The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 61 Temporary Calm (1)
The Chinese left a mystery after they disappeared into the icy mountains of North Korea.Did the retreat reflect the cautious temperament in Mao Zedong's nature?Are the Chinese trying to test the U.S. response to their involvement?Or even signaling a willingness to negotiate?Or is this kind of temptation just a means of reconnaissance, and when the bleeding and wounded army has a chance to receive reinforcements and supplies, it will launch a full-scale attack?
It is understandable that the U.S. military seeks an explanation from military rather than political aspects.In retrospect, both factors appear to be at play.However, U.S. intelligence analysis is greatly hampered by flaws in both the near-term and long-term intelligence efforts of the Chinese Communist Army.

The Marine Corps initially believed that the Chinese army had withdrawn from the battle due to "running out of ammunition and food."Based on interrogation reports of Chinese prisoners of war and records of the Chinese Civil War, intelligence experts learned that Chinese infantry carried only three to five days' worth of food -- one was rice, and the other was ground rice, beans and millet by the North Koreans The staple food mixed together can be eaten with water, and it can also be eaten dry in case of emergency on the battlefield.Ammunition rations were similarly meager—essentially as much as a soldier could carry in his pocket, or a kind of coarse roll.Although the Chinese commandeered the North Koreans to carry supplies in traditional A-frame backs, the resupply route didn't really exist.

In the "first battle" of the Chinese, the reconnaissance plane of the Marine Corps found many Chinese trucks on the north bank of the Changjin Reservoir.These trucks are extremely valuable and easy targets for cruising Corsair rockets, so the Chinese rarely use them.In this way, when Lin Biao, the commander-in-chief of the Chinese army, was constrained by a rigid framework when formulating a battle plan: the divisions on the front line could only fight for three to five days, and the food and ammunition were exhausted, so they had to use other troops to fight. troops to replace.

If U.S. intelligence agencies had paid more attention to Chinese revolutionary-era tactics, they would have been able to explain more precisely why the Chinese suddenly disappeared. In 1938, at the height of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Mao Zedong laid out his creed for guerrilla warfare in a simple and clear way.For the United Nations forces in North Korea, the words in the book "On Protracted War" are prophetic: "We have always advocated 'luting the enemy to go deep', because this is the best way for a weak army to fight against a strong army in strategic defense. Effective military policy." He believed that retreat is a tactic, and asked and answered in a rhetorical way: "Isn't it contradictory to fight bravely and decisively before, and then give up the land later? Isn't it self-contradictory? Have you eaten for nothing?" In another article, Mao Zedong summarized his tactics into a single slogan that has since gone down in the annals of irregular warfare:

The enemy advances and we retreat,

The enemy is stationed and we are disturbed,

When the enemy is tired, I fight,

The enemy retreats and I pursue.

Yet little was known about Mao's philosophy in the U.S. military and intelligence community.According to irregular warfare experts and political scientists Gene Hanrahn and Edward Katzbach, Jr., translations of Mao's writings "are widely distributed in communist countries around the world."But they did not reach US military intelligence. Mao's work was published in London in 1954, and later in the year by the International Publishers Association in New York, but before that, Mao's work "...except for a few scattered small It is almost nowhere to be found in the United States other than brochures... including the Library of Congress", according to Hanrahn and Katzbach, "not even in the libraries of the military.  …"

With little knowledge of Mao's tactics in previous wars, the military could only rely on unfounded speculation.The longer the Chinese postponed a new offensive, the more convinced some officers were that the Chinese would not come again.The arrival of the severe winter in North Korea made them more sure of this idea.Day after day, week after week, the third week has passed, and the Chinese have not yet shown up.During this period, even Major General Oliver Smith was under the illusion that the worst was over. "Even Genghis Khan," he said, "would not dare to fight in the Korean winter."

