The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 56
A major source of intelligence for Willoughby was the U.S. military and diplomatic establishment in Taiwan, which received a great deal of information from the Chinese Nationalist intelligence system. (Willoughby's Daily Intelligence Roundup sometimes admits that some of Taiwan's reports are "quite suspect.") On the same page, Far East Command cites such reports: (a) According to the U.S. 7th Fleet intelligence reported that Chinese troops would engage in combat in Korea; (b) Zhou Enlai "privately stated" in mid-August that the Chinese would not fight in Korea or anywhere outside of China "unless they were attacked" in order to avoid the They wish to do harm to the matter of membership in the United Nations.Two days later, Far Eastern Command reported that a meeting had been held in Peking, attended by Chinese, Soviets, "two Czechoslovaks, one German, one Poles, one French and one North Koreans," they discussed extensive and substantial assistance to North Korea, including sending 8 Chinese troops to the war. (Willoughby took this report with a grain of salt.)
However, another Willoughby report said: "At a meeting in Beijing in September, the issue of Chinese participation in the Korean War was the subject of intense debate." A faction headed by Mao Zedong opposed active intervention, Zhou Enlai and others "Strongly advocate intervention. It is said that the final decision requires the CCP to intervene if the United Nations forces cross the 9th parallel."The Far East Command's comment on this is: "An independent intelligence source designated as C-3 is convinced that despite the aforementioned decision, the Chinese Communists will not take action because negotiations for a seat in the United Nations are ongoing."

two days later:

With the North Korean army disintegrating, the pressing question facing the UN forces was the attitude of the Chinese communists and the Soviets.Both have been indirectly involved in supplying supplies, and will they intervene, overtly or covertly, to save their neighbors?It is currently believed that Russia finds out that if it stays out of the conflict, it leaves the CCP's idle millions of troops to accomplish this task as part of a grand scheme to deplete US resources in the geographical rat hole of the East It is very convenient and economical for it.All intelligence attention was thus focused on the actions of the Yalu River and the elusive forces of Lin Biao (a military hero of the Chinese Civil War who was believed to be the commander of the troops mobilized in "Manchuria"). …The Chinese military leader recently threatened to march into North Korea if the U.S. military crossed the [-]th parallel, which probably falls under the category of diplomatic blackmail.This decision, if it exists, is also undetectable to all intelligence agencies.It was a decision to go to war at the highest level, a decision made by the Kremlin and Peking.

A warning from the Chinese

Much to the embarrassment of intelligence analysts, they realized in hindsight that the serious warning, which they denounced as "diplomatic blackmail," was exactly what the Chinese intended: it made it clear to the United States that if the U.S. military crossed the [-]th parallel, , the course of action China will take.The dissemination channel of these warnings is India's ambassador to Beijing, Panikha, who is fiercely pro-communist and anti-American.Pannica has often relayed diplomatic signals (though sometimes unreliably) from the beginning of the war.

Chinese leaders have turned to Panika as a useful tool.He was entertained and praised by high officials, which only added to his pretentiousness.They knew full well that the fraudulent information they fed him would be passed swiftly through his Foreign Office to London and then to America.

What the Chinese told the ambassador this time, however, turned out to be genuine warnings.Panikha had dinner with Nie Rongzhen, the acting chief of the Chinese army's general staff, on Sept. 9.Pannica found Nie, with his "round face and shaved head, to give the impression of a Prussian officer," friendly and frank.Over dinner, the general told Pennegar that his people "are not going to stand by and let the Americans push their borders."When Paniker objected that the destructive power of total war would be enormous, Nie smiled and replied: "We have considered this issue. They will even drop atomic bombs on us, but a country cannot defend its independence without making sacrifices. "Nie believed that a war could not be won by aerial bombing alone, and he also did not believe that the United States would send combat troops to China to fight a war.

Panikha immediately reported the conversation to the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, from where it was soon in British hands and forwarded to London.Then on the afternoon of September 9, word reached the British embassy in Washington.Counselor Hubert Graves of the British embassy hurried to the State Department to report an "emergency" to Livingston Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.Merchant asked Graves how he felt about the situation.Graves said British diplomats "didn't take Panikha's concerns seriously as a erratic and unreliable reporter" but were concerned that the reports could upset Indians , so that they no longer support the war in the United Nations.

The State Department unanimously believes that this is nothing more than China's propaganda of false intimidation.

