The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 63 Temporary Calm (3)
Still, the State Department overruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff and decided to accept French language demanding that China's borders be kept "inviolable."The United States and five other countries put forward the proposal on November 11, but it soon fell victim to the Soviet Union's deliberate obstruction of the bill.The Soviet Union insisted that the issue could only be discussed in the presence of a Chinese representative.

On November 11, the Chinese briefly informed the United Nations that they would not participate in any discussion of the MacArthur report and proposals, but Beijing agreed to send a delegation of 11 Chinese diplomats to Lake Chenggong for consultations on Taiwan.The arrival date was originally scheduled for November 14.For unknown reasons, the Chinese dawdled along the way, via Moscow, Prague and London, and did not arrive until November 11.This phase coincides with the disengagement of Chinese troops in North Korea.The Chinese refusal to take part in the debate convinced most of the council that no immediate action was necessary, and the council moved on to other issues.Warren Austin, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., cabled MacArthur on Nov. 14 to say that the mere introduction of the U.S.-sponsored proposal, though without a formal vote, would reassure the Chinese that U.N. forces would not encroach on their borders.

Truman's inner circle was as confident as Austin.Army Secretary Frank Pace echoed the sentiments of civilian secretaries from other services: "You have to remember that the red Chinese have been threatening all the time. . . It’s something.” Pace admitted that his views on the issue of Chinese interference were influenced by what he heard in Tokyo. "Of course, General MacArthur was very clear that they would not intervene, and I must say that after the Incheon landings, I had great admiration for General MacArthur's ability to assess the situation on the ground."

Allied governments are not as confident as Washington. In mid-November, diplomats from many friendly countries conveyed warnings to Washington.The Swedish ambassador to Beijing reported that a large number of Chinese Communist troops were heading for North Korea.The Burmese embassy believed that the Chinese were ready to aid North Korea "at any cost" and reported that the Chinese were raising a "hysterical clamor" that the United Nations intended to invade "Manchuria." On November 11, the Netherlands conveyed to the U.S. State Department the message sent back by the Dutch ambassador to Beijing, saying that the motive of the Chinese intervention in North Korea was the fear that "Manchuria" would be violated; if the United Nations stopped 11 miles south of the Yalu River, the Chinese would Will not go any further.The CIA has been skeptical in evaluating the reports, arguing that China's military operations in North Korea "presumably remain defensive."The chiefs of the British military said in a report to Prime Minister Attlee's cabinet that they considered North Korea to be "of no strategic importance to the democracies" and that there was no need to go for the trivial victory of conquering all of North Korea Run the risk of a major war.

Allied unease, however, prompted both President Truman and the State Department to further try to allay Chinese fears of invasion. On November 11, Acheson sent an indirect message to Beijing at a citizens' meeting on foreign affairs in Washington. It is crucial "to get rid of any misconceptions that may be in the minds of the Chinese" that if they are concerned about their borders, then "everything that is going on in the world will make them understand that their legitimate interests will will be taken care of."However, if they spare no effort to provoke a "really serious crisis", then the United States will face this crisis firmly.

The next day, Truman invoked the UN resolution on China at a press conference as a gesture to show that the United States had no intention of directing hostilities toward China.It is the policy of both the United Nations and the United States to "regionalize the conflict and withdraw its troops from North Korea as soon as the situation permits."Truman said the United States—

... will take all legitimate steps to prevent the spread of hostilities in the Far East.If the Chinese communist authorities or the Chinese people do not believe this, it can only be because they have been deceived by those who seek to prolong and expand hostilities in the Far East against the interests of all the peoples of the region in order to benefit from them .

Even as the president made conciliatory gestures, the Pentagon staff argued that nothing should stand in the way of MacArthur's march to the Yalu, especially advice from "certain elements of the State Department."A report dated November 3 by Maj. Gen. Charles Bolt, Chief of the Army's G-11 (Operations Branch), was particularly scathing, boldly stating that British and French pressure had "significantly affected" the State Department, making it In favor of establishing a demilitarized zone along the Sino-North Korean border.Bolt wrote that the G-20 was "unwavering in its opposition" to the creation of a buffer zone, and making such a commitment "would severely constrain U.S. (and U.N.) military get any benefit from them".

Bolt's report focused on the pros and cons of reopening the offensive, as well as the military and psychological dangers and benefits.That article is the only comprehensive account of why the War Department, and then the Joint Chiefs of Staff, decided not to question its field commanders.