Whatever the reason—whether it was exigencies on the battlefield, diplomatic mediation, or simply indecision on the part of the Chinese leadership—this calm gave American strategists the opportunity to reassess war policy, and MacArthur A hasty decision was made here.In the veteran's view, the Chinese intervention was little more than a feint.He intended to resume the offensive once Eighth Army could redeploy and resupply, as he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In early November 8, MacArthur's intelligence agencies wrote hundreds of pages of analysis of Chinese intentions and capabilities, but none of this could shake the general's fundamental belief that the best way to conduct a war was to direct it to enemy.

poor presidential adviser
President Truman's advisers admitted that they had not served the president well at this stage.Because of their indecision, indecision, misjudgment, and most of all, the fear of offending MacArthur, the United States lost the opportunity to keep the war in the right direction.Dean Acheson lamented in his memoirs: "The administration missed its last chance to stem a catastrophe in North Korea. All concerned presidential advisers, civil and military, knew something was wrong, but what Everyone messed up what was wrong, how to find it, how to deal with it.”

The chief sin of the Pentagon is cowardice.Before MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs of Staff trembled with fear like schoolboys before small-town bullies.When the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked whether it would be wise to leave a gap between Eighth and Tenth Armies, given the actions the Chinese had already taken, MacArthur dismissed the query with unusual arrogance. “General MacArthur always treated us like a bunch of kids,” said Gen. Omar Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “He never got his own way.”

On the surface, MacArthur still acted in accordance with the instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 9, that is, if the Chinese army intervened on a large scale, he must turn to the defense and ask Washington for further instructions. On November 27, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked MacArthur for his opinion on possible UN forces actions, they reminded him of the changed nature of warfare and said it was necessary for him to review his mission, which was to "destroy the North Korean The armed forces of China" has always been premised on the non-intervention of the Chinese.Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not say it directly, the implication was that MacArthur should give up the offensive and hold the territory he had already captured.

MacArthur moved on
However, MacArthur had no such intention.A day earlier, on Nov. 11, he had also complained that the "massive" involvement of Chinese troops in North Korea had "completely changed the whole situation" when he called for the lifting of restrictions on air movement.Now, he's quietly bypassing that clearance, using as a shield the Joint Chiefs of Staff's order authorizing him Oct. 7 that "the Chinese Communist Party . . . Next, he should continue to act as long as he "is likely to win".In MacArthur's view, "If the most fundamental and basic policy of the United Nations, that is, 'destroy all North Korea's armed forces that resist, so that North Korea can become a unified and free country', there will be fatal consequences."In this short cable, MacArthur managed to confuse the military mission assigned to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the UN General Assembly's October 10 proposal on Korean reunification.Despite the Chinese intervention, he was clearly unwilling to be restrained.

The general believed that his air power would be able to prevent Chinese reinforcements from "Manchuria" across the Yalu River and to eliminate Chinese troops already in Korea.After these aerial bombardments, he planned to launch an offensive on November 11 to completely wipe out the enemy army and drink horses by the Yalu River.MacArthur again tossed out his plan with conditions that implied the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no choice but to approve it:

Otherwise, any plan would seriously weaken the morale of our troops, and the psychological consequences would be incalculable.This would stall our military forces indefinitely on an extremely difficult line of defense in North Korea.There is no doubt that this will cause such displeasure among the South Koreans that their army will collapse and may even turn against us.

MacArthur also dismissed the British proposal to create a buffer zone along the Yalu River, which he compared to the 1938 cession of Czechoslovakia's Sudeland to Germany.He believes that the correct approach for the United Nations is to pass a resolution condemning China and threaten military sanctions if the Chinese do not retreat.Abandoning any part of North Korea, even just as a buffer zone, “would be the biggest setback the free world has seen in recent memory. Indeed, if such a bad proposition were adopted, our leadership and influence in Asia would be bankrupt, politically And militarily, it will be difficult to gain a foothold."If his troops were not allowed to advance to the Yalu River, they would "obviously follow in the footsteps of the British, who recognized Communist China with a policy of appeasement, and lost the respect of all other Asian nations, and did not win the respect of the Chinese.  …" MacArthur proposed "with the utmost sincerity", "we must not weaken the offensive at this critical moment, we must go forward until complete victory.  …"

The Joint Chiefs of Staff received the cable from MacArthur hours before their Nov. 11 meeting, and it was virtually ignored.The Joint Chiefs of Staff should first discuss the intentions of the Chinese, and then the possible response of the United States.According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chinese intervention stemmed from three motives:
——The Chinese are trying to protect the hydropower facilities along the Yalu River and establish a cordon on the south bank of the river.If these were the motives of the Chinese, then the Chinese may withdraw in exchange for a guarantee from the United Nations that the sovereignty of "Manchuria" and the hydroelectric facilities will not be violated.If the U.N. gives assurances and the Chinese continue to fight, "then one possible explanation for the behavior of the Chinese can be ruled out."