A week later, Pennygar came back with another message, this time carrying a warning from someone higher up. Shortly after midnight on October 10, the Chinese Foreign Ministry awoke him from his sleep and informed him to go immediately to the residence of Premier Zhou Enlai.Zhou invited the Indian to tea, chatted politely with him, and apologized for waking him up in the middle of the night.Zhou Enlai then sent the message that if the Americans crossed the 2th parallel, China would be forced to intervene in North Korea.In addition, Zhou is eager to find a peaceful solution.

Pennycar asked Zhou if he had heard anything that Americans had indeed crossed the border.

Yes, Zhou replied that he had heard that the Americans had crossed the [-]th parallel, but he did not know where (only American patrols had crossed the [-]th parallel at the time).

What if the South Koreans cross the [-]th Parallel?
Zhou's answer was crisp and forceful: "It doesn't matter to the South Koreans, but the US invasion of North Korea will be resisted by China."

The warning from Paniker this time has attracted great attention, but there are still various interpretations.Government officials were visibly tense on the morning of Oct. 10.A report from the Associated Press said that a nine-mile-long Chinese column armed with artillery was crossing the Yalu River from "Manchuria" into North Korea.The South Korean army was reconnoitering the abandoned defensive positions of the North Korean People's Army, and MacArthur was on standby at the 3th parallel.Now, China's premier has issued what appears to be an unmistakable warning that Americans should not go too far.

Threats or intimidation?
Still, much of the government class once again dismissed the threat as "intimidation" (though, for example, Livingston Merchant argued that "we should take it extremely seriously").So did Alexis Johnson, deputy chief of Northeast Asian Affairs, who suggested to his supervisor, Dean Rusk, that "it is well worth further exploring the possibility of completely using South Korean forces to conquer North Korea." Secretary of State Eich In testimony before Congress seven months later, Johnson admitted that he and others in Washington with access to all the intelligence "had come to the conclusion that it was more likely that they (the Chinese Communists) would not get involved than that intervention".General Bradley agreed with Acheson when he addressed the military community.

U.S. diplomatic missions in various countries have also offered their own predictions.Ambassador to Moscow Alan Kirk expressed surprise that a "message of such a serious nature" had not been conveyed more directly to the UN or the US.Consul General James Wilkinson of the Hong Kong Consulate, the main U.S. watchdog for China, said it was a "threat of force" from China.The U.S. ambassador to the Netherlands, Selden Chapin, reported some other tidbits gleaned from Dutch diplomats.In private conversations with a Dutch diplomat in Beijing, the chief of the Chinese army's general staff said China "has no choice but to join the war" if it crosses the 50th parallel, although war with the United States would set back China's development by [-] years. If China does not resist, it will be "forever subject to the United States."The Dutchman also said that Nehru had telegraphed Mao Zedong that the United States, Britain and France had decided that the [-]th Parallel could not be crossed without an express mandate from the United Nations (which was not stated) and that India was working to prevent This authorization.

Britain's response has been far less equivocal than that of the United States.British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was alarmed.From the cabin of the Queen Mary (where he was visiting the Commonwealth of Nations), he wired the Foreign Office to work with the Americans to draft a United Nations statement that would prevent Chinese intervention and send a message to China Provide an opportunity to have a say as the UN discusses the pending resolution on North Korea. (It will be recalled that the US does not want China to participate in any UN talks on the grounds that China is not a member of the UN and therefore has no legal status in the North Korea debate.)
On the afternoon of October 10, Secretary of State Acheson tried to harden the British at a meeting of the United States Mission to the United Nations in New York.Bringing the Chinese into the debate is too late, and doing so will only further confuse the issue.He agreed that crossing the 4th parallel would be dangerous, but "at present he believes that indecision and timidity invite greater danger".Acheson dismissed Zhou Enlai's private conversation with Pannica because the Chinese could deny it at any time.If the Chinese "are going to play poker," Acheson said, "they should be showing more cards than they are doing now."He finally said: "We should not be overly alarmed by what may be a false threat from the CCP."

By the end of the meeting, the British seemed satisfied.

In any event, the Chinese threat did cause the Joint Chiefs of Staff to scramble to remedy the instructions it had sent to MacArthur.In an apparent oversight, none of the previous directives specified what to do if the Chinese intervened in North Korea without declaring their intentions.With Truman's consent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a telegram to MacArthur on October 10, instructing:
In the future, if the CCP uses a large number of troops openly or covertly anywhere in North Korea without prior announcement, you should use your own judgment and continue to act as long as the troops under your command are likely to win.