The only reason not to launch a general offensive, Bolt wrote, was that it would create "a great danger of global war."He regarded the military situation as a stalemate. Regardless of whether MacArthur took the offensive or stood still, the Soviets and the Chinese would act according to their established policies.

Bolt was not worried about the capabilities of the Chinese, "it is not necessary to imagine that the Chinese communists will succeed in driving the UN forces currently in North Korea out of North Korea unless they are heavily supported by Soviet ground and air forces." "Under the present prevailing conditions," MacArthur's forces "have sufficient strength to hold any front in North Korea."Bolt does not want to interfere with programs and policies that are already in place:
Continued offensives near the China-North Korea border will no doubt increase rather than reduce tensions to some extent.However, the decision to cross the [-]th Parallel was based on the consideration of clearing the entire territory of North Korea of ​​Communist troops.

Given this, any attack across the North Korean border would be considered a clear act of military aggression internationally.The same principle applies to the current situation.Thus, removing all communist forces from North Korea, it is believed, may give us a better chance of regionalizing the conflict.In addition, in the face of future aggression, if you show strength, you will deter it, and if you show weakness, you will condone it. This is a well-known saying.

Unless MacArthur showed his inability to continue the operation, "a cessation of the offensive would be totally unacceptable to the American public and would be very different from the principles we are fighting for."

In a related report, the War Department's Planning Division recommended more drastic action than a ground offensive: An ultimatum should be presented to the Chinese, either through the United Nations or unilaterally by the United States, to leave North Korea; otherwise, the United States would Launch air and sea attacks on military installations in "Manchuria".

What's more: "The United States should take all necessary steps to ensure that it has the ability to immediately use the atomic bomb against the Chinese Communist Party should the President order it."

In the months that followed, General MacArthur faced criticism in Washington for advocating a tougher crackdown on China, but Pentagon officials trumped him in advocating the use of nuclear weapons.

The State Department eventually brokered a compromise that fell far short of the threat of nuclear weapons but went further than Britain's demand for a demilitarized zone.The State Department's bureaucratic edge (thanks to Acheson's persuasion) was evident when Dean Rusk, the State Department's assistant secretary of state, was tasked with drafting a telegram to MacArthur ordering him to stop working on a It does not touch, but it can overlook the front of the Yalu River.

Rusk's order begins with an outspoken political warning:
In the event of a major conflict with the CCP over your all-out approach to North Korea and "Manchuria" - the entire border of the USSR, other members of the UN will express growing concern... about the possibility of an all-out conflict.This may ... lead to a loss of support within the UN ... (but) also involves a growing risk of a military nature.

Rusk went on to refer to the "sentiment" of the United Nations to establish a demilitarized zone along the border to reduce the Chinese's fear of military action by the United Nations forces in the northeast, "and the Soviet Union's response to Vladivostok (Vladivostok). The corresponding sensitivity expressed".

The consensus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State and Defense Departments, and "other officials" was that MacArthur's mission remained the same.Not attacking the border "may provide the CCP with a platform to withdraw back to 'Manchuria' without losing face; and it may also reduce Russian concerns about the security of It is the root cause of the Russians’ pressure on the CCP to intervene in North Korea.”In indirect but intelligible terms, Rusk seemed to be urging MacArthur not to go straight to the Yalu River, but to hold back in defensive positions.The telegram was another excellent example of Washington's reluctance to give MacArthur clear orders.

This also shows that Washington has no intention of adopting a risky policy. It wants to tell the Chinese and the Soviets that the United Nations intends to occupy North Korea and stay there according to the instructions of the United Nations. Any expansion of the war by the Chinese will be severely responded.It is true that the US will not "win" a ground war from the Chinese in Asia, but US air power will blow all major Chinese cities to rubble, and Chinese leaders will have to account for that loss.Throughout November, what the United States did was speculate on what the Chinese would do, not what the United States could do.

The brief "first battle" by the Chinese taught them that they could punish the UN troops for not hitting back, and that officials in Washington would not order strikes on their rear bases.For the first time in U.S. military history, the United States is going to fight a war in which the enemy's homeland is not attacked.

However, MacArthur did not intend to heed the admonitions in the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Rusk telegram.By the time the telegrams arrived in North Korea, he had launched a publicly announced offensive to "end the war," regardless of what the Chinese might do.

(End of this chapter)