The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 59 China's Intervention (3)
One of MacArthur's designated targets was Sinuiju, the North Korean city across the river from Andong in "Manchuria," an attractive target.The government evacuated by Prime Minister Kim Il Sung had taken refuge here, and the city's warehouses and houses housed leading North Korean officials and troops.Two three-quarter-mile-long bridges connect the two cities, one is a mixed rail and road bridge and the other is a dual-track rail bridge.

MacArthur told the Army staff about the plan in a routine teletype meeting with the Pentagon.No one in the Pentagon sees reason to question that.However, Strattmeyer reported the operation to Washington in a "reported copy" of his order to the Air Force.Someone in the Pentagon felt that the situation should be reported to a higher level.With that, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett was busy within minutes.

The operation was three and a half hours away when Lovett learned the news, so national security sprang into action.Lovett hurriedly dragged Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to Secretary of State Acheson's office.Lovett didn't like MacArthur's plan.From the map, the waters near the mouth of the Yalu River are very shallow, so destroying the river bridge will not prevent the movement of troops (although it will affect railway traffic).Moreover, the danger of the aircraft accidentally bombing Anton and other targets in "Manchuria" was "very great."

Rusk agreed, noting that the United States had pledged not to take offensive action on the "Manchurian" coast of the Yalu River until it had consulted with the British.The British cabinet was meeting that day to discuss the issue of Chinese intervention, and "inappropriate actions on our side may have serious consequences."The United States also intends to bring the issue of Chinese interference to the United Nations within days.Additionally, Rusk mentioned the possibility of Soviet involvement.The Joint Chiefs of Staff also expressed doubts about the necessity of the bombing.For example, General Collins believed that MacArthur's sudden change in attitude showed a "frightened and uneasy mood."

Rusk later wrote that, after a brief discussion, it was decided that the attack should be postponed "until its reasons are more clearly known."Lovett called Secretary of Defense Marshall, and Marshall agreed: "Unless some large-scale crossing operation is found to threaten the safety of our troops, this operation is unwise." A bureaucratic minuets began .Lovett then called Air Force Secretary Thomas Finlert to tell him what had happened and suggested that the operation must be put on hold until the president made a decision.

Acheson then called the president in Kansas City—coincidentally, because it all happened on Election Day, and Truman was determined to vote there, despite requests elsewhere—and they chatted briefly.Truman would only authorize such bombing to prevent an "imminent and serious threat" to U.S. forces.Acheson told the President that there was no such reference in MacArthur's report the day before, although he mentioned that there was a Chinese reserve on the Chinese side of the Yalu River.Truman first proposed that Acheson call MacArthur, and then agreed that such military-related communications "should be conducted through the military department."

An hour and 90 minutes before the 29 B-1s took off for the mission, Lovett ordered MacArthur not to bomb targets within five miles of the Manchurian border.Lovett also asked MacArthur to provide specific information on the necessity of bombing Sinuiju and the Yalu River Bridge.What puzzled Truman's strategists—Acheson, Marshall, and Bradley—was MacArthur's sudden change in attitude.Just two days earlier, MacArthur had warned Washington not to act hastily and suggested that everyone wait and see what the Chinese wanted.By any measure, the bombing of Sinuiju was a clear escalation of the war.

Of particular concern to Truman was the attitude of the British.However, the United Kingdom that the president has in mind at this moment is more of a show than a name.Great Britain is no longer a world power.In the post-war years, the British Empire shrank like a balloon with holes in it.Still, the Anglophile Acheson saw Britain as a major world power, and gave undue weight to the views of a hamstrung and down-on-his-luck India.During the Korean War, India received disproportionate attention from the State Department.

MacArthur was furious

The cancellation of the bombing of Sinuiju made MacArthur furious.In an extraordinary call back, he accused Washington of posing a danger to his troops and suggested he would make the request directly to the president, beyond the Joint Chiefs of Staff.In his telegram, he also disclosed the dangerous battlefield situation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the first time:
A large army of people and a large amount of supplies are rolling in from "Manchuria" across all the bridges on the Yalu River.This action... puts the entire force under my command in danger of being wiped out.The actual operation of crossing the river... can be carried out under the cover of darkness, and the distance between the Yalu River and our defense line is so close that the enemy can deploy against our army without facing serious air attack.The only way to prevent enemy reinforcements...is to destroy these bridges and give...maximum air damage to all facilities supporting the Chinese advance in the northern area.Every hour of delay will cost Americans and the rest of the UN in precious blood.The main crossing at Sinuiju was to be bombed in the next few hours, and the mission was practically ready.I am suspending this attack and carrying out your orders at the worst protest I can make.The actions I have ordered are in full compliance with the principles of war and the resolutions and instructions I have received from the United Nations, and do not constitute any minor acts of belligerence against Chinese territory, although it is from there that flagrant violations of International Law have occurred.I do not want to exaggerate too much the physical and psychological disastrous consequences of your restrictions.I hope that this matter will be brought to the attention of the President immediately, for I believe that your orders are likely to lead to a catastrophe, and I cannot bear the responsibility if the President did not have personal and direct knowledge of the situation.Time is so short, I ask for an immediate reconsideration of your decision.While waiting for your decision, nature fully obeys your orders.

General Bradley was appalled by the sudden urgency of MacArthur's telegram and by the acerbic language he used, such that a lesser general would have been dismissed if he spoke in such an arrogant tone.He immediately called the president and read the telegram to the president.Truman was so worried about this that he spoke of the dangers of bombing so close to Manchuria, fearing that an "overeager pilot" might incur Soviet retaliation.Truman had Bradley authorize the bombing of Sinuiju because MacArthur "felt the urgency of the situation acutely."

