The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 64 Going to the Abyss (1)
It was no secret that MacArthur was ready to attack.Perhaps never in history has a general exposed his plans to the enemy so thoroughly. On November 11, the Times of London published a message from a reporter from Washington: "There are reports in the United States that seven United Nations divisions, including three American divisions and four South Korean divisions, as well as the Commonwealth brigade, ready to launch the so-called 'final offensive', with the aim of sweeping the lower part of the Yalu River from the west coast to the point where South Korean troops have arrived." The reporter of "The Times" believed that the advance announcement of the offensive "really A peculiar way of fighting."In the following days, this practice also caused heavy casualties, because Communist diplomats in the West must have told the Chinese about this operation.Ironically, a high-ranking colonel in the 24th Army (whose name will not be used here) was dismissed as a general before Normandy for blurting out the plan in front of people who shouldn't have heard it a very small part of.Although allowed to remain in the Army, his file noted that he could no longer attain the rank of general.However, his "leaking secrets" is nothing compared to MacArthur's thundering horns when he aggressively attacked the Chinese.

On Thanksgiving Day, November 11, troops on the front lines enjoyed a festive meal that was much bigger than most Americans: shrimp cups, stuffed olives, roast turkey with cranberry sauce, sweet potatoes, Fruit salad, fruit cake, mince pie and coffee.At Tenth Corps headquarters, Almond and other officers, including some less happy Marines, such as General Oliver Smith, also had a dinner.Cocktails were served, and tablecloths, napkins, china, silverware and even place cards were used.To some officers such extravagance in a field of battle might seem absurd, but Almond enjoyed himself.Jokes were talked about "fattening the army up for slaughter" but the most pleasing news was that a detachment of General David Barr's 23th Regiment of the 10th Division of the Army had reached the Yalu at Huisanjin .The 7th Division has made rapid progress since landing without major combat, and its main obstacle is the sub-zero cold, not the Communist soldiers.The 17th regiment had only one hand-to-hand encounter with the CCP army, killing 7 people in Baishan City.The regiment braved the wind and snow until the 17st Battalion entered Huisanjin on November 50 and occupied a position overlooking the Yalu River that was about to freeze.General Almond was in high spirits. He flew to Huishanjin specially, and took pictures with a group of senior officers with "Manchuria" as the background. (Other officers panicked when they saw Chinese sentries patrolling across the river.)
MacArthur telegraphed Almond and said: "Ned, I sincerely congratulate you. Please tell David Barr that the 7th Division has made great achievements." Almond also commended Barr and his soldiers: "Only 20 days ago , Your division just made an amphibious landing at Liyuan beach. The 200 miles of rugged and steep mountain terrain and the successful defeat of a stubborn enemy in sub-zero freezing temperatures will go down in history as an outstanding military achievement."

But Barr privately confided to General Smith at X Corps' Thanksgiving feast that the advance made him nervous.According to Barr, he had to carry out the operation meticulously, and he never had more than a day's worth of supplies on hand.On an almost impassable road, it would be a desperate move to do so.

As Almond continued to exert pressure, Barr did not carry out orders as carefully as the 1st Marine Division advancing to the west.Barr's ability to advance at such a speed with insufficient supplies and lack of flank protection, and to pass through the dangerous land in bad weather, is indeed a great contribution.But it was because of Almond that Barr later paid a heavy price.The 7th Division failed to secure its own flank and did not prepare adequate supply lines.It sent a party of troops speeding through the mountains and deep into a completely unknown enemy, as if capturing an outpost on the Yalu River would win the war.Compared with Barr's advance and the 1st Marine Division, there was another major difference: the 7th Division only encountered the remnants of the North Korean army, while the Marine Corps' first day of advancing encountered new cutting-edge troops from China.However, Barr's rapid progress was congratulated by MacArthur and Almond, who were eager to win, and it was also doomed that most of the soldiers in his division would have to struggle for life and death in the severe cold and the hail of bullets from the Chinese.

