The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 65 Going to the Abyss (2)
On 11 November, the intelligence service warned in another report that the Chinese and the North Koreans had "significantly strengthened" their defenses during the first two weeks of November, leaving them "in the largely no longer vulnerable to "air and amphibious attack.Guerrilla activity was also intensified, with "well-planned and executed" operations by troops of up to 16 men. "Since these guerrillas attack weak parts of UN supply lines, they can neither be ignored nor left to the newly formed police forces. UN forces, which can serve as valuable mobile strategic reserves, are thus held in the rear area.” If UN forces were to resume their offensive, the force “may require an overwhelming concentration of forces for each attack”.Communist air support and subzero temperatures from December to February would "further impede the United Nations offensive."

All signs pointed to the renewed readiness of the Chinese to fight—signs that General Willoughby's intelligence services in Tokyo picked up on, but MacArthur ignored.

walker be careful
In the area of ​​the Eighth Army, General Walton Walker was apprehensive about sending his troops into battles where they had been defeated, especially when the intentions of the Chinese were unclear.Therefore, he postponed the resumption of the offensive, defying the urgent order from Tokyo to attack.Walker wanted to make sure his troops were well supplied and their flanks were protected.The first order to attack came on 8 November, while the 11th Army was still redeploying south of the Ching Chuan River.The order set the date for the attack on 6 November, but Colonel Albert Stebbins, Jr., Quartermaster of Eighth Army Quartermaster Division, complained.The 8th Army needs 11 tons of supplies every day when it attacks, and these supplies have not yet arrived. The November 15 deadline was hit, passed, rescheduled for November 8, and then again for November 8.Walker paid too much attention to tactical details. He hoped that the offensive could be closely coordinated with each other, and all troops should be under the control of the Eighth Army from beginning to end.Army historian Roy Appleman wrote that Walker's order reflected "a considerable degree of caution and a certain respect for the enemy."Walker was so confident in the mission that he would be able to reach the Yalu River.He was less confident, however, when speaking privately with reporters at headquarters.He told at least one reporter that his hesitation about crossing the Ching Chuan River, and his reticence to MacArthur and Almond's scathing telegrams, was because he knew he might have to prepare to retreat.The same caution may have saved the Eighth Army in the Chinese "first battle."

Walker took a big career risk by delaying the offense.His friends at MacArthur's headquarters whispered to him that he had nearly lost his post because of the Eighth Army's retreat before the Chinese.MacArthur disliked Walker from the first days of the war.Although no one suggested it directly, Walker knew that he had to attack on MacArthur's plan and win on MacArthur's plan, or his military career would be over.

The Pentagon watched in horror as MacArthur's offensive ended the war.Matthew Ridgway, a veteran of the European battlefield in World War II, looked at military situation maps every day and was extremely worried that Walker had "dangerously exposed" his right wing.The only security for Walker's right wing was the shaky South Korean army.Ridgway also disagreed with MacArthur's offensive scenario:
Although MacArthur referred to this advance toward the Yalu as an "offensive," it was really nothing more than an engagement exercise.You can't attack an enemy until you know where the enemy is, until you've verified that the enemy is actually there, and until the enemy's troops are in contact with yours.

When many commanders of the field forces are convinced that the powerful Chinese troops must be waiting for an opportunity somewhere, and there are also one or two commanders who are blindly advancing without regard to the safety of the flanks and without contact with friendly neighbors on both flanks. When in doubt, no one backed down, and many people also showed the overly optimistic mood like the commander-in-chief.

frustrated marines
In the area of ​​​​the 10th Army in eastern Korea, the 1st Marine Division was depressed when it received an order to relaunch the offensive.General Oliver Smith felt that Almond's plan to march north "was based on the assumption that we were pursuing and destroying the defeated North Korean army, without taking into account the involvement of Chinese Communist forces".A more logical line of attack, Smith argued, would be to advance along the northeast coast, where Marines could rely on naval support and use amphibious encirclement tactics against enemy positions.But Almond insisted that the area on the left flank was "the most critical area in the offensive, where the most tenacious resistance of the enemy is likely to be encountered".Almond hoped that the 1st Marine Division would be ordered to go out as "the most valiant and combative division in the army".

Smith learned from further conversations with Almond over the course of a few days in early November that the corps "would be rushing forward to the frontiers of 'Manchuria' before the onset of winter so that we would not have to fight a campaign in winter conditions".Smith disagreed, but with X Corps apparently "mission set," he prepared for a winter campaign.The order was sent to the logistics team: "Start collecting all the cold zone equipment you can find."

