The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 58 China's Intervention

Chapter 58 China's Intervention (2)
The officers of the 3rd Battalion realized that the road to the south was controlled by the enemy and decided to retreat by land.They lined up the vehicles side by side, and exhausted soldiers slept in the cabs of trucks, on the carriages, and in foxholes, waiting for the order to retreat.But a company of the Chinese army sneaked across the cordon—the sentries mistook them for South Korean troops—and suddenly, the sound of bugles filled the silent night sky.A soldier later reported: "I was woken up and asked if I could hear a herd of horses running.  … Then came the sound of bugles, but at a distance. Then someone blew a whistle, and a few minutes later, There was a sea of ​​flames in our area." Lieutenant Hill thought he was dreaming: "I heard a sound of bugles and galloping horseshoes, and then a group of indistinct figures seemed to descend from the sky, and immediately came to what they found. Anyone who shoots and stabs."

The two sides were chaotic against chaotic, which saved Captain Fillmore McCabe from death.One bullet knocked off his helmet; seconds later, a second bullet wounded his shoulder blade.With the Chinese in hot pursuit, he ducked behind a jeep and fired a round of carbines into a group of about 30 Chinese.Due to excessive blood loss and exhaustion, McCabe fell into a ditch.Three Chinese stabbed him with bayonets, but they did not surrender his gun.McCabe later said they were "talking rapidly to each other and seemed to be clueless".He immediately took advantage of the situation, pointing to the road below, with no intention other than to confuse the Chinese.They argued for a while longer, then walked away.McCabe hurried to the battalion command post, but encountered more Chinese.They touched him with bayonets and let him go, still with his carbine.McCabe finally returned to the command post, wounded but alive.

The battalion command post was set up in a bomb shelter on the side of the hill, which became the last refuge of the Americans.The defenders fought off the Chinese with what the battalion chief of staff, Major Will Moriarty, called "cowboys and Indians" tactics of point-blank pistol fire, boxing, and throwing grenades at critical moments.Moriarty's strong command kept the battalion in combat.During the brief break in fighting at dawn, he and others were able to get 170 wounded back into the perimeter.They had no time to count the dead.

Given the battalion's casualties and the strength of the Chinese, the only hope of survival for the 3rd Battalion was outside rescue, which was impossible. During the daytime on 11 November, remnants of the 2th Cavalry attempted to come to the rescue, but the officers quickly realized that they could not break through the Chinese blockade.Their lack of artillery, and the heavy smoke that hung over the field, resulted in the loss of 5 men in rescue attempts by the two battalions of the regiment during a pitched battle that afternoon.

Later that day, General Milburn, commander of the corps, met with General Guy, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division, in a silent depression just a few thousand yards from the front line.One of the cruelest demands of military command is to save the many at the expense of the few.Milburn spoke to Guy and the staff officers.He moved away from the crowd, pondered for a moment, and then came to a decision: any attempt to rescue the 3rd Battalion would probably be futile, and might be dangerous to the entire regiment.Milburn told Guy and other officers: "This is the most heartbreaking decision I've ever made in my entire military career, and it goes against the tradition of the Army to leave these men alone. I don't like this decision, and I don't like it. You are not expected to like the decision, but it has now been made." This was the gist of Milburn's instructions to his men.

So the order was issued.Attempts to rescue had been abandoned, and the surrounded 3rd Battalion was now on their own.If it wants to survive, it must fight alone.

That afternoon, the news reached the officers and soldiers of the battalion, and the officers and non-commissioned officers decided to wait until dawn before moving.At dusk, the Chinese artillery and mortars began to fire salvos.That night, the Chinese launched six attacks, each with 6 or more men.Captain McCabe, who was seriously injured, tried his best and finally climbed out of the destroyed command post.He was shocked to see piles of Chinese corpses.He estimated that there were more than 400 dead bodies around the perimeter.

On the third day, November 11, the heavy bombardment of phosphorus incendiary bombs made the battalion aware that the final Chinese attack had begun.General Milburn's decision the previous day was now about to become reality: to survive, the men of the 4rd Battalion would have to leave behind some 3 wounded comrades, who would almost certainly be captured. "Damn it, I don't like doing it," one soldier said to his friend, who was also a private. "I don't like it either," replied his friend. "If you can go back to Tokyo, then, give me a drink and a woman." Captain Clarence Anderson was a brave doctor, He stayed with the wounded and remained in a prisoner of war camp until the end of the war.The battalion commander, Major Robert Ormond, succumbed to his wounds a few hours later.

