The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 62 Temporary Calm (2)
General Bradley, speaking on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recalled three possible intentions of the Chinese that the military had discussed the previous day (a cordon to protect the Yalu River hydroelectric facilities; create a fixed front further south; United Nations forces were driven out of the Korean peninsula).Bradley argued that the United States could hold its current positions, but "the growing question is how much pressure we can withstand without attacking bases in 'Manchuria'" and that holding the current defenses "would cause Serious situation, because in the long run, we will lose a lot of people."Bradley pointed out that the Soviets had recently delivered 200 to 250 aircraft to China. Since the Russian conversations could no longer be heard when these aircraft flew in formation, he speculated that these aircraft "have been delivered to the Chinese and the Russians have returned home."

Although MacArthur believed that authorizing him to bomb the bridges on the Yalu River would drive the Chinese away, Bradley considered this view "a little too optimistic."However, he went on to say: "MacArthur is a field commander after all. Before the instructions given to him change, he can advance at will. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that the instructions should not be changed now, but this instruction should be checked frequently."

Secretary of Defense Marshall noted that the U.S. military situation "has been complicated by the fact that we are spread out and vulnerable in eastern Korea" (he was referring to the area of ​​Tenth Army, from which the 10st Marine Division was moving toward "Manchuria"). "Advance).

Bradley replied that MacArthur dispersed his forces in order to implement his order to occupy all of Korea and hold elections. (Indeed, Bradley's interpretation of MacArthur's order was overly general, although no one at the meeting disputed it.)
In response to a question from Acheson, Bradley said that MacArthur did not appear to be worried about the situation in the West.Acheson asked: From a military point of view, is there a better front than MacArthur's current position?Bradley replied that "from a military point of view, the further back the front the better off we are," however "such a retreat might cost us political support and might demoralize the South Koreans" .

Acheson continued to ask questions on this.Apparently, “the Russians are particularly interested in defense in depth,” and one way to assuage Soviet concerns would be to create a buffer zone in northeastern North Korea, administered by a UN-appointed police force rather than armed forces.Acheson went on to say that, as far as the State Department is concerned, it intends to "blame the Chinese Communists openly at the United Nations to make it clear that their troops are not volunteers."Acheson said privately (sometimes publicly): "We may want to explore the possibility of establishing a 10-mile-wide demilitarized zone within 20 miles of each side of the Yalu River. According to this plan, the Chinese Communists are required to Withdraw from North Korea, we will hold elections, and then withdraw from North Korea." But Acheson also pointed out that there was a flaw in his idea.If the Chinese accepted the proposal, they would insist that all foreign troops be withdrawn from North Korea and that a government be established that would represent both North and South Korea, "and that would mean it would be a communist government".

After the discussions, the National Security Council decided not to take any action. "Currently" does not change the instructions given to MacArthur, the general "is free to act in the military, but not to bomb 'Manchuria'".At the same time, political discussions will be held when the Chinese Communists arrive at the United Nations. (Acheson acknowledged that the State Department had been trying to "seek, without success, some way of dealing with the Beijing authorities.")
There was no sense of urgency in the NSC minutes.The committee puts no time frame in the research assignments to its staff, the only guidance being that they should consult with the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA.

The National Security Council's Nov. 11 recommendation makes little sense, and it sets the United States contradicting itself along political and military lines.Before the Chinese intervened, policymakers assumed the war could end without involving Beijing.According to this assumption, if the Chinese intervened, the UN forces would stop their military operations and go on the defensive, waiting for the development of the situation.However, the initial Chinese intervention, though brief, was enough to remind Washington that China could force United Nations forces out of North Korea.Nevertheless, the NSC intended to allow MacArthur to continue the offensive in the same manner, now recognizing (according to Bradley's admission) that the bombing of Manchuria might be necessary to victory.However, when Acheson reported the meeting to the President the next day, November 9, he spoke dishonestly, if not foolishly, of a parallel diplomatic effort to begin negotiations.Acheson's apologists—most notably Richard Neustadter, a pedantic political scientist who served in the White House during the Korean War—argued that the secretary of state did not want to Meddling in military strategy, especially at a time when his Far East policy has come under attack. “To put it bluntly,” Neustadter later wrote, “the risk is on the 'military side. This statement is nerdy gibberish.The strategy of the Korean War was a delicate balance between military and diplomatic actions. When a military action made it difficult or impossible to achieve a diplomatic and political goal, Acheson had the right and even the obligation to advise the president.Acheson did the opposite.In this way, his sympathy for the city and MacArthur's self-righteousness combined to lead the United States to disaster step by step.