Truman really had little choice, since MacArthur's November 11 telegram would put him in the spotlight should the American army be broken.Truman aptly saw MacArthur's telegram as a statement on the record that could be re-quoted to absolve the general of any defeat in the Korean War and to place blame on those in Washington who did not follow his instructions. Advice to act on the boss.

The November 11 telegram, sent shortly after MacArthur's use of non-Korean troops near the Yalu River, put the Joint Chiefs on the defensive again.The chiefs of staff, therefore, were extremely apt to call back, using language that reflected their misgivings.

At the beginning of their telegram they subtly charged: "The situation described in your (November 11th) telegram, compared with the situation reported in the last sentence of your (November 6th) telegram which we received earlier, has Considerable change." They agreed that blowing up the Yalu Bridge would be "significantly helpful" to the security of UN forces, "if "this action" would not lead to the Chinese committing more ... forces, and even the participation of the Soviet Union ".They then reiterated what they had said to MacArthur many times: that the administration did not want to do anything that would "expand the area of ​​conflict and put the United States at great risk."The Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized MacArthur to carry out the bombing of Sinuiju and bridges on the North Korean side of the Yalu River if he deemed it "essential to the security of your troops."They warned MacArthur to take "extreme care" to avoid bombing "Manchuria".

At the end of the telegram, the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized that "we must be notified in time of major changes in the situation" and reminded MacArthur that they had not received MacArthur's analysis of the entire battle situation requested three days ago.

In his reply to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 11, MacArthur cited more reasons for his air strikes.Intelligence has "indisputably" confirmed the presence of Chinese organized forces in North Korea.Although its strength is still unknown, the Chinese had seized the initiative against the Eighth Army and stalled the advance of the Tenth Army on the Eastern Front.If the enemy continues to build up its strength, MacArthur believes that it may be necessary to give up hope of continuing to advance, or even to retreat.However, he hoped to resume the offensive on the Western Front within 7 days, if he could hold back Chinese reinforcements. "Only by taking this initiative can an accurate assessment of the enemy's strength be possible," MacArthur insisted.

That last sentence seemed inconceivable to some Pentagon officials.One of these officials said many years later (after retiring as a three-star general): "The Chinese have shown with the 8th Army that they are strong enough to beat MacArthur all over the place. They didn't ambush us - they met us head-on , to halt our advance, and then push us back. When MacArthur's intelligence agency told him that the Chinese were bringing in massive reinforcements, he again insisted on putting his entire army in the mouth of that damned dragon. MacArthur's The situation couldn't be more clear: he was putting himself in a situation where he would inevitably collide head-on with the Chinese again. The safe way should be to collect intelligence first and then formulate a battle plan. However, MacArthur was by no means based on prudence and famous."

MacArthur implicitly dismissed President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as fools in the final part of his November 11 telegram.Bombing targets on the Yalu River was the only way to stop the Chinese surge, which posed a threat to his forces.This is the normal practice of blocking enemy traffic, "clearly defensive, but it is inconceivable that such an action would increase the degree of local intervention, or ... provoke a general war."The inviolability of "Manchuria" and Siberia had been "the chief responsibility of this command" since the beginning of the war.

The remarks sparked outrage in Washington.MacArthur was either prepared to disobey the advice, or he planned to continue to tease the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and Truman) until he had the power to do whatever he wanted.General Marshall, who has always been experienced and tactful in dealing with people, intends to appease MacArthur. In a long conciliatory reply to MacArthur, he understands that "when you fight a desperate battle in the winter mountain environment and the conditions are bound to be limited, difficulties faced".Marshall assured MacArthur that he enjoyed the full support of the President, the State Department, and the Department of Defense.

In his November 11 reply, MacArthur lashed out at a lengthy denunciation of the changed "character and culture" of the Chinese, which he claimed to know well. Very aggressive."MacArthur was convinced that "the Chinese Communist Party's support for the North Koreans was the key factor."Their actions in Korea and Indochina largely reflected "the same greed for the expansion of power that has inspired every would-be conqueror throughout history."

MacArthur's cables made it clear that he believed his main enemy was no longer North Korea but China, though he did not say so outright.Moreover, his concern was not to control a local war, but to prevent Chinese "expansion" throughout Asia.

Bomb the Yalu River

The telegrams came and went on both sides of the Pacific, and the theme that gave rise to the phenomenon—the bombing of the Yalu Bridge—was finally carried out on November 11, when shipboard and land-based air forces launched from the seas on both sides of the Korean peninsula inland along the Yalu River. attack.The bombing of stockpiles, military terminals of the railways, roads and bridges was extremely effective, but also practically useless: the Chinese field armies did not come by cars and railroads, but with weapons Walk with supplies on your back.

Bombing the Yalu Bridge was a more complex issue.Restrictions against flying over Chinese territory made bombing Jiangqiao fraught with danger, if not impossible.The normal bombing method should be that the B-29 bomber flew north along the route parallel to Jiangqiao, and then turned south after dropping the bomb.However, in order to avoid entering the Chinese airspace, the pilots were forced to make a very difficult turn, approaching the target at right angles to the river bridge, and keeping the aircraft on the south side of the winding main airway at all times.The Chinese deployed massive anti-aircraft artillery on the north bank, whose fire drove the B-29s to altitudes above 2 feet, where they would again be attacked by MiG-15 fighters.

(End of this chapter)