The escapees spent the night marching—or rather crawling—through the bleak autumn rain to avoid the Chinese, but they were unsuccessful.Several times they thought they had slipped past the Chinese lines, but the enemy kept coming. On November 11, they were besieged again, but they refused to surrender.At the discretion of the few surviving officers, they divided into groups in the hope that some would escape, but almost none did.Most were either killed or captured before sunset.The 5rd Battalion of the 8th Cavalry ceased to exist.The 3rd Battalion lost a total of more than 3 officers and soldiers in the fighting around Yunshan.

brink of disaster

By November 11, General Walton Walker was powerless to do anything but clean up the mess.Chinese intervention had nullified MacArthur's plan to swoop down on the Yalu, and all Walker could do was to hold a beachhead on the north bank of the Ching Chuan, which he hoped would allow him to resume his offensive.The task fell to the 2th Commonwealth Brigade and the 27th Infantry, 24th Division.

During the continuous offensive, the Chinese Communist Army shrewdly concentrated the attack point on the junction of the South Korean Army and the Eighth Army near Junyu-ri. Their goal was obviously to break through the defense line of the South Korean Army, encircle the Eighth Army in a roundabout way, and force the United Nations Army to attack. Back off again.The Chinese repeated their pattern of attack again and again: popping up at night through seemingly impassable mountains where neither American nor South Korean troops were stationed.They are fierce and tough in individual combat, able to appear unexpectedly in the rear of enemy troops.

For example, during the night of November 11-5, the Chinese Communist Army followed the field telephone lines to the position of Company C of the 6th Infantry Regiment on a hill.Despite constant warnings from the Chinese that they were good at fighting at night, many Americans were trapped in their sleeping bags and killed on the spot.

One American who was not caught off guard was Corporal Mitchell Red Crowder, an Indian from Friendship, Wisconsin.He sounded the alarm from an observation post on the ridge before he was attacked by a group of Chinese only 100 feet away.Red Crowder returned fire with his Browning automatic, but a burst of fire from the Chinese knocked him to the ground.He braced himself to his feet, wrapped one arm around a tree, and fired a Browning rifle at close range until he was killed by Chinese bullets.Another soldier in the company, Private First Class Joseph Balboni, suddenly spotted the Chinese soldiers 75 feet in front of them.The Chinese charged, and he fired at them with his Browning automatic rifle and held his ground until he was killed.

On the night of November 11th and 5th, the Chinese focused on attacking the beachheads of the US and British troops on the north bank of the Qingchuan River.Company C of the 6st Field Artillery Battalion was attacked from behind and was surrounded.The commanding officer, Captain Howard Moore, deployed his 61mm howitzer and fired flat fire at the Chinese—105 rounds at close range of 50 yards.The Chinese tried to rush through the battery and blow up a bridge behind the company's position, but failed.When a British force came to rescue C Company at dawn, there were more than 1 dead Chinese lying around the battery.On the same night, the Australians also bayoneted off another Chinese attack on another part of the same front.

the face of the enemy

As more and more captives fell into the hands of American and South Korean troops, interrogators began to piece together a clear picture of the covert Chinese intervention.Chinese troops began crossing the Yalu River into North Korea on October 10 or 13.They hid in caves and heavily wooded areas during the day and marched only at night, until they reached positions on the southern slopes of the high mountains about 14 miles south of the Yalu River - which, according to Chinese high-level command, was clearly inaccessible to American and South Korean forces front.There they were condescending, overlooking the only way the coalition forces must pass.

To the astonishment of intelligence officials, they learned that no fewer than five fully armed Chinese field armies (each with three divisions) had quietly advanced into North Korea, with a total strength of nearly 5 troops.Among them, 3 armies encountered the 10th Army and the Korean 3nd Army head-on in the central mountainous area.The other 8 armies, or 2 divisions, remained in the western mountains as reserves and did not participate in what was later known as the Chinese "first battle".Contrary to what Willoughby's intelligence analysts asserted, the troops were all Chinese.Field interrogators found no mixing of North Koreans and Chinese.

U.S. field commanders reported that the Chinese military was far more agile and sophisticated than the "Asian ragtag" MacArthur mocked.The Chinese infantry were not armed with any heavier weapons other than mortars, but they were able to fire excellent levels of fire against strong American and South Korean positions, especially at night.Their patrols were effective in searching out American positions.The attack plan they drew up was to attack from behind, cut off the retreat and supply lines, and then launch a frontal offensive.Their basic tactic is a V-shaped attacking formation.The Chinese moved the enemy force in this formation, which would then encircle the edge of the V; at the same time another force moved into the opening of the V to prevent any attempt to escape and to block reinforcements.

During the "First Battle" the Chinese showed amazing sympathy for the captives, and especially for the wounded.The Chinese would put the American wounded on stretchers, carry them to the side of the road, then retreat and stop shooting, waiting for the UN field medics to remove them.The Chinese did not have humanitarian motives in doing this - they advised prisoners of war to "tell his companions" about the humane treatment they had received from the Chinese, and urged American soldiers to "turn their guns on the officers."The Chinese military apparently believed their own propaganda that American soldiers were victims of capitalist oppression, desperate to escape "imperialist hell" in order to gain freedom in a communist paradise.