Smith has been at odds with Almond since early November.Like other generals in the theater, he regarded Almond as MacArthur's "double" and arguing with the commander of the 11th Army was tantamount to arguing with the commander-in-chief of the Far East Force himself.But Smith's courage was doubled because he belonged to another branch of the military.Due to the tense relationship between MacArthur and the Marine Corps during World War II, Smith, a division commander who dared to offend "Doug the Burrower" (this is the nickname given to MacArthur by the Marine Corps), would not harm his future.In many of his arguments, Smith has often asserted himself and overstepped the line of prudence.However, after the initial contact with the Chinese was over, he obeyed orders and had his troops begin moving again towards the Chosin Reservoir.In the first few days of the advance, Almond came to congratulate the Marines on their earlier achievements.When he heard of the gallantry of Capt. Thomas Cooney—the company commander who fought for a key high ground despite two wounds—he decided to award Cooney a Silver Star on the spot.The lack of a medal at hand could not stop the enthusiastic Almond. He scribbled "Silver Star Medal for Bravery - Almond" on a piece of paper, and then pinned the paper to Cooney's military jacket.

Just as MacArthur was planning a new offensive, at noon on November 11, a patrol of volunteers left Jinheung-ri to scout the situation of the Chinese.They left the main supply route and followed trails through rough country for some twenty-five miles to Gutuli and the high ground not far southwest of the reservoir, but found no trace of the enemy.The patrol commander, Lieutenant William Goggin, reported by radio that there was no enemy situation along the way, so the 8rd Battalion passed through Huangcaoling Pass to Gutuli.

They were in good spirits along the way and encountered no resistance except for a bear cub which ran into a company's defensive circle during the night of November 11th and 9th.The uninvited visitor scared a Marine private out of his sleeping bag, who vowed seriously the next morning to wear a hammer and sickle badge on it.No matter which country the bear belonged to, the marines snarled it and scared it into a panic.

However, the good times of the Marine Corps did not last long. On the night of November 11, Lieutenant Colonel Ray Davis' battalion camped along a river in Gutuli Highlands.It was very warm that night, and he took a nice bath in the stream.Two nights later, the temperature dropped to minus 10 degrees Fahrenheit with blustery winds. "When we woke up in the morning," Davis said, "all the vehicles wouldn't start. The soldiers' noses were all white with big spots on them, and their fingers were numb. The temperature was at this level in 16 hours. The change was unbelievable." Colonel Alpha Bowser watched the Marines come down from their positions "like zombies. It was freezing cold. Fighting in the cold was probably the hardest thing.""Nothing can compare to it, whether it's wet, hot, or anything else," he said. "In extreme cold every now and then ... there's some sort of paralysis." When the cold hits, "our soldiers are very Not suitable".Colonel Homer Lizenberg, commander of the 24th Marine Regiment, admitted: "There have been cases reported by the medics, and soldiers who come to the infirmary appear to be frightened. Some of them come crying. , and some were extremely nervous. Doctors said it was simply because they were unprepared for the sudden onset of cold."

However, the Marine Corps quickly made adjustments.They learned to fire often, day and night, to keep their weapons from freezing."warm tents" were set up in each row, with diesel stoves with exhaust pipes serving as chimneys, hot coffee pots and large soup pots steaming on the stoves day and night.This allows soldiers to come here after a patrol, or after a few hours on the ground.Soldiers burrowed into sleeping bags to keep warm when they weren't out on patrol, but regulations required that at least one rifleman be awake in every firing point or foxhole in case the Chinese attacked.Still, many Marines developed chilblains, turning their skin purple.Soldiers who were found to have chilblains were ordered to retreat. (Many days later, it was discovered that many soldiers, despite having blackened toes from freezing, had been hiding from the army doctors and staying at the front. Their reason was the same: they "didn't want to leave their brothers.")
During the first few days of November, General Almond's orders to the 11st Marine Division changed several times.At first, the only task of the Marine Corps was to advance west of the Changjin Reservoir, and then go due north to "Manchuria".The order was later amended.The first phase of the advance was extremely smooth, so Almond planned to ask the Marine Corps to send a vanguard to the Zhanzhan Reservoir, about 1 miles northeast of the Changjin Reservoir, to test the Chinese defense situation in that area.Meanwhile, Major General David Barr's 50th Infantry Division, which had followed the Marines along the road to Hagaru-ri, ventured up another road leading up to the steep east side of the Chosin Reservoir. shore.