However, in MacArthur's view, reaching the Yalu River was extremely symbolic.His troops have led the war to the Chinese border with seemingly impunity, and now he is poised to end the conflict quickly. On November 11, he issued a communiqué to all troops:

The United Nations has reached a decisive moment in the large-scale compression and encirclement of the new Red Army fighting in North Korea.The various air forces, which are independent components of this pincer, have succeeded in cutting off the enemy's supply lines from the north in a sustained attack that has been exemplary in coordination and combat effectiveness for the past three weeks.As a result, the enemy's follow-up reinforcements were drastically reduced, and the necessary supplies were obviously limited.With significant and effective naval support, the eastern sector of this pincer offensive has now reached the condescending enveloping positions, bisecting the enemy's favored northern sector.This morning, a general offensive was launched on the western sector of the pincer offensive to complete the encirclement and close the jaws.If successful, this would de facto end the war, restore peace and unity in Korea, and bring about the swift withdrawal of United Nations military forces, allowing the Korean people and country to enjoy full sovereignty and equal international status.That's what we fight for.

go home for christmas
On the same day, MacArthur flew to the 8th Army's headquarters in Sinanju along the Qingchuan River, and the plane of the "Supreme Allied Commander" landed on the bumpy runway.It was freezing cold (15 degrees Fahrenheit) but sunny that day.The general pulled the hood of his parka over his head, squatted down and playfully patted Ebe, the German terrier, the auspicious pet of Gen. Frank Milburn's 1st Army.After General Walton Walker and other officers briefed the situation, he spent about five hours inspecting the front line in a jeep.While talking with Maj. Gen. John Coulter, the commander of Ninth Corps, MacArthur was reminded of the Wake Island talks, when he had told Gen. Omar Bradley that he might be able to send some troops to the Back to America.There are several versions of what MacArthur said and how it was interpreted.According to a Time magazine reporter who was present, MacArthur told Coulter and Major General John Church, the commander of the 5th Division: "I have made a promise to the wives and mothers of the boys in the 9th Division that the boys We will be returning home at Christmas. Don’t make me lie. Get to the Yalu River and I’ll let you go.” MacArthur’s staff officer, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, was also there, and five years later he wrote in his memoirs, MacArthur's words were "half jesting, but with a certain certainty in meaning and purpose...'If this operation is successful, I hope we can get the lads home for Christmas.'" MacArthur simply said in his autobiography : "In the conversation with some military officers, I told them General Bradley's wishes, hoping to transfer the two divisions back to the country before Christmas, if China does not intervene." MacArthur argued reluctantly: "This sentence The words were misinterpreted by the press as a prophecy of the victory of our actions, and this false misinterpretation was later used as a powerful propaganda weapon against me." Indeed, MacArthur's political opponents opposed him with the phrase "go home for Christmas" , to his great embarrassment.It was the press, he claimed, that created overconfidence in the offensive.But the impassionedness of his own communiqué of November 24 (he makes no mention of it in his memoirs) makes this statement seem absurd.A more credible explanation comes from what MacArthur said to Margaret Higgins, a reporter of the New York Herald Tribune at the time. Higgins was his confidante and he had a good impression of her.After the failure of the offensive, MacArthur "privately admitted that he had made a mistake in issuing such an optimistic communiqué," according to Higgins.MacArthur's post-hoc excuses (the general had a host of them ready) were: his stated withdrawal of US troops "was designed to reassure the Chinese that we would leave North Korea once we reached the border of 'Manchuria'".

In his memoirs published many years later, MacArthur claimed that what he saw at the front on the day of the offensive "worry me extremely" and that the South Korean troops were in poor condition and that the entire front was "depressingly weak."MacArthur said he had decided that if the Chinese entered the war, he would abandon the offensive "immediately" and halt any efforts to advance north.Even if MacArthur did make such a decision, it was not communicated to his field commanders, or to his staff, and there is no indication in Far Eastern Command files that MacArthur ordered to meet The Chinese retreated.

MacArthur boarded the "Supreme Allied Commander" plane again that afternoon, and said to the pilot Tony Storey: "Fly to the west coast, and then fly north along the Yalu River." This really surprised everyone.The staff officers looked at each other in amazement.Even if the USS Supreme Commander was armed and escorted by a large number of fighter jets, the flight was extremely dangerous.But the staff officers knew that once MacArthur decided to reconnaissance himself, it would be futile to argue with him.He said he wanted to study the terrain and look for signs of enemy activity.He said, don't worry about not being escorted by fighter jets, the courage to make this flight is the best protection.Courtney Whitney and others hope that MacArthur will carry a parachute on his back.MacArthur laughed and said: "If you gentlemen want to carry it on your back, I will stay on the plane." An accompanying reporter complained in a low voice to Colonel Sidney Huff, MacArthur's adjutant: "Sid, this Is this flight really necessary?"