In any case, if you want to conduct any military activities against targets in China, you must have prior authorization from Washington.

The last sentence was not intended to tie MacArthur's hands or imply that he would be denied the opportunity to strike bases in China.In fact, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council agreed in August that if the Chinese attacked, the United States would not only use its forces in North Korea to resist, but also "take appropriate naval and air actions against China outside North Korea."The president has yet to give final approval to the decision.But the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked MacArthur to consult Washington before bombing air bases in Manchuria or blocking the Chinese coast, which it believed would ensure that politically significant decisions were not made in Tokyo.

When the CIA prepared a briefing for President Truman to use at the Wake Island meeting in mid-October, the information Pennegar provided was part of an intelligence study.The CIA stood by its view of previous months that Chinese ground forces "can intervene effectively" but "not necessarily be decisive in warfare."It concluded, however: "Despite Zhou Enlai's statements, the movement of Chinese troops into 'Manchuria,' the rhetoric of propaganda, and the incidents of border violations, there are no convincing indications that the CCP does intend to intervene fully in North Korea. "If China defeated the United States, such an intervention would give China a chance to "make a name for itself," though the CIA cited a host of reasons why China would not intervene.Chief among these reasons: "The Chinese communists undoubtedly fear the consequences of war with the United States. The scale of their domestic programs dictates that the regime's entire domestic programs and economy will be jeopardized by the burden of war."

This CIA analysis was written on October 10.A week later, on October 12, Willoughby's intelligence service from the vantage point of Tokyo came to a similar conclusion.However, throughout October, Far East Command continued to receive sporadic intelligence about the activities of Chinese Communist forces in "Manchuria." The Daily Intelligence Roundup of October 10 again stated that the presence of large numbers of Chinese troops in "Manchuria" is a fait accompli; therefore, it is also a fait accompli that they are "capable" of "crossing" the Yalu River in Andong or elsewhere fact.But Willoughby concluded: "However, the local intelligence agencies do not have the authority to make such a decision. It will depend on whether the Kremlin is highly prepared to use the 'Manchurian' Chinese army on standby to fight this war." .”

An officer in Tokyo disagreed with Willoughby's estimate and approached him with his views, but to no avail. One morning in mid-October, Rear Admiral Arley Burke, deputy chief of staff of the Naval Commander Far East Command, spoke with intelligence officers on his staff, and one of them reviewed the raw intelligence they had been receiving, saying: " To us, it looks like the Chinese are in North Korea."

Burke reported the situation to Willoughby, who called in his intelligence experts to analyze the data.Their interpretation was diametrically opposed to that of the Navy, and Willoughby agreed with them. "I also don't think they're there," he said, "and I don't think they're going to come in either."

Two or three days later, Navy intelligence officers again concluded that the Chinese were in Korea, and Burke reported to Willoughby again.But Burke didn't think Willoughby's case was convincing this time around.When he returned to his office, he told his superior, Admiral Turner Joy, that he intended to leave one-fifth of the transport ships that came to deliver supplies in the Far East, so that he would have enough ships in case of emergency Make a retreat.Joy (and the Admiralty) agree.Thus, over the next few weeks, Burke was able to stock up on some 90 transports.

Stalin intervened

But the momentous episode that will define China's intervention took place far beyond the gaze of any Western intelligence agency.In early autumn, Stalin received Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai in Sochi, the resort of the Soviet premier.Zhou Enlai came to visit Stalin at the order of Mao Zedong.According to Nikita Khrushchev: "Zhou Enlai asked Stalin whether Chinese troops should enter North Korean territory in order to block the advance of the Americans and South Koreans." Stalin and Zhou Enlai at the beginning "seemed to come to a conclusion , arguing that China's intervention will be fruitless".But after a long discussion, they made a decision: China will give North Korea "active support".Both Zhou Enlai and Stalin, according to Khrushchev, "believed that these forces were fully capable of controlling the situation."With Stalin's support, Zhou Enlai flew back to Beijing.

Nothing in Khrushchev's account mentions that Stalin expressed any willingness to bring Soviet troops into battle.Just as in the spring of 1950 Stalin approved Kim Il-sung's invasion of South Korea, the Soviets were acting through a proxy state, this time China.

(End of this chapter)