A Marine reconnaissance team soon discovered that there was a major error in Almond's plan: there were no roads around the Gozhan Reservoir, and the only road was far west of the Gozhan Reservoir, which Barr's 7th Division was taking way.Based on these reports from Smith, Almond told the Marines to abandon the advance to the Battle Reservoir.But Almond immediately had other plans. The rapid advance of the Marine Corps convinced him that the X Corps would not encounter fierce resistance from the Chinese.He had scouted the area by air, had seen the wilderness, and the Marines had reported to him the poor condition of the rutted paths that had been mistaken for secondary roads.The large-scale Chinese army will certainly not fight in such a deserted place.He believed that the real battle would be in the area of ​​the 10th Army to the west, where the Army's 8th Division had suffered heavy losses during the Chinese "first campaign."

Almond's decision, issued as a formal order by MacArthur on November 11, drastically changed the mission of the Marine Corps.The order acknowledged an equal number of 15 "enemies" (the order did not specify whether they were Chinese or North Koreans) in the face of some 10 U.N. troops, but said they would be dealt with by U.S. air superiority.Nevertheless, the CCP army has an estimated 10 troops north of the Yalu River that can be reinforced.Therefore, Almond (and MacArthur) hoped that the 14st Marine Division would send some of its forces to the west at Wupingli to assist the Eighth Army in its attack, and then head north toward the Yalu River.In effect, the 1st Marine Division would act as a blocking force to prevent Chinese attempts to circumvent the Eighth Army's right flank.

Smith refused. "I went to Almond and said to him: 'We can't attack in two directions at all. We have only one attack direction, which is along this road by Changjin Lake to the Yalu River. And now you want us to prepare to attack in two directions. Make the main attack from the northwest.'" Smith thought the division of troops into two groups was foolish.He reminded Almond that the Army's 3rd Infantry Division had recently landed in Korea and suggested that it be sent to secure the Eighth Army's flank.

In effect, Smith was prepared to halt the advance of the Marines at their present position and entrench them until the winter passed.He intended for the Marines to hold only enough area to secure the Hamhung-Hungnam-Wonsan area, a beachhead along the coast.Smith conducted an inspection of soldiers near the reservoir.He was sure that in the frigid climate they were first and foremost forced to survive, let alone attack.

The 1st Marine Division also continued to receive disturbing intelligence about Chinese intentions.Although only a few Chinese soldiers could be seen on the battlefield, Marine pilots flying northward reported a steady stream of trucks driving across the Yalu River into North Korea.Sinuiju, the southernmost city on the border, has been under constant rocket fire and bombing, but the bombardment, and the billowing smoke from burning houses in the city, have not slowed transport operations even slightly.The pilot's report kept describing the scale of the traffic going south from China: "The traffic volume is very large, very large, amazingly large, huge."

But how do you fit these bits and pieces into a complete puzzle? On November 11, a patrol ventured into Xinxing Valley, about 8 miles east of Gutuli, and found a sleeping Chinese soldier in a house.Marine Corps Intelligence found the soldier's account implausible because it came from such a low-ranking soldier.He said that China has decided to invest 10 divisions in North Korea.Analysts have studied it and concluded it was a hoax—it is impossible for an Army soldier to be informed of such vital strategic intelligence.The intelligence agencies got it wrong, however, and unlike modern militaries, the indoctrination of the Chinese forces (as the intelligence service later found out) included a more accurate picture of what troops were being put into and what they were expected to accomplish.

Unsure, like others, of the possible intentions of the Chinese, General Smith made a fateful (and life-saving) decision on November 11.He evaded Almond's orders, and on purpose. "What I was trying to do," he admitted years later, "was to slow down and stop until I could get the 15st Marine Division behind us to catch up and all of us could join." He was on the march The troops "take it easy, we set a goal every day."The Tenth Army wanted him to go to the Yalu, and he would get there, but at his pace.However, the momentum of the advance has also at times pushed Smith beyond the prudent approach. "I told Litzenberger not to go too fast. He didn't want to go through the (Dokdongling) pass and go down to Ryutan-ri because our flanks were too exposed. But we were pressured to move forward. I finally had to ask Litzenberger to move on, cross the pass, and occupy Yudam-ri."

But it also occurred to Smith to report to Marine Corps Headquarters in Washington the unbearable situation he was facing.He wrote a long letter on November 11 to General Cates, the commander of the Marine Corps, expressing his disbelief that the news could reach Washington through Tokyo.Smith outlined his tactical situation, described the terrain on which he fought, and explained how he was careful to draw his troops together despite Almond's orders to the contrary.

(End of this chapter)