Storey turned the plane east at the mouth of the Yalu River and flew along the river at an altitude of about 5000 feet, which gave the crew a clear view of the snow-covered Manchuria.Roads and trails are visible but show no signs of heavy use.Yet the snow was falling thick enough to hide any traces of recent traffic.That scene frightened Whitney: "As far as the eye can see, there are endless backcountry, high mountains, deep rifts and deep canyons, and the almost black water of the Yalu River, all frozen in the deathly silent world of ice and snow." Whitney Feeling that MacArthur was right not to have a parachute: In an emergency, it was better to stay on the plane than to jump into "this unforgiving wilderness".

After MacArthur finished his tour, General Walton Walker stood on the runway to salute and bid farewell, and then watched the "Supreme Allied Command" landline disappear into the horizon. "Shit," he whispered, not referring to anyone in particular, and climbed into his jeep.His adjutant Mike Lynch clearly remembered this sentence, "Because General Walker never swears or abuses no matter what annoyance he encounters."

Walker approached Major General John Church, commander of the 24th Division, and handed him a letter addressed to Colonel Richard Stephens that his 21st Infantry would spearhead the attack. "You tell Stephens to back off as soon as he smells Chinese food."

willoughby nervous

MacArthur's intelligence officer, Charles Willoughby, was not as optimistic as the general this time.Even as MacArthur was planning a new offensive, Willoughby warned that although the Chinese had disengaged, they still "intended to hit the United Nations forces in Korea with all their might." On Nov. 11, an intelligence review cited reasons why "predictions of sweeping action ... by the Chinese" hold true.The Chinese delayed entering the war in the belief that the North Koreans would win and were therefore "not prepared to intervene hastily."Their large-scale operations were delayed until the war reached the frontier, so that "their lines of communication were greatly shortened."This is crucial in a situation where the United Nations has command of the air and sea.Willoughby also foresees political benefits for the Chinese:

The greatest advantage that can be gained at the frontier is the degree to which an act of aggression is customarily understood by world public opinion.Thus, the discovery of mere regiments on the other side of the border was not considered an overt act by public opinion. ...

Doing so would also easily gain the support of Chinese public opinion for a major military operation, as long as they declare that the northeast border is directly threatened.Sources believe that the Chinese military leaders made such a claim even though they must have known that the UN forces had no intention of crossing the northeastern border.

During these days, other daily intelligence reports of Chinese buildups in "Manchuria" and North Korea.It is estimated that from 11 to 4 November, the number of enemy troops facing Eighth Army rose from 11 to 8.Daily interrogations of prisoners of war showed a steady stream of new Chinese troops crossing the border.Willoughby warned on November 40100 that "about 98400 combat-experienced Chinese troops" had assembled along the 11-mile stretch from Andong to Manpujin on the north side of the Yalu River.Intelligence from Guangdong in southern China said that "large quantities of artillery, light weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies" were being shipped northward.

Willoughby grew increasingly concerned as he read the reports.He wrote on November 11:
The Chinese communists have shown they are capable of easily infiltrating troops into North Korea.Taking advantage of remote roads and the cover of night, it is entirely possible for the Chinese Communist Army to secretly move ... this ready army to a position south of the Yalu River in preparation for a counter-offensive.Logistical support...should be relatively simple...because the supply lines are extremely short.

The Chinese military "has a considerable potential reinforcement capability that ... could pose a serious threat to United Nations forces.  …"

The reasons for the intelligence service's difficulty in calculating the number of Chinese infiltrators are revealed in the reports of the interrogation of the prisoners of war much later.By any standard, the Chinese military's ability to force a march is extraordinary.A documented example is that three divisions marched 16 to 19 days from Andong, the northwest corner of the "Manchuria" side of the Yalu River, to reach an assembly area in eastern North Korea by marching 286 miles; Here, the average daily march is 18 miles on rugged mountain roads.The "day" of the Chinese soldiers began when night fell, around 18:7 pm, and continued until 3:5 the next morning.At 30:[-] when dawn breaks, they should have dug their bunkers, camouflaged all their weapons and equipment, and finished their meals.During the day, only reconnaissance units acted in search of camp for the next day.If a Chinese soldier is exposed during the day, he must remain motionless where his tracks are when the plane comes.Officers have the power to shoot anyone who violates the order immediately.

Thus, in October and November, the Chinese military moved approximately 10 soldiers into North Korea, all stationary and camouflaged so that they could not be seen by aerial photography and observation.

(End of this chapter)