——Another possibility is that the Chinese "go to war without declaring" to contain the US military in North Korea.The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want the Korean War to injure the United States so that it would not be able to cope with trouble elsewhere.However, this Chinese aim may open the door to a negotiated solution to the North Korean issue.

——The third possibility is that the Chinese are trying to drive the UN troops out of North Korea.But the effort could not have been successful without the support of Soviet sea and air power.Soviet intervention marked the beginning of World War III and heralded the forced withdrawal of United Nations forces from Korea.

So what should the US do?The Joint Chiefs of Staff saw three options: renew the offensive and force the war to an American victory; establish and hold a defensive line south of the "Manchurian" border; or retreat.The first option calls for sending more troops to North Korea, even if the Chinese do not materially expand their involvement.The third option is unacceptable. Once the United States is forced to make this choice, "it can only be accepted as a prelude to global war."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly favored the second option, that of establishing a defensive line south of the Yalu River "as a stopgap measure until the military and political problems caused by Chinese intervention are clarified."The chiefs of staff urged that "every effort must be made...to resolve the issue of Chinese interference politically, preferably through the United Nations...with urgency." The Joint Chiefs demanded public assurances that the United China.They also propose peace talks through countries that recognize Red China.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the best solution was to establish a defense line south of the Yalu River, it did not make any efforts to get MacArthur to implement it.If they did, then conceivably the lull in the war would give Acheson time to pursue a political settlement at the UN and elsewhere.The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed that MacArthur's mandate should not change, although it should be "regularly reviewed."This again allowed MacArthur to launch the offensive as he wished.

When the National Security Council met on November 11, it was not prepared to take any decisive action.Truman was not present at the meeting, and Acheson, who chaired the meeting, suggested that the NSC "just discuss the situation" while the staff conducted further research and drafted a recommendation."We need to know more exactly where we are before deciding how to act," he said.

Acheson discusses the prospect of a political solution.He noted that the United States has been careful not to describe its goals in public statements. "At the United Nations, we have never endorsed any resolution calling for the expulsion of the Communists from all of North Korea," said the Secretary of State. , we are not committed to subjugating all of Korea, if some other satisfactory solution can be found.” Here, Acheson ignores previous UN resolutions on Korean unification, which MacArthur is now using as his Cited as the basis for action in North Korea.But neither Acheson nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff took action to reconcile the different policy goals pursued by Washington and Tokyo.

In the eyes of CIA Director General Walter Biddle Smith, the unclear question was "to what extent the Chinese ... were willing to serve ... as pawns ... to the Soviets."Smith said the CIA estimated that the involvement of Chinese troops, with material assistance from the Soviet Union, indicated that the Soviets would risk an all-out war in Korea.The Soviets should be willing for the United States to fight an all-out war with China, "which would mean that our commitments in Europe ... become empty talk".

"This raises the question under what circumstances the United States will be compelled to ... solve the problem at its root, that is, from Moscow rather than from its periphery. ... The Soviets run no risk because they can do whatever they want at any time Drain their satellites and start peace talks." Smith went on, but "it's unlikely that the Soviets would consider abandoning North Korea and suffering a major setback there".

Thus, Smith concludes, "the problem we face ... is either to go forward or to go back". "The political consequences of maintaining the status quo or retreating would be dire." He saw no "real reason to change the previous [CIA] estimate that the Soviets were not ready for a full-scale war." , despite their willingness to let the US fight wars in Asia.In Smith's view, "the danger is that the Soviets, like the carpet merchants of the East, will press us down until a war is necessary." ", without the need for an all-out war.He said: "But democracies cannot accept this limited state of hostility." The Chinese will at some point be forced to respond to the bombing of "Manchuria" by American planes "because it involves the face of the Chinese people."

(End of this chapter)