Ironically, Truman seemed to have a better grasp of the issue than his strategists. Long after November 1950, adviser Neustadter asked Truman if he had ever worried about MacArthur's "offensive to end the war."While Neustadter concedes that Truman's answer was an afterthought, he argues that it reflects the essence of Truman's views at the time:

What we should have done was stop at the neck of North Korea (he said, pointing to a globe) ... that's what the British wanted. … We know that the Chinese have an army of nearly 100 million or so on the border. ...but (MacArthur) was a field commander.You pick him, you have to support him.This is the only way a military organization can function.I got the best opinion I could get, and this guy on the front line said, this thing should be done... so I went with it.It was a decision I made, regardless of hindsight.

In this way, MacArthur continued to plan an offensive to win the war by the end of the year, and still follow the instructions he had been executing in the early autumn.

MacArthur is optimistic again
MacArthur showed no signs of nervousness.On the contrary, on November 11 he spoke with his political adviser, William Siebold, with great optimism.His immediate goal, he said, was to destroy the bridges over the Yalu River, thus cutting off "Manchuria" from the front.At the same time, the Far Eastern Air Force would destroy the staging areas behind the enemy's rear so that the communists could not "survive in Korea."MacArthur told Siebold that preparations for the advance to the Yalu River were underway, and that it was of the utmost importance to get there before the Yalu River froze (the CIA estimated that the river would be closed between November 14 and December 11). Freeze in between).If his attack was successful before the freeze, the war would be over; otherwise, he saw no alternative but to bomb targets in Manchuria.It was well known that if this was done "it would be a big deal" and the Soviets would almost certainly intervene.He hoped that such extreme action would not have to be taken.If the United Nations forces could successfully advance to the frontier, MacArthur believed the war would be over.The Chinese regime can also prove that they really want to help a communist neighbor and are capable of fighting a modern war, so that they can withdraw from North Korea without losing "face".

Three days later, on November 11, MacArthur insisted in a conversation with Ambassador Mucho that no more than 17 Chinese might have infiltrated North Korea.If there are more than this number, it will be detected by aerial reconnaissance.His "all-out attack . . . will 'clear' within 3 days all areas still in North Korean and Chinese hands."He would then take all the Chinese POWs to the border and release them, then withdraw the 10th Army to Japan, leaving the 8th Army, other UN troops, and South Korean troops to occupy Korea.

In MacArthur's view, the Chinese only delayed, but did not prevent him from marching to occupy the entire North Korea.

gridlock in the united nations
On the diplomatic front, in November, the United States was at an impasse at the United Nations.The United States has taken action on several fronts, but the primary purpose of each has been to try to reassure the Chinese that the United States has no intention of violating their borders.

On November 11, the Security Council voted to discuss a MacArthur report on Chinese intervention and invited a Chinese representative to participate.The United States agreed and looked forward to starting a dialogue with China.

The Council discussed two proposals.One is a U.S. proposal that calls for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from North Korea and the continued presence of U.N. troops until a "unified and democratic government" is established under the supervision of a U.N. special committee.In this regard, the French also put forward a proposal, requiring the United Nations Army to "give due consideration to the necessity of military security" and take measures to prevent damage to the hydropower facilities on the Yalu River.In the aftermath, there was a bitter debate between the Pentagon, the State Department and the French over acceptable wording.The State Department hopes to change the wording of the French to "do not cause damage to military needs" to give MacArthur a broader autonomy.The French agreed, but demanded that the U.S. proposal include a sentence affirming the policy of the United Nations to "ensure the inviolability of China's border with North Korea and fully protect China's legitimate interests in the border area."The Joint Chiefs of Staff called the addition "completely unacceptable" because it would effectively "give Chinese aircraft a safe haven from attack."

(End of this chapter)