According to the "combat experience" pamphlets that the Chinese handed out to their front-line troops after the first weeks of fighting, Chinese army officers have a mixed view of American soldiers.They admired American technology and the ability to coordinate mortar, tank and artillery fire with the rate of fire of air support, transport and infantry fire, but the Chinese command establishment dismissed the individual capabilities of ordinary American soldiers.A booklet entitled "Basic Summary of Yunshan Combat Experience" distributed by the 66th Army of the Chinese Communist Army made the following evaluation of the 8th Cavalry Regiment.Once American Soldiers are cut off—

They will randomly discard all heavy weapons everywhere and pretend to be dead. ...The infantry are timid and afraid of death, and do not have the courage to attack and defend well.

They depended heavily on planes, tanks and artillery, and feared my firepower.If they heard gunshots as they advanced, they would cower. …they are afraid of pushing too far. ...they are only good at fighting by day...not used to fighting at night or hand to hand. ... Once they are defeated, they will be defeated.Without the use of mortars, they are completely at a loss...dejected and demoralized. ... They were besieged in Yunshan for several days, but nothing was achieved.They fear being cut off.When supplies stop, its infantry loses morale.

In view of these weaknesses, the Chinese pamphlet proposes tactics that should be adopted in the future: make quick decisions, outflank the enemy, and cut off the enemy's rear; avoid roads and open terrain when attacking, "to prevent enemy tanks and artillery from blocking offensive operations "; Carry out night battles, clarify the purpose, and maintain the connection between the platoons. "First attack with a small patrol force, and then sound the bugle. At the same time, the large forces follow up in columns."

Chinese "volunteers"?
The Chinese publicly acknowledged the presence of their troops in North Korea in a Nov. 11 radio broadcast, saying they were volunteer troops protecting hydroelectric areas, entering North Korea specifically to protect dams and power facilities along the Yalu River.The Chinese use of the word "volunteer" confuses Willoughby.He speculates that the extremely cunning and "desperate for face" Chinese want to "have both."The Chinese described their army as volunteers and insisted that there were no organized troops in North Korea so that if their army was defeated they would not be discredited, but they could take credit for helping the North Koreans.Still, Willoughby concluded with a caveat that sent a shudder through Washington:

While the indications so far point to sporadic Chinese involvement for nominally limited purposes, it is critical not to lose sight of the enormous potential power that the Chinese Communists have at their disposal.

If the Chinese communists decide at high levels to intervene all-out, they can immediately commit 44 of the 29 divisions they currently have deployed along the Yalu River and can cover a major offensive with as many as 150 aircraft .

This cable, combined with reports that the Eighth Army was withdrawing under the Chinese offensive, led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to request MacArthur's assessment of the situation on November 8.But the general, despite the realities of the battlefield, still dismissed the prospect of full-scale Chinese intervention or the idea that the situation was spiraling out of control.In his Nov. 11 call back, he claimed that it was impossible to "assess the current status of Chinese Communist Party intervention," although his intelligence agencies had raised several possibilities, the worst of which was China's intention to enter the war fully and openly.MacArthur did not think that would happen, although he acknowledged that a full-blown Chinese intervention was a "clear possibility" and that it would be a "major decision of the most serious international significance".Instead, MacArthur sees the Chinese intervention as a combination of three other courses of action, namely: covert intervention for diplomatic purposes; the use of "volunteers" to maintain a foothold in North Korea; People went to war expecting that they would only encounter Korean troops and that defeating the Koreans would not be very difficult.

In any case, this return call is for reassurance. "I suggest that when the conditions may not be mature enough, do not draw conclusions hastily. I believe that the final estimate needs to accumulate more comprehensive military intelligence." No matter in terms of tone or content, this telegram has no Suggesting that an emergency has arisen, or that the situation is getting out of control.

However, MacArthur's behavior has always been contrary to the carefree tone of his telegrams to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.Lieutenant General George Strattermeyer had drawn up plans for the first use of incendiary bombs to intensify the bombing of North Korean arsenals and communications hubs.The order he was about to give his combatant commander, Emmett O'Donnell Jr., was crisp: Raze these cities to the ground.

MacArthur was still not satisfied with this.While Stratmeyer took his plan to Mansion One for approval, MacArthur sketched out a more extreme two-week battle plan."Pilots engaged in combat must be flown to exhaustion if necessary," he ordered. He ordered Strattermeyer to destroy the "Korean portion" of all international bridges on the "Manchurian" border.According to the air force commander, this means that for the first time it will be possible to cross the Yalu River from the North Korean border by air.The Far East Air Force should then begin bombing the area south of the Yalu River and "destroy all communication facilities and all equipment, factories, cities, and villages," except for the Rajin and Sufeng dams and other power plants.MacArthur did exhort that "the frontier must not be violated".

(End of this chapter)

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