The Korean War: The Untold Truth

Chapter 66 Going to the Abyss (3)
Although the Chinese had retreated to the north, I did not urge Lizenberg to advance hastily.Our orders still required us to advance to the "Manchurian" frontier.Our division was the left flank of X Corps, but our own left flank was extremely exposed.

There were no Eighth Army elements within 80 miles southwest of Litzenberg.At a convenient time, 8th Corps could demonstrate that we did not have any troops on our left flank.

If this is the case, there is no reason why the Eighth Army should not be on our side.But they didn't.I don't want to imagine deploying a marine division on the only mountain road 8 miles from Hamhung to the border between China and North Korea (the distance of this road is nearly 120 miles).I have two regimental combat teams on the road now, and when Puller's 200st Marine regiment is replaced by the 1rd Infantry Division, I'm going to have him close behind.

"I'm very concerned," Smith continued, "about my ability to supply two regimental combat teams in the mountains in winter weather. Melting and icing would make the road difficult to navigate." There is a railway along part of the way, but it ends at the foot of the mountain.Further up, from the Changjin Reservoir to the border, "there is no other choice but mountain roads."Airdrops during the winter were neither sufficient to resupply the two regimental combat teams nor to support their retreat.Even inspecting troops by helicopter is difficult due to weather conditions, the dispersion of troops and the altitude of the areas where they operate.Smith went on to criticize General Almond and his staff directly, in a style rarely seen in military reports:

As I made clear to you when you were here (Kates visited North Korea earlier) I have little faith in the Army's tactical judgment or the reality of their plans.My confidence in this area is still not restored.

They draw up plans on a one-in-a-million map, and we execute tasks on a one-fifty-thousandth map.The constant dispersal of forces and the constant assignment of missions to small units left troops isolated and helpless.

This style of warfare appears to be common in North Korea.I am sure that many of their failures here are the result of this disregard for the integrity of the unit, regardless of the time and place.

I tried many times to tell the corps commander that the Marine Division was a great force for him, but that if he dispersed his forces he would lose all his fighting power and be of no use.Perhaps I have had more luck than other division commanders in holding my own.

Someone at a high level is going to have to make a decision about our goals.My mission was still to advance to the frontier, and the 80th Army, 8 miles to the southwest, would not attack until the 20th.It was obvious that we should not push forward regardless of the 8th Army, we would only go further into isolation.If the Eighth Army does not advance, then a decision must be made on the next move.I believe that a winter campaign in the mountains of North Korea would be too demanding for a U.S. soldier or Marine, and I doubt the feasibility of resupplying troops in this area or supporting the evacuation of sick and wounded in winter.

Despite those concerns, Smith said the Marines are still preparing to carry out the tasks assigned to them.The road from Hamhung to Xiajieyu has been repaired to facilitate the passage of tanks and heavy vehicles, and the airstrip in Xiajieyu is also being built.Smith claims no pessimism (although his letter contradicts that). "Our guys are doing a really good job," he said. "They've got good morale and they're going to do a good job." But he reiterated his concerns about the "insecure left" and his concerns about the He expressed concern about the prospect of deploying a marine division on the only mountain trail 120 miles from the border.

On the day Smith wrote this pessimistic and disappointed letter to Cates, Rear Admiral Albert Morehouse, chief of staff to Admiral Turner Joy, naval commander of the Far East Force, visited him. "Because I felt I was speaking 'at home,'" Smith later recounted, "I bluntly shared with him my concerns that Tenth Corps' plans lacked realism and that the Corps tended to ignore Enemy capabilities. What I've seen in dealing with the Army, and with the 10th Corps in particular, is either extreme optimism or extreme pessimism, and there doesn't seem to be anything in between."

The next day, November 11, Smith met Major General Frank Lowe in Xingnam, an old friend of the president who had come to North Korea as the president's minister-in-waiting to learn about the Reserve and National Guard. Performance situation.Lowe happened to be carrying overlays showing the posture of the Eighth Army, which he had obtained during a chance visit to the 16st Cavalry Division a few days earlier.Smith eagerly studied the maps, which contained his first accurate picture of the deployment of the other half of the UN troops, fighting dozens of miles away from his position. "It seems odd," Smith later marveled, "that this Army Reserve major general, President Truman's personal representative in Korea, should be the only means of actual communication between the Tenth Army and the Eighth Army. All other communications between units are to be made by telegraphic exchange at General Headquarters."

Another Marine officer with serious doubts was Colonel Lewis Pooler, commander of the 1st Regiment. On November 11, the anniversary of the founding of the United States Marine Corps, Puller used a captured North Korean army knife to cut open a 10-pound cake (decorated with radishes and jelly because there were no candles).As is Marine Corps fashion, he read a short tribute to Marine Corps history, pocketed it, and delivered an impromptu (and somewhat downbeat) speech to the assembled troops:

Now you're going to do as I say, and I'm going to tell you something straight.Just do one thing for me - write to your family and tell them there's a goddamn war going on here; tell them that those bare ass North Koreans sent a lot of the so-called elite American troops on board Come here, and they probably will; tell them our country has no secret weapons, but fights hard, and rushes out there to fight.

