it, it will link the Romanian city of Calafate with the Bulgarian city of Vidin; the Romanian government has extended the service of its troops; partisans based in Albania are returning to Greece; The supplies "are believed to be in excess of Albania's normal needs"; the Soviets began teaching Russian among the Czech armed forces; and Budapest propaganda broadcasts "slow enough to be recorded" outlined specific instructions for the destruction of Yugoslav industry and agriculture. (Yugoslav Prime Minister Joseph Broz Tito insisted on independence from Moscow, even though he was a communist.) The CIA concluded:

Throughout the Soviet sphere of influence, the trend toward military, economic, and psychological preparations continued.Moreover, there are signs that some phases of this plan are accelerating in somewhat urgent fashion.And several projects will be completed this fall, especially in the Balkan countries and China.

However, there is not yet enough evidence to draw firm conclusions about the Soviet Union's near-term intentions.

On Oct. 10, in an analysis applauded by intelligence agencies at the Defense and State Departments, the CIA reaffirmed its earlier assessment that China probably would not enter the war because doing so would do more harm than good.The CIA concluded that:

A full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea should be considered still possible, but taking all known factors into account, it can be concluded that Chinese intervention in 1950 was probably not possible unless the Soviet Union decided to start a global war.Intervention during this period will probably be limited to continued clandestine support for the North Koreans.

The CIA believed in late October that the North Koreans were entering a period of protracted guerrilla warfare, but there was no indication that China and the Soviet Union would intervene.According to U.S. estimates, only 10 North Korean remnants of seven divisions were still fighting; another 7 were north of the 2th parallel but were cut off behind the United Nations lines; Ten thousand people remained in South Korea to fight guerrillas, although "they obviously did not have a unified leadership and mutual coordination".The CIA does offer a warning: "The Chinese Communist Party's large purchases of medical supplies abroad in recent months can be seen as meeting a large number of normal needs; but the sharp increase in purchases since the outbreak of the Korean War can also indicate that in military stockpiles."

A top-secret—and, as it turned out, most accurate—intelligence assembled by the CIA, it was provided by a daring ex-Chinese Nationalist officer who voluntarily infiltrated the mainland in the late summer of 1950 to learn about military affairs in "Manchuria." situation.In the days before the Communists came to power, the officer had served in the Nationalist army in the northern provinces.Many of his former colleagues are now serving in the People's Liberation Army. "From his conversations with them and from his own careful observation," reports Harry Rositzk of the CIA, "he obtained with reasonable accuracy the numbers of Chinese Communist forces along the borders of 'Manchuria' and North Korea. and deployment." These reports, along with other intelligence, "sent a clear warning to the United Nations forces that the Communists were about to cross the Yalu River.  …"

Still, none of the intelligence agencies—the CIA, the military, the State Department—answered the central question: Even if the Chinese were able to intervene, would they do so?And if the Chinese do enter the war, the United States has no effective contingency plans to use.From the perspective of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the policy is clear. "We all agree that if the Chinese Communist Party enters North Korea, we will withdraw." General Bradley said at a meeting of the US and British chiefs of staff in Washington on October 10.

Willoughby counts the number of Chinese

Reports from Far Eastern Command intelligence under General Willoughby were equally unhelpful.Just as Willoughby did not foresee the outbreak of war in June, his intelligence personnel were able to see many individual trees in summer and early autumn, but never saw the entire forest-that is, they found many signs that the Chinese may There were signs of intervention, but never to the point of convincing MacArthur and Willoughby that such intervention was imminent.

The most important development that Far Eastern Command identified in late summer was the gradual movement of Chinese forces from the southern and central provinces to "Manchuria" in the north. A "Daily Intelligence Summary" circulated by the Far East Command on July 7 determined that China's military strength in "Manchuria" was 6 (18.9 were regular troops and the rest were militias), and the regular army in North China was 11.5. .By August, the number of regular troops in "Manchuria" had increased to 17.6, and by September 8 to 24.6.However, it is believed that this action was mainly the return of the Fourth Field Army after a successful campaign against the Nationalists, mainly in central China.None of Willoughby's analysis during this period mentions that these troops might have been moved northward to enter the war.

But Willoughby's Daily Intelligence Roundup does contain a great deal of outlandish intelligence.For example, a report he circulated on October 10 stated that as of September 1, 9 divisions of the Chinese Communist Army had been found in North Korea, of which 10 divisions were in the northwest border area, and the locations of the other divisions were unknown. Know.The next day, another report added the prevarication: Far East Command was unable to determine whether these soldiers in the "Chinese Communist Army" were actually Chinese or North Koreans serving in the Chinese military.

On October 10, an American reconnaissance plane flying along the Yalu River spotted 18 to 75 planes at an airfield near Andong, "Manchuria", across the river from North Korea. Lieutenant General Strattmeyer was taken aback.The next day, a reconnaissance plane was sent to the Andong area.The presence of such a powerful air force was clearly at odds with what MacArthur had told President Truman at Wake Island only three days earlier - that the Chinese would certainly not be in the war.To Willoughby's relief, the planes were no longer in Anton.The second reconnaissance found no "signs of an aircraft" and only a motor vehicle on one of the runways.In addition, rail and road transport also decreased compared with the previous four days.

Willoughby breathed a sigh of relief.He did believe that the sighting of Chinese planes on October 10 was "real", but his explanation for this was: "Long-distance flights with large fleets and short stops at selected airports as their training It is a sensible and reasonable tactic for the Chinese Communist Air Force...." Another possibility is that the sudden mass deployment of Chinese aircraft is part of the "threat with force" that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai is promoting part of the policy.

Stratmeyer was also unimpressed by the discovery of these Russian fighters.He said in a cable to Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg that the planes were diverted to Anton, presumably to add vividness and authenticity to "the aggressive rhetoric and threats of the Chinese Communist Party leaders. They presumably felt that, given our obvious desire to avoid a border incident, there was little risk in a show of force from them."If the Chinese wanted to fight with these planes, they would attack the vulnerable surveillance plane, Strattmeyer said.And if they plan to use those planes in the future, "it's absolutely impossible for them to deploy them in a way that gets the attention south of the border."

(End of this chapter)