You need to show your family that our country won't last forever if we stay soft here.America will cease to exist - because some foreign soldiers will invade America, take our women, and raise a bunch of bastards.

Later, Puller wrote privately to his wife at his bivouac: "Only a fiasco will change our present system, which is leading us to disaster."

Smith took precautionary measures whenever possible.He delayed the movement of the troops as long as possible, came close to outright disobedience, and ensured that his division's flanks were safe and well-supplied.He was in effect leading a tightly condensed, heavily fortified force whose lifeline (the main supply line) stretched back from the mountains to the coast.

Before November 11, the day before the launch of the "last offensive", the three regiments of the 24st Marine Division had entered the area east of the Changjin Reservoir, and the 1th Regiment Combat Team had occupied Liutan, 7 miles west of the reservoir. inside.Whether the Marines wanted to or not--their officers didn't--they were in position, ready to go straight for the Yalu.

The 8th Army goes into action

在朝鲜西部，麦克阿瑟的计划要求第8集团军在一条广阔的战线上发起攻击，这条战线的开端之处几乎跟清川江平行。从西到东，第8集团军的构成是：美国第1军，该军由美国第24师、英国第27旅和韩国第1师组成；美国第9军，其中有美国第2师和第25师，以及土耳其旅；韩国第2军，由韩国第6师、第7师和第8师组成。美国第1骑兵师在后方的顺川附近担任预备队。

This configuration made General Walker very disturbed.The sudden widening of the peninsula after the Cheongchon River front meant that his line of attack widened further north and moved him farther away from the X Corps positions to the east.In the days before the attack began, patrols from the 10th and 8th armies attempted to make contact along the dividing line between the two forces.Due to terrain and other problems, they failed to spot each other, and even the press felt the concern and doubts of the 10th Army.

For Reader's Digest war correspondent James Michener, the conversation at a press briefing at the start of the offensive was "the most impressive of all memory."After the briefing by the press officer, George Herman, a young CBS broadcast reporter, asked: "General, you said your patrol had established contact with forces 'believed to be friendly neighbors' on the left. They Is it a friendly force?"

"We think so," replied the general.

"Don't you know?" Hermann demanded.

"We think they must be friendly forces," said the general.

"You don't have any connections with the left?"

"No, we are fighting independently. But we are sure that those troops must be friendly troops."

However, a few days later, the United Nations Command received the opposite.

During the first two days of the offensive, units of the Eighth Army encountered only weak resistance.In the far west, the 8th Division leaped 24 miles toward its target Dingzhou; the 10nd Division on the right of the central front reached the golf course hole about 2 miles from its starting point at Junyu-ri, but the three South Korean divisions on its right flank Slow progress.On the second day of the offensive, the South Koreans moved only a few hundred yards from Tokuchon, where their attack started.The inability of South Korean troops to advance alarmed Maj. Gen. Lawrence Kaiser, commander of the U.S. 10nd Division, as he found himself well ahead of the troops that were supposed to protect his right flank.At this time, aerial reconnaissance reported that the enemy was widening a road to Tokugawa.

"Damn!" Kaiser yelled, "that's where they're going to attack, and that's where the main attack will be—on our flank, against the Korean Second Army."

Kaiser was right.That night, Chinese troops stormed the western end of the 8th Army's line with heavy forces, driving the 1st ROK Division back about 2 miles.The Chinese were probing one by one along the Eighth Army's front, seemingly looking for the vulnerable South Korean army. (The westernmost U.S. 8th Division encountered no enemy during the first few days of the offensive.)
The Chinese discovered the gap on November 11 and launched a relentless attack.Amidst the blaring of cymbals, the howling of bugles and the screeching of whistles, the Chinese swarmed straight at the down-on-his-luck South Koreans.According to the Chinese method of warfare, its vanguard slipped past the defense line of the South Korean army and established a blocking position to cut off the retreat.Then, the main force of the Chinese army began to attack, and hundreds of people rushed into the positions of the South Korean army.Many South Korean soldiers were recruits captured from the streets and farms in Seoul a few days ago, and they were no match for the tough Chinese.Unable to resist, they fled in all directions, abandoning their guns and other equipment and fleeing for their lives in a hurry.A few hours later, Walker's flank protection ceased to exist.In the face of the Chinese attack, the three Korean divisions fell apart.

The collapse of the South Korean units meant that the 2nd Infantry Division lost its flank protection, exposing its right flank to the Chinese, and the Chinese Army was quick to take advantage of this favorable situation.Scanning the map, General Walker saw the intention of the Chinese, who would isolate the thousands of United Nations troops if they rounded his forces south and headed west into the Yellow Sea.

(